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  1 
Introduction 
The tribuni plebis and the end of the Roman Republic 
The tribunate of the plebs was a very peculiar magistracy in Antiquity, as to the best of 
our knowledge there were no ready parallels in other city-states. Cicero compared the 
tribuni plebis to the ephors in classical Sparta, and while there are some similarities 
(mostly the check on the highest power), there are many differences too, and no direct 
link.1 There is a relatively clear origin story for the tribunes, which ascribes their 
creation to the first secessio plebis in 494 BCE and a vow by the plebs to protect their new 
magistrates, the lex sacrata. While the story then becomes somewhat shaky, with the 
sources having differing theories, the tribunes do always prominently figure in the 
‘Struggle of the Orders’ between the plebs and the patricians. Despite a relatively fixed 
tradition on the origins of the tribunes, there was much discussion about these 
magistrates at the end of the late Republic and the start of the Principate. To name but 
two examples, Cicero’s de Legibus features a relatively long and undecided debate about 
the usefulness of the tribunate, while Plutarch points to debates over whether the 
tribunes were even magistrates at all.2 
Discussion on the tribunate has not ceased since Antiquity. In modern times, scholars 
have vigorously debated various aspects of this magistracy. Opinions have been divided 
for all periods of the Republic, but the tribunate in the late Republic has probably been 
the most divisive of all. Slightly simplifying, there are still four broad types of analysis: 
scholars looking at the function of the tribunate in the Roman political system, those 
depicting the tribunes as the primary champions of popular politics, those primarily 
highlighting the use of the tribunes by the ‘Great Individuals’, and those focussing on 
the use of the tribunate as a step in the career of young elites. The goal of this thesis is 
 
                                                     
1 Cic., Leg., 3.16, Rep., 2.58. Thommen, ‘Volkstribunat und Ephorat’. 
2 Cic., Leg., 3.19-26; Plut., Quaes. Rom., 81. 
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to reassess the great variety in the behaviour of the tribunes of the plebs in the late 
Republic, and it will criticise to some extent all four of these types of analysis. 
The thesis will first attempt to reconcile widely different cases, in the late Republic, of 
behaviour by the tribuni plebis. Attention will be given especially to the influence of a 
variety of groups in Roman society on this tribunician behaviour. In general, this thesis 
will claim that the organisation of the tribunes as magistrates was geared towards 
receiving entreaties by all kinds of groups. The second goal is to look at how we can 
reliably approach the tribunate in the changing political climate of the late Republic, 
with an emphasis on the transformation to the Principate. 
First, it should be noted that the ‘late Republic’ will be defined as the period between 
the start of the year 112 BCE and the end of the year 23 BCE. This choice, like any 
demarcation of a historical period, is mostly symbolic. The year 112 BCE followed a short 
period of relative silence about the tribuni plebis (between 117-113 BCE). More 
importantly, however, it was the start of the tribunician activities involving king 
Jugurtha of Numidia. One of the most important sources for the late Republic, Sallust, 
who also was a former tribune, wrote a rich history of this conflict. While he did not 
personally experience these events, his narrative does allow us to make reasonably 
certain claims from this time onward. Furthermore, this period featured the preamble 
to both the consulships of Marius and the tribuneship of Saturninus. The Gracchi, some 
of the most famous tribunes of the Republic, have been deliberately left out of this 
timeframe. Already in the late Republic the history of their tribuneship had become 
mythologised, and therefore on some points less trustworthy. The year 23 BCE has been 
chosen as a symbolic end, as it was in this year that Augustus appropriated the tribunicia 
potestas. Not only does this imply a new period for the tribunate, it can be used as the 
start date of the Principate. The rule of subsequent emperors would be primarily 
counted by the yearly reaffirmation of this tribunician power, after all. Even before this 
date the tribunes had become far less relevant, and only some years later, in 14 BCE and 
12 BCE, the sources attest that no-one wante to be a candidate for the tribuneship 
anymore.3 
The methodology of this thesis, while a wide range of cases will be addressed, is a 
qualitative analysis based on a theoretic framework. Based on the most recent 
prosopography, by Eric John Kondratieff more than a decade ago, we know the names of 
as few as 220 to as many as 263 tribunes during this timeframe, out of at least 900.4 We 
know of the actions of anonymous tribunes as well, while for some of the known 
tribunes only the name is known. For ancient standards, this evidence is quite rich. 
 
                                                     
3 Dio, 54.26.7, 30.2; Suet., Aug., 40.1. 
4 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 347-659 (esp. p. 614-618). 
  3 
However, Kondratieff has rightly pointed out the limits of quantitative analysis.5 
Quantitative analysis does not necessarily provide a better theory when evidence is 
known to be both very fragmentary and biased, as is the case here. Therefore, a 
qualitative analysis will be preferred, and rather than counting percentages to indicate 
who the tribunes ‘really served’, this thesis will attempt to provide an explanation for 
accounts of very disparate behaviour. 
The theoretic framework will be based on the concept of ‘contention’, which is 
provides an analysis of the consequences of interaction with others for the behaviour of 
an individual. This will be gradually expanded into a model based on the metaphor of a 
principal-agent relation. The principals in this analysis are various societal and political 
groups, while the tribunate as a governmental institution is the agent which has to 
behave in accordance to the expectations of the principals. I will argue that the 
changing society of the late Republic had important consequences for the tribunate, and 
can explain both the peak of the influence of the tribunes and the rapid decline after a 
certain date. Furthermore, the fragmentation of Roman society into a plethora of 
different groups, and the increasing power of many of these groups, provides a good 
explanation for the many conflicts in which the tribunes became involved. This 
involvement could have an active role, primarily in demonstrating that interests and 
desires differed between groups. 
This dissertation will maintain a very broad scope on Roman society. As a consequence, 
a number of topics relevant to late Republican society will be important. For instance, 
the debates between some scholars on the form of Roman governance, democratic or 
oligarchic, will be shown to be besides the point. I will also criticise the recent trend to 
search for elements which bolstered consensus in Roman society. It will be argued that 
we cannot approach Roman society as monolithic. Furthermore, I will argue that the 
possibilities of non-elites to actively engage in politics should be further investigated, 
and that this does not automatically imply that Rome was a modern democracy. This 
thesis will not be primarily concerned with the political representation of non-elite 
groups, but with their presence in politics. All strata of Roman society were very diverse 
and knew internal dissension, not just the elites. Most of all, I will critique narratives 
fixated on the ‘Great Individuals’ and their presumably fully rational schemes, which are 
unfortunately rampant in Ancient History even today. The focus will be on groups, 
uncertainty of information, and on mistakes in behaviour. 
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Formal institutional characteristics 
A description of the formal characteristics and the potestas of the tribunate is necessary 
at this moment. A short overview of the evolutions over the period of the late Republic 
will be added as well. The tribunate of the plebs had a complex evolution between its 
inception, traditionally dated to the first secessio plebis in 494 BCE,6 and the start of this 
framework in 112. These evolutions and even the origins of the institution have been 
debated vigorously, and the purpose here is not primarily to engage in these 
discussions. This is the only moment in this thesis were formal authority will be put 
central. 
The tribuni plebis were elected magistrates, and like most magistrates in the Roman 
Republic their term of office was characterised by annuality and collegiality. Unlike 
most other magistrates in the late Republic, however, all tribunes had the same duties at 
all times. The quaestors and praetors, for instance, had different duties (quaestor 
ostiensis, quaestores urbanis, praetor urbanus, praetor peregrinus, ...), and the consuls gave 
way to each other’s presidency alternatively, but neither provision existed for the 
tribunes.7 Another peculiar feature was that it seems to have been the only regular 
higher office which was not part of the cursus honorum, which had been established by 
the tribunician lex Villia annalis. The absence of the tribunate in the cursus honorum 
possibly was effected by Sulla, as the dictator had introduced a lex annalis of his own.8 
The ages of tribunes fell anywhere between 20 and 50, but mainly between 32 and 38 
with an average age of 34.9 The tribunes entered their office on the 10th of December, 
almost all others did so on the 1st of January in the late Republic (the quaestors on the 5th 
of December). The tribunes were elected before all other magistrates, and these 
elections were presided over by the tribunes themselves rather than the consuls. To be 
elected, of course, one had to be a member of the plebs. The tribunes did not have 
imperium, and like the plebeian aediles sat on benches, subsellia. This also meant that 
they did not have lictores, but they did have apparitores as aides. 
A tribune at the start of the timeframe had at his disposal an array of formal civil 
powers, potestas.10 It is possible that the power of the tribunes was limited to the city of 
 
                                                     
6 From here on, except in the status quaestionis and the bibliography, all dates are BCE, unless otherwise noted. 
7 See Bunse, ‘Entstehung Und Funktion Der Losung’. 
8 Timmer, ‘Zwischen Militär und Recht’. 
9 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 10-11, 71-81. 
10 For overviews on what follows: Bleicken, Das Volkstribunat der klassischen Republik, p. 5-26, 74-149; Lintott, The 
Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 121-128; Sampson, ‘A Re-Examination of the Tribunate of the Plebs’, p. 283-
366; Thommen, Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik, passim. For a discussion on the difference 
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Rome, in the sense that their potestas was valid only if their bodies were no more than a 
mile outside of the pomerium. There is also discussion over whether tribunes could leave 
Rome at all.11 The matters which affected the tribunes certainly were not limited in any 
way: they could propose laws to annex territories, for instance. 
The basis of the authority of the tribunate was the sacrosanctitas of the tribune. 
Anyone who insulted or physically harmed a tribune became sacer, his or her life and 
property forfeit to Ceres. The origin of this religious aspect has been debated, but the 
traditional story at the very least was widely recognised in the late Republic: the 
inviolability of the tribunes originally was established by an oath of solidarity sworn by 
the plebs to defend their tribunes (the lex sacrata). 
The ius auxilii was probably derived from this. It meant that the tribuni plebis could 
provide assistance against the potestas of other magistrates, including other tribunes. A 
tribune in the most extreme cases could guarantee auxilium only by physically, with his 
body, protecting another citizen or even an object. The ius auxilii was closely connected 
with provocatio, with the tribune ‘embodying’ the plebs, but their is no certainty on 
which right was derived from which.12 The tribunes collectively had to be available to 
grant auxilium at all times, and for instance had to leave the doors of their homes open. 
A separate power was the ius intercessionis, the veto. Through intercessio, tribunes 
could stop formal actions from taking place by any other governmental institution. This 
includes laws, senatus consulta, decisions by magistrates, elections, official meetings of 
any sort, and even the act of speaking by an official. The intercessio had nothing to do 
with divine protests, it was purely civic. 
Auspicium, which the tribunes also held to a certain extent, did concern the gods. It 
was the right to interpret the auspices in order to guarantee divine sanction for formal 
actions, mainly for decision-making processes such as votes on laws or elections. 
Obnuntiatio, as part of auspicium, was the declaration of adverse omens. It could stop 
elections, the lectio senatus, or the census itself. Under the leges Aelia et Fufia of halfway 
the second century BCE, which regulated when legislative assemblies could take place 
and when they could not, obnuntiatio could stop any popular assembly as well.13 The 
same law(s) also prohibited legislative assemblies between the formal announcement of 
an election and the announcement of the results. This right seems to have been not very 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
between imperium and potestas, see for instance Drogula, ‘Imperium, Potestas, and the Pomerium in the Roman 
Republic’, p. 421-429. 
11 Badian, ‘Tribuni Plebis and Res Publica’; Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 50-51, 357, 399, 403, 404, 
423, 425, 435, 481-483, 488, 489, 501, 504, 507; Sampson, ‘A Re-Examination of the Tribunate of the Plebs’, p. 
341-345. 
12 Humbert, ‘Le tribunat de la plèbe et le tribunal du peuple’; Staveley, ‘Provocatio during the Fifth and Fourth 
Centuries B.C.’, p. 416-419. 
13 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 386; Sumner, ‘Lex Aelia, Lex Fufia’. 
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useful for the tribunes, as they had the veto. However, while intercessio required the 
physical presence of the tribune, obnuntiatio under the leges Aelia et Fufia did not have 
this requirement. In theory this limited the legislative possibilities of the tribunes, 
because other magistrates could declare unfavourable omens. 
Summoning the people (ius agendi cum plebis) was one of the most important rights of 
the tribunes. They could call the comitia tributa (which was, at least by then, the same 
institution as the concilium plebis)14, publish legislative proposals (promulgatio) and ask 
the people to vote on them (rogatio). In the late Republic, there was no distinction 
between the authority of a plebiscitum and a lex. The tribunes had the right to summon 
contiones, which was indispensible for legislation. No-one could call away a contio from a 
tribune. Tribunes also held the ius edicendi, the right to issue edicts. 
The tribunes were the only magistrates without imperium which did possess the ius 
agendi cum senatu: the right to convene the senate. They could propose topics for 
discussion, and also could intervene in its discussions at any time. Tribunes were 
regular members of the senate, and through the lex Atinia from halfway the second 
century BCE they automatically became senators after their time in office.15 
Tribunes also possessed a form of coercitio, the right to intervene in public order. 
They could arrest and imprison citizens and magistrates, even consuls (vincula, prensio). 
They could not summon people to come to them, but de facto the tribunes had usurped 
this right by the start of the timeframe. They had the right to issue fines (multae), seize 
the property of persons (pignoris capio), and even confiscate that property (consecratio). 
The tribunes had the right to prosecute citizens before a iudicium populi: normally with 
the comitia tributa as jury, or when capital punishment was demanded it was the comitia 
centuriata. 
So what changed in the late Republic? One important evolution, which had almost been 
concluded, was the introduction of the secret ballot: From 139 to 130 three leges 
tabellariae had instituted the secrecy of votes in the electoral, judicial, and finally 
legislative comitia, and in 107 C. Coelius Caldus completed the evolution by introducing 
secret votes in trials on perduellio.16 Tribunes could preside over any of these assemblies, 
so this had important consequences for the procedure, but especially for the voters. 
 
                                                     
14 Develin, ‘Comitia Tributa Plebis’; Develin, ‘Comitia Tributa Again’; Sandberg, Magistrates and Assemblies, p. 
105-110. 
15 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 10, 30-31, 387; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 69. 
This would thus pre-date Sulla’s automatic admission of quaestors. For a very different, but in my view less 
credible theory: Develin, ‘The Atinian Plebiscite, Tribunes, and the Senate’; Sampson, ‘A Re-Examination of the 
Tribunate of the Plebs’, p. 317-321, 405-414. 
16 Cic., Leg., 3.36. Jehne, ‘Geheime Abstimmung und Bindungswesen in der römischen Republik’; Kondratieff, 
‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 392, 393, 398-399, 411; Lundgreen, ‘Geheim(nisvoll)e Abstimmung in Rom’; 
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Two important laws cannot be dated very accurately: the lex Aebutia (121-64) and the 
lex Licinia (121-63). Together they prevented not only “eum qui tulerit” from holding a 
curatio or potestas under the law which he had introduced, but also “conlegas eius, 
cognatos, adfinis”.17 These tribunician laws mostly limited the activities of the tribunes, as 
checks were put in place from introducing proposals out of self interest. 
In 98, the consular lex Caecilia Didia concerning legislative proposals confirmed some 
customs, but also introduced new measures. The trinundinum was an institution which 
already existed in practice, but was now put in law. It meant that between the first 
promulgatio of a law and the rogatio, at least three nundinae must have passed, so a 
minimum of 17 days by modern counting.18 It also prohibited the combining of separate 
topics into one single proposal. Again, making legislative proposals in bad faith was 
curtailed. 
Six years later, in 92, a senatus consultum affirmed that magistrates leading a contio 
were responsible for a seditio breaking out in a contio, as the magistrate had the power to 
dissolve the assembly.19 It followed tumults arising from assemblies led by the tribune 
Cn. Papirius Carbo. The senate argued that Carbo could have seen that formal action was 
no longer possible due to the violence, and that he had had no business in continuing 
the assembly. It affirms the fear of the Roman elites for non-formal actions. While 
senatus consulta were not legally binding, it legitimated actions by magistrates or 
prosecutors against tribunes for rowdy assemblies. 
The most important changes in this timeframe are of course the measures taken by 
Sulla, first in 88 and again in 82-81, when he militarily took control of Rome.20 In 88, 
together with the other consul Q. Pompeius Rufus, he introduced one or multiple laws in 
the comitia centuriata.21 It was decided that tribunes could no longer propose laws 
without the prior discussion by and approval of the senate. Furthermore, all laws should 
be passed in the comitia centuriata rather than the comitia tributa. The laws were already 
repealed the next year. When Sulla returned from the east, however, he introduced 
numerous laws as dictator. Among these were the so-called leges Corneliae de tribuniciae 
potestate minuta.22 These laws, to the best of our knowledge, repeated the laws of 88. 
Furthermore, tribunes could no longer act as prosecutors in a iudicium populi, some 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Thommen, Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik, p. 82-85; Yakobson, ‘Secret Ballot and Its Effects in 
the Late Roman Republic’; Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome, p. 124-147. 
17 Cic., Leg. Agr., 2.21, also see Cic., Dom., 51. Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 509. 
18 Lintott, ‘Trinundinum’. Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, p. 16-19. See Cic., Dom., 53. 
19 Cic., Leg., 3.42. 
20 Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican, p. 56-57, 140-141; Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht 2.1, p. 279-303; 
Sampson, ‘A Re-Examination of the Tribunate of the Plebs’, p. 355-364. 
21 App., BC, 1.59. 
22 App., BC, 1.100; Caes., BC, 1.5, 7; Cic., Cluent., 110, Leg., 3.22, Verr., 2.1.155; Liv., Per., 89. 
 8 
unknown restrictions on the ius intercessionis were introduced (there is disagreement 
between Caesar and Cicero over this), and once a person had been tribune he could no 
longer be candidate for curule offices. As a result of these laws, the number of contiones 
organised by tribunes diminished, and ancient plebeian families seem to have shunned 
the office. The sacrosanctitas and the ius auxilium were not touched, however. 
Immediately after Sulla’s death, there were already attempts to repeal these laws.23 The 
tribunes asked the consuls to restore their power, which they refused. In 76 the tribune 
Cn. Sicinius again agitated for the restoration, but was killed with the possible 
involvement of the consul C. Scribonius Curio.24 The next year, the consul C. Aurelius 
Cotta repealed part of Sulla’s laws: former tribunes could once again take up curule 
offices.25 The fight for the restoration was picked up by several tribunes in the following 
years: L. Quinctius Rufus in 74, C. Licinius Macer in 73, and finally M. Lollius Palicanus in 
71, who convinced Pompey to stand for the consulship with the promise of restoring the 
tribunicia potestas.26 In 70, then, the consuls Pompey and Crassus fulfilled this promise, 
and the Sullan laws on the tribunate were repealed. 
In 62 the consular lex Licinia Iunia reaffirmed the lex Caecilia Didia on the trinundinum, 
made prosecution for infractions possible, and provided specific punishments for those 
who did not comply.27 It also compelled legislators to deposit legislative proposals in the 
Aerarium.  
The last measure which altered the formal powers of the tribunes was a lex Clodia in 
58, which modified and according to Cicero completely repealed the leges Aelia et Fufia.28 
Obnuntiatio was no longer a valid way to stop an assembly if the person announcing it 
was not present. According to Cicero, Clodius’s law also limited the power of intercessio 
in stopping a legislative comitia, but this is generally not given any credence, as Asconius 
does not mention it. 
After this, little changed about the formal powers of the tribunes. Augustus did make 
the tribunate part of the cursus honorum (one option besides the aedileship to take 
 
                                                     
23 App., BC, 1.107; Gran. Licin., 33-34F; Sall., Hist., 1.48.23-24, 67.14-15. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic, 
p. 108-120; Marshall and Beness, ‘Tribunician Agitation and Aristocratic Reaction 80-71 BC’. 
24 Cic., Brut., 216-217; Ps.-Ascon., 189 Stangl; Quintil., Inst. Or., 11.3.129; Sall., Hist., 2.22, 3.34.8-10. 
25 Ascon., 66-67, 78C; Ps.-Ascon., 255 Stangl; Sall., Hist., 2.44, 3.34.8. Marshall and Beness, ‘Tribunician Agitation 
and Aristocratic Reaction 80-71 BC’, p. 368-371. 
26 App., BC, 1.121; Ascon., 79C; Cic., Cluent., 110-112, Leg., 3.22, Rab. Perd., 7, Verr., 1.44-45; Liv., Per., 97; Plut., Luc., 
5.4, Pomp., 21-22; Ps.-Ascon., 189, 220 Stangl; Sall., BC, 38, Hist., 3.34; Suet., Iul., 5; Val. Max., 9.12.7; Vell., 2.30.4. 
Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, p. 23-28; Martin, ‘Die Popularen in der Geschichte der Späten 
Republik’, p. 7-23; McDermott, ‘Lex de Tribunicia Potestate (70 B.C.)’. 
27 Cic., Att., 2.9.1, Phil., 5.8, Sest., 135, Vat., 33-34. Sumner, ‘Lex Aelia, Lex Fufia’, p. 339. 
28 Ascon., 8C; Cic., Har. Resp., 58, P. Red. in Sen., 11, Pis., 9-10, Prov. Cons., 46, Sest., 33, Vat., 18; Dio, 38.13.3-6. 
Balsdon, ‘Roman History, 58-56 B.C.’, p. 15-16; Mitchell, ‘The Leges Clodiae and Obnuntiatio’; Tatum, The 
Patrician Tribune, p. 125-133. 
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between the quaestorship and the praetorship), and other measures were taken in 
regard to candidates for the office. By that time, it seems to have become very 
unpopular.  
 10 
Status quaestionis 
In this section, we will briefly look at the major evolutions of scholarship on the 
tribunate of the plebs specifically, and late Republican politics and society in general.29 
The intention is not to present a comprehensive overview of the subject matter. The 
focus point will be broad explanatory models, to the extent that these relate to the 
argument developed in this study. Comments on these works will return throughout 
this thesis. This overview will already criticise some elements within the literature, 
while also shortly indicating to which theories this thesis will agree. 
Theodor Mommsen is generally considered to have laid the basis for the modern history 
of Ancient Rome. His ‘Römische Geschichte’ and ‘Römisches Staatsrecht’ were 
particularly influential for the political history of the late Republic.30 Mommsen 
described the tribuni plebis as representing the plebeian state in opposition to the Roman 
state. He focused, like many other scholars in his wake, on the negative powers of the 
tribunes, and claimed that in the late Republic they constituted a weapon in the hands 
of different elite parties. These parties engaged in formal party politics, according to 
Mommsen. His works of the Republic laid parallels with German society, and therefore 
often describe a formal state with a constitutional legal basis. In the late Republic, 
Mommsen argued, society descended into a general chaos through the inadequacy of 
the system, until brilliant reformers set it straight. Another important aspect of his 
work were the philosophical elements. As a Hegelian, Mommsen considered it a joke by 
the Weltgeist that the originally revolutionary tribunes had become the basis for the 
monarchy under Augustus.31 Since Mommsen, many authors have rightfully indicated 
that identifying a static, formal constitution is impossible for the late Republic. His 
general method is, n my view, overly juridical and formalistic, and tend to neglect the 
general ‘messiness’ of society, contrasting interests, and societal struggle. 
Mommsen’s version of the Republic did not remain uncontested for long, as the 
Gelzer model established a clear competing narrative.32 Rather than focus on a 
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tribunicische Gewalt schliesslich zum Rechtsboden der Monarchie ward.” Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht 2.1, p. 283. 
32 Gelzer, Die Nobilität der römischen Republik; Gelzer, Caesar, der Politiker und Staatsmann. 
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constitution or the state, Matthias Gelzer looked at the people in control of political 
institutions, whom he described as a hereditary nobilitas, and their relation to one 
another. According to Gelzer, politics was regulated by social norms: patronage 
controlled the lower strata, while amicitia provided bonds between the elites. Friedrich 
Münzer slightly altered this model, suggesting that different elite groups struggled for 
dominance in the form of ‘Adelsparteien’, rigid alliances (‘factiones’) mainly based on 
familial ties.33 Both scholars criticised Mommsen’s model of political parties in the late 
Republic, and claimed that populares and optimates were individuals differing over 
method, not separate parties divided over ideology. These theories were further 
explored by Hermann Strasburger, especially in his contributions in the RE.34 While this 
model turned to the intricacies of informal society, it remained very elite-centric. The 
work of these men often outright dismissed the power of any groups but the nobilitas 
and a select group of novi homines. The social ‘customs’ such as patronage were 
presented very rigidly, and as permeating the entirety of Roman society. While Gelzer 
introduced interesting notions about political groups, this thesis will generally go 
against his theories. 
Ronald Syme welcomed the work of especially Münzer, and completely turned his 
back on Mommsen’s legalistic ideas with expressions such as “The Roman constitution 
was a screen and a sham.”35 He criticised the anachronistic elements in the Prussian’s 
19th-century views, but was not innocent of it himself. His own description of the fall of 
the Republic echoed the problems in Europe in the 1930s. Syme did also contradict 
Gelzer and Münzer on several points, such as their emphasis of elite regulative norms. 
For Syme, there was only power. While he agreed that the elites fully controlled the 
Republic, he claimed that the late Republic was characterised by total competition 
between these elites, who all wanted to increase their auctoritas. The tribunate became a 
tool in the hands not of parties or families, but of the ‘Great Individuals’ such as Pompey 
and Caesar. Syme’s main idea (which still is followed by many scholars today) was that 
power was gradually concentrated in fewer hands and that the Republic was doomed to 
fall, because the Republican institutions were not adequate to rule over the empire 
which the Romans had built. This thesis will pay more attention to general evolutions in 
society and the influence this had on politics, rather than the other way around. Syme 
was mainly concerned on the the nitty gritty of political machinations, and especially 
those of the ‘Great Individuals’. This focus will not be followed in this thesis. 
The basic ideas of Mommsen (legalism and formalism), Gelzer-Münzer (normative 
elite rule), and Syme (total competition for power) still dominate many interpretations 
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34 Strasburger, ‘Nobiles’; Strasburger, ‘Homo Novus’; Strasburger, ‘Optimates’. 
35 Syme, The Roman Revolution, p. 15. 
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of late Republican politics today. While Mommsen was the father of institutional studies 
of the Republic, the models of Gelzer, Münzer, and Syme stressed the importance of 
prosopography. Combining elements of Mommsen with the contributions of Gelzer and 
Münzer, Giovanni Niccolini between 1932 and 1934 wrote the first prosopography for 
the tribuni plebis.36 An important aspect of his work was re-evaluating the positive 
powers of the tribunate, as the negative factors had long been the focus. Niccolini 
contended that in the late Republic the tribunes became the defenders of the people in 
general, as progressive reformers in the style of social democrats. However, given this 
all too overt anachronism, he was rarely taken serious by later scholars. Nevertheless, 
his theories remain valuable, and his prosopography was invaluable to later work. Less 
than two decades later, T.R.S. Broughton would begin the monumental work of 
compiling a list of all known magistrates of the Republic.37 His work remains a standard 
tool for much work on the Republic, including this thesis. 
After the second world war, and especially starting in the late 1950s, there was a 
significant increase in the number of studies on late Republican politics. For the 
tribunate, Jochen Bleicken’s study in 1955 was a milestone, even if it primarily dealt 
with the Mid-Republican period.38 In the tradition of Mommsen, Bleicken 
predominantly focussed on legal matters. His theory claimed that after the ‘Struggle of 
the Orders’, the tribunes became the aides of the senate against the magistrates. After 
the Gracchi, however, he agreed with Syme in describing the tribunes as the tools of the 
‘Great Individuals’. Not much later, Lily Ross Taylor attacked his interpretation by 
pointing to ‘Forerunners of the Gracchi’, tribunes who already before 133 BCE had acted 
against the senate.39 This argument had serious implications for interpretations on how 
the middle Republic functioned, but before Millar it was not regularly implemented. In 
1981, Bleicken would return to the subject of the tribunes to clarify his positions on the 
late Republic.40 Some academic literature at the time claimed that the tribunes were the 
champions of the plebs. Bleicken disagreed, and asserted that the function of the 
tribunes was stabilising the Republican system. According to him, the tribunes, 
regardless of their individual motives, through their functional role in the system 
essentially served as a ‘safety-valve’ for non-elite frustrations. Further in this thesis 
these claims will be criticised. This thesis will disagree with Bleicken mainly on his 
search for an ‘essential role’ of institutions. It will be argued that, while institutional 
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orientations did exist, political institutions were linked with societal diversity and 
struggles. 
From the late 1950s onwards, but especially in the 1970s, growing interest in social 
history led to the re-evaluation of societal groups besides the senatorial elites, such as 
the equites and the plebeians.41 Scholars who particularly garnered much influence in 
this period include Peter Brunt and Claude Nicolet.42 The relations between the 
dominant and dominated acquired central stage, while competition for status and 
power remained, as with Syme, the main motivation attributed to the elites. 
Nevertheless, while recognising this primary drive, some scholars began to re-
appreciate the possibility that Roman politics did concern real issues and political 
differences. Another innovation was researching the importance of the lower strata. 
These insight will be central to this thesis as well. At that time, however, most scholars 
still looked at the factors (ritual, ideological, material) which contributed to non-elite 
domination by the senatorial and, which was new, other elites. Nicolet, for instance, put 
forward a citizenship theory based on duties and rights. He argued that the masses were 
relieved of their military and fiscal duties towards the state in the late Republic, but at 
the same time they also lost their political rights and were seduced by gifts and shows. 
The rural population was scattered and could not participate in politics. Some of the 
urban masses were activated as mobs by demagogues, until they collectively became 
tired of constant struggle and desired peace. In Nicolet’s view, which often closely 
paralleled that of his compatriot Veyne,43 the people in the late Republic were mostly 
spectators. Unlike Nicolet, in this thesis an active role will be attributed to the non-
elites. Brunt was one of the first to make a similar argument, as he saw urban violence in 
the late Republican as uprisings of the impoverished masses. In his opinion, the late 
Republic saw growing rifts in society. According to Brunt, the establishment of the 
Principate signified a rearrangement of the dominating coalition after a failure of the 
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political institutions to cope with the consequences of the large empire. The earlier 
senatorial dominance was broken by the Princeps and the equites, who enjoyed the tacit 
collaboration of the non-elites. The rural non-elites played an important part as soldiers 
in the legions of the ‘Great Individuals’. Brunt still is very valuable today, and it will 
become clear that this thesis agrees with many, but not all, of his theories. Before Brunt, 
Andrew Lintott had already focused on violence. He had not approached it as a factor of 
societal conflict, however, but as a simple result of the actions of the elites.44 According 
to Lintott, the inability to control violence through ‘constitutional’ means (for instance 
through a police force, standing army, or comprehensive bureaucracy) led to the use of 
violence by individual elites such as the tribunes. Rather than general moral corruption, 
which he claimed was not new at all, the failure to constrain corrupt means led to the 
fall of the Republic. Lintott firmly believed in miscommunication and error, a position 
which was fairly unique at the time. Lintott furthermore was one of the first to seriously 
and consistently deconstruct the discourse of the late Republican sources. These last 
two elements will be adopted throughout this work. Helmuth Schneider, then, went 
even further than Brunt in proposing a conflictual model. Schneider claimed that 
competition, both among the elites and between economic strata, led to societal 
conflicts.45 This was reflected in politics: optimates, defending the rich and the senate, 
were confronted by the populares, who truly looked after the interests of the plebeians 
and sometimes the equites. The tribunes were the typical ‘weapon’ of the populares in 
this conflict, while the senate was that of the optimates. Schneider claimed that the 
nobility could only win this conflict by establishing a military dictatorship, leading to 
the Principate under Augustus. He was one of the first scholars to recognise that the 
‘Volksmassen’ could act relatively independently, and were not merely used as support 
by the elites.46 His theories changed much about the interpretation of the late Republic, 
and although the strict dichotomy between optimates and populares may have lost much 
of its relevance, his focus on military coups and social unrest remain very important.  
Another, different tradition throughout these decades continued to deal with 
prosopography and the theories of Gelzer and Münzer, renouncing the shift to social 
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history.47 This predominantly Austro-German tradition focussed on the corruption of 
norms in the late Republic. It included Ernst Badian, Erich Gruen, and Christian Meier.48 
The fiercely anti-marxist Badian expanded theories of Republican social norms, patron-
client relations (which were, according to him, even ‘international’), personal networks, 
and subtle elite manoeuvring. In his opinion, the true conflict of the late Republic was 
between competent administrators (especially Pompey) and morally corrupt ‘brigands’. 
The combination of these attributes in figures such as Tiberius Gracchus or Caesar 
(competent but amoral leaders) and the destructive innovations introduced by these 
persons were what ultimately changed the Republic. Meier also minimised the active 
role of any groups besides the senators, but did provide some adjustments to the model. 
He argued that populares sometimes tried to overrule the senatorial majority through 
the use of the plebs contionalis. Aristocratic factiones, he claimed, were not very powerful 
and should be seen as fleeting agreements of convenience in the struggle for power and 
office. Furthermore, he contended that relations of patronage declined sharply in the 
late Republic. Although this thesis will employ a different definition for political groups, 
Meier’s interpretation of unstable relations and limited importance of patronage will be 
the basis. Meier also suggested that the crisis of the Republic was widely recognised by 
contemporaries, but rather than think of alternative models, they could only propose to 
restore the old Republican institutions and values. It was a ‘Krise ohne Alternative’. The 
evolution towards the Principate gradually gathered its own momentum, lessening the 
actual influence that individuals could have on its outcome. On this point I will disagree: 
when conflicting societal interests, uncertainty, and structural changes combined with 
individual ageny are taken into account, this does not imply complete path dependency 
without alternatives. Gruen, then, vehemently defended the models introduced by 
Gelzer and, in some aspects, Syme. In his view, large familial parties vying for power 
remained the movers and shakers of the Republic, even if other, more radical factions 
did rise up. Gruen’s rather unique contribution was the outright denial that anything 
was wrong with the late Republican institutions. In his view, they functioned quite well 
through informal rules, and were only overthrown through a coincidental series of 
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events which gave Caesar the opportunity to do so. In his view, the tribunate continued 
to serve the aristocracy even in the late Republic. Gruen’s broad interpretation has 
rightfully been criticised. However, his insistence on the ‘business as usual’ up to and 
even beyonnd some of the greatest crisis moments of the late Republic did give a fresh 
view on the limited knowledge of contemporaries on what was going on, and places 
limited information and unintended consequences front and center. 
The dissertation of Jochen Martin on the populares in the late Republic can be situated 
between these two ‘traditions’.49 He claimed that the populares did not only differ in 
method from other Roman politicians, but also held a truly differing ideology. They 
desired to become the champions of the people, but never could escape the structural 
causes of their efforts, being intra-elite differentiation. The tribunate was the crutch of 
the populares in their conflict with the senatorial majority. Before Sulla, many tribunes 
were genuine ‘Reformtribunen’, but after the dictator many of them became tools in the 
hands of demagogues or generals, while still others were truly independent. While 
Martin still attempted to understand an ‘essential role’ of the tribunes, he did offer an 
analysis which allowed for structural evolutions, ideology, and concrete policies. Martin 
also claimed that in this period, tribunes were being increasingly drawn from outside of 
the nobilitas. Our evidence is limited, but a consistent and substantial shift cannot be 
proven. 
At the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, attention further shifted towards 
elements of social mobility and differentiation. Earlier, scholars such as Wiseman and 
Shatzman had already looked at diversity and mobility within the elite groups, but now 
broader strata of society were put centre stage.50 The positions of slaves and freedmen 
were more closely scrutinised as well, and so was the concrete organisation of the lives 
of non-elites (through, for instance, the collegia).51 Some of the most influential 
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researchers were Brunt, Keith Hopkins and Barbara Kühnert.52 Central concepts of the 
Gelzer-Münzer model, such as a hereditary nobilitas and the pervasiveness of patron-
client relations, were successfully shown to have been much more marginal in the late 
Republic. Especially influential was ‘Death and Renewal’, which was a head-on attack 
against the Gelzer model, as Hopkins together with Graham Burton argued that the 
Republic was actually characterised by a high turnover of new elites replacing the old.53 
Together with Hopkins, Brunt figured in a renewed interest in demography as a crucial 
factor in understanding Roman society. Several scholars further researched the political 
role of the lower strata, but rather than class struggle, models of social movements and 
their organisation were advanced.54 Luciano Perelli argued for a ‘popular movement’ in 
the late Republic, supported by the multi-faceted strata of non-elites. Norbert Rouland 
sought and thought to have found a democratic tradition in Rome, already before Millar 
would make this argument. Rouland argued that the influence of Hellenic thought in the 
second century inspired popular leaders and consequently a ‘turn to the left’ for Roman 
politics. Clientelism prevented this turn from overturning the system, however. Paul 
Vanderbroeck proposed several levels of popular leadership (mostly top-down). A 
majority of the tribuni plebis took the role of ‘assistant leaders’ in this hierarchy. He also 
defended the existence of a plebs contionalis, a specific, small group within the plebs 
urbana consisting of tabernarii and opifices who regularly attended the contiones and 
other assemblies. The hierarchical and top-down interpretation of Vanderbroeck will be 
questioned further in this thesis, as will the exclusive importance of a plebs contionalis. 
The Gelzer model was of course not abandoned at the time, and most forcefully 
defended by Leonhard Burckhardt.55 This thesis will mainly follow the tradition of the 
social historians, however. Research on these topics has not stopped since this time, and 
has provided very valuable new insights. 
At the end of the decade, Lukas Thommen expanded on Bleicken’s monograph on the 
tribunate.56 Based on statistical analysis of a prosopography, Thommen concluded that 
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the tribunes served to solidify the interests of the senatorial elites, even in the late 
Republic. The tribunate was mainly significant as a start for the cursus honorum of young 
nobles. Especially families of the nobilitas who had for a long time not held higher office 
were interested in the office, according to Thommen. Against most other historians of 
the late Republic, he argued that most tribunes served the optimates, not the populares. 
While opposition to the senate did increase over the course of the last century BCE it 
was not a feature of the tribunate itself, but the responsibility of a minority of tribunes. 
This minority followed the equites or the Great Individuals, but did not have any wish to 
reform the Republican institutions. In Thommen’s view, the masses did not participate 
in politics at all. Most features of Thommen’s analysis will be criticised throughout this 
thesis. The limits of statistical analysis on this subject have already been noted by 
Kondratieff. As has been indicated, a search for an essential ‘role’ of a political 
institution is mainly counterproductive. Furthermore, I will criticise the view that there 
was a widespread utilitarian conception of magistracies in the late Republic, and that 
nobles mainly coveted the position of tribune as a step towards further career 
advancement. 
In the 1990s, debates once again became quite vehement as a reaction to the proposal of 
Fergus Millar to characterise the Roman Republic as a democracy, or at least as a ‘mixed 
constitution’.57 Millar had published quite a few articles during the 1980s, but especially 
his book “The Crowd in Rome” in 1998 laid out his arguments quite clearly. Besides this 
divisive argument about democracy, Millar and others who could be placed in the same 
tradition (such as North, Sandberg, Wiseman, and Yakobson) proposed to shift the focus 
in late Republican society to the ‘publicness’ of politics and to the assemblies (especially 
the contiones).58 The importance of the senate in politics was questioned, and it was 
argued that the people were in an on-going political dialogue with the elites. The lower 
strata could have an active role in Roman politics, but for most scholars this was still 
only possible through elite competition and division, for example between the camps of 
optimates and populares. One other feature of this ‘democratic school’ was a return to the 
formal legal aspects of the Republican ‘constitution’. According to Millar, ‘popular 
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sovereignty’ was based in the right of the tribuni plebis to introduce legislative proposals 
on which the people could freely vote. While I do not agree that Rome could be 
described as a democracy, some insights of the ‘democratic school’ remain significant. 
The importance of contiones and the publicness of Roman politics are now widely 
recognised, and debates have shifted to how ‘equal’ the dialogue between the elites and 
non-elites was. 
The reaction against Millar’s theories, from the beginning of the 1990s until even 
today, explicitly focused on the oligarchic elements in Roman politics. The earliest 
direct attack was launched by three German scholars, Egon Flaig, Karl-Joachim 
Hölkeskamp, and Martin Jehne, in the 1995 publication of “Demokratie in Rom?”.59 All 
three would continue to work on the theme, focussing on political culture and collective 
ideas. They suggested that the Roman Republic was based on a ‘Grundkonsens’ between 
all societal strata. Competition between elites was a functioning, rule-based aspect of 
the system, not the primary cause of its downfall.60 If the non-elites had any active role, 
all these scholars argued to some extent, it was in functionally supporting their own 
domination by the ‘meritocracy’. They also claimed that public rituals played an 
important part in reproducing this deference. Robert Morstein-Marx at first followed 
this criticism. Looking at the relations in concrete speech situations, he put forward the 
concept of ideological monotony in oratory, which signified that the Roman plebs could 
not discern which elites would act in their interest and which would not.61 All orators, 
after all, openly acknowledged the plebs as a legitimate participant in political 
discussion and claimed to defend their interests. Yet another criticism levelled against 
Millar was based on very practical objections to the involvement of the lower strata. 
Henrik Mouritsen in 2001 claimed that the common people could simply not participate 
in politics, and gave several reasons for this.62 First, they were constantly preccupied 
with labour, and this did not allow them the leisure to attend public meetings. Second, 
the elites determined the issues and most of these did not really concern the plebeians. 
Third, Rome had simply grown beyond the practical feasibility of truly inclusive politics, 
and the areas reserved for its practice could physically not hold even a decent 
percentage of the urban population. According to Mouritsen, only the leisured groups 
and partisan followers truly participated, and only symbolically represented the populus 
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Romanus. This thesis will try to answer some challenges raised against Millar, especially 
those questioning the influence of the non-elites. As will be presently discussed, 
Morstein-Marx criticised his own work later on, and some arguments made by him will 
be integrated in the theoretical framework. Against Mouritsen’s arguments there are 
new interpretations of the day-to-day lives and living conditions of the non-elites. 
These criticisms inspired a focus on the subjects of communicative contexts and 
spaces for interaction in recent years.63 Claudia Tiersch, for instance, identified the 
crisis of the late Republic as a crisis in communication between the masses and the elite. 
Topography, spaces, and time-distance became dominant notions, especially in the new 
milennium.64 Political culture and thought remained important as well, with a new wave 
of Begriffsgeschichte providing some valuable new insights. One important study was 
Maggie Robb’s book in 2010 which attempted to disprove, quite convincingly in my 
view, the division of late Republican politics into optimates and populares.65 While few 
scholars still defended a democratic Roman Republic, some have re-evaluated the 
empowerment of the lower strata. Ray Laurence already in the mid-1990s argued that 
rumour contributed to the informal spread of information among the non-elites.66 In his 
contribution for the Cambridge Ancient History, Nicholas Purcell argued for plebeian 
organisation and agency, mainly by the so-called plebs contionalis of the tabernae and 
officinae, which was active both in formal and informal politics.67 In a very original 
thesis, Peter O’Neill argued that we should pay attention to non-official places of 
interaction and plebeian cultural practices to discover the political potential of the 
plebeians.68 Morstein-Marx changed his position in the debate and argued that Roman 
society was not in fact dominated by a monolithic political culture, providing some 
more theoretical support for O’Neill’s position by referring to James Scott’s monograph 
on infrapolitics.69 As evidenced by O’Neill’s research, a search for the culture of non-elite 
groups was in many studies closely connected to the political elements of Roman 
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society. In 1994 a cautious attempt at identifying a separate plebeian culture had 
already been made by Nicholas Horsfall.70 Quite recently, Cyril Courrier has expanded on 
this, arguing that this separate culture could give rise to political consciousness and 
collective action.71 I believe the influence of these contributions is yet to be fully felt, 
and new research is hopefully to follow. 
The study of the tribunate saw some interesting new developments in this period as 
well. In the 1990s Jeffrey Tatum published several works on Clodius.72 He argued that 
Roman politics was ‘Realpolitik’, where not ideology but ambition, compromise, and 
building support were the main issues. This was a typical feature of this decade, and the 
focus of this thesis will not be on these elements, although they remain important. Jean-
Michel David in a short article considered the tribunes the prime examples of political 
innovation through opposition between magistrates in the late Republic.73 This was, he 
argued, because the tribunes were the most important weapons in political struggles. In 
1996, Badian surprisingly defended Mommsen’s interpretation of the tribunes as the 
leaders of a separate state.74 In the late Republic, in his view, this produced a 
‘constitutional monstrosity’. Kai Sandberg, in his investigation of the assemblies in 2001, 
followed previous scholarship in identifying the tribunes as the main popular element 
of the late Republic.75 He also saw them as being predominantly responsible for 
legislation, even being prompted by other magistrates to pass laws in their stead, which 
went against Thommen. 
Some specific, full-length studies on the tribunate itself were written as well. Eric 
Kondratieff wrote a dissertation on the tribunate in 2003.76 He agreed with many 
‘functions’ which have been mentioned, such as the tribunate as an electoral crutch and 
as the prime legislators in the political system. He expanded on previous 
prosopographical work on the tribunes, by for instance including tribunes whose name 
is unknown. This invaluable work has been used throughout this thesis. K. also cast a 
new look on old topics such as the origins of the institution and the career of individual 
tribunes. New topics of scholarship such as oratorical style and topography were 
included in his overview as well. Admitting to some aspects of the ‘democratic school’, 
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K. allowed the diverse lower strata some role in politics, as they played on electoral 
competition betwee elites. He professed that “the tribunate was clearly not an end in 
itself”, and the main concern was “trying to make an impact in civil office without 
annoying the wrong people”.77 Another, and, in my view, more correct element in K.’s 
argument was the warning not to draw too many conclusions from prosopographical 
material, as our sources greatly limit the representativeness of the known cases. Gareth 
Sampson wrote a dissertation with very similar prosopographical focuses in 2005, 
apparently unaware of Kondratieff’s work.78 However, while K. started his overview 
after the Hannibalic War, Sampson attempted to go back to the origins of the institution 
and focused on its changes throughout the Republican period. Like Martin, Sampson 
argued that many tribunes were recruited from outside of the ‘office holding elites’. He 
proposed a three-tier system of tribunes: noble plebeians, a ‘middle group’ of families 
with minor offices, and ‘lesser tribunes’ who were drawn from the ranks of the non-elite 
plebs urbana. Evidence for this latter group is in my view insufficient to make such an 
extraordinary claim. According to Sampson, these socio-economic differences de facto 
split the tribunate into one which was concerned with big political problems and one 
which catered to the direct needs of the plebeians. For this too there is little evidence. 
Very recently, in 2013, 2015, and as recently as early 2016, Amy Russell has tackled 
some aspects of the tribunate.79 Russell approached the tribunate, in a similar way as 
Kondratieff, as a place for intra-elite competition and differentiation. Public oratory was 
closely linked with the institution, as the tribunes were the most active in giving 
contiones, and therefore the most important skill a tribune should have possessed in 
constituting a ‘contional personality’. However, there was more to the institutions than 
this, with which this thesis will agree. R. claimed that tribunician oratory also provided 
a means to establish new programmes in the late Republic.80 Furthermore, the tribunate 
was more than any other political institution involved in societal conflicts and changes 
to the political sphere. She also convincingly argues that this had been the case even 
before the late Republic, and rightly does not equate these institutional characteristics 
to an ‘essential function’ in the Republican political system. Other broad claims will be 
contended in this thesis. R. claimed that the tribunate was the institution which could 
provide an alternative for the Republican political system, and that this scared some of 
our sources. Ultimately, the tribunes did not effect this change because, to quote her, 
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“they did not go far enough.”81 R. appears to interpret the tribunate as mainly 
advancing the interests of the people against the senatorial elites. While it will be 
argued that she is right to note the extraordinary openness of tribunes to these groups, 
the core of this thesis is to explain why this does not necessary imply a generalised 
championing of non-elite interests.  
 
                                                     
81 Russell, ‘The Tribunate of the Plebs as a Magistracy of Crisis’, p. 139. 
 24 
Sources 
In this thesis, I will mainly employ literary sources. I will infrequently refer to some 
inscriptions, mainly of laws and treaties (the Tabula Bembina, the agrarian law of 111, 
and the law of 101-100 about praetorian provinces), and the Res Gestae Divi Augusti, but 
the epigraphic tradition in the late Republic is far less elaborate than in the following 
centuries. It is therefore much more difficult to use inscriptions as a foundation for 
research, especially for political history. In the past decades, studies on the late Republic 
have included the symbolic side of numismatic research to look at the self-
representation of elites, Roman interpretations of their history and society, and even 
the realm of symbols in politics. Images on coins are a typical example of what I will call 
the public transcript, and this thesis will not primarily concern itself with this subject. 
Of course, numismatics can also tell something about the Roman economy and 
monetisation. At certain times, I will use the results of such numismatic research. 
Similarly, the evolutions in archaeological research will be employed indirectly. As will 
become clear, archaeological research has been crucial for developments in economic 
history, but also for the relatively recent increase in scholarship on topography. 
While the reliance on literature in this thesis therefore can be seen as very traditional, 
the scope of the research does call for it. The literary sources available for an 
interpretation of late Republican politics and society are quite diverse, and relatively 
extensive.82 They are the primary way to interpret political developments, as 
epigraphically attested laws are quite rare. Of course, there are many problems 
concerning their reliability. While contemporary sources are generally more reliable 
factually, they often misrepresent events or do not mention them. Later sources have 
problems of their own, but feasibly made more factual mistakes. Unfortunately, for 
many events and developments in the late Republic we only have a single attestation by 
one source, whose reliability is not completely guaranteed. Another common problem 
of all our literary sources is their very moralistic nature.83 Ancient writers were, of 
course, ancient, and therefore did not dispose over modern methods of critical analysis. 
This feature of the sources should not tempt us to copy these moral explanations, 
however, as some modern historians tend to do. 
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There are several contemporary sources for the late Republic, although many more 
have been lost. There are three main authors on which we can rely for contemporary 
accounts. The texts of the first, M. Tullius Cicero, have been preserved in such a way 
that they provide the majority of our evidence.84 Cicero, an important political figure in 
his own right, was born in 106 and was killed in the proscriptions of the triumvirs at the 
end of 43. We have parts of his correspondence between 67 and 43, several of his 
political speeches which were published, and some theoretical texts on oratory, politics, 
and philosophy. The texts mainly provide information for the period between 81 and 43, 
when he was active in politics, but also for the decades preceding it, of which we 
otherwise know very little. Cicero’s texts include a lot of untruth, which is sometimes 
obvious in his speeches (where he sometimes twists or ignores facts, or directly lies), but 
often less so in his letters. A few of his published speeches were actually never 
delivered.85 Some letters were meant to be public, others were very formal, others were 
addressed to his friends and family, but even this last category includes 
misrepresentations and were often very carefully constructed to attain certain goals.86 
They do often indicate Cicero’s uncertainty and changing opinion, which is valuable in 
itself. Without a doubt, Cicero remains our most useful source for the late Republic, 
even if his words should never be taken at face value, and his own close involvement in 
politics often gives a very one-sided view. Cicero professed to follow a distinct political 
ideology, built on the concordia ordinum between all rich strata of Roman society (the 
consensus omnium bonorum), and later, when the civil war had began, the freedom from 
tyranny (the libera res publica).87 
This remains true for the second important contemporary source, C. Iulius Caesar. 
Born in 100 and killed in the theatre of Pompey on the Ides of March in 44, no person of 
the late Republic is of course more famous. Caesar’s works of propaganda, the 
Commentarii de Bello Gallico and Commentarii de Bello Civili, are mainly reports of his 
military conquests, but in some paragraphs report about the political developments in 
Rome. Quite importantly, one of these parts, in book 8 of the On the Gallic War, was 
actually written by one of Caesar’s close political associates, Aulus Hirtius. Caesar is as a 
source only relevant for a very narrow timeframe, however, especially around the time 
of the start of his civil war against Cn. Pompeius Magnus. 
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The third important late-Republican source of politics in the late Republic which has 
been preserved is C. Sallustius Crispus.88 Sallust was born in 86, died in 35, and was 
tribunus plebis in 52. As he was banished after his tribunate by the political group which 
had supported Pompey and recalled by Caesar, Sallust was a supporter, but a critical 
supporter, of Caesar’s policies. He was not a contemporary writer in the sense of Cicero 
or Caesar, in the sense that he wrote about present events, as he was a historian. 
However, Sallust focussed on very recent events, and while the Bellum Iugurthinum took 
place before his birth, Sallust would have directly experienced at least the broad events 
he describes in the Bellum Catilinae (or de coniuratione Catilinae). Regrettably, the vast 
majority of Sallust’s most important work, his Historiae, has been lost, and only some 
fragments survive. It most likely concerned events which Sallust experienced as a child, 
between Sulla’s death in 78 to 67. Sallust had a conflictual view on politics and society. 
Antagonism or differences in opinion, and especially the conflict between different 
kinds of virtus, are presented by him as the core of history.89 Sallust thus clearly 
constructs a narrative, in which pride is depicted as the primary cause of conflict. 
Aside from these three authors, some other works have been preserved, such as the 
Life of Atticus by Cornelius Nepos, parts of Varro’s treatises on agriculture and 
language, and poetry such as the Carmina of C. Valerius Catullus. Most sources have been 
lost, however, or only known by fragments, such as Nicolaus of Damascus’s biography of 
Augustus.90 Some of the authors were former tribunes, such as C. Fannius and C. Licinius 
Macer. The lost works varied greatly, from biographies and autobiographies, over family 
histories, to histories and annalistic accounts. Some of these fragments will be used in 
this thesis. Equally important is the influence these lost sources had on later historians. 
Other important sources are those from the Principate. Again, there are three major 
authors which will return throughout this thesis: Appian, Dio, and Plutarch. These later 
sources are often very unreliable, especially when they attribute motives to historical 
characters or when they describe relations of subservience between Roman politicians. 
Even more than the contemporary sources, the imperial tradition heavily focusses on 
the ‘Great Individuals’ of history. 
Appian, who lived during the first two thirds of the second century CE, was an 
important eques from Alexandria and at a certain moment a procurator for at least 
Antoninus Pius. Especially important are his books on the civil wars, which mainly focus 
 
                                                     
88 Schmal, Sallust, p. 9-23. 
89 Batstone, ‘The Antithesis of Virtue’; Kapust, Republicanism, Rhetoric, and Roman Political Thought, p. 27-80. 
90 For an overview of contemporary late Republican authors of which fragments are known: Cornell, The 
Fragments of the Roman Historians. Volume 1: Introduction, esp. p. 244-471. 
  27 
on the internal political strife in Rome.91 One of his most important sources was the 
work, now lost, of C. Asinius Pollio, a supporter of Caesar. 
Cassius Dio, who lived from halfway the second century until a third into the third 
century CE, wrote half a century later. Originally from Bithynia, he became an 
important senator in Rome, and consul under Septimius Severus in 204 CE. Dio was a 
historian basing himself mainly on the annalistic tradition. 
Plutarch was a Greek who wrote around 100 CE, and was mainly a biographer and a 
moralist, not a historian. His parallel lives were lessons on political and moral virtue. As 
a consequence of his goals, Plutarch was more interested in character than in complete 
historical accuracy.92 One interesting element in his work is the attention to anecdotes, 
which he mostly took from his sources. These anecdotes can be very valuable for 
information on life in the late Republic, about which we are otherwise seldom informed. 
Besides these three, many other later sources will be used. One unfortunate absentee 
is Livy. His works are missing or very fragmentary after 167, and we have to rely on the 
summary of his epitomator. Another very important source, which will be frequently 
relied upon, is Q. Asconius Pedianus. Living in the first century CE, all which is 
preserved of Asconius’s work are some of his commentaries on some of the speeches of 
Cicero. An interesting feature about him is that, although his subject matter is fairly 
limited, he constantly reports about which sources he uses. Not only does he use works 
now lost to use, such as Tiro’s biography of Cicero or Varro’s histories, he also claims to 
have frequently dug into the Roman archives to read the Acta Diurna or reports of 
senatorial sessions. While we have but little, Asconius is probably one of our most 
trustworthy sources. Other important sources of the early Principate which will 
frequently return, among many others, are C. Suetonius Tranquillus (his biographies of 
Caesar and Augustus), Valerius Maximus (the Facta et dicta memorabilia), and M. Velleius 
Paterculus (his Historia Romana). 
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The structure of this work 
This thesis will be divided into five chapters.  
Chapter 1 will establish the theoretical framework for the analysis of the tribunate. It 
will start very broadly, with a  section covering how behaviour is linked to interaction 
with other people. The second section will look at how the identity of several groups 
can be theorised, and how this effects the behaviour of an individual. Third, the scope 
will be expanded even more by looking into politics in general, and how both individual 
and group agency have an impact in the political sphere. The fourth and final section of 
the chapter will directly concern the tribunate, and how we can employ the theoretical 
framework in the analysis of this governmental institution. The metaphor of the 
principal-agent relation will be explored. 
Chapter 2 will be an exploration of Roman society in the late Republic, as a 
background both to general political evolutions and to the various groups which the 
tribunes would have encountered. The first section of the chapter will very broadly look 
into demographic and economic developments. The second section will attempt to 
identify several broad categories of societal groups, which could act as principals for the 
tribunate. 
Chapter 3 will somewhat continue the contextualisation, but will also move towards 
explaining features of late Republican politics. First, I will explore the question of how 
we should see political groups in this period. The second section addresses the 
possibilities of non-elites to engage in political activities. The third and final section will 
concern the general ‘architecture’ of the highest political institutions in the Roman 
Republic in the final century BCE. 
Chapter 4 will contain the general analysis of the tribunate of the plebs in the late 
Republic. It will be established that the tribunate was an ‘agent institution’, in the sense 
that many principals could influence the behaviour of the tribunes and competed with 
one another over this role of ‘principal’. The first section will establish the basic premise 
that we can see the tribunate as an agent for political and societal principals. The 
second section of this chapter will then expand this theory by considering multiple 
principals, and the metaphor of the ‘complex web of strings’ will be presented. Finally, 
the third section will consider the individual tribune and his influence on this complex 
principal-agent relation and on the institution of the tribunate. 
Chapter 5, finally, will apply the model from Chapter 4 in explaining the position of 
the tribunes in the transformation of Republic into Principate. The first section will look 
at the popular theory that the tribunes were the puppets of the ‘Great Individuals’, and 
in this capacity the heralds of the Principate. The second section concerns the position 
of the tribunes in the various conflicts of the late Republic. The third and final section 
will concretely analyse the last decades of this period, and the decline of the tribunate. 
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Chapter 1 Theoretic framework 
This chapter will be dedicated to constructing a framework for the thesis, based on 
various theories from sociology, political theory, even economics. Its intention is to 
provide tools for researching the subject matter of this thesis. These tools will have to 
be useful for a wide range of society, as the choiche has been made to entwine political 
manoeuvring by individuals, political institutions, and societal relations of power with 
societal change. In order to provide a valid analysis of society, the ‘toolbox’ also needs to 
be internally coherent. The eclectic nature of the different theories which will be cited 
necessitates a firm basic assertion which will run through this chapter as a linking 
element, in order to propose a consistent theory. This core of the framework is the 
assertion that human behaviour is contended, that is, constituted and reproduced 
through interactions with other humans, which require exertions of power and can 
occur through a variety of means. 
Throughout this thesis, I will argue not only that that the framework which follows 
can lead to a more correct analysis of aspects of the late Roman Republic, which takes 
into account the complexity of politics in this ancient society. One difference with many 
narratives on the late Republic is that, rather than make a priori observations about the 
‘nature’ of the political system, this thesis will focus on the continual struggles for 
political power and influence between groups. Another focal point will be continuous 
but non-linear change in society. There will not be a search for the ‘essential function’ 
of the tribunate: the concrete behaviour of tribunes depended on a complex societal and 
historical context. A last general feature of this framework will be to underline group 
dynamics and agency in politics, besides individual agency. 
For reasons of theoretical consistency, this chapter will flow from general assertions 
about human behaviour to, only at the very end, specific observations on the tribunate 
of the plebs. One remark should be made, namely that both ‘power’ and ‘contention’ will 
be used as neutral concepts, not necessarily having any negative connotations. To 
provide some clarity, core terms in this chapter will be marked in bold.  
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1.1 Structured agency and contention 
This chapter will begin with some general socio-political explanations for human 
behaviour, to provide a basis on which to build further analysis. The term ‘behaviour’ 
designates conscious or unconscious actions and communication, including the way in 
which the individual carries her- or himself and experiences emotions. Behaviour is 
creatively derived from structures inculcated in habits of thought and inscribed into the 
human body.1 Contention signifies on a primary level that behaviour is at all times 
subject to control and correction by other human individuals. Not only specific 
mannerisms can be criticised, but in interaction there are expectations about how the 
other person should feel. On a secondary level – which is equally important – contention 
implies that the claims by diverse individuals and by the structures which humans 
reproduce do not always refer to the same basic expectations. In interaction, exertions 
of control and correction can contradict the expectations of the individuals involved, 
and can even go against the basic structures with which they interpret the world. This 
will become more clear throughout this section. 
1.1.1 A theory of structure and agency 
As a basis for further claims, a definition of ‘structure’ is required. Structure is a crucial 
element in both primary and secondary contention, and even in the constitution of the 
individual. The historian William H. Sewell Jr., examining several of the most important 
sociologists of structure in the late 20th century, offers a logically coherent and useful 
description: 
Structures, then, are sets of mutually sustaining schemas and resources that 
empower and constrain social action and that tend to be reproduced by that social 
action. But their reproduction is never automatic. Structures are at risk, at least to 
some extent, in all of the social encounters they shape – because structures are 
multiple and intersecting, because schemas are transposable, and because 
resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictability.2 
 
                                                     
1 Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 88-89, 93, 117, 122; Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 178-179, 185, 189-190, 193. 
2 Sewell, Logics of History, p. 143, for the entire chapter, p. 124-151. It is important to note that Sewell is neither 
an idealist or a materialist. In a sense, as many post-structuralists of the latter half of the twentieth century, 
he tries to reconcile Marx with Hegel by underscoring the dialectic between both idealism and materialism. 
For the inspiration which Giddens provided, see especially Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 15-25. 
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To understand this definition, we primarily need to understand the two elements that, 
according to Sewell, only together can constitute sustained structures.3 They are 
schemas and resources, which he respectively describes as virtual and actual. He 
illustrates the difference and essential connection between both by referring to 
Bourdieu’s study of the Kabyle house,4 but the same analysis can be made for the Roman 
domus. The house is built reflecting virtual schemas, such as a dichotomy between public 
and private, but once finished it reaffirms and reproduces these encoded schemas by, in 
the concrete experience of the individuals in the house, assigning different types of 
interactions with different people to different spaces.5 One feature of the tribunate can 
be interpreted in the same way. The dress and the benches (subsellia) as attributes of the 
tribunes are meant to reflect expectations of groups about the accessbility of tribunes to 
‘commoners’, and in turn reproduce these expectations in day-to-day interaction. 
According to Sewell, schemas are virtual ‘tools of thought’, and include fundamental 
dualities, outlines of action, and habits in behaviour.6 Resources, then, are all actual 
elements which can enhance or maintain power. They are divided into two categories: 
nonhuman and human. Nonhuman resources include both non-human living beings and 
non-living objects, whether these are man-made or not, as long as they can be used as 
‘tools of power’.7 The Roman domus, but also coal, horses, crop seeds, watermills, statues 
and archives are all nonhuman resources. Codifications of rules, such as manuals on 
oratory or bronze tables inscribed with laws, are nonhuman resources.8 Human 
resources are attributes of individuals, such as “physical strength, dexterity, knowledge, and 
emotional commitments [...], including knowledge of the means of gaining, retaining, controlling, 
and propagating either human or nonhuman resources.”9 The skills acquired in an academic 
study are human resources, while the actual diploma is a nonhuman resource. 
Resources are unevenly distributed in every society, but every individual has at its 
disposal at least a minimal extent of both human and nonhuman resources, which are a 
requirement for agency.10 The usefulness of resources, however, is in part limited by a 
society, as, for example, the knowledge of using uranium can be absent, or the use of 
 
                                                     
3 Sewell, Logics of History, p. 137. 
4 Ibid., p. 138. 
5 Wallace-Hadrill, ‘The Social Structure of the Roman House’, passim. Also see ‘regionalisation’, Giddens, The 
Constitution of Society, p. 118-119. For a differing interpretation, focussing on mutability: Russell, The Politics of 
Public Space in Republican Rome, p. 12-16. 
6 Sewell, Logics of History, p. 131. 
7 Ibid., p. 133. 
8 Ibid., p. 131. 
9 Ibid., p. 133. 
10 Ibid., p. 133. If we compare this to Bourdieu’s theories, all forms of capital are resources rather than 
schemas. It should be noted that having resources at one’s disposal does not take account of property rights. A 
slave who – in theory – does not even own herself, has his own body at his disposal. 
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certain animals (by eating them for instance) can be presented as illegitimate.11 Using 
physical or even verbal violence against a tribune of the plebs was illegitimate in official 
Roman discourse. Although this did not stop persons from using it, this could 
potentially cause their behaviour to be seen as illegitimate by large numbers of people 
in Roman society. 
Human agency is both constrained and empowered by structures. For schemas this is 
clear: in new contexts they need to be drawn upon to inform creative behaviour, but 
they also necessarily limit the possible array of choices.12 Resources permit social action 
by mobilising power, but also impose a logic of their own which constrains agency. For 
example, certain resources, both human and nonhuman, are necessary to reproduce the 
individual itself (as physical and mental sustenance).13 Furthermore, the quality and 
quantity of available resources impel the behaviour of the individual. Structures 
structure human society, that is, they are not disinterested, and they empower 
individuals differently.14 A schema of masculine-feminine duality does not by itself 
discriminate. However, the structure of patriarchy includes this schema and 
disenfranchises women by the distribution of resources, for example because the 
methods of food production favour the male contribution in caloric value, because 
physical violence by males is legitimated, because a lack of resources (for instance a lack 
of knowledge or tools) makes deaths related to childbirth endemic, or simply because 
laws exist which limit female agency.15 
Structures are equally constrained and empowered by human behaviour.16 They are 
constantly but imperfectly reproduced. Structural change is not only a consequence of 
individual creativity and empowerment, the traditional attributes of ‘agency’, but just as 
much of human error and limitations.17 For example, the human body is only capable of 
so much, including emotional commitments and memory, and is always bound by time. 
An individual is never fully knowledgeable.18 This is quite important in the analysis of 
history, as these limits should be taken into account in analysing decision-making 
 
                                                     
11 Ibid., p. 135, 216-217. Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 127. 
12 Sewell, Logics of History, p. 143; Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 160-161. 
13 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 102-103; Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 113. 
14 Bourdieu, La distinction, esp. p. 126, 191; Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 113. 
15 Culham, ‘Women in the Roman Republic’; Garnsey, Food and Society in Classical Antiquity, p. 49; Rawson, 
‘Finding Roman Women’. 
16 This is of course inherent in the ‘duality of structure’ on which this model is based, Giddens, New Rules of 
Sociological Method, p. 104, 121, 161. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 25. 
17 Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 178; Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 102. 
18 Giddens focuses on what can go wrong with monitoring actions, and emphasises unacknowledged 
conditions and unintended consequences. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 77; Giddens, The 
Constitution of Society, p. 1-13, 282; also Sewell, Logics of History, p. 352. Bourdieu emphasises the importance of 
forgetting, see Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 179-180. 
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processes of actors. As Bourdieu has stated, “réintroduire l’incertitude, c’est réintroduire le 
temps, avec son rythme, son orientation, son irréversibilité, substituant la dialectique des 
stratégies à la mécanique du modèle, mais sans retomber dans l’anthropologie imaginaire des 
théories de l’ « acteur rationnel ».”19 All these negative factors of agency can give rise to 
imperfectly reproducing structure, to unintended deviations. Intended changes of 
course also remain possible. However, this is not all there is to say about the 
reproduction of structures. They are not dependent on the whims of individuals because 
of contention, that is, exertions of power by individuals on others in relation to 
behaviour.20 
1.1.2 Primary contention 
Now, let us focus on contention.21 From the definition structure and agency, it follows 
that agency can prompt both change and inertia. A tribune can slightly alter the 
institution of the tribunate by creatively making use of resources or relying on groups 
in new ways. Lack of knowledge or a momentary misstep can lead a praetor or 
provincial governor to create a new precedent. Conversely, religious observances such 
as the transvectio equitum can reproduce, among other things, status in the official 
discourse. But individuals do not operate within a void. Behaviour is not only enabled or 
constrained by internalised structures, but also by other individuals with their own 
agency. Interaction involves contention on behaviour. Dutifulness towards one’s family 
appears to have been at least an elite norm in the late Republic, and would have been 
established during contention between family members. During Roman oratorical 
education, teachers and mentors attempted to impart a broad range of behaviour, 
including dictum and posture. If a person from outside Rome mispronounced a Latin 
word, or even the typical dialect of the Urbs, another individual could choose to correct 
this, criticise this, or ignore it. A tribune who went against procedure would often be 
notified of that fact, but others could choose to ignore it for a variety of reasons. 
 
                                                     
19 Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 170. Also see Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 5, 8. 
20 Giddens defines power as “the transformative capacity of human action”, Giddens, New Rules of Sociological 
Method, p. 110. Also, power “may be defined as the capability to secure outcomes where the realization of these 
outcomes depends upon the agency of others.”, Ibid., p. 111. Also see Ibid., p. 15, 102, 104, 157; Bourdieu, Théorie de 
la Pratique, p. 182; Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 2, 9, 14-15, 32, 283. 
21 Giddens talks about ‘primary contradictions’ and ‘secondary contradictions’: “By primary contradictions I refer 
to those which enter into the constitution of societal totalities; by secondary contradictions I mean those which are 
dependent upon, or are brought into being by, primary contradictions.” Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 193. 
However, this refers to a far more limited and concrete part of society, based on ‘system organisation’, than 
will be used here. Ibid., p. 193-199; Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 21, 124. 
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In general, when individuals interact, they lay claims on each other’s behaviour, 
ranging from implicit emotional expectations to formal legal limitations. The constant 
feedback loop between these claims and the behaviour of involved individuals is what I 
term ‘primary contention’.22 Contention does not have to be experienced as 
confrontational. However, these interactions do require exertions of power, even if the 
individuals are not aware of them, and power arbitrates for a large part in whether 
structural reproduction or alteration is successful or not.23 If a certain new dress or a 
manner of gesticulating in oratory is adopted by a member of the Roman elite, the 
exertion of power on others through his status may incite them to copy it. If the person 
cannot mobilise this power, he may be, for instance, ridiculed. Primary contention 
generally causes large nonconformities to social structures to have difficulty to endure, 
as the control and correction by a variety of others in constant interactions will most 
likely include attempts to stop the resulting ‘deviances’ in behaviour.24 Creativity or 
error can still lead to structural change if, as Sewell puts it, “[...] enough people, or even a 
few people who are powerful enough, act in innovative ways [...].”25 Primary contention is the 
attempts to regulate the behaviour of individuals as members of a group. 
1.1.3 Secondary contention 
The qualitative difference between primary and secondary contention is that secondary 
contention implies an interaction in which individuals refer to differing sets of 
structural complexes to inform and frame their behaviour.26 In interaction, individuals 
can experience it as conflicting expectations of and frameworks for the interaction 
 
                                                     
22 The term ‘socialisation’ is often used for the successful reproduction of social structures, but since this 
vision is based on a flawed, essentialist vision on culture and society, I believe it should be reconsidered as any 
attempt at ‘adapting’ another individual to perceived necessities flowing from structures, which does not 
necessarily reproduces these structures. Furthermore, while ‘socialisation’ implies a conscious series of 
actions, primary contention is limited to concrete interaction and is not necessarily deliberate. Lastly, primary 
contention invokes bi- or multilateral agency, while ‘socialisation’ refers to an a priori hierarchical relation. 
23 “’Power’ in the sense of the transformative capacity of human agency is the capability of the actor to intervene in a 
series of events so as to alter their course; as such it is the ‘can’ which mediates between intentions or wants and the actual 
realization of the outcomes sought after. ‘Power’ in the narrower, relational sense is a property of interaction, and may be 
defined as the capability to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes depends upon the agency of others. It 
is in this sense that men have power ‘over’ others: this is power as domination.” Giddens, New Rules of Sociological 
Method, p. 111. Also see Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 175; Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 110, 
124; Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 27-28, 176-177, 283-284. 
24 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 289. 
25 Sewell, Logics of History, p. 127. Also see Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 185. 
26 Giddens notes the importance of shared interpretative schemes, Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 
157-158. Bourdieu argues for a difference between the habitus of groups, Bourdieu, Raisons pratiques, p. 23; 
Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 88-93. Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 174-175, 179, 181, 185. 
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itself, as mental boundaries between the parties involved.27 An individual may be 
mystified by how another could behave in a certain manner, speak about certain things, 
or think in certain ways.   
Structural complexes are formed by frameworks of connected, interlocking 
structures, which are formed by the historical (that is, long-standing, while undergoing 
uneven and unpredictable change) coexistence of several individuals in similar lived 
experiences.28 This coexistence leads to the reproduction of similarities in behaviour. 
For instance, children growing up in households with slaves will probably have 
developed behaviour in dealing with servitude, authority, legal status, and differences 
between persons of distant places. However, these remain discrete psychological 
instances, easily judged as abnormalities, unless these individuals consolidate a 
structural complex by continuous interaction (and primary contention) in playing with 
other elite children or interacting with other persons in the same situation. 
Dissimilarities in behavioural tropes are formed between distinct groups as a 
consequence of this, and this can be analytically discerned.29 
Parallel to Bourdieu,30 it can be stated that societal groups are not constituted only by 
differences between properties of the lived experiences of groups (variances between 
what traditionally are called ‘cultures’, but also between the experiences of men and 
women; subaltern classes, aspiring classes and elites; freeborn, enslaved and those born 
in slavery; people growing up in cities, suburbs, or the countryside...)31, but by 
differentiation in status and resources when individuals are assigned to a place in 
multidimensional grids of legitimacy (or ‘fields’), on the basis of the relations between 
all relevant properties. As a concrete example, the lived experience of a female child 
born a slave in an elite domus in Rome is complex, and the properties of being a female 
and a slave would give a subordinated social status. However, the structural complexes 
inculcated by this individual will have greatly differed from a female child born a slave 
in a camp around the silver mines in Hispania, perhaps in such a way that the shared 
subordinated position of femaleness and enslavement do not immediately offer mutual 
 
                                                     
27 Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 175; Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, p. 78-79. See Giddens, New Rules of 
Sociological Method, p. 157-158. 
28 Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 97-99, 124, 159-160; Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 112, 192-193, 230; Bourdieu, 
Théorie de la Pratique, p. 174-175, 179-181, 188-191. 
29 Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 174-175, 179-181, 185, 188-191; Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 70, 112, 117-118, 
192-193, 195; Bourdieu, Raisons pratiques, p. 23.  
30 Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 117-119, 126-127, 190-195, 257-260, 362; Bourdieu, Raisons pratiques, p. 9-10, 23; 
Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 233; Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 174-175, 180. At this point, this is not a one-
on-one comparison because Bourdieu’s theory of structure differs somewhat from what has been put forward 
here based on Sewell. 
31 Sewell, Logics of History, p. 195-196, 209. 
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grounds. In the eyes of the pater familias they will be differentiated, the usual behaviour 
of the first slave will be that of a useful servant, of the second most likely that of lowly 
scum, and this will be reflected in status and available resources in the field of 
‘servitude’. The same difference can be discerned between members of the nobilitas who 
grew up in a rich household with many magistrates in the family, members of the 
nobilitas whose family had fallen on hard times, both financially and in elections, and 
persons whose father had, being wealthy and influential, become the first person in the 
family to achieved the position of a high magistrate. Some structural complexes would 
be similar, but often it was the combination of properties which mattered. Non-elites 
who came from a long line of inhabitants of Rome would be a different societal group 
from immigrants from Apulia who had just recently been granted Roman citizenship, 
again for the same reasons. Bourdieu has convincingly argued in his description of the 
habitus that the earliest upbringing is crucial for the inculcation of the most basic 
structural complexes, but that the trajectory of the individual throughout its lifetime is 
a factor as well.32 Structural complexes themselves can undergo change, just like 
structures can, but these change are less visible than the trajectory of an individual.33 
Societal groups in the late Republic will be discussed in chapter 2. 
Differentiation between societal groups through structural complexes form the basis 
for struggle: for resources, for the legitimate use of certain resources, for the legitimacy 
of practices, for meaning... Struggle in society is the sum of instances of secondary 
contention.34 As Giddens has stated, routinisation urges individuals to defend the 
structures which frame their lived experiences.35 Land confiscation may elicit strong 
response, for example, not only because of displacement and other economic 
consequences, but also because peasants can consider themselves ‘part of the land’, 
because they are used to it.36 The forms of struggle in social interactions include 
conflict, differentiation, subversion, and appropriation.37  
In daily life, individuals do not experience struggle as all-encompassing because 
structural complexes are numerous, and any individual incorporates several (on 
 
                                                     
32 Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 70-71, 124-125, 514, 529; Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 177-181, 189-191; 
Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 90-91, 101-102. 
33 Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 125. 
34 Sewell, Logics of History, p. 196. Bourdieu conversely argues that struggle always reproduces its own causes, 
which implies that it can never lead to change. Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 280. 
35 Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 85, 117; Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 60, 64, 72, 282. 
36 As there has never been a monolithic, ‘structurally functionalist’ society, this secondary contention is 
always present. For a critique of Giddens on functionalism, Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 21; 
Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 293-297. 
37 Sewell, Logics of History, p. 194-195. 
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different fields).38 For instance, two people going to a contio can identify with each other 
in how they experience and enact the speech by the elite orator, while one person may 
be a comparably wealthy freedman artisan (an anularius, for instance) and the other a 
day-labourer at the docks. This assertion has two important consequences. First, it 
allows individuals a degree of social code-switching, leading to easier communication. 
The experienced mental boundaries in communication can be activated or deactivated. 
Acknowledging this accentuates possibilities for social cohesion, but this does not imply 
cohesion is ‘normal’ or inevitable. If an individual feels its view of society (its 
ontological security) is threatened, for instance, this strengthens resistance to code-
switching. If the artisan begins to speak about the injustice of not qualifying for grain 
distributions because he is a freedman, the dockworker may (or may not) find it harder 
to communicate given his own socio-economic status. Second, the incorporation of 
several structural complexes also implies that individuals can experience internal 
struggle, through the inconsistency between certain expectations or strategies. This is 
the typical problem of role conflict, but this struggle can take place within the same 
structural complex as well. For the Republic, a dilemma could be experienced by a 
provincial governor, for instance. Is his duty to keep the peace in the provinces, to 
retain good relations with Roman allies, protect the interests of the publicani, or those of 
the Roman treasury? 
The diversity of structures and structural complexes and the resulting secondary 
contention makes social interaction very intricate, and confirms structured agency as 
an important element. As Sewell has stated: “A multiple conceptions of structure, 
consequently, makes human creativity and reflection an integral element in the theory of history, 
not a philosophically prior metaphysical assumption.”39 
 
                                                     
38 Ibid., p. 213. 
39 Ibid., p. 213. Also Ibid., p. 151: “To invoke structures as I have defined them here is to call for a critical analysis of the 
dialectical interactions through which humans shape their history.”. 
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Figure 1 Simplified schematic representation of contention 
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1.2 More concepts: societal groups, interests, and ‘contention 
costs’ 
In order to advance to an analysis of politics, some more concepts have to be explored 
which are relevant to the framework. Societal groups have already briefly been touched 
upon by discussing secondary contention. Here, we will look deeper into collective 
projects, individual choice within a group, implications of differentiation on a societal 
scale, and what can be said about ideology which spans groups. Important concepts will 
be discussed: legitimation, public transcripts, and hidden transcripts. Next, the 
difference between interests and desires will be explored. Last, it will be asserted that 
contention is never free, as resources will always have to be used to mobilise power, 
whether the individuals involved are aware of this or not. 
1.2.1 Societal groups: collective agency, choice, differentiation, ideology 
Active group identification can have several consequences. First, as it can give a strong 
sense of identity.40 Second, and very importantly, individuals in societal groups can 
band together in collective projects.41 Collective agency by groups is a very important 
factor in societal struggle. Legitimation plays an important part in group identification. 
Legitimation is not the absence of contention, but rather the synchronisation of 
behaviour with others against a third person, group, or structures. When a person 
legitimates the existing system of voting, for instance, this implies solidarity with 
persons who benefit from this system, in opposition with either those who would 
benefit from the absence of voting, those whose vote is worth less, or those who do not 
have a vote altogether. Groups are characterised by primary contention between its 
members, and often by internal hierarchies and authority, even domination.42 In the late 
Republic the senatorial elites competed for votes, for instance, while non-elites would 
have had their own internal struggles. Focussing merely on elite competition in the 
Roman Republic is a valid subject for history, as is focussing on the legitimation of elite 
groups in society against other groups. But focussing on these aspects can create a blind 
 
                                                     
40 Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 493. 
41 Bourdieu argues there does not have to be a ‘conductor’ to arrange this. Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 
174-175. Also Ibid., p. 181, 185; Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 204; Sewell, Logics of History, p. 145; Tilly 
and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, p. 5. 
42 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 26, 118-119, 129-131. 
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spot for the wider struggles of which they are part. Collective agency can involve 
coalitions of several groups.43 
Structural complexes inform (but do not determine) an individual’s sense of belonging 
to a societal group. An individual in this sense has a choice, but this choice does not 
imply complete freedom. Whether or not an individual identifies as a member of a 
group, structural complexes impose certain logics of behaviour.44 Furthermore, as has 
been argued in explaining secondary contention, different structural complexes imply 
differing logics of behaviour between groups. A person identifying with a group for 
which he or she has not inculcated the proper structural complexes, can behave 
‘inappropriately’. For instance, while a certain accent may be seen as the norm in some 
contexts, in other groups it may be rebuffed as being rustic. Therefore, when an 
individual attempts to identify with a different group, this normally leads to conflict. 
The Cena Trimalchionis in Petronius’s Satyricon is a good example of this phenomenon. 
As has been stated, the differentiation between structural complexes on ‘fields’ gives 
rise to societal groups which can be analytically distinguished, even if they are not 
actual groups with formal membership.45 Societies differ on the level of distinction (or 
segregation) between these groups. Differentiation is not limited to traditional 
interpretations of classes or status groups. The definition allows for the analysis of 
differences between generations; or between established families and newcomers (sons 
of novi homines, for instace), and so on.46 According to Bourdieu, the elites’s vision on 
legitimate differentiation is a self-fulfilling prophecy: as elites are elites, people believe 
they must know why they ‘belong’ and others do not.47 This can prompt theories of 
ideological domination and Gramscian cultural hegemony, theories which ultimately 
disenfranchise lower and middling classes. This would conflict with the focus on 
structured agency held by this thesis.48 
 
                                                     
43 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 199-204. 
44 It is impossible to follow Bourdieu in a priori characterizing elite taste as ‘legitimate’, as this depends on the 
point of view. Of course, this is related to the specific fields Bourdieu was studying, such as university and art. 
Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 14-16, 43, 59, 252-253. Also see Bourdieu, Théorie de la Pratique, p. 180-181; Bourdieu, 
La distinction, p. 64, 70-71, 93, 110-112, 191-195, 293, 361-362, 365, 443, 490-491, 512; Giddens, The Constitution of 
Society, p. 282-283. 
45 Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 191. I will have to sidestep the question which groups belong to Roman society 
and which do not. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 283. 
46 Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 336-337; Goldstone and McAdam, ‘Contention in Demographic and Life-Course 
Context’, p. 195-196. 
47 Bourdieu, La distinction, p. 25, 101, 284; Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 241. 
48 Scott argues that the hegemonic thesis automatically leads us back to functionalism: “The problem with the 
hegemonic thesis, at least in its strong forms as proposed by some of Gramsci’s successors, is that it is difficult to explain 
how social change could ever originate from below. If elites control the material basis of production, allowing them to 
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A compelling alternative has been proposed by James C. Scott. Scott’s main argument 
is that open forms of domination by elite groups stimulate possibilities for resistance. 
However, this resistance will most often be reproduced in secret social spaces, in the 
form of so-called ‘hidden transcripts’.49 Hidden transcripts are complex criticisms of 
‘public transcripts’. Several structural complexes are shared on different levels of 
society.  The public transcript is not a mirror of the structural complexes of either elite 
or subaltern groups, but a shared, ‘performed ideology’ which enables and constrains 
individuals from all societal groups in various ways.50 It is a frame open to different 
interpretations, but the frame itself is not so neutral as it seems.51 To paraphrase Žižek, 
official ideology always fails to fully constrain or tame difference and exclusion.52 In 
other words, the public transcript tends to favour the use of power by elite groups, and 
this is often apparent to non-elite groups.53 Nevertheless, routinisation of public 
performance in daily life is far from innocent. Because it does have consequences for 
contention, the public transcript does structure the lives of these individuals to a 
certain extent, which varies between concrete historical cases.54 
Scott’s theory implies that public acceptance of official differentiation is never the 
whole truth. As he states, “The public transcript, where it is not positively misleading, is 
unlikely to tell the whole story about power relations. It is frequently in the interest of both parties 
to tacitly conspire in misrepresentation.”55 Hidden transcripts are constructed by dominated 
groups to socialise their resistance, and by the dominating groups to hide brutal or 
vulnerable aspects of their elite discourse. Cicero’s discourse comparing all non-elites to 
scum, claiming that their occupations are dishonourable, or defending the enormous 
inequality in the late Republic all remain hidden from the public. He does not speak of 
this in his public speeches.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
extract practical conformity, and also control the means of symbolic production, thereby ensuring that their power and 
control are legitimized, one has achieved a self-perpetuating equilibrium that can be disturbed only by an external shock.” 
Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 78; also p. 72-86. 
49 Ibid., p. XI-XIII, 4-5, 14, 20, 25, 27-28, 32, 37, 45, 91, 103, 109, 111, 114-115, 119, 123, 132, 191; Wickham, ‘Gossip 
and Resistance’, p. 11-19, 23. 
50 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 4, 10-11, 28, 32-33, 45, 49-55, 70, 91-93. See, for instance, Arena’s 
description of libertas: Arena, Libertas, p. 30-31. 
51 Fiennes, The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology; Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 102-103. 
52 Fiennes, The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology Also Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 18, 24, 45. 
53 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 4-5, 10-11, 18, 32-34, 48-50, 54, 61-67, 87. Also see Giddens, The 
Constitution of Society, p. 16. 
54 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 3, 24, 28, 49; Westby, ‘Strategic Imperative, Ideology, and 
Frames’, p. 226. 
55 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 2. 
 42 
The dominance of the public transcript does cause hidden transcripts to be mostly 
derivative of the public ideology.56 Rather than see this public transcript as merely a 
scene of social stabilisation, it is fruitful to also analyse it as a space of mutual control.57 
Between the public and the hidden transcripts lie contentious politics.58 All the concepts 
will be discussed again in section 3.2, when we discuss the agency of non-elites. 
1.2.2 Interests and desires 
The second concept which is required in order to speak about politics is interests. 
Interest are defined here quite simply as avoiding a change which means a loss in the 
quantity or quality of the resources available to an individual or its associated group, 
and thereby striving to maintain or expand these resources. This definition does not 
prevent individuals and groups from acting against their own interests, whether by 
consciously or by accident. Because resources accumulate unpredictably, are extremely 
varied, and because structures intersect in complex ways, it is very difficult for an 
individual or group to measure the sum of its interests. Even then an individual can 
behave in a manner which clearly goes against her or his interests, and that individual 
can be fully invested in this pursuit. For instance, a Roman soldier could beg his 
commander to start a decimation, even if he had 1/10 chance to die. This behaviour can 
be partly explained by the difference between interests, which can be described as 
objective to the societal position of the individual or group, and desires, which are 
subjective. Individuals have various desires which can encourage them to act in various 
ways.59 An individual does not have to be aware of their desires in order to attempt to 
secure them.60 This is what can be described as unconscious motivations. Even then, 
individuals do not always act in accordance to either their interests or desires: they can 
for instance be coerced by others (consciously or not), or can be conflicted.61 
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57 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 3, 14, 45, 48-51, 55-58, 67, 78, 91-93, 102-103, 192-193. 
58 Ibid., p. 18-19, 136, 183-184, 199. 
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1.2.3 The ‘costs’ of contention 
Individuals and societal groups both can act creatively, often in order to secure interests 
and/or desires. Not every individual or group is equal, as has been asserted, resources 
are unequally distributed.62 This matters because contention is not free. Individuals and 
groups have to mobilise power through the mobilisation of resources. These ‘contention 
costs’, if you will, can be compared to the concept of transaction costs as developed by 
the Institutional and New Institutional Economics.63 Resources can be used in various 
but limited ways: for instance, the strength of one’s body can be instrumental in 
physical violence, as a means of production, or in producing sexual status. It does not 
lend itself to, say, making philosophical or ethical claims in discussions. For this it is 
usually not a legitimate resource. Methods of contention are not universal, but depend 
on concrete instances. The constant threat of physical violence is probably a bad way 
for drawing people into your tavern, while symbolically gifting food to organised rebels 
may prove to be counterproductive. In the same way, resources mobilised in certain 
ways, in certain conditions, can be far more effective than others. Positive affirmation 
by a figure of authority can be great motivator. Here, however, societal groups are again 
important. Persons from differing groups have different responses to various forms of 
motivation. The resources a person or group has to spend in contention, to make other 
individuals conform, are largely dependent on the structural complexes inculcated by 
those other persons. Roman elites and even members of the plebs urbana would 
presumably be open to the clever use of meter in a speech, and could accept this as 
attesting to the character and authority of the orator. While this does not need to be the 
decisive factor for the response of these people to the orator, it would normally have 
been accepted as a legitimate method of debate, even if only unconsciously. One can 
easily assume that a recently captured Gallic slave would be less impressed.64 Structures 
can lower the costs (nationalism can make it easier to demand self-sacrifice) or raise 
them (‘personal liberty’ can make people resilient to direct claims), depending on the 
situation. These aspects of costs will be touched upon in subsection 4.2.2.  
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1.3 Politics 
With the concepts explored in the previous section, we come into the realm of politics. 
Politics operates on different scales, from the family to (in modern times) the global 
scale. On all scales, dominating and subordinated individuals or groups can be 
discerned, although the smaller the scale, the more easily balances can shift as fewer 
persons are engaged in contention. 
It is debatable whether the collection of governing bodies of the Roman late Republic 
can be described as a state.65 However, it cannot be denied that there was a well-
established political sphere, which was central in the lives of many Romans. This section 
will mainly discuss politics on the centralised level of the Roman Republic, such as 
magistrates, priests, senate, and popular assemblies. 
First, the concept of institution and the link with resources will be discussed. Next, a 
general view on central politics will be presented. An argument will be made about the 
link with society, and an interpretation will be given of how political power is 
constituted. Third, although it will be argued that contention is typical for all politics, 
the special case of the distinct concept of contentious politics will be discussed. Political 
groups are crucial for this concept, and we will explore how they mobilise and frame 
their actions, or are demobilised. 
1.3.1 Central governmental institutions 
Governmental institutions form the core of officialised politics. Institutions can be 
defined as structures or linked complexes of structures which organise the relations 
between individuals in an officialised capacity, thereby claiming clear rules. This 
definition is deliberately more restrictive than, for example, the one proposed by 
scholars of New Institutional Economics,66 in order to make a clear difference between 
institutions and structures. The ancient Roman forms of marriage or manumission, the 
 
                                                     
65 See for instance Erdkamp, ‘War and State Formation in the Roman Republic’, p. 97-98; Lintott, The 
Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 1-8; North, ‘The Constitution of the Roman Republic’, passim. 
66 For instance, North: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, 
social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to 
understanding historical change.” North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, p. 3. The 
proposed definition comes closer to NIE’s definition of organisations (Ibid., p. 5, 7; North, Wallis, and Weingast, 
Violence and Social Orders, p. 15-16) or the one of institutions by Tilly: “established, organized, widely recognized 
routines, connections, and forms of organization are employed repeatedly in producing collective action within any 
particular regime.” Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, p. 48. 
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comitia centuriata, and, in our modern day, the omerta and academia are all institutions. 
Mathematics, Latin, and the subject of Ancient History are structures, but they are not 
institutions in the proposed definition, and neither are money (in itself) or friendship.67 
Governmental institutions incorporate a plethora of structures, and therefore can 
decrease the powers-costs of contention. For instance, the institution of imperium 
decreased the individual effort a commander had to undertake in the contention with 
his troops. An augur making the claim that the gods disapproved of a certain course of 
action would have had more influence than a random farmer doing the same thing. 
When individuals take up positions within institutions, they ‘borrow’ resources from 
that position. They can only claim access to them because of the existence of that 
institution.68 These resources include symbolic capital and emotional commitments by 
others to that institution. This ‘borrowing’ of resources is not without its risks. They can 
be lost by the behaviour of the individual. A corrupt quaestor can diminish the belief in 
the legitimacy of the quaestorship itself. 
1.3.2 Politics and society 
Politics, of course, never stands on its own. In order to position these governmental 
institutions in the broader framework of society, we can borrow notions from the work 
of Nicos Poulantzas on the capitalist state.69 Poulantzas convincingly claimed that the 
state is a ‘material condensation’ of the on-going struggle (‘relationship of forces’) 
between societal groups.70 In light of what has been proposed here, this material 
condensation should be interpreted as the various structures which form institutions, 
and inform the individuals occupying positions within them. This materiality can be 
deduced from institutions ‘having’ non-human resources (written laws, for instance, but 
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68 Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 227. 
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also governmental buildings or symbols), but also from the socialisation of new 
members to institutional habits.71 The socialisation of the tribuni plebis will be the 
subject of subsection 4.3.3, and the malleability of the institution will be considered as 
well. The advantage of Poulantzas’ interpretation is that two reductionist views are 
avoided – states as either possessing independent agency, or states as neutral 
instruments of social groups.72 His definition describes the State (or, mutatis mutandis, 
the late Republican political institutions) as a field of contention, with a relatively 
persistent institutional matrix which incorporates opposition and differentiation.73 His 
model does not reduce the state to simply the scene of class struggle, however, as 
political institutions are defined by an overarching architecture which is somewhat 
resistant to continuous changes. While this rigidity could be seen as beneficial to the 
dominant groups, the theory of Poulantzas again is more complex. In his view, 
institutions vary in power and in accessibility by societal groups. Some political 
institutions would have been more open to contention by the senatorial elites (the high 
priesthoods, the senate), while others were relatively accessible to the lower strata of 
society (the tribunate of the plebs, the comitia tributa). The differentiation between and 
relative power of different societal groups is condensed in the institutional architecture 
of political power.74 As we will see, the increased importance of praefecti under Augustus 
reflects the shifted balance towards both the Princeps and the equites. The importance of 
the tribuni plebis in the late Republic and their disappearance in the sources after the 
institution of the triumvirate also follow changes in Roman society. The overall effect of 
the organisation of political power by governmental institutions usually tends to favour 
the dominant coalition of elite groups, in part by helping them to reproduce this 
coalition.75 However, non-elite groups have ‘beachheads of resistance’ in the central 
institutions. Positive policy towards non-dominant groups is often a feature of any 
system of rule, and not merely the result of elite attempts to secure acquiescence.76 It 
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76 Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, p. 30-31, 83-84, 137, 141; Jessop, State Power, p. 123-124. 
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will be argued that the tribunate of the plebs is one such ‘beachhead’, but that there are 
a lot of caveats to this claim. 
Governmental institutions depend on their ability to exert power. One method is the 
reproduction of their legitimacy. Bourdieu’s symbolic capital (the accumulation of the 
belief that social differentiation which advances particular groups and hierarchies can 
be beneficial to all members of society, and should be seen as legitimate), for instance, 
can be an especially useful tool.77 However, symbolic capital is a resource, not an 
internalised mind-set. Staged performances of power, military parades such as triumphs 
for example, can serve to reproduce this resource.78 In general, symbolic capital is 
‘captured’ through so-called WUNC-displays, displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, 
and commitment.79 To reproduce the public transcript and therefore their own 
legitimacy, governmental institutions often organise collective WUNC-displays 
involving an array of societal groups. This is never the sole resource for governmental 
authority, however.80 To once again paraphrase Žižek, even political power which is 
accepted to function legitimately, with the rule of law and a high degree of popular 
participation, has to be backed by the implicit message that governmental institutions 
can do with you what they want.81 In the late Republic, for instance, official violence 
included decimation, the concept of homo sacer, and public execution by throwing 
people from the Tarpeian rock.82 The authority of the central institutions implies the 
exertion of official violence towards members of the dominant coalition as well. This 
was a constant reality in the late Roman Republic, which can be seen for instance in the 
many political trials which ruined members of the elite. 
1.3.3 Contentious politics 
Intertwined with this core of governmental institutions are other forms of politics 
dispersed over broad society. These also have a bearing on the centralised level. 
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Examples are intra-elite weddings or banquets, or mobilisation by subaltern groups. In 
this part, the focus will be to explore contentious politics, as defined by Charles Tilly 
and Sidney Tarrow.83 According to these authors, 
Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on 
someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared 
interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of 
claims, or third parties. Contentious politics thus brings together three familiar 
features of social life: contention, collective action, and politics.84 
Contentious politics are especially visible forms of contention, involving both societal 
groups and governmental institutions. Studying them can be an indirect way to identify 
societal groups, but also can provide insight in the architecture of political power and 
the position of a specific governmental institution. 
Individuals within governmental institutions are involved in these claims, very often 
as the target of expectations on how they should behave. Because these claims often 
intend to upset governmental routines, official rules which restrict contentious politics 
to specific frames of time and space (‘regionalisation’ of contentious politics)85 and to 
specific groups are not uncommon.86 A central element of the politics arising from 
hidden transcripts will, as a response to these restrictions, take the form of an 
ideological ‘guerrilla war’ of contention by disguise and anonymity, to paraphrase 
Scott.87 The techniques of the marginalised “include spirit possession, gossip, aggression 
through magic, rumor, anonymous threats and violence, the anonymous letter, and anonymous 
mass defiance.”88 Governmental institutions then often will attempt to eliminate or 
control the safe spaces where hidden transcripts are produced.89 
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In order for interactions to count as contentious politics, they have to be taken by 
groups which, at least in part, work towards the same ends. These seldom are entire 
societal groups, but rather coalitions between individuals of different backgrounds. 
These coalitions can be ideological groups, religious groups, kinship groups, etc.90 By 
engaging in contentious politics, they constitute political groups, whose identity 
according to Tilly is characterised by boundaries with other groups, shared stories 
about these boundaries, and social relations within and across these boundaries.91 In 
other words, political groups organise which differences should be relevant to their 
members and which should not. WUNC-displays play an important part in organising 
these groups, and in legitimating them towards others. WUNC-displays and other public 
actions often become routine, and involve ‘repertoires of contention’.92 
The time it takes to get people or messages to move may severely inhibit contentious 
action, especially with the technologies available in the late Roman Republic.93 Spaces 
were important in a physical sense. The Forum Romanum limited the size of gathered 
crowds but also provided resources such as inscriptions, statues, temples, and the rostra 
itself. Spaces are often ‘regionalised’, in that individuals can be organised in the ‘front’ 
or ‘back’, appear higher or at the centre at certain times, etc.94 In other words, times and 
spaces are far from neutral, as they are a crucial factor in the mobilisation of power.95 
Besides repression by governmental institutions, political groups face several 
challenges. The process of demobilisation can severely diminish the availability of 
members or resources.96 Mobilising individuals in the first place is no mean feat. It takes 
resources to attract new individuals and resources and to maintain them. Mechanisms 
of mobilisation include brokering between hidden transcripts (between groups in 
different locales or differing structural complexes); diffusion of repertoires of 
contention; the concrete coordination of action between individuals or groups by 
leaders; deactivation of boundaries with new constituent societal groups; incitement of 
certain emotions (by charismatic leaders, for instance); institutionalisation which 
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91 Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, p. 32; Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, p. 9, 78-80. Also Bourdieu, La 
distinction, p. 484. 
92 Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, p. 34, 45; Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, p. 8, 12, 16, 23, 81-82; 
Tilly, Contentious Performances, p. 14-16, 121, 202; Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 150-151. 
93 Sewell, ‘Space in Contentious Politics’, p. 60. 
94 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 64, 124, 282; Jessop, State Power, p. 104; Sewell, ‘Space in Contentious 
Politics’, p. 56-57. 
95 Sewell, ‘Space in Contentious Politics’, p. 68. 
96 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, p. 35, 74, 97-98, 101; Aminzade and McAdam, ‘Emotions and Contentious 
Politics’, p. 44-46; Westby, ‘Strategic Imperative, Ideology, and Frames’, p. 219. For a definition of mechanisms 
and processes, Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, p. 29. 
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maintains political demands and emotional investment.97 Through all these interactions, 
of course, the groups, their repertoires, and structures may change.98 
One important element in mobilisation and the strategic functioning of groups is 
framing.99 Framing is the construction of a relatively coherent narrative with the 
purpose of incorporating a balance between public and hidden transcripts.100 This 
‘frame resonance’ is important as the hidden transcripts are crucial for mobilisation, but 
in achieving its goals a political group must generally refer to the public transcript in 
order to produce ‘moral cover’. Moral cover makes contention with governmental 
institutions feasible, that is, not too costly in terms of contention.101 Frames of meaning 
can shift throughout the contentious politics, and can escalate and de-escalate 
according to the strategies of groups involved.102 
All of these elements may seem very abstract, but will be used throughout this thesis. 
Political groups in the late Republic will be defined in section 3.1, and we will come back 
on the importance of and difficulties with mobilisation in subsection 4.2.2. Contentious 
politics in general is the main subject of this thesis, as the tribunate of the plebs was a 
governmental institution which was involved in claim-making by various groups.  
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1.4 Positioning the tribunate 
So how does the tribunate of the plebs fit into all of this? Throughout this thesis, I will 
use the proposed framework of contention in politics to describe the tribunate, and 
Roman society in general. To simplify the various assertions in this chapter, the 
metaphor of principal-agent relations will be used as a base for contentious politics. The 
tribunate as an institution can be described as the agent in this metaphor. 
Agency theory (which has, confusingly, little in common with the structure-agency 
debate) concerns the analysis of several aspects of principal-agent relations. The theory 
acknowledges that the interests of principals and agents can never be perfectly aligned. 
Second, information asymmetry is a strong feature of this theory. Third, agency theory 
acknowledges that even within the principal-agent relation it is costly to maintain and 
especially monitor an agent. Fourth, by focusing on the metaphor of the contract, the 
fundamentally unstable relation between principal and agent is the very object of 
analysis. As Waterman and Meier have stated in 1998, “Principals seek to manipulate and 
mold the behavior of agents so that they will act in a manner consistent with the principals’ 
preferences.”103 In other words, principals have to engage in contention with agents in 
order to steer their behaviour. 
Principal-agent (P-A) models which derive from economic theory tend to focus on 
formal contracts.104 They mainly investigate how the goals of the principal can be served 
best through deploying various methods of control, such as rewards and supervision. 
The costs to steer agents to perform according to the wishes of the principal are a 
specific form of ‘transaction costs’.105 If we want to transfer this to a terminology 
relevant for governmental institutions, the focus has to be shifted to demands made of 
institutions (agents) by powerful groups (principals) to perform certain tasks. The costs 
which the principals have to bear in order to to control and adjust the behaviour of 
these agents are, as in any contention, ‘power costs’. 
The tribunate of the plebs can be described as an agent in this sense. It will be argued 
that principals constantly engaged in contention with the tribunes in order to ‘mold 
their behaviour’. Principals wanted tribunes to behave in a manner consistent with 
their own expectations. Some qualifying remarks need to be made, however, and will 
 
                                                     
103 Waterman and Meier, ‘Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?’, p. 174. 
104 Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory’, p. 58, 60-65; Waterman and Meier, ‘Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?’, p. 
174; Laffont and Martimort, The Theory of Incentives, p. 3, 28; Sappington, ‘Incentives in Principal-Agent 
Relationships’, p. 45, 51-61. 
105 Moe, ‘The New Economics of Organization’, p. 743, 757, 761, 765-766; Waterman and Meier, ‘Principal-Agent 
Models: An Expansion?’, p. 176; North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, p.21, 33, 54. 
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return throughout this thesis. Not only does the tribunate have various principals, but 
the goals of these principals can also conflict directly, and external individuals or 
groups can become involved as their interests or desires are touched upon.106 
Furthermore, there was normally not one, but ten tribunes occupying the same 
position. In some cases, other governmental institutions than the tribunate were 
valiable alternatives which the principals could activate. Of course, this makes the 
whole principal-agent model more ‘messy’. Agency theory will be primarily used as a 
simplifying metaphor which can help to identify relations in discrete cases, between 
tribunes and societal groups. It will be expanded upon throughout Chapter 4. 
There are some interesting concepts in principal-agent theory which are interesting 
for the analysis of the tribunate by themselves. The first, ‘adverse selection’, is 
important because the tribunes were elected magistrates. It states that principals, in 
this case the voters, upon selecting an agent can never be sure that the agent is 
presenting his/her abilities, motives and values correctly.107 One consequence of this is 
that when persons were elected who did not pay attention to the interests or desires of 
the non-elites, it does not automatically follow that these non-elites did not have any 
influence. Groups may simply have mistaken the values of the candidates. ‘Moral 
hazard’ means that the principal does not know perfectly if the agent is sufficiently 
engaged and committed to secure the goals of the principal.108 A member of the 
senatorial elite who was counting on a tribune to protect him from his enemies might 
have found himself open to attack, if he mistook the commitment of the tribune to his 
cause. Both concepts are a consequence of information being asymmetrically 
distributed between principal and agent, typically to the benefit of the latter.109 
However, this advantage of information for the agent is not a given, and can change 
over time. An agent may be surprised to learn that she/he misunderstood the 
expectations or commitment of the principal. Furthermore, the more principals and 
agents are involved in crisscrossing relations concerning the same issue, the more likely 
information gets equalised, for example through leaks.110 These aspects, in the sense 
that they relate to the tribunate, will be discussed in subsection 4.2.2 of this thesis. 
So, concrete attempts by societal groups or political groups, as principals, to control 
and adjust the behaviour of tribunes of the plebs, as agents, will be the chief focus of 
this thesis. These attempts were instances of primary or secondary contention, 
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depending on which structural complexes framed the interaction. For instance, when a 
member of the non-elites asked a tribune to provide auxilium against the coercitio of the 
consul because this was the traditional duty of a tribune, this was primary contention as 
it referred to the public transcript. Secondary contention takes place when groups to 
which the tribune does not belong – elite Italians without Roman citizenship – demand 
behaviour which was not informed by the public transcript, for example looking after 
the interests of non-citizens. Contention is not necessarily verbal. A crowd smashing the 
fasces of a consul who was obstructing a tribune is also an example of contention with 
that tribune. Contention often took place between large numbers of people, with 
varying groups and agent, with primary and secondary contention running through 
each other. This makes the situations more complex, but it is possible to analyse these 
events with the framework which has been proposed. 
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Chapter 2 Societal Groups in the late Republic: 
demographic, economic, and social structures 
This chapter will provide a sketch of Roman society in the late Republic, in order to lay a 
base for understanding the societal groups which could act as principals for the 
tribunate. The broad societal changes were not only the background to, but a crucial 
element in the actions of the tribunes. Ideally, this overview would combine a definitive 
identification of societal groups which acted as principals with a discussion of their 
interests and desires. It is clear, however, that the sources available for the late Republic 
only allow for a very limited identification of societal groups, and only for an implicit 
appreciation of some of their possible goals at certain times. Given these limits, this 
chapter will present these groups by way of a ‘sketch’. Interests and desires will not be 
explicitly listed, as there is no way to directly prove them. Some interests can be 
guessed at, and where possible shall be mentioned. 
This chapter will be divided into two sections. First, I will discuss some general 
developments of the demography and economy of the Italian peninsula and the Po 
valley in the late Republic. Although our understanding of the term is modern, ‘Italy’ 
will be used to describe this region, and ‘Italians’ as its inhabitants. The broad subjects 
of demography and economy are still heavily debated, and the focus will be on the latest 
developments in the research which are relevant for this thesis. In the second section, 
several factors of differentiation between several societal groups in ancient Italy will be 
scrutinised.  
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2.1 General demography and economy of Italy 
First, it is important to establish the major demographic and economic evolutions of the 
late Republican period. These two factors are closely linked, and have a massive impact 
on our general understanding of Roman (and Italian) society. They determined most of 
the broad context of the diverse lived experiences of the Roman populace, such as life 
expectancy, fertility and mortality, the standard of living, the conditions and use of 
labour, the forms of agrarian and non-agrarian production, the relative size of the slave 
population, the impact of Rome’s military mobilisation... Differentiation and struggle in 
the late Republic cannot be understood independently from our understanding of 
demography and economy.1 
Both subjects inspire much discussion even today. Much is still unknown. Informed 
guesses are almost always disputed. Undoubtedly, scholarly interpretations will further 
develop in the future and potentially completely overturn our understanding of late 
Republican society. For now, an attempt will be made to present first demographic and 
then economic evolutions as I believe they are interpreted at the moment. As this is not 
the core topic of this thesis, what I offer in this chapter is just a brief reconstruction of 
far more complex sets of arguments. If I simplify or particularly emphasise specific 
elements, I do so primarily for the purposes of the broader argument developed in this 
thesis regarding the political role of the tribunes, and not to make my own contribution 
to these debates on economic and demographic developments in the late Roman Republic. 
2.1.1 Demographic evolutions 
The scholars who have produced the various estimates of the population size of Italy in 
the late Republic and Early Empire are divided into proponents of three models: the so-
called high (Launaro, Lo Cascio, Wiseman)2, low (Brunt, de Ligt, Hopkins, Scheidel)3, and 
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2 Launaro, Peasants and Slaves; Lo Cascio, ‘Recruitment and the Size of the Roman Population from the Third to 
the First Century BCE’; Lo Cascio, ‘The Size of the Roman Population’; Lo Cascio, ‘Roman Census Figures and 
Property Qualification’; Lo Cascio, ‘Urbanization as a Proxy of Growth’; Wiseman, ‘The Census in the First 
Century B.C.’. Also see Morley, ‘The Transformation of Italy, 225-28 B.C.’. 
3 Brunt, Italian Manpower; de Ligt, ‘Poverty and Demography’; de Ligt, ‘The Population of Cisalpine Gaul in the 
Time of Augustus’; de Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers; Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves; Scheidel, ‘Human 
Mobility in Roman Italy, I’; Scheidel, ‘Roman Population Size’. 
  57 
middle (Hin)4 counts. The main cause of the considerable variation between the various 
estimates is disagreement about the interpretation of the surviving Republican and 
Augustan census figures for the number of Roman citizens. The figures show an 
enormous leap in the number of citizens in 28 BCE compared to earlier Republican 
counts, which has been explained in various ways.5 If we summarise the various 
viewpoints, we might say that low counters argue that Augustan censors started to 
include women and children alongside men. The high counters claim that, while the 
method of registration improved slightly, there was no change in the groups which 
were counted, as these were still only adult men. Hin with her middle count argues that 
the census under the Principate included sui iuris women and children, besides the sui 
iuris men who had been the only persons counted in the Republic. Within these three 
‘camps’, there is some more variation between the views of different scholars, but 
summarised for the Italian population in 28 BCE, including Gallia Cisalpina, the low 
count commonly supports a number of 5,2 to 7 million (mainly depending on the 
number of slaves) while the high count suggests one in the range of 14 million.6 Hin’s 
middle count provides several scenarios, but she prefers a population around 8.2 million 
and counts fewer slaves than the highest ‘low count’ numbers.7 
One of the most important consequences of the discrepancy between these numbers 
is the implications that they have for our interpretations of the growth of the free 
population.8 The high count supposes that the last two centuries of the Republic saw an 
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Roman Italy, p. 295. Oddly, the average growth rate by these numbers is not 0,18% p.a. as Hin provides, but 
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extraordinarily high increase of the free population (around 0,41% p.a.). Given 
comparative evidence this number is rather unlikely, all the more because this was a 
very violent episode in Italy’s history, and because this growth would not have made the 
large influx of slaves economically viable, let alone necessary. Until recently, it was 
supposed that the low count implied a negative population growth or at least a 
stagnation, especially for the rural population. De Ligt has revised the model to allow for 
(very low) growth (0,04% p.a.).9 This growth is rather low compared to other historical 
societies, especially if we take into account that the institution of manumission also 
provided for a rise of the free population. The middle count, then, suggests a modest 
growth (0,15% p.a.). For the starting date of this study, 112 BCE, the different models do 
not readily provide numbers. Taking into account the numbers that they do give, and 
presupposing a constant growth (which is of course a vast simplification), the free 
population of the peninsula in 112 would have been 9,5-10,8 million (high count), 4,1 
million (low count), or 5,9 million (middle count). All three scenarios have their merits 
and their problems, and it is not the purpose of this thesis to choose between them. 
Luckily, recent scholarship has evened out some of the differences, ensuring that the 
implications of choosing between these estimates are less dramatic for the 
interpretation of some vital aspects of Roman society than they seemed in the past. 
Recent studies, which are increasingly based on archaeological surveys, confirm that 
there must have been at least some demographic growth in the final two centuries BCE, 
even for the free Italian rural population.10 Only the regions of central Etruria and 
southern Italy seem to have experienced a stagnation or limited decline, slipping from 
their position of dominance in previous centuries. One factor in population growth until 
midway the first century, besides natural growth, was net immigration towards Italy 
(through slavery, but also free will). After 50 the migratory balance seems to have 
shifted towards emigration away from the peninsula.11 The primary cause of this shift 
was that colonies were increasingly founded in the provinces, rather than Italy. The 
number of Roman citizens permanently residing outside of Italy rose from 150.000 adult 
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10 de Ligt, ‘Poverty and Demography’; de Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, p. 10; de Ligt, ‘Urban Archaeology, 
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men in 49 to 375.000 in 28, mostly in the western half of the empire.12 These numbers do 
not even take the legions into account, which did keep large numbers of citizens outside 
of Italy on a permanent basis. The nature of the Roman presence in the provinces 
changed too, and evolved from mostly small communities, often as parts of larger cities, 
to a general trend of full-fledged colonies as they had already been present in Italy.13 
Roman Italy was characterised by a ‘high-pressure demographic regime’. This 
concretely means that survival on the medium term was highly uncertain for the entire 
population, and that death was a constant in the life of the Italian population.14 The 
population dynamics was characterised by a high percentage of both fertility and 
mortality. The age structure of Roman Italy remains debated, despite the use of model 
life tables in recent decades. These tables are not perfect even if they can be used, as 
they hide large regional and temporal variations. Researchers have generally used the 
Coale and Demeny ‘Model West level 3’ to describe the Roman Empire.15 Life expectancy 
at birth cannot be determined any more specifically than that it must have been 
between 20 and 30 years. The average age at which Romans married differed 
significantly between the sexes: for women it was c. 20, for men it was c. 30. One of the 
reasons for this strong difference in marital age was conscription in the Roman army. 
The last two centuries of the Republic were characterised by an increasing percentage 
of the population residing in the cities. De Ligt has argued that regardless of which 
overall demographic model is preferred, the rate of urbanisation in Italy (excluding 
Rome and counting only towns larger than 20 ha.) must have been between 15 and 20% 
at the end of the Republic.16 Campania and Latium had a more dense urban network of 
medium- (20-40 ha.) and large-sized (>40 ha.) towns than the other regions.17 Most 
population centres, however, were smaller than this. 
The city of Rome itself was huge (1.370 to 1.800 ha.), especially given pre-industrial 
levels.18 The inhabitants of the metropolis formed a large fraction of the entire 
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population of Italy. Around 112, estimates about the inhabitants of the sprawling city 
vary between 375.000 and 500.000.19 In 50 this would have expanded to at least 600.000. 
By 28, the population of the Roman Urbs would have grown to the extent that it 
numbered around 800.000 to 1.000.000 persons (up to 19,2% of the entire Italian 
population according to the low count).20 This growth was due to two factors: the 
massive immigration of free citizens to the city, and the increasing presence of slaves 
and manumitted freedmen.21 
The population density of the city has been estimated between 45.000 and 65.000 
persons/km², which is impressive even for modern sprawls.22 One consequence of this 
was undoubtedly the further proletarianisation of the city populace. Other concerns 
caused by the extremely high population density were – given the total absence of any 
permanent policing force until 52 – rampant violence, extortion, and other crimes.23 
Furthermore, the city must have been plagued by many diseases, such as tuberculosis, 
measles, salmonella, and dysentery.24 Another epidemiologic factor was the spread of 
malaria in the last two centuries BCE, not only in Rome itself but as a factor for large 
parts of Italy. Despite all these factors, some recent scholarship has claimed (through 
comparison with pre-industrial Chinese cities) that the Urbs did not necessarily form an 
‘urban graveyard’ for new migrants. Migration between the city and the countryside 
could spread diseases, and therefore resistance to them. 
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24 Erdkamp, ‘Mobility and Migration in Italy in the Second Century BC’, p. 438-444; Hin, ‘Population’, p. 159; 
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2.1.2 Development of the economy 
Let us turn to economic factors. Perhaps most importantly, it is clear that economic 
activities expanded during the late Republic. Population growth and urbanisation are 
some indicators for this, and were supplemented by an increasing specialisation.25 The 
wealth of attested professions in the epigraphic habit of the Principate confirms 
proliferation of specialised labour. The Italian peninsula also saw a very strong increase 
in trade: over sea, river, and land.26 The expansion of the Roman road network, the 
efforts against piracy (however erratic), the monetisation of Roman society, and the 
steep increase in persons occupied in money-lending and -exchange were only some of 
the elements beneficial to trade. The conquests of the Roman army in the last two 
centuries BCE, while undoubtedly causing excess deaths and problems for fertility, also 
meant an enormous flow of food and riches to Italy, and fewer problems with a surplus 
male agrarian population.27 Not all of the riches which were taken to Italy immediately 
disappeared into the pockets of the rich, and part of that which did was eventually 
distributed through the institution of euergetism, elite spending in the cities, or, 
somewhat more bleakly, the proscription of large parts of the elites. Aside from these 
general evolutions, both rural and urban production saw specific evolutions during this 
timeframe. 
Recent studies have established, contrary to earlier theories, that slaves did not 
predominantly constitute the workforce in agricultural production.28 Only in Etruria, 
Apulia, and along the Italian coastline there appears to have been a significant relative 
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increase in medium or large estates, which traditionally are thought to have been run 
on slave labour. Everywhere else the increase seems to have gone hand in hand with an 
equally higher attestation of small farms. As a result of these studies, current theories 
on Roman agriculture emphasise the increasing importance of tenants in the late 
Republic, which would not have been as visible in the archaeological record. Tenancy 
would have alleviated the consequences of the proletarianisation of the rural 
population: a family could be sustained despite shrinking property if they could keep 
part of the produce which was produced working on the land of a landlord. Similarly, 
another form of labour that increased in importance was wage labour. Aside from the 
rural population, urban populations (including those from the Roman Urbs) engaged in 
agrarian production through a form of seasonal migration.29 
Small property holding, even if it decreased in certain regions, probably remained 
the most common form of production. Very likely, this was often and increasingly 
combined with tenancy. Especially in central Italy (Latium, Campania, Sabinum), many 
private plots probably had become smaller.30 Halfway the second century there had 
been a reduced readiness to serve in the legions and a smaller influx of wealth from 
warfare. Additionally, a slight economic downturn in the urban centres of central Italy 
would have temporarily limited the desire to migrate to the cities.31 Both developments 
resulted in a surplus rural population and the fragmentation of small properties. Fierce 
competition for land in this area was encouraged by the nearness of urban centres (and 
therefore markets for agrarian produce), which led to the sale of plots to large 
landowners. As a consequence of the sale and division of plots, the census figures 
showed progressively fewer peasants in the higher census classes, and many peasants 
even became completely ineligible for military service. On top of this, it is likely that 
proletarians were less motivated to register themselves. This gave rise to a vision of a 
depopulated countryside worked by slaves. In fact, of course, most of these rural regions 
were overpopulated by freeborn plebeians with only little property. The privatisation 
and redistribution of the ager publicus at the end of the second century sought to deal 
with this relative surplus population of the Roman heartland. Agrarian laws relocated 
significant portions of the population to publicly owned land in the periphery: regions 
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such as Gallia Cisalpina, Picenum, Samnium, and southern Italy.32 Although this proved 
to be a successful temporary solution to the problem of the heartland, this was a 
devastating blow for the Italian Allies, who had previously been allowed to continue 
their use of the ager publicus. The privatisation of the ager publicus seems to have been 
completed by Caesar’s laws in 59. The tribunes of the plebs were central to these issues, 
and the founding of colonies will be touched upon later in this thesis. 
There are several indicators for a rise in agricultural productivity.33 While the 
specialised ‘villa economy’ certainly did not become the predominant form of 
production, medium-sized farms did allow for a fraction of their activities to be invested 
in agricultural specialisation such as viticulture. Especially in the immediate vicinity of 
Rome, production for the urban market must have become important – perhaps even 
more so in the production of vegetables. This was also the case for peasants. There was 
no evolution to monocultures in Italy, and mixed farms remained the norm. 
Agricultural manuals like the one by Cato the elder became more prolific from the 
second century onwards, showing some interest in maximising productivity. However, 
modern scholarship usually presents elite attention to productivity as minimal. Cattle 
appears to have been quite large in this period, which signifies some attention to 
selective breeding and growing specific feeds. The collection of human waste from the 
cities and its use as manure could have improved yields. Technological innovation was 
rather limited, but more efficient presses and a donkey-mill were invented, as were 
techniques of cultivation. The watermill was introduced to Italy during this timeframe, 
but its diffusion was still very limited. The spread of tenancy could have helped to 
improve productivity through shared investments in tools or storage spaces. 
Furthermore, during and before the timeframe under scrutiny, climatic conditions seem 
to have become slightly better for agricultural needs (although they did also allow for 
the spread of malaria). 
The immense growth of the Italian urban market, mainly through the development of 
Rome, went together with a significant increase in specialisation and trade. The Urbs 
could not have survived on its scale without the influx of huge quantities of riches and 
subsidised grain from the provinces, or indeed without the spending of the elites, but 
the urban populace was not inactive. The city population of Rome was in fact so 
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energetically engaged in commerce and production during the late Republic that Caesar 
had to ban wheeled traffic during most of the daytime.34 
Logistics was unsurprisingly a significant source of employment. To supply the 
population (especially in Rome), there must have been considerable numbers of 
dockworkers, muleteers, porters...35 As a trade hub which also had to supply its own 
massive population, the Urbs constantly housed numerous traders, sailors, rowers, and 
guards-for-hire for trade caravans. The internal commerce of the cities must have been 
quite extensive, ranging from wholesalers to small taverns and informal petty traders 
such as hawkers.36 Like the rural economy, labour in the cities was tied to the seasons. 
Summer seems to have featured the largest influx of wage labourers to the cities, 
especially Rome, due to it being the high point of the overseas trading season.37 Other 
busy periods were linked to large building projects. 
The productive industry of the cities was another sector in which a significant 
portion of the populace was active.38 Compared to early Imperial times, the high 
percentage of Italians tied up in the legions probably made (skilled) labour relatively 
scarce, despite the high urbanisation. Compared to the early Principate, therefore, we 
can expect skilled craftsmen to have been paid better and a larger number of slaves 
engaged as craftsmen.39 Nevertheless, large workshops still were the exception, not the 
rule. They would have been limited to certain specific tasks in the labour process which 
benefitted from concentration (because of high investment costs of tools, the 
continuous need for large quantities of ‘products’, or the production of unwanted by-
products such as odour). Generally, the urban examples which are known were limited 
to specific processes within the food and textile industry, such as dye-makers, fullers, 
and bakers.40  
The main unit of production in the late Republic was the small 
workshop/shop/house: the taberna or officina.41 The archaeological material rarely 
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attests a clear distinction between production and sale. Only some of these units appear 
to have been constructed with specialised provisions, such as built-in basins or ovens, 
while most examples are very generic. The tabernae industry was relatively small-scale 
and specialised. Especially luxury goods , such as those made of precious metals or 
jewellery, had long chains of workmen devoted to their production. The building 
industry, which in Rome must have employed at least 6% of the entire urban population, 
was specialised as well.42 Contractors focussing on ‘interior decoration’ are attested, and 
so are specialists in working with marble and those who mainly did constructions with 
concrete. The generally high degree of specialisation with co-dependent small 
workshops as its basis was made possible by vast ‘subcontracting networks’.43 The 
collegia played an important part in linking individual craftsmen through social ties, as 
did the clustering of skilled labourers of similar professions into neighbourhoods. 
Similarly, amicitia, patronage, and societates lowered transaction costs for elite economic 
activity.44 
Few technological advances are attested for the urban industries. The one exception 
was the development of concrete in the second century BC, which was spread during 
the first century. Concrete allowed for new types of construction and more cost-
effective work, but probably did not limit the demand for workmen.45  
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2.2 Societal groups 
The population of Italy was differentiated along several axes, ‘fractures’ which ran 
across Roman society. In this section, we will identify several of these factors, and mark 
some changes during the late Republic. These properties are legal status, sex, socio-
economic factors, and geographical and cultural factors. Together, these axes 
constituted a grid. Persons sharing a position on this grid had similar lived experiences, 
and were differentiated from others, as has been established in the theoretical 
framework.46 This differentiation was even to some inscribed into the body of 
individuals. Social mobility by persons and the groups they belonged to was an 
important part of their lived experiences and had an impact in the formation of their 
desires as well. Unfortunately, the sources which are available do not allow for a very 
fine ‘grid’, or for a thorough analysis of the social mobility of large groups of people. 
To give an example of this differentiation, the tribunes of the plebs all were freeborn, 
male, Roman citizens, who were members of the equestrian census class. These 
elements were important for their incorporated structural complexes and their 
interests and desires. There were differences between tribunes too, however, such as 
the history of their families, their present and past economic situation, and their 
geographical origins (urban or rural, which region of Italy, or , later on, even one of the 
provinces was possible). The sum of these elements were important for the societal 
group to which a tribune belonged, for instance impoverished members of the nobilitas 
versus nouveau riche forerunners of their families of the senatorial rank. 
Societal groups and the differences between them are important for our 
interpretation of struggle in the late Republic. Societal groups which established 
collective projects were one type of principal for the tribunes, together with political 
groups and very powerful individuals. Their interests and desires are very relevant for 
the interpretation of contention with the tribunate. Although these aspects cannot be 
fully reconstructed, describing the ‘rifts’ in Roman society does provide us with an idea 
about which these interests and desires could have been. 
2.2.1 Legal status 
Within all the broad categories of differentiation, the factor of legal status is one of the 
most easily identified. As legal status was meant to have apparent consequences in 
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public life, it was important to keep these differences as clear-cut as possible. The 
elements of legal status which will be discussed here are freeborn – freedperson – slave, 
sui iuris – alieni iuris, forms of citizenship, census class, and tribus. 
Perhaps the most crucial division in legal status was that between free, freed, and slave. 
While its economy was not dominated by slave labour, Rome definitely was a slave 
society.47 Scheidel has estimated that the slave population in Italy would have risen 
from around 200.000-300.000 in 225 to around 1,2 million by the time of Augustus.48 This 
last number neatly broke down into 600.000 rural slaves, 300.000 in Rome, and another 
300.000 in the other cities of Italy combined. The increase of the slave population would 
have required a total import of about 3 to 4 million slaves. These estimates are highly 
speculative, and other researchers have preferred either lower or much higher 
numbers.49 The form of slavery in Rome of course was classical chattel slavery. 
The simple division between free and slave hides vast differences within the slave 
population.50 Some Italian slaves were used in strenuous agricultural labour or as 
rowers, others were specialists, and a few were the ‘personal assistants’ of the Roman 
elites. Many slaves were born as slaves. Others were originally freeborn but sold 
themselves or were sold by their parents, or were enslaved as a punishment, while yet 
others became slaves through war or piracy. A slave could have been born on Italian 
soil, in the provinces, or even outside of the empire. Between two recently captured 
Gallic slaves, one might have been a famous nobleman, the other a subsistence farmer. 
Two Hellenistic slaves may have followed completely different religious customs. 
Modern researchers can only guess to what degree previous identities remained 
important, especially because it must often have been a highly personal matter. 
The importance of slavery was not only in numbers, but also in their ‘role’ in the 
Roman economy.51 The elites preferred slaves to free men or women as their domestic 
servants. Because the fate of a slave entirely depended on the whims of their master, but 
signified an investment as well, it was often thought to be worthwhile to spend money 
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on their education. Many persons of specialised professions – such as actors, doctors, 
scribes, or teachers – were slaves.52 Elites sometimes granted their slaves a peculium: an 
amount of money, a business, or even a plot of land which they could manage, but 
which remained the property of the master. If the slave made enough profit, he or she 
could even buy their own freedom. Some slaves could achieve a fairly high standard of 
living. Towards the end of the Republic, more and more freedmen would have been 
relatively rich. 
The institution of manumission was widespread in Roman society, with estimates at 
the end of the first century of 16.000 manumissions per year.53 At the end of the first 
century, the number of freedmen in the city of Rome has been estimated at 50.000-
100.000.54 Freedmen became full Roman citizens if their manumission was performed in 
the presence of a magistrate. Freedmen invariably became part of one of the four urban 
tribes, which limited the impact of their vote. They could never hold (most of the) 
public honours, including any form of magistracy, and could normally not serve in the 
military except as rowers. Besides these legal limitations, they were expected to remain 
subservient to their former masters through performing operae and through supporting 
their patron in times of need. If their former master was a senator, freedmen were 
expected to be present for the daily salutationes in the morning, at the domus of their 
patron.55 Furthermore, a patron could go to court if his freedman abandoned him in his 
time of need. 
Many slaves did not have it quite so good.56 Physical and mental abuse was the norm, 
slaves could be put to death or tortured on a whim, and sometimes sick or old slaves 
were manumitted or otherwise left to their own devices. The promise of freedom was 
probably not very pronounced for slaves performing arduous labour such as mining. 
Slaves escaping their fate was probably quite common, and there were several large 
slave revolts during the Roman Republic. Two of these fall into the timeframe of this 
thesis: the Second Servile War between 104 and 100 in Sicily, and the most famous, the 
Third Servile War between 73 and 71, mainly taking place in the Italian heartland and 
led by the escaped gladiator Spartacus.57 The leadership in 104 was based on a typical 
 
                                                     
52 Herrmann-Otto, ‘Slaves and Freedmen’, p. 62; Hin, The Demography of Roman Italy, p. 50; Holleran, Shopping in 
Ancient Rome, p. 28-32. 
53 Herrmann-Otto, ‘Slaves and Freedmen’; Mouritsen, The Freedman in the Roman World, p. 120-205; Treggiari, 
Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic, passim. For the numbers, see Herrmann-Otto, ‘Slaves and Freedmen’, p. 
68. In Scheidel’s low count of 5,2 million, this alone would account of a rise of the free population of 0,3% p.a. 
54 Herrmann-Otto, ‘Slaves and Freedmen’, p. 73; Morley, ‘Population Size and Social Structure’, p. 40, 42. 
55 Scheidel, ‘Slavery’, p. 101-102; Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic, p. 68-81. 
56 Herrmann-Otto, ‘Slaves and Freedmen’, p. 70. 
57 Golden, Crisis Management during the Roman Republic, p. 70-79; Shaw, ‘The Great Transformation’, p. 200-204; 
Welwei, ‘Das Sklavenproblem als politischer Faktor in der Krise der römischen Republik’. 
  69 
aspect of infrapolitics, leadership based on magical authority, and copied the 
institutions of Roman and Hellenic public transcripts. On several occasions, political 
leaders attempted to recruit slaves to support their own cause in exchange for freedom. 
It should be noted that free citizens were not necessarily free according to our 
understanding, as there was a big difference between citizens sui iuris and those alieni 
iuris.58 Some citizens fell under the jurisdiction and control (‘patria potestas’) of another – 
whether this was a biological or adoptive (grand)father, or a husband in a marriage cum 
manu. They could theoretically not hold property or affect legal transactions, even if 
they were adult, and were liable to punishment by the paternal figure. Legally, the basic 
structure of Roman society was the extended family, which included slaves, in which all 
the rights and property belonged to the pater familias. The pater familias had the 
possibility to emancipate his children, ousting them from his potestas, but also legally 
from the use of his property. Emancipatio seems to have been quite common among the 
urban elites when a son married.59 Wealthy families often granted a peculium to 
dependent unmarried sons to sustain themselves. For other groups in society, the 
emancipation of sons was much less common. Rural peasant families would benefit from 
being an extended family if a son was in the military or performing wage labour, 
providing a supplement to their own income.60 Some Romans must have lived lives in 
some sense parallel to those of modern migrant workers, residing in areas with higher 
wages or labour opportunities and sporadically returning home to share the earnings 
with their extended family. Urban proletarians likely had small nuclear families, if any, 
as a result of mobility or out of necessity to have fewer mouths to feed.61 The free grain 
distribution in Rome may have changed this. Familial structure may have had profound 
effects on different groups in Roman society, and pietas was at least among the elites 
reproduced as an important value. 
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Other differences became less relevant in the course of the late Republic, such as the 
different forms of citizenship.62 In 112, Italy was anything but united, and featured many 
independent city-states. The one characteristic which these all shared is that each of 
them was in a separate alliance with Rome, and that their independence was limited 
through Roman command over their military.63 There were two types of Italian allies 
(socii): the ones which were not granted any special relation, and the Latin communities. 
Citizenship of a Latin community implied some favourable relations with Rome: they 
had the right to produce legal offspring with Roman spouses, their trade enjoyed legal 
protection, and if they acquired residency in the city of Rome they could vote in Roman 
assemblies. As of 121, it was forbidden to flog Latin (but not other) allies.64 Some of the 
Latin allied communities had been founded by Rome as large colonies (often 2000-5000 
families).65 They were independent, but their ruling bodies were modelled after Rome. 
Their senior magistrates usually were quattorviri. Rome also sent out colonists who 
retained their Roman citizenship. In the earlier history of the Republic these Roman 
colonies had often been founded in existing communities, which had the effect of 
replacing the original city-state by a Roman dependency. They had often been much 
smaller (300 families), and while some local business was decided by duoviri and a 
senate, they were not independent city-states.66 Other communities in Italy were under 
full Roman control. These municipia also existed in two forms: those with no specific 
limitations, and those with civitas sine suffragio. The second largest in Italy, Capua, was 
an example of this last type. 
The position of the allies had become less and less interesting throughout the second 
century BCE.67 One of the most painful elements was the obligation to supply troops: a 
large part of the Roman armies consisted of allied citizens. As Rome expanded, more and 
more troops were needed, which placed an immense burden on the allied communities. 
These armies were led by Romans, and discrimination between Roman and allied troops 
was uncommon but not entirely absent. The benefits of Rome’s wars were progressively 
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more appropriated by Rome itself, such as the influx of wealth from the provinces. 
Magistrates, in their dealings with the socii, often were authoritarian. Roman officials 
meddled in disputes between other city-states. On several occasions, allied citizens were 
expelled from Rome. Furthermore, beginning at the end of the second century, Rome 
began to solve the problem of overpopulation in its heartland by re-appropriating ager 
publicus which was de facto being used by its allies. The new colonies had an enormous 
impact on the region in which they were established. Rome tried to entice the Italian 
elites with favours, such as rewarding those who successfully prosecuted Roman 
senators or local Latin magistrates with Roman citizenship, but it was clearly not 
enough (or what they desired).68 
All these factors aggrieved the allies, and ultimately resulted in the Social War.69 In 
91, riots broke out in Asculum. The local populace murdered most of the Roman citizens 
present in the city. Towards the end of the year, many of the socii revolted against 
Rome, forming their own state of ‘Italia’. The resulting war was hideously destructive to 
both sides. The outcome of the Social War between 91 and 87 in terms of legal status was 
the en masse granting of Roman citizenship to many allied citizens. In a first phase, 
through the lex Iulia in 90, many Latin communities were integrated into the Roman 
city-state in order to secure their manpower. In 89, the communities in Gallia Cisalpina 
north of the Po were granted Latin benefits, those south of the river could receive 
Roman citizenship. Other allies which had remained loyal were given the option to 
become full citizens as well. The tribunician lex Plautia Papiria granted the option of 
Roman citizenship to individual citizens of Italian communities if they presented 
themselves within 60 days to the urban praetor. As more and more groups of the 
rebellious Italians surrendered, the independence of their communities was taken away 
and they were given Roman citizenship. It was only with the census of 70, however, that 
most of the new citizens were effectively inscribed into the 35 tribes. Throughout the 
first century BCE, more Roman colonies were established all over Italy, sometimes with 
the intention to integrate some of the rare communities which had remained 
independent. By the time of Caesar’s civil war, the peninsula was fully Roman, and by 44 
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tribunician laws (the lex Roscia and/or lex Rubria) had granted full Roman citizenship to 
the northern parts of Gallia Cisalpina.70 
Whereas the legal differences had disappeared, the Social War left deep rifts in Italian 
society. The loss of so many lives was not erased in a couple of years, or even decades.71 
Relatively few new Roman citizens would become Roman senators before Caesar’s 
dictatorship, especially those who came from towns which did not have Latin rights 
prior to the war.72 This cannot only be attributed to a lack of elite networks, as relations 
such as hospitium and vicinitas certainly were present before the Social War. Another 
factor must have been the Roman assemblies, which were notoriously xenophobic on 
several occasions (Cicero’s defeat of Rullus’s agrarian law being one example). Even if 
Italy was officially united, many of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ citizens held some enduring 
grudges against one another. 
The census attempted to supply an overview of the Roman citizen population and fix 
several aspects of their status.73 It had three objectives: identify potential recruits for 
the legions, register the taxable population, and determine who had which voting 
rights. Besides the factors of age and sex, the execution of all three aspects was heavily 
dependent on the property qualification of the citizens. The unit of registration was the 
sui iuris citizen, the only unit which could possess property. This does not necessarily 
mean that our sources only gave the number of sui iuris citizens. Before, or possibly 
during the timeframe under consideration (a probable terminus ante quem is after the 
Social War, the census of 86/85), the census became decentralised, so declarations were 
not only organised in Rome. 
By 112, the Roman citizenry was divided into 193 centuriae.74 Some details of this 
division are unknown, because the evidence between Livy, Dionysius and Cicero is very 
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muddled.75 18 of the centuriae were those of the equites, being freeborn male members of 
families of which the pater familias owned at least 400.000 sestertii, and who were 
considered to display morals deemed good enough by the censors.76 Only persons 
belonging to this census class could be candidates for the highest offices of the Republic. 
Among these 18 centuries were, if they still existed, the ‘sex suffragia’, 6 centuries which 
contained either the patricians or, more likely, the patricians plus all current senatorial 
families. The next military level was that of the pedites, comprised of 170 centuries. It 
was divided into 5 census classes. Originally, every class of the pedites had been equally 
split between centuries of seniores (aged 45+) and iuniores (18-45), but this might have 
changed by the late Republic. The first class of the pedites was the largest in number of 
centuries: 70. However, as there was a property criterion of 100.000 sestertii, each 
centuria contained the smallest number of actual members. One of the centuries of 
iuniores of the first class was assigned by lot to be the praerogativa centuria, which voted 
before all others. Much less is known about the other 100 centuries of the pedites, spread 
over four classes in an unknown manner. Rathbone has argued that the property 
qualifications for the second through fifth centuria were respectively: 75.000 sestertii, 
50.000 sestertii, 20.000 sestertii, and lastly 375 sestertii.77 Seeing that this property 
belonged to an entire extended family, and that subsistence for one person was around 
480 sesterces per year,78 this prerequisite for the fifth class was very low. The remaining 
5 centuries were those of the non-combatants: tignarii (carpenters), fabri (artisans), 
tubicines (trumpeters), cornicines (horn players), and finally the accensi (the proletarians, 
falling below the fifth class). We do not know for a certainty how people were 
practically assigned to the four centuries which had nothing to do with property, but 
rather with profession or skill. It is not entirely impossible that membership of the 
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relevant collegium gave citizens the right to be inscribed in these centuriae. Another 
important but difficult question is how many citizens fell under the category of the 
proletarians. The opinion of Dionysius, that the proletarian centuria was as large as the 
remainder of the centuriae combined should surely be taken with a grain of salt.79 This 
might have been true for the population within the city of Rome, however. 
Through the voting procedure in the comitia centuriata, the property classes gave a 
very disproportionate amount of power to the wealthiest of the Roman citizenry.80 
Originally, this had been ‘compensated’ by the disproportionate efforts which were 
expected of the rich, who not only had to pay more taxes, but also had to supply 
relatively more soldiers to the legions (through the larger proportional number of 
centuriae). However, even before 112 the manipular form of warfare had given way to 
the cohortal system, and the type of troops became standardised.81 Together with 
changes in the levy and the proletarianisation of the legions in the last century BCE, this 
meant that the rich became less and less responsible for manning the legions. 
Furthermore, the tributum had not been raised since 168. The larger ‘commitment’ of 
the rich to the Republic had disappeared altogether. 
Lastly, another factor of the legal status of citizens was their tribus.82 Theoretically, the 
tribus had covered fixed geographic regions, with 4 urban tribes in Rome and 31 rural 
tribes in its hinterland of Latium, Campania and Sabinum. The high mobility of the 
Italian populace would have upset this neat division, however, especially in the cities. 
With the new colonies of the second century and especially the grant of Roman 
citizenship to almost all of Italy in the 80s, the tribes lost all semblance of territorial 
coherence, as there were no further attempts to geographically link tribes. The legal 
division did not lose all meaning. It remained an important factor in the identity of a 
person, and the tribune of a person often was given together with his name. The tribes 
remained especially important as the unit of the populace for voting in the comitia 
tributa.83 The tribuni plebis were elected by this assembly, as were the quaestors and 
plebeian aediles, and the same assembly voted on the legislative proposals made by the 
tribunes. Other uses for the tribal divisions in the late Republic were the delegation of 
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the tribuni aerarii in the juries between 70 and 46, and the distribution of grain and other 
gifts to the urban populace. It is however quite unlikely that the tribes were formalised 
organisations, with fixed officers (curatores, divisores) and headquarters, as for instance 
Taylor and Lintott have proposed. 
2.2.2 Sex 
The differences in terms of social and legal position and political rights between men 
and women were quite large in the Roman Republic, even if they were not so extreme as 
in Classical Greece, for example.84 Most researchers agree that Roman women often had 
a lot of freedom in practice, and Roman society was not marked by strict segregation 
between the spaces of men and women. The spread of Roman rule over the 
Mediterranean meant some improvement for the status of women, but then mostly elite 
women.85 Women could hold property if they were sui iuris, but could not legally control 
it independently. Women who married sine manu, which became the large majority in 
the late Republic (in the form of ‘usus’), were protected from all sorts of abuse by their 
husbands, as they were not under his power. Domestic violence was legally prohibited 
as well. Divorce became usual in the first century BCE, and it was fully possible for the 
wife to take the initiative in leaving her husband. 
Despite this (for a pre-modern society) relatively positive position of women in the 
late Republic, female agency played no consistently significant part in official public life. 
Women could not vote, let alone stand for office. Those who did exert political power 
often did this indirectly, and the few elite examples we have (Clodia, Fulvia) did not 
enjoy a positive reputation in our sources.86 An important structural exception in the 
Republic were the public priesthoods, such as the Vestal virgins, daughters of elite 
houses who often had much political significance, and priestesses of Ceres.87 Because of 
the limited influence women were allowed to have in political life, and because the 
sources do not permit an alternative, most of this thesis will deal with men. 
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2.2.3 Socio-economic factors 
In this subsection, we will look at a variety of socio-economic factors in the late 
Republic. The divisions of the census classes attest that Rome was marked by vast 
differences in wealth. However, they imply that there must have been middling groups 
as well.88 This by no means indicates that anything existed like a modern middle class, 
or even very broad middle classes in the Weberian sense as Mayer has proposed, but 
there were broad groups which fell between permanently uncertain existence and a 
‘leisured’ group.89 In the late Republic, some few members of these middling groups may 
even have consolidated this position, with only a limited chance of falling back to 
subsistence levels. However, the high pressure demographic regime always made this a 
distinct possibility. Both downward as upward social mobility were experienced by 
many individuals. Entire socio-economic groups experienced social mobility as well. 
Some non-elite, ‘middling’ strata did see an increase in their standards of living. In the 
bigger picture of societal changes, however, their increased wealth remained marginal 
next to the vast surge in inequality in the late Republic.90 The rift between elite and non-
elite strata grew. Furthermore, there was a growing divergence within these groups. 
The census puts beyond any doubt that Romans had a strong awareness of socio-
economic stratification.91 There are ways to estimate the implications of owning enough 
to fulfill the requirements of a census group, but none of them are perfect. Scheidel on 
the basis of yields directly extrapolated the equivalence of the property qualifications, if 
fully invested into agricultural land which only produced grain, into yearly income. He 
concluded that the fourth property class should just be able to sustain a family of four 
with an average of 2400 kg of grain per year.92 Of course, rural families might have been 
quite a bit larger. The value of land fluctuated, depending on whether there were 
buildings, the quality of the soil, how it was cultivated, and the location of the plot. In 
pre-industrial societies, 5 ha. is usually considered the average need for self-sustaining 
peasants, and we have seen that Scheidel identifies this type of peasants with the fourth 
census class. This correlates nicely with Columella’s attested price of HS 1000 per 
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iugerum of uncultivated land.93 Citizens of the fourth class at least had to own the 
equivalent of around 20 iugera of land (5 ha.), of the third class 50 iugera (12,5 ha.), of the 
second class 75 iugera (18,75 ha.), and of the first class 100 iugera (25 ha.).94 Peasants of 
the third and fourth class would have lived relatively (given a high-pressure 
demographic regime) secure lives. The second but especially the first class would have 
stood out economically. A family of the fifth class would have owned between HS 375 
and HS 19.999, if Rathbone’s estimates are correct. This implies a bottom line  of (for 
lower land prices of HS 500 per iugerum) 3/4 of a iugerum (0,1875 hectare) in order to be 
counted as an assiduus. Of course, counting property in land is not enough. Families 
could own slaves (citizens from the second, perhaps third class up)95, heirlooms, armour, 
buildings, tools, and animals, and therefore less land, yet still belong to a certain 
property class. Persons not owning any land, but able to work it through tenancy, or 
craftsmen, or specialists, may have a better standard of living than some assidui. For the 
free population, Scheidel has argued that the first century BCE knew a general trend 
towards increases in real incomes.96 While the wealth of elites continued to grow at the 
start of the Principate, Scheidel argues that real incomes for non-elites significantly 
dropped. This relative growth in the late Republic does not imply, however, that 
farmers below the second class could travel to Rome frequently.97 Even if more people 
from the countryside could sporadically flock to Rome for the ludi, elections, or very 
important measures which directly touched upon their interests, frequent large-scale 
participation of the rural population in the legislative assemblies was unfeasable. 
The elite strata too were characterised by recognisable socio-economic variances. The 
second and especially first class would probably have constituted a local elite. By the 
early Principate, membership of the first census class was necessary for local 
magistracies and the rank of decurio.98 The minimum property requirement for the 
equestrian census greatly surpassed that of even the first class. Their own bottom line of 
HS 400.000 was a pittance if we look at the wealthiest individuals known to us. Cicero, 
who called himself ‘moderately’ wealthy, had an income of HS 100.000 each year from his 
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landed estates alone, which is the equivalent of the property qualification of the first 
class.99 This disparity must have been quite visible. One important outward sign of 
wealth were the domus in a city, especially in Rome, which greatly varied in size, 
location, and decoration.100 
The elites relevant to the Roman Republic can be divided into three large categories: 
the senators, the equites, and the Italian elites. Between all three categories there was 
social mobility, but entrance to groups with a higher status was closely guarded. In 
terms of property, the difference between these groups was not absolute. Some Italian 
elites may have been more wealthy than some senators. Membership of the senate was 
determined by the lectio senatus. From the time of Sulla, being elected to the 
quaestorship automatically gave someone the right to be part of the senate.101 The 
censors also determined who received the equus publicus and could call himself a 
member of the equites. The category of ‘Italian elites’ is therefore very broad, and was 
comprised of rich families with significant status which did not belong to the two other 
categories. These Italian elites could be Roman citizens, but also includes allied elites 
before the Social War. Although there were no restrictions for their sons, rich freedmen 
could theoretically not join the equestrian class (only some exceptions are known), and 
at most to this category as well.102 
The main source of wealth for all these elites, regardless of the category, was 
landholding.103 The predominant form of investment in land was ownership over a 
number of medium-sized farms scattered over a region. These medium-sized villas were 
often centres of social, economic, and political activity for their immediate 
surroundings.104 Non-elites could seek the help of the local elites to deal with problems 
such as banditry, famine, or provide privileges or support. In cities, the domus would 
have fulfilled a similar social and political, perhaps even economic function. Urban real 
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estate was another important element in the wealth of the highest strata. Many elites 
rented out tabernae or insulae.105 Another common element of the elite lifestyle was 
slaveholding. Catullus, for instance, very clearly equals poverty to not owning slaves.106 
Many elite households were to some degree involved in moneylending and trade, as 
negotiatores.107 There were some differences among the elites in this aspect. There were 
some legal restrictions to large-scale trading by senators. These laws were not 
virtuously obeyed, but other categories of elites did have more opportunities to openly 
be engaged in trade. One distinct group were the publicani, societies which bid on 
contracts from the Roman state for tax farming, public works, mining operations, or the 
supply of the armies.108 Collecting taxes in the provinces became an especially profitable 
activity. The interests the publicani were often directly opposed to those of the Roman 
treasury. They also (together with moneylenders, who could be senators) on several 
occasions provoked the anger of provincial governors. Unlike trade, senators were 
completely barred from participating in these activities, and therefore could 
(theoretically) not have overlapping interests. Auctioneers (praecones) appear to have 
been generally very wealthy, but were generally considered vulgar, and therefore 
seldom became members of the equestrian class.109 
Nicolet has also argued that the equites dominated ‘intellectual life’ in the late 
Republic, either personally or through patronage.110 Conversely, senatorial families were 
of course more directly involved in state activities. They could more easily receive ‘gifts’ 
by allied states, or directly benefit from the governance of provinces. Warfare seems to 
have been monopolised more and more by a distinct group among the elites.111 A limited 
number of members of both the senatorial and equestrian groups participated as senior 
officers, as the equites had stopped to effectively serve as cavalry units.112 
The main difference between the senatorial families, equites, and Italian elites was 
access to political power. Throughout the late Republic attempts were made by the 
senatorial elites to protect their privileged access to politics, of which for instance the 
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discussions on juries for the quaestiones perpetuae was a result. Other forms of 
differentiation were symbolic, such as adopting the clavus latus. Over the course of the 
last two centuries BCE, the senators and the equites increasingly established different 
identities. Already by the late Republic the equus publicus of the senators had been taken 
away, and eventually they were officially split into two clearly defined ordines with 
separate property qualifications by Augustus.113 Some equites simply were not interested 
in becoming part of the senatorial stratum.114 Safeguarding and expanding equestrian 
privileges, which constituted their identity as an ordo, became their main concern. For 
instance, the tribunician lex Roscia of 67 granted equestrians fixed seats in the theatre.115 
Status symbols such as the golden ring were defended with increasing fervour. The 
Italian elites, then, mainly had access to local politics (an independent state, a colonia or 
a municipium). Equites and senators were active in their hometowns too. Upward 
mobility and local dominance would have been typical desires for the Italian elites. 
Despite attempts at closing the ranks on multiple levels, all elites had close ties. There 
were elite networks of gift-exchange, friendship and kinship spanning Italy.116 
Patronage was an important factor on this level, for instance through judicial or 
military patronage.117 A complex network of loans also linked the elites. 
Because of the nature of our sources, the senatorial elites can be further analysed. The 
tribunes were part of this category. In the first century, there was no strict concept of 
the nobilitas, and its definition as those with consular ancestry is purely modern.118 
Novitas could be interpreted in various contexts: one’s family could be new to the 
consulship, to a curule office, to the senatorial rank entirely... Generally, however, the 
nobilitas were the families with a history of being engaged in the higher magistracies. 
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The old families, boasting a long list of magisterial ancestors, were very distinct. The 
most distinguished among them (some branches of the gens Aemilia, Claudia or Cornelia, 
or the Caecilii Metelli, for instance) were ever-present in the Roman cityscape, boasting 
statues of their ancestors, familial burial sites, and public buildings, bridges, roads, and 
aqueducts named after their family. Their houses were political centres, the façades 
sometimes adorned with the spoils of ancient wars, and the interiors with family trees 
and the death masks of ancestors.119 These elites had vast political networks. Even if the 
system of political patronage of non-elites had lost most of its significance in the late 
Republic, these families even then may have had many free dependants (clients) besides 
slaves and freedmen.120 Between the absolute top of the senatorial families and those 
who were strictly new, there was a wide spectrum. Some families, even those with a 
long line of consular ancestors in centuries past, barely held on to political relevance 
(the Fabii Maximi, for instance, or the branches of the gens Fulvia), others were sons of 
a father who was no senator at all.121 
Ancestry was not all which divided the senatorial rank. Already in the second century 
BCE there was cut-throat social competition between the senatorial elites.122 Whether it 
was as a means to gain office or just for the sake of the game of distinction itself, 
conspicuous consumption and the granting of beneficia exploded during the late 
Republic, fuelled by the riches of the empire. The cost of staying on top meant that 
many senatorial families became badly indebted. This phenomenon must have been 
especially common among the senatorial elites, but was by no means limited to that 
category.123 The census was largely defunct for a large part of the late Republic (from 69 
to 28), as it was boycotted by many who did not want to lose their status.124 Some 
sumptuary laws tried to protect senatorial families from some aspects of competition 
with rich, but otherwise less powerful elites. One factor of ‘social mobility’ during this 
timeframe was the en masse murder and appropriation of property on three occasions: 
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twice in the civil wars between Marius and Sulla (by both camps), and once by the 
second Triumvirate. These events struck all categories of the elites. One consequence 
was major redistributions to new groups, especially veterans.125 Other elites used it to 
quickly expand their own riches. This redistribution through proscription and later 
through special taxes was far from sufficient to counteract the increase in inequality 
during this period, however. 
Our knowledge about the senatorial families allows for some analysis on differences 
between generations. In the late 60s and 50s, Cicero’s works clearly attest a generational 
conflict, such as his references to ‘barbatuli iuvenes’ or the young nobiles who followed 
Caesar in the civil war, but this phenomenon may very well have been older.126 The 
changes during the late Republic clearly resulted in a different lived experience during 
childhood of subsequent generations. This approach has already been given attention 
by scholars such as Gruen, Dettenhofer, and Timmer.127 
The differentiation between the non-elite strata is equally important, as it gives insight 
into the variety of claims which would have been made of the tribuni plebis. 
Aside from property, the rural Italian population was internally diversified. The 
relation to the land they worked, for instance, could vary. While wage labour tenancy 
increased in the late Republic, the form involving formal patronage, precarium, severely 
declined.128 Differences in wealth grew as the urban and export markets expanded and 
infrastructure improved, of which middling farmers could have profited.129 The 
bargaining position of many poor peasants was severely undermined by the population 
growth and by the enrichment of the local elites. 
Growing crops was not the only occupation on the countryside, animal husbandry for 
instance.130 The mixed farm seems to have been the norm in Roman agriculture, but 
other forms of raising livestock existed and became more popular. Small-scale 
pastoralism in the highlands or other marginal lands remained the norm, but forms of 
large-scale transhumance were encouraged by urban growth and the political 
unification of Italy. An unknown portion of the rural population was involved in rural 
industries, such as mining, forestry, the pottery and brickmaking industries, tool 
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production... Rural day-labourers would not have had good wages, perhaps even less 
than their urban counterparts.131 Skilled craftsmen would have been paid better, as Cato 
reported in the second century, as much as HS 8 per day.132 This is far from meagre, and 
skilled rural labourers, like their urban counterparts, could have constituted a different 
socio-economic group. 
Transport expanded. Some farmers sold their produce to urban and rural markets. 
The nundinae offered a fixed calendar for large markets, other mercatus were more 
infrequent, and the macellum was a permanent market for fresh produce.133 Local 
sanctuaries, scattered over the Italian countryside, could serve as centres of trades as 
well. Middlemen, ranging from petty traders and muleteers to wholesalers, often went 
from farm to farm to buy surpluses.134 The high mobility of the population gave rise to 
the growth of mansiones and mutationes, which mostly provided stopovers to non-elite 
travellers. 
The predominant social organisation of the countryside would have been the small 
rural community.135 The political connectivity of these communities largely depended 
on their size and composition. Local elites would have been important for tools or 
storage, safety, help with failing crops, or broad political issues.136 This may have caused 
strong ties between the rural population and local elite families, but does not preclude 
various forms of peasant infrapolitics. The mobility of the population enhanced the 
dissemination of rumours, ideas, and political news, and the travelling petty trader 
undoubtedly provided some link between cities and the countryside. The nundinae 
provided a platform for regular interaction as well, especially in the densely populated 
Italian heartland.137 While these factors made political information available to rural 
non-elites, effectively making demands of the central institutions such as the tribunate 
would have remained quite difficult. 
Rural agrarian production does not particularly lend itself to social mobility, but 
there were some significant exceptions. The growth of urban centres could have had a 
profound impact on their hinterland, both for upward and downward social mobility. 
The privatisation of the ager publicus elevated some groups while being devastating for 
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others. Colonies of veterans also had the potential to upset social status of earlier 
residents. For the veterans it usually implied a significant improvement of their 
economic situation, for the population already present this was not necessarily the case. 
Our sources for the Republic mainly allow for an analysis of the urban population of 
Rome itself.138 The sheer scale of Rome had some implications for the socio-economic 
circumstances of its inhabitants, and so did its status as the political centre of a vast 
empire.139 Furthermore, Rome became a central trading hub, which slightly diminished 
the role of the other towns of Italy.140 Some of these other cities endured at least as 
regional centres of politics and trade. To avoid confusion, throughout this thesis I will 
use the term ‘plebs urbana’ solely for the non-elite citizen inhabitants of the Urbs itself, 
and ‘city population’ or similar terms as a general expression.141 
Some elements of urban life differentiated the city population from the rural plebs. 
We can point to population density, for instance, and to the presence of a variety of 
societal groups. Furthermore, elites competed for wealth, power, and influence in urban 
centres, which also brought euergetism with it.142 The population of cities consisted of 
relatively more slaves than the countryside. Monetisation was closely related to urban 
centres. Professions in cities were generally more specialised, and professional identity 
probably played a larger part. Lastly, urban residents were slightly more likely to have 
been literate or have literate neighbours than their rural counterparts, even if we 
cannot estimate the concrete difference.143 
City populations were very diverse. The non-elite ‘urban masses’, encompassing at 
least 95% of the population of any city, was not an undifferentiated blob. This had 
important consequences for contention with the tribunes, especially for the population 
of Rome itself. It is difficult to estimate the standards of living for these groups.144 Based 
on comparative material, Morley has suggested that a fifth of the urban population fell 
below subsistence levels.145 The poorest, perhaps 8 per cent of the population, must have 
been the disabled, orphans, and beggars, who barely survived on scraps, co-rented a 
low-ceilinged attic room in an insula (in the best case), or slept outdoors or in public 
buildings, and were dumped in a mass grave (or even eaten by vultures and dogs) when 
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they died.146 This bleak image should not be trivialised, but it should be noted that most 
of the populace was better off. Again based on comparative material, perhaps 20 percent 
could barely scrape by, while 30-40 percent were somewhat better off.147 As has been 
established, a significant part of the city population would have been either 
craftsmen/shopkeepers, day-labourers, or traders, with persons permanently engaged 
in services being another large group. The only direct attestation of an income, that of a 
male slave day-labourer, mentiones HS 3 per day.148 The bare minimum for survival has 
been estimated at HS 1,33 per person each day.149 Non-slave day-labourers quite likely 
received a ration in bread as part of their wages, on top of the HS 3. All this implies that 
a free person would have been able to sustain himself, but would have a hard time 
supporting an entire family. There are no direct attestations for skilled urban labour. If 
we would assume that the ratio between unskilled and skilled labour was constant from 
the Republic to the time of Diocletian’s price edict, which admittedly is quite 
problematic, a skilled labourer could have earned HS 5 per day, plus bread.150 If 
anything, however, the demographic evolutions in the late Republic favour a higher 
estimate of wages for skilled labour.151 Speculating further on Scheidel’s estimates, 250 
days of skilled labour, not counting the addition of wages in bread, would have slightly 
exceeded the income of the least wealthy farmers from the fourth census class. Skilled 
labourers, even if they had to pay rents, would not have been a destitute group. They 
could earn as much as scribae and more than other ‘public servants’.152 It is still more 
difficult to estimate the living standards of resident traders, innkeepers, prostitutes, 
barbers, urban retailers, let alone craftsmen.153 There was considerable differentiation 
within these professions. There must have been many kinds of redemptores, for instance, 
and not all of them could tackle a contract on an aqueduct or a large temple. Seasonal 
fluctuations had a great impact on demand for these groups, complicating matters even 
further.154 In any case, it is anachronistic to only take the wages of one person into 
account for estimating the living conditions of an entire family. The Roman economy 
was not, after all, characterised by the breadwinner model.155 Children and women 
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contributed to the income of the family. One specific female profession was wet nursing, 
the only profession where non-slave servants were hired by elites.156  
Information on the collegia in this timeframe is far more limited than for the 
Principate.157 What we do know is that these important associations were mostly formed 
by artisans and traders, but musicians, actors, and poets also feature in our sources. A 
list by Plutarch gives us an idea about some of the collegia which must have been 
existent in the late Republic, even if the mythical foundation of these nine by Numa is 
highly uncertain: musicians, goldsmiths, carpenters, dyers, leatherworkers, curriers, 
brass workers, potters, and ‘the remaining trades’.158 The collegia increased in number as 
specialisation created more professions.159 As has been established, the organisation of 
labour by the collegia was almost a necessity in order to keep transaction costs 
manageable in the highly specialised but atomised economy of the late Republic.160 The 
associations provided social integration and were a factor of socio-economic prestige.161 
Real wages for skilled urban labour significantly improved, and the expansion of the 
grain doles in Rome supplemented this to improve the quality of life even more. The 
collegia built ‘clubhouses’, organised common funerals for their members, and in the 
empire vigorously engaged in the erection of epigraphic testimonials. The collegiati were 
not equals, and internal stratification was an important aspect of the associations. In the 
late Republic, the collegia of Rome acquired a reputation for political unrest.162 
Traditionally, this is mainly explained by referring to elite competition: the collegia were 
sought out for electoral and physical support. However, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the associations developed their own agendas. The growing standards of living 
for the urban craftsmen may have prompted a desire for political participation, and the 
associations were an ideal platform. The collegia in Rome had a direct link to the centre 
of political power, and did not rely on the patronage of the elites to make demands.163 As 
a result of their political influence, a number of collegia were banned on several 
occasions (possibly only limited between 64 and 58, and extensively by Caesar and again 
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by Augustus). It is unclear how effective these measures were. Conversely, the 
tribunician law of Clodius in 58 seemingly allowed even very poor citizens to establish 
collegia.164 Clodius also provides the most direct attestation of the importance of these 
associations as principals for the tribunate. 
Another important factor for the experiences of city populations was their 
residences. The most common type of housing seems to have become the taberna, which 
has been discussed above as a (work)shop-house.165 These were fairly standardised living 
spaces, usually one room with sometimes a backroom and/or mezzanine. In Rome, the 
residential blocks of the plebs urbana, being densily built-up and featuring insulae, would 
have created a new way of life.166 There would have been little to no private space, and 
the neighbourhood became the relevant social unit. Life largely took place on the 
courtyard within a block. These would have been ringed by workshops, shops, or 
‘reception areas’, which often made up the bottom floor of an insula. Rent-dodging was a 
familiar trope to Roman elites, as rents were high and some commoners were constantly 
in dire straits to survive. Non-elite neighbourhoods bordered far richer buildings. The 
luscious domus of the elites and sumptuously decorated public buildings must have 
jarringly contrasted with the residences of non-elite Romans. Richer non-elites lived 
next to poorer ones, and the former sometimes combined multiple insulae apartments to 
have a larger living area, perhaps even with access to a private lacus, or owned a taberna 
with an extra floor.167 The poorest in Rome usually inhabited the low-lying areas, 
between the hills. Smoke and heat settled there more easily, but the most catastrophic 
consequences were felt when the Tiber flooded, which was a regular occurrence.168 
One important group which arose in the city of Rome during the late Republic was 
the plebs frumentaria.169 In 123, Gaius Gracchus had proposed a grain distribution law, 
which provided for the monthly distribution of a maximum of 5 modii (43,75l) of grain 
for the fixed price of almost HS 8 (the exact amount is 6 1/3 asses per modius), while 
normally this amount could have cost anything from HS 15 or even HS 20 to up to HS 60 
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during times of dearth.170 The subsidies fluctuated over the late Republic, until Clodius 
made 5 modii completely free in 58. After this date, adjustments were mainly made to 
the eligibility of recipients. The beneficiaries of the doles had to be male citizens with a 
domicile in Rome, from either 11 or 14 years of age, perhaps sui iuris, and the 
requirement of being freeborn varied over the course of the first century BCE.171 These 
subsidies made a huge difference. The subsidised amount of grain actually was more 
than sufficient to feed an adult man.172 It could even be enough for a husband and a wife, 
but not for feeding a family with children. On the other side of the coin, the grain doles 
may very well have driven up rents and driven down wages. Nevertheless, a large part 
of the freeborn plebs urbana became the plebs frumentaria, a socio-economic group 
separated from the other city populations through the reasonably stable provision of 
their caloric needs.173 This system was kept in place by the demands of the plebs urbana 
itself, with the constant possibility of violent demonstrations if anything was wrong 
with the supply of what they thought of as fairly priced food.174 
A significant number of Roman citizens were enrolled in its legions (and, before the 
Social War, so were Italian allies).175 According to Scheidel, who supports the low count, 
mobilisation in 112-23 only rarely sank beneath 10% of the adult male population of 
Italy (before the 90s and after 28), and had peaks well above 20% (in the 80s and 40s).176 
In theory the Roman army was a citizen militia and not a separate social (let alone 
economic) group. Several developments in the late Republic changed this, however, 
leading to a professionalising military.177 Long conflicts extended the length of service, 
and the army could become a significant portion of the lives of young men, starting at 
the age of 17. Non-combatants were expelled first by Marius, and their absence then 
became the norm. Military drills were increased. The pay for soldiers had been 
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introduced relatively shortly before the start of the timeframe.178 Basic pay probably 
was around HS 480 per year and rose to HS 900 during Caesar’s civil war. Rations and 
other possible costs were deducted from this stipend, even if this went against a law 
instated by Gaius Gracchus.179 Equipment was increasingly standardised, and soldiers 
who could not supply their own had to pay it off from their salary. 
Differentiation within the army did not disappear, but was increasingly linked to the 
military career.180 Some soldiers could be promoted to principales and received 1,5 times 
basic pay, and there were several types of officers who received even more. Senior 
officers were often recruited from members of the elite. Officers received more land 
when they retired, and larger rewards when lump sums were distributed. Differences 
between Roman and Italian allied soldiers theoretically disappeared after the Social 
War. Prior to the Social War, some soldiers of different origins had close contacts with 
one another in the Roman army. This might have been a factor in improving relations 
between Italian communities, mainly for elite troops.181 
Soldiers were increasingly conscripted among the class of the proletarii.182 This 
development was not linear: the example set by Marius in the levy in 107 to accept 
proletarian volunteers was not regularly followed, and before the Social War armies 
consisting of proletarians would have been rare.183 Only after 91, and probably with the 
Social War as catalyst, this became more and more common. The attestations of protests 
against conscription do diminish for the late Republic, but do not completely disappear. 
However, as service in the army for some increasingly became a matter of choice, the 
identity as a soldier or veteran became more relevant. Land distributions to veterans 
probably were the most significant evolution towards the military as a seperate 
category in society. The size of plots varied, with mean allotments between 15 iugera 
(3,75 ha.) and 50 iugera (12,5 ha.).184 Aside from land distributions, late Republic generals 
on several occasions gave lump sums as bonuses after a successful campaign. These rose 
from HS 3.200 in 69 to HS 20.000 in 42.185 This is not insignificant: the grant of 42 would 
have catapulted a soldier into at least the fourth census class, regardless of previous 
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property. Veterans became a new middling group, and former centurions even became 
petty elites.186 The army was the most important vehicle for upward social mobility in 
the late Republic, especially but not exclusively for the poorest in Roman society. 
A very important consequence of this evolution was the increasingly personal bond 
between soldiers and their general. Soldiers often continuously served under the same 
commander, and it was he who gave them rewards.187 While this partly explains the 
strong military men of the late Republic, one should look at this from the other side too. 
Not rarely, soldiers mutinied or switched their allegiance. Generals often gave in to the 
demands of their soldiers, even if the ability of these leaders at persuasion, 
manipulation, and discipline does account for a part of their success.188 As will be 
confirmed at the end of this thesis, the end of the Republic was very closely tied to the 
development of the professionalised army. 
2.2.4 Geography and culture 
A last important differentiation between societal groups was the result of geographical 
and cultural factors. These two elements cannot always be strictly separated in our 
sources, and are sociologically closely related. Culture is a slippery term, as it can be 
argued that city neighbourhoods can form their ‘own’ culture, as can groups sharing the 
same language, or generations. The construction of identities based on a ‘cultural 
background’ or the observance of religio-cultural rites remained an factor of 
differentiation in the late Republic. 
One of the most straightforward factors of geographical differentiation in the late 
Republic was the physical distance to Rome, in terms of travel times. The time-distance 
from the political centre is a significant factor in contentious politics. The distance to 
Rome largely determined the possibilities of travelling there personally, the diffusion of 
information, the presence of elites...189 As a result, the experience of Roman politics in 
daily life could differ significantly. Other geographical factors played a part as well. 
Inhabitants of medium-sized or large cities could more easily organise delegations to 
Rome. Peasants living close to the villas of senators could beseech them to defend their 
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interests directly.190 Intermediary stages always limit the influence of groups, however, 
as these intermediaries introduced a new level of principal-agent problems.191 
Rome was geographically differentiated as well, and one of the most important elements 
was topography.192 There were no strictly separated residential areas, and all streets 
combined houses with shops and other activities. The hills of Rome were coveted, 
however, especially those adjoining the Forum Romanum: mainly the Palatine, but also 
the Velia, Esquiline, Viminal, and Capitol, which was partly inhabited. The low-lying 
areas such as the Subura had a bad reputation. There were several practical reasons for 
this. For one, Rome was very prone to flooding, which destroyed houses and could leave 
behind filth.193 Trade was obviously centred around the Tiber.194 The area south of the 
Capitol and the Forum and west of the Palatine could be considered a ‘merchant 
district’, which included the Portus Tiberinus hugging the Aventine. The sheer size of 
Rome had the effect of separating some areas of the city in terms of travel times. The 
streets must have been so busy that movement was much slower during the day.195 The 
built-up area of the Urbs stretched far beyond the walls. 
The sprawling city had smaller units of social organisation which were quite 
important for contention with the tribunes. The vici, montes, and pagi, in the Republic 
still structured bottom-up, were neighbourhood organisations. They integrated all 
inhabitants of the quarters, at least in theory.196 Based around crossroads (the compita), 
there are indications that the vici actually did offer some cohesion and imposed some 
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form of social control, perhaps they even took up a self-policing role. Convicium, for 
instance, was a type of mob justice employed by non-elites in ancient Rome.197 Besides 
geographical and social organisations, the religious nature of the lares compitales made 
the vici religious societies as well. In the Republic the neighbourhood associations 
already elected their own magistri, and were involved in controlling the water supplies 
(lacus, which were of course social hotspots), preventing fire, social control on criminal 
activities, business activities, and perhaps already even the grain distributions. Like the 
collegia, the vici were increasingly caught up in violent struggle in the Urbs.198 They were 
centres of political activity, and often were canvassed for political support. Attempts 
were made to hamper their functioning, such as disallowing the celebration of the ludi 
Compitalicii. Augustus ultimately gave the vici an official status, which will be discussed 
at the end of this thesis.199 
As has been established in discussing the various forms of citizenship, only from 91 
onwards the Italian peninsula became largely politically unified. In the first century BCE 
it certainly never became culturally united.200 Geographic differences would have played 
an important part in this process. Several regions had different histories, customs, 
language, organisational forms, demographic structures and population densities... 
Some of these differences gradually flattened out during this timeframe, and some 
languages gradually started to disappear in favour of Latin, but these processes were by 
no account finalised before the rise of the Principate. Pronunciation became an element 
in differentiation for the elites, with ‘vulgar’ forms of Latin and pronunciation from 
outside the Roman core being shunned.201 However, it has also been argued that Latin 
literature, by offering a canon of philosophy, rhetoric, and cultural attitudes, had the 
effect of integrating the fragmented Italian elites.202 Colonisation on de facto allied lands 
may have made cultural differences more relevant to some groups, and the Social War 
may have led to revanchism in defeated communities. Colonies had an enormous impact 
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on the region in which they were established.203 Asculum, for instance, where the 
slaughter of the Roman populace triggered the Social War, had been completely 
surrounded by Roman colonies, which were encroaching on its territories. 
The city of Rome was immensely diverse as well.204 Besides various Italian groups, it 
housed slaves and freedmen from numerous backgrounds. Resident foreigners were 
quite numerous, perhaps 5% of the urban population. These foreigners included 
diplomats, hostages, merchants, philosophers, and specialists, and the largest groups 
were probably of Egyptian, Gallic, Greek, Jewish, Phrygian, and Syrian origins. The non-
slave non-Italian population of Rome has been estimated at around 60.000 persons in 
the Augustan age, but was possibly much smaller at the start of this timeframe. 
Foreigners were sometimes banished en masse, but this does not seem to have had any 
lasting effects of stopping the Urbs from becoming cosmopolitan. There do not appear 
to have been quarters which housed specific groups of migrants in Rome. From Caesar 
onwards, foreigners with certain professions were actually encouraged to take up 
residence in the city. 
Despite this theoretical unity of the population’s religious observances, the late 
Republic saw a proliferation of various religious and philosophical beliefs in Rome, often 
coming from abroad.205 In the early second century BCE already, the sudden rise in 
popularity of the Bacchanalian cult, and especially its connection to suspected plots 
against Rome, led to the control of its practices across Italy. Likewise, the cult of Isis and 
other foreign gods such as Anubis were banned at several moments during the late 
Republic. The followers of these cults must have included immigrants, but especially the 
Egyptian cults seem to have attracted new members among the Italian population as 
well. Rüpke has argued that in the late Republic, strategies were adopted to deal with 
this multiplicity of religions, but the diversity remained.206 Augustus would of course 
heavily invest in religious practices to attain some unity, at least in Italy. 
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Chapter 3 Politics and the tribunate in the late 
Republic: general considerations 
This chapter is the last establishing important context for contention with the 
tribunate, as it concerns the realm of politics in the late Republic. Its aim is to establish 
another type of principal (political groups), look at the concrete possibilities of non-
elites to engage in politics, and analyse the ‘architecture’ of governmental institutions 
in so far as they came into contact with the tribunes. By the end of this chapter the 
focus will have fully shifted to the tribunate, which will be fully explored in the next 
two chapters. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will provide an 
interpretation of the variety of political groups which existed in the late Republic. These 
groups could, as principals, engage in contention with the tribunes of the plebs. Some 
examples will be given to substantiate a broad definition of these groups, but the main 
claim which will be made is that it is a mistake to limit our interpretation by strict 
definitions. Again, the focus will be on variety and complexity. In the second section I 
will ask the question whether non-elite groups could actively participate in politics in 
the late Republic. While concrete evidence will be given throughout the remainder of 
this thesis, a positive answer will be given. Based on the theoretical framework, 
arguments will be presented against modern theories which emphasise the role of non-
elites in maintaining their own domination by the elites.1 The third and final section, 
then, will delve into the structure of political power in the late Republic. It will look at 
how the tribunes could aid other political institutions or come into conflict with them, 
and an attempt will be made to sketch some changes throughout the period.  
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3.1 Political groups 
The nature of the groups which were active in the sphere of Roman politics has been 
debated vigorously for over a century, even if recent scholarship has not focussed on 
this subject. Theories about political groups have varied between Mommsen’s idea of 
formal political parties, Münzer’s Adelsparteien, Meier’s insistence on short-lived, 
‘gegenstandsabhängige’ groups, to discussions over the exact nature of the populares-
optimates dichotomy.2 Some scholars have argued that political groups were not 
important at all, only individuals. While the debate has never fully been resolved, the 
present communis opinio primarily presents political groups in two ways. 
One (decreasingly) common argument states that populares and optimates constituted 
the most important division in late Republican politics, differing either purely by 
method or by ideology. Dividing late Republican politics into dichotomies has always 
been quite popular – between optimates and populares, between Caesar and Pompey, 
between Marius and Sulla, between senate and people... The reason is quite simple: our 
sources, even contemporaries such as Cicero and Sallust, do this as well. Describing his 
banishment in 58 to the senate the next year, Cicero for instance says: 
Two parties were held to exist in the state, one of which, it was supposed, was led 
by hostility towards me to demand my surrender, while the other was backward 
in my defence, because of the taint of murder which they thought clung to me.3 
Of course, Cicero’s point is that this analysis was wrong. Seager has argued that 
republican sources only use the word factio, which has a pejorative connotation, to 
denote one group opposing them in Roman politics (there could only be one ‘factio’), or 
as two inimical groups in non-Roman contexts.4 It will be argued here that the dualistic 
interpretation of politics did not match reality, and is not very fruitful. 
The second common notion on political groups in the late Republic describes them as 
especially aimed towards electoral and judicial support between elites. They would have 
been useful mainly for the effective use of bribery and other methods of influencing 
votes. That some groups in this sense existed cannot be denied. In this section, I will 
mainly argue that these theories do not suffice. Political groups in the late Republic 
were quite complex and diverse in form, scope, and membership. 
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First, let us consider the division between the ‘optimates’ and the ‘populares’. These two 
groups have inspired several generations to make prosopographical studies and do 
research on the precise nature of both groups and the goals of their ‘members’.5 The 
tribunes played an important part in these theories. Scholars such as Martin and 
Doblhofer have claimed not only that the tribunes were the prime popularis suspects, 
but that the tribunate was the only political institution which allowed for effective 
popularis politics.6 Thommen, conversely, has argued that most tribunes were in fact 
optimates, although even a few popularis tribunes could make a big difference.7 The main 
disagreements have always concerned whether members of these groups differed in 
their method of doing politics, or if ideology and political goals were important. 
Theories focussing on method argue that optimates used traditional methods in 
gathering influence, while the populares employed demagogic means such as radical 
speechifying and popular legislation. Scholars pointing to ideological differences greatly 
vary on the scope of the political goals, and have discussed among one another how far 
the populares were prepared to go in changing the Republican institutions. 
Half a decade ago, Maggie Robb has proposed that we should discard the dichotomy 
altogether.8 By deconstructing the texts on which modern theories have been built, such 
as Cicero’s pro Sestio, she convincingly argues that ‘optimates’ was nearly always used as a 
synonym for elite groups in their entirety. The exact meaning could slightly differ 
between authors. ‘Optimates’ could mean anything from senators to, very abstractly, ‘the 
establishment’. ‘Populares’ had a more fluid meaning, was used in different ways by 
several authors, and could even carry different meanings within the same texts. Robb 
argues that the sources did not generally use it to refer to either an ideology or a 
political grouping. The one exception is the commentariolum petitionis, in which the term 
was used to describe persons employing demagogic means. Without trying to establish a 
new dichotomy, Robb argues that persons who were deemed to oppose the ‘aristocratic 
consensus’ were consistently termed ‘seditiosi’, rather than populares. 
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A second common depiction of political groups argues that factions were actually 
flexible, bilateral alliances inspired by the selfish objectives of their members. First fully 
introduced by Meier and expanded upon by Brunt, this theory was not mutually 
exclusive with a division of politics into optimates and populares, nor did it prevent 
scholars from claiming that ideology or political issues could play some limited part.9 
This interpretation does emphasise that political groups primarily were alliances of 
convenience. Achieving every position in the cursus honorum and accruing as much 
power as possible were depicted as the primary driving forces for the senatorial elites. 
Elites altered their political behaviour or changed their social circles in order to 
optimise their electoral prospects. Sometimes, alliances were established to advance 
legislative proposals which could benefit faction members. Legal defence could be 
organised in this way as well. 
An important motive for forming political groups, according to this interpretation, 
was the efficient organisation of bribery.10 Bribery of the tribes, centuries, and juries 
was a very real problem in the late Republic. Evidence for bribery on the legislative 
comitia is far less apparent. Bribery was in fact often organised by groups. These groups 
allowed for specialisation in the distribution of ‘gifts’, between divisores and sequestres, 
for instance. Some laws attempted to curtail these groups. The consular lex Licinia de 
sodaliciis of 55 specifically targeted sodales (or sodalitates), small elite groups which 
engaged in electoral bribery and perhaps in mutual judicial support.11 
Because of this evidence, this interpretation of political groups inspired by mutual 
aid cannot be completely refuted. Perhaps most famous example of this type 
arrangement, because it turned out to be the most powerful and impactful, was the ‘first 
triumvirate’. The members of this faction (Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey) both in 60 and 
56 formed an alliance which was mainly inspired by bids on the consulship and plans 
about provincial arrangements relevant to their personal position.12 Especially in 56 the 
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amount of senators involved was quite extensive, and several negotiations took place at 
several locations. This type of political group could be mobilised for specific problems as 
well. After the census of 69, Dio reports that many members of the senate had been 
expelled and were forming factions and cliques to more efficiently stand for office, to 
regain their senatorial rank.13 This interpretation does have some strengths. In contrast 
to many other narratives of the late Republic, political actors are seldomly considered to 
have been the tools of others. Any subservience is analysed from the idea that the junior 
party tried to temporarily use the more renowned senators to reinforce his own career. 
However, these theories do have the tendency to ignore agency by any other entities 
than the selfish, rational, elite individual.  
In the theoretical framework, political groups have been defined as coalitions between 
members of potentially strongly varying societal groups. As will become clear, after all, 
not only elites could engage in politics. Political groups require mobilisation in order to 
be able to pursue collective projects. Political groups determine which differences are 
relevent for its members and which are not, which is basically framing but can be seen 
as ideology. Mobilising these groups is costly, and it requires effort to sustain them. 
Sometimes they fall apart, occasionally they disperse after having achieved their central 
goals. Throughout this thesis it will be argued that in the late Republic, political groups 
differed in ideology, goals, programmes, methods of doing politics, but also were 
sometimes characterised by personal relations such as family, friendship, tutorship, or 
shared enemies. The differences were not binary. There were no two clear, mutually 
exclusive alternatives. Furthermore, pressure by other groups and uncertainty will be 
factored into politics. Political groups also were scaled. In the late Republic there was no 
modern communication, propaganda, or doctrinal political ideologies. Cohesive political 
groups could be more easily sustained on the long term if they included only a couple of 
individuals. These smaller groups could form coalitions on specific issues with other 
groups, or attempt to mobilise other individuals for certain long-term programmes. 
Political groups were not necessarily hierarchical. 
The sources provide many examples of elite political groups.14 Before 70, there were 
groups consisting mainly of equites who, allied with members of other elite groups 
(including senators) and sometimes with non-elites, defended the inclusion of a number 
of their order in the jury courts. In the 70s and into the 60s, a group which is described 
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as the pauci, a limited group of senators, sought to safeguard their dominance which was 
based on the Cornelian laws of Sulla. At the same time, an alliance of publicani moved 
against Lucullus’s eastern command, partly with the hope of recuperating their losses 
and partly out of hatred for Lucullus. After Cicero was banished, an alliance was 
laboriously formed by his supporters to effectuate his recall. Elite political groups 
tended to change often: Cicero was a notorious example, gaining the nickname of 
turncoat even with his contemporaries.15 Pompey and Crassus shifted between enmity 
and alliance throughout their lives.16 Both father and son C. Scribonius Curio defended 
Clodius in the Bona Dea scandal, but only some years later laboured for Cicero’s recall.17 
The son was depicted by Cicero as the leader of a group of ‘barbatuli iuvenes’, a group of 
young elites which shared at least some ideas about Roman politics.18 
Elite political groups could be very complex, which can be seen in the case of the 
restoration of Ptolemaeus XII Auletes.19 Several coalitions were made to support 
different positions in the senatorial debates, which mainly took place at the end of 57 
and the beginning of 56. The case also shows the difficulty in assessing political groups 
in the late Republic, as often only the position of consulars was deemed worthy of note. 
Most of the former consuls were in favour of a proposal by Bibulus, that three legates 
selected from the senators without imperium should restore the king of Alexandria. 
Despite the majority of consulars supporting it, the proposal suffered a resounding 
defeat. A smaller group of former consuls was supporting Spinther: Cicero, Hortensius, 
and M. Lucullus. They were aided by the tribune L. Racilius. While this coalition secured 
a stronger position, partly by convincing initially neutral senators of their right, they 
did not succeed in effecting anything. One reason was that groups of moneylenders, 
mostly non-senators, were opposing Spinther by putting pressure on the debate. King 
Ptolemaeus was a factor as well, as he was supporting Pompey to lead his restoration. 
The former consul L. Volcatius Tullus introduced a measure to this effect in the senate. 
The proposal was supported by L. Afranius, the tribunes L. Caninius Gallus and P. 
Rutilius Lupus, and Pompey’s friends. This last group, ‘the friends of Pompey’, was one 
of the most tight-knit and long-lived political groups in the 50s. Cicero attests, however, 
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that Pompey himself was not very enthousiastic. After all, he was fully engaged with his 
procuratio of the annona. Roman politics was more complex than groups advancing the 
perceived interests of individuals, however. Both consuls, Cn. Cornelius Lentullus 
Marcellinus and P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus, were convinced that Ptolemaeus should not 
be restored at all. At first they successfully wasted time, and eventually their opinion 
was supported and confirmed by senatorial decree. The debate was not over, as Pompey 
then overtly supported the appointment of Spinther. A last group which was involved in 
the debates included Crassus, C. Scribonius Curio, and the tribune C. Porcius Cato. While 
Crassus was overtly proposing something quite similar to what Bibulus had introduced, 
with three legates selected from magistrates with imperium, it appears that this group 
mainly wanted to prevent either Spinther or Pompey from being appointed. Cato then 
proposed to abrogate Spinther’s imperium, which stopped the debates completely. Later 
in 56, Crassus and Pompey would form an alliance to vie for their second consulship, 
which indicates how quickly political groups could shift. The debate did not only 
concern the issue of who would be appointed. Some Sibylline verses, it was claimed, 
specifically mentioned that the Alexandrine king should not be restored with an army. 
These religious concerns were all the more impactful because some groups (according 
to Cicero the majority of the senate) wanted to prevent Pompey from being given an 
army. 
Another example of an elite group formed for a specific political issue was the group 
around Faustus Sulla. After the death of P. Cornelius Sulla, his father, the issue of the 
money which had been appropriated from the treasury was placed on the political 
agenda at several times. Proposals were made to recover the public funds, and trials 
were brought against the perpetrators. Asconius attests, however, that the issue was a 
mix of personal and political elements, and that even judicial arguments and ideologies 
on property were important: 
The issue was frequently considered and then dropped, partly because of the 
influence of Sulla’s group, partly because it seemed unfair that money acquired by 
anyone should after so many years ... be the subject of proceedings for recovery.20 
Non-elites could form political groups as well. Some examples are the competing ‘gangs’ 
which were linked to Clodius and Milo in the 50s, or the ‘Pompeians’ and ‘Caesarians’ 
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who fought at the outbreak of the Civil War.21 Groups involved in wider struggles, such 
as the freedmen agitating for their redistribution among all 35 tribes, can be seen as 
societal groups, but it is quite likely that political groups operated within these 
‘movements’.22 Political groups could span several strata of society. A good example 
outside of Rome are the Etrurian peasants who in 78 revolted against the Sullan 
veterans who had established colonies on their lands (cfr. 5.2.1). This group probably 
included local elites and non-elites. Besides using violence, they also negotiated with 
the consul Lucullus. Another good example of mixed groups, which also attests the 
importance of ideology, is the case of L. Gellius Poplicola, the brother of the consul of 72. 
This “nutricola seditiosorum omnium”23 had, according to Cicero, squandered his fortune 
on wine.24 He had retained the status of eques, perhaps only because the censors do not 
appear to have stripped away rank from persons in these years. Cicero mentions that 
Gellius was renowned for his dedication to the non-elites, “semper versabatur in spe rerum 
novarum”,25 and even going so far as to marrying a freedwoman just to appear popular. 
He was connected to many ‘seditiosi’ and involved in countless mobilisations, for 
instance for contiones and the vote on Cicero’s banishment. Gellius thus appears to have 
been active in political groups which were at least partly comprised of non-elites.  
 
                                                     
21 For the ‘gangs’ of Clodius and Milo, among much other literature:: Flambard, ‘Clodius, les collèges, la plèbe et 
les esclaves’, p. 122-131; Lintott, ‘Cicero and Milo’; Martin, ‘Die Popularen in der Geschichte der Späten 
Republik’, p. 100-110; Russell, ‘Why Did Clodius Shut the Shops?’. 
22 Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic, p. 37-52. 
23 Cic., Vat., 4. 
24 Cic., Sest., 110-111, Vat., 4. 
25 Cic., Sest., 110. 
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3.2 The relevance of non-elites to late Republican politics 
If there was a great variety of societal groups and political groups, the tribunes of the 
plebs would have faced a great number of interests, desires, and agendas in the late 
Republic. However, the sources greatly limit our possibilities to analyse these interests, 
desires, and agendas in politics, especially for any groups which were not the senatorial 
elites. When the sources were interested, they generally referred to moral aspects 
rather than mobilisations, alternative views, or claims.26 The stereotype of the non-
elites in the Roman sources depicts them as violent, changeable, ignorant, and, of 
course, filthy.27 For some time now, scholarship has been divided over the possibilities 
for non-elites to engage in politics in the late Republic.28 Some researchers have 
outright denied that these groups could meaningfully act within the political field, 
another group has allowed for a political influence, albeit very indirectly. 
In this section, arguments against the politicisation of non-elite groups will be 
considered, and an argument will be presented for a potentially substantial involvement 
of non-elites in Republican politics. The formal power of these non-elites will not be 
central to this section.29 The factors of ‘constitutional’ power and ‘sovereignty’ were 
considered by the early ‘democratic school’, but have been successfully shown by their 
opponents to be irrelevant when wider societal dynamics are not taken into account. 
The main argument in this section will state that the lower social strata were not 
excluded from knowing about or forming divergent opinions about political 
developments, and could in fact mobilise to meaningfully engage in contentious politics. 
Some elements of the plebeian repertoires of contention will be explored as well. 
The very public nature of Roman politics did allow possibilities for non-elite persons to 
gather information. Decisions on laws, elections, and, for the earlier part of the 
timeframe, the guilt or innocence of a person in a public trial (iudicium populi), involved 
large numbers of citizens in open, public spaces.30 Whenever these were organised, 
 
                                                     
26 Courrier, La plèbe de Rome et sa culture, p. 496-497; Horsfall, The Culture of the Roman Plebs, p. 22; Scott, 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 87. 
27 Blonski, ‘« Sales Pauvres »’; Hollard, ‘Le rôle politique du peuple à Rome au Ier s.apr. J.-C.’, esp. p. 141; 
Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic, p. 68-70. 
28 For an overview of some literature: Nippel, ‘Die plebs urbana und die politische Gewalt’; Yakobson, ‘Popular 
Power in the Roman Republic’. 
29 For an excellent position on this, O’Neill, ‘A Culture of Sociability’. For criticism on the formalism of the 
democratic school, see especially Hölkeskamp, Rekonstruktionen einer Republik. 
30 Ando, ‘Empire, State, and Communicative Action’; Bell, ‘Cicero and the Spectacle of Power’; David, ‘Rhetoric 
and Public Life’, p. 421-422; Flower, ‘Spectacle and Political Culture in the Roman Republic’; Millar, ‘Politics, 
Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150-90 B.C.)’; Millar, The Crowd in Rome; Steel, Roman Oratory. 
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crowds of people moved to and through the city of Rome, which would at least have 
demonstrated the importance of these rituals to bystanders. Participation must have 
been quite purposeful, which implies that people engaging in popular politics would 
have at least talked about their opinion to their social circles. Besides these moments of 
collective voting, other official, supervised gatherings were a prominent feature of the 
Republic. Contiones were not free discussions, as they almost exclusively featured 
communication by members of the elites. It were hierarchical, elite orations before a 
crowd. However, the role of the contiones in spreading information was not 
unimportant.31 Contiones had to be held on legislative proposals at several points in time, 
and each time the proposal was read out. Sometimes, decisions of the senate or general 
developments in politics were discussed by magistrates in a contio.32 Public 
communication was a complex phenomenon in Republican Rome. Orators had some 
power to channel information, but the spread of that information empowered the 
crowds as well.33 Meetings of the senate were the most protected form of official 
political communication, but not completely secretive. It seems that meetings of the 
senate, if they took place in the Curia, could sometimes be followed by people standing 
outside, on the so-called Graecostasis or on the steps of the Curia.34 Public political events 
were regular, almost daily features of late Republican society in Rome. 
Even for those who were unable to be physically present at these events, Roman 
governmental institutions officially offered facilities to allow citizens to inform 
themselves. The lex Caecilia Didia of 98 obligated legislators to allow at least three 
 
                                                     
31 Arena, ‘The Orator and His Audience’; Hiebel, Rôles institutionnel et politique de la contio, passim, for information 
p. 278-294; Jackob, ‘Cicero und die Meinung des Volkes’, p. 172-173; Moreau, ‘Svblata priore lege’, p. 212-213; 
Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic, p. 68-118; Morstein-Marx, ‘’Cultural 
Hegemony’ and the Communicative Power of the Roman Elite’, p. 40-46; Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late 
Roman Republic, p. 38; Mouritsen, ‘From Meeting to Text’, p. 68-69. Tatum, ‘Roman Democracy?’, p. 221-223. 
According to Jehne, there were elite stories warning against non-elite participation in contiones: Jehne, 
‘Scaptius oder der kleine Mann in der großen Politik’. 
32 For instance, Cornelius in 65: Ascon., 57-58C. 
33 Arena, ‘The Orator and His Audience’; David, ‘Rhetoric and Public Life’; Jackob, ‘Cicero und die Meinung des 
Volkes’; Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic, p. 119-159; Morstein-Marx, 
‘’Cultural Hegemony’ and the Communicative Power of the Roman Elite’; Tan, ‘Publius Clodius and the 
Boundaries of the Contio’; Ueding, ‘Das Konzept des Redners als Meinungsführer in der römischen Rhetorik’; 
Yakobson, ‘Traditional Political Culture and the People’s Role in the Roman Republic’. Hölkeskamp has 
underscored the self-representation of orators and the role of contiones in reproducing consensus: 
Hölkeskamp, ‘Oratoris maxima scaena’; Hölkeskamp, ‘Self-Serving Sermons’; Hölkeskamp, ‘Friends, Romans, 
Countrymen’. Also Jehne, ‘Feeding the Plebs with Words’. For an overview of theories on ancient rhetoric, see 
Kuhn, ‘Politische Kommunikation Und Öffentliche Meinung in Der Antiken Welt: Einleitende Bemerkungen’; 
Steel and van der Blom, ‘Introduction: Community and Communication’. 
34 Cic., QF, 2.1.3. 
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nundinae between the proposal of a law and calling a vote on it.35 Legislative proposals 
had to be published by the responsible magistrate, and from 62 onward, with the lex 
Iunia Licinia, a copy was immediately deposited in the Aerarium.36 Allowing citizens to 
read proposals on at least three market days seems to have been fixed by custom even 
before the lex Caecilia Didia. The law also prohibited bundling completely separate topics 
into one single proposal. Both this law and the lex Iunia Licinia served to prevent 
inequality of access to legislative information. This was not the only area of public 
decision-making where the spread of information was facilitated.37 Laws, once 
approved, were often cut on bronze plaques and displayed openly, and only later moved 
to the Aerarium or the Tabularium. Edicts had to be publicly declared and written on an 
album which was displayed in public. A copy of a senatus consultum and even of a senatus 
auctoritas was always deposited in the treasury. Caesar even started to publish the 
proceedings of the senate during his first consulship, but Augustus discontinued this 
habit.38 Furthermore, in the late Republic important public developments (such as 
reports of trials, the amount of taxes paid, the price of corn, the elected magistrates, or 
important omens) were collected in the Acta Diurna, which were prominently displayed 
in the Forum Romanum and then archived. In the late Republic, politicians took up the 
habit of spreading pamphlets, publishing speeches, and distributing other written 
works.39 This points towards a culture of informed discussion on politics. Everyone who 
could read Latin and was present in Rome therefore had many possibilities to inform 
themselves about political developments. Of course, while we have no definite numbers 
about literacy, it must have been quite low.40  Unofficial writings were mainly directed 
towards the elites. Still, a small minority of non-elites must have been able to 
understand public texts to some degree. Great care was taken that officially published 
texts were recited by criers in the employ of the magistrates. 
So far, representativeness has not been taken into account. Henrik Mouritsen of 
course made valid points concerning the lack of representation of the lower strata in 
the collective rituals of Roman politics.41 His remarks about the spatial limitations are 
 
                                                     
35 Lintott, ‘Trinundinum’;  Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, p. 16-19. See Cic., Dom., 53. Also, on the procedure, 
Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 182-188; Moreau, ‘Svblata priore lege’; Williamson, The Laws of the 
Roman People, p. 118-122. 
36 Sumner, ‘Lex Aelia, Lex Fufia’, p. 339. 
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Ancient Literacy, p. 206-208; Moreau, ‘Svblata priore lege’, p. 202. 
38 Suet., Iul., 20.1. Harris, Ancient Literacy, p. 206. 
39 Mouritsen, ‘From Meeting to Text’. 
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literacy, however. Corbier, Donner à voir, donner à lire, p. 77-90. 
41 Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic. Before him: Rouland, Rome, démocratie impossible?, p. 
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still very relevant: the adult, male citizen population became so large that they simply 
could not fit into the public places meant for public participation, and even if they did 
there was no time to take the votes of 400.000 to close to 1 million or even several 
million voters. His argument that the absence of modern technology to reinforce speech 
further limited the size of possible crowds perhaps holds up less: public protests in 
recent years have shown that simple systems (such as the ‘human microphone’) suffice 
in carrying correct information across large audiences. Furthermore, Courrier has 
argued that orators did not address a static crowd, and that the Forum or Campus 
Martius was not closed during votes.42 More people could have been involved in this 
way, moving through these places. This takes away some, but not all arguments about 
practical limitations. A second problem of representativeness which Mouritsen has 
tackled was the composition of the crowd. Many scholars have attempted to identify a 
specific ‘plebs contionalis’, a section of non-elite society which participated in Roman 
politics. According to Hiebel, Meier, O’Neill, and Vanderbroeck, among many others, it 
were the freedmen tabernarii and opifices who became very politicised and participated 
in the public decision-making process.43 Mouritsen criticised this, and argued that only 
the leisured strata could participate, as only they had the time and the steady income 
which was required.44 I believe that neither practical objections (as we cannot fully 
estimate the concrete circumstances of plebeian labour or life) nor Cicero’s 
contemptuous slurs allow us to definitively identify a specific group which exclusively, 
or even predominantly, constituted the plebs contionalis.45 Attendance probably varied, 
depending on the speaker, the issue, the context, the time of day, the expected 
violence... 
Practical objections to the possibility of a cross-cut of Roman society participating in 
the contiones and comitia should not be dismissed. The people attending these events 
only symbolically represented the populus Romanus, and a formal democratic analysis of 
the Republic is therefore difficult to substantiate. However, these criticisms do not 
completely discount the political relevance of the lower strata.46 People did not have to 
personally be a scribe in the treasury, attend every contio, or read legislative proposals 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic’. For more favourable reviews: Burton, ‘Review of Plebs and 
Politics in the Late Roman Republic’; Nippel, ‘Review of Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic’. Also see 
Scheidel, ‘The Demography of Roman State Formation in Italy’. 
42 Courrier, La plèbe de Rome et sa culture, p. 437-441. 
43 Hiebel, Rôles institutionnel et politique de la contio, p. 60-67; Meier, Res publica amissa, p. 114-115; O’Neill, ‘A 
Culture of Sociability’, p. 256, 286-296; Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior, p. 69, 81-93. 
44 Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic, esp. p. 39-45. 
45 For Cicero’s double position: Kühnert, ‘Populus Romanus und sentina urbis’. Cic., Acad., 144, Att., 1.16.11, 18, 
Sest., 114, 124-125. 
46 See Logghe, ‘Plebeian Agency in the Later Roman Republic’. 
  107 
or even the acta to be informed about new developments. As O’Neill has discussed in his 
thesis, ‘popular sociability’ has significant consequences for our interpretation of non-
elite impact on politics.47 Diffusion of information among the non-elites was quite high. 
Rumour was notoriously effective in spreading information among the common people, 
and politics and the political elites seem to have been a common subject.48 One specific 
form of communication was song, which could transmit general ideas, reproduce 
narrative history, or be adapted to serve new developments.49 The importance of 
political graffiti in the ancient city for bottom-up communication has been 
substantiated by Morstein-Marx.50 Graffiti had to power to constitute ‘common 
knowledge’ among the masses. O’Neill has looked at circuli, groupings of citizens 
emotionally discussing public matters, and circulatores, who besides being ‘entertainers’ 
unofficially disseminated all kinds of information, including political news and 
rumours.51 Unlike the contiones, the circuli were truly informal gatherings, without any 
supervision by a person of official authority. Because of this, and because they could 
lead to collective action, the senatorial elites were very concerned about this form of 
non-elite interaction. Circulatores included fortune-tellers, astrologers, philosophers, 
and all kinds of street and village entertainers, and have been painted as propagators of 
non-elite culture and education.52 The compita around which the vici were organised 
were the heart of urban non-elite Roman social life, and it has been widely attested that 
it was a place of congregation for gossip, religious activities, cultural activities, and 
economic activities such as auctions.53 O’Neill goes one step further, claiming that local 
politics were organised there. According to O’Neill locals discussed matters pertaining 
to the res publica on the compita, such as convincing each other to support or oppose 
certain proposals or politicians.54 O’Neill even depicts the Forum Romanum as nothing 
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48 Laurence, ‘Rumour and Communication in Roman Politics’; Néraudau, ‘La Fama dans la Rome antique’; 
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51 O’Neill, ‘A Culture of Sociability’, p. 94-133; O’Neill, ‘Going Round in Circles’. Also Booth, ‘Allusion to the 
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64. 
 108 
more than the central compitum of Rome, with the subrostrani as a special type of 
circulatores unique to the space. This would of course fit neatly into the hidden 
transcript - public transcript interaction which has been proposed in the theoretical 
framework. Another form of non-supervised events were the convivia. These festive 
occasions were incurred less suspicion by elites because they were a constant of elite life 
too. The collegia, the vici, or similar societal units provided platforms for discussions 
about political issues. Collegia organised such banquets. General topics of public interest 
cannot have been completely absent in the discussions. Not by chance, the governing 
structures of these associations closely paralleled those of the central political 
institutions. Again, a common feature of infrapolitics is that they are commonly based 
on the public transcript.55 According to Asconius, it was the political, non-authorised 
influence of the collegia which inspired the attempt to abolish many of them in 64: 
Meetings frequently took place at the time, attended by disorderly men without 
proper sanction with damaging consequences. As a result the collegia were 
abolished by decree of the senate and a number of laws later on, except for a few 
specified ones with a clear public benefit, such as those of carpenters and 
potters.56 
To sum up, even non-elite strata in Rome could and did inform themselves about 
politics. This could happen directly, through the public nature of almost all political 
deliberations and the official dissemination of information, or through ‘popular 
sociability’ about politics. Some scholars have questioned whether the lower strata 
could understand the complexity of Roman politics, or were really grasped by its 
contents.57 While the former question is hard to convincingly answer either way, many 
sources seem to attest at least the latter. Politics often was exciting, with frequent trials 
determining the lives of important politicians, and rife with backstabbing and even the 
occasional murder. Non-elites went out to fight over certain issues, even seem to have 
been involved in issues even when these did not directly concern them.58 
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A second important argument against plebeian agency is the notion that the structural 
complexes (dispositions, the way of experiencing society) which they developed were 
either exactly the same as those of the elites, or at least inspired a culture of deference.59 
Scholars arguing this version of plebeian subservience disagree with Mouritsen’s 
remarks about the minimal role of the non-elites in public rituals. They believe that 
broad participation in these rituals socialised the ‘body politic’ to the art of obedience. 
The institutions which Millar described as democratic were in reality a form of primary 
contention, making non-elites accept elite discourse. These claims have already been 
addressed in the theoretical framework by indicating the difference between the public 
and hidden transcript. Public rituals such as elections, contiones, triumphs, and funerary 
processions were reaffirmations of the public transcript. These were dramatisations of 
elite rule.60 However, as has been stated, the public transcript does not tell the entire 
truth of political discourse, and is – to once again paraphrase Scott – partly the result of 
a “tacit conspiracy in misrepresentation”.61 
Even if they sometimes participated in public decision-making, most political 
experiences of the plebeians took place separated from the elites. Popular sociability in 
the late Republic took place in spaces which were safe from elite control or 
interference.62 Our sources clearly were very uneasy about these forms of interaction, 
which does indicate a fear of a different, ‘vulgar’ political discourse.63 Non-elites, 
because of the stark contrast in their lived experiences with those of the elites, 
reproduced very different structural complexes.64 Compared to elite groups, the plebs 
urbana seems to have been concerned far less with ‘good taste’ or evading 
offensiveness.65 They seem to have abhorred excessive attention to formalism in 
politics.66 The elites knew very well that politics were important to the lower strata, but 
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either chose to ignore it, denounce it, or forbid it on some occasions. Even if the late 
Republic was no Orwellian police state, there were clear attempts to control non-elite 
spaces, times, and forms of communication.67 
There are some clear attestations of plebeian hidden transcripts, although many are 
dated to periods just after the timeframe of this thesis. Repertoires of collective 
contentious action are far better attested for the late Republic. Subaltern behaviour 
drawing from the hidden transcript often took the form of a ‘guerrilla war’, which 
disguised the seriousness of the protest or secured the anonymity of the protester. 
Song, in the words of Horsfall, was “[W]ell suited to the memorisation and diffusion of 
disrespect, abuse and protest”.68 Humour is another traditional way in which elite 
discourse is subverted. Some jokes from the early Principate clearly turn haughty elite 
culture on its head.69 Another form of political expression took in the theatre, but was 
perhaps shared among broad groups. Communication in that context ranged between 
applause, demands for encores, to direct shouts.70 Suetonius reports several instances of 
infrapolitics during Caesar’s dictatorship.71 Libelli were spread which called upon people 
not to show new ‘foreign’ senators the way to the senate, and short verses (“Galllos 
Caesar in triumphum ducit, idem in curiam”, “Galli bracas deposuerunt, latum clavum 
sumpserunt”) were sung by the ‘vulgus’ about the same individuals. When Q. Fabius 
Maximus entered the theatre, the crowd shouted “non esse eum consulem”. Finally, after 
the tribunes L. Caesetius Flavus and C. Epidius Marullus were banished, many people 
gave their names in the elections for the consulship. Unofficial communication in 
official contexts is well attested as well. The crowds at contiones grumbled, hissed, 
shouted, often threw stones, and – what was worst of all for the orator – occasionally 
walked away.72 When things became even more serious, the lower strata occupied public 
spaces such as temples or the Forum, or even more violent actions were taken.73 
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Sometimes the elites were personally attacked. Besides outright lynchings, symbolic 
actions such as attacking the lictors of magistrates and smashing the fasces implicated a 
direct attack on the legitimised basis of power. Destroying voting urns sent a similar 
message. More personal attacks such as the pelting of statues and the besieging of elite 
houses are other well-attested features of the repertoire of contention. In the next 
chapter (4.1.1), specific attention will be given to the repertoires of contention in 
relation to the tribunes of the plebs. 
A common theory states that plebeian politics was reactive in nature and required 
leadership by members of the elite. Since Brunt and Rouland, the idea of political 
clientship in the late Republic has been rightfully discredited.74 Practical elite leadership 
was never abandoned, however. Vanderbroeck’s investigation of popular leadership 
went very far in theorising this feature.75 He argued that different, hierarchised levels of 
leadership existed in the factio of populares, and that the top and assistant leaders always 
were elites. Contentious action was organised top-down. Courrier argued that the plebs 
urbana had its own political culture and was conscious of its own interests.76 Although 
he maintains that the plebeians were reactive and needed elite leadership, they are not 
represented as passive. According to Courrier non-elite behaviour was spontaneous and 
not always manipulated by the elites. David did not focus on direct leadership, but 
argued that magistrates always had the initiative in disturbances in the contio, and 
violence by the crowds were institutionalised reactions to these conflicts.77 In other 
words, even violence was ‘part of the system’. These are only some examples of various 
theories about elite leadership. This thesis argues that leadership within non-elite 
groups existed, and that these groups could and did mobilise on their own accord (see 
4.2.2). One very direct attestation of this is given by Nicolaus of Damascus, talking about 
the reaction against the tyrannicides just after Caesar’s death: 
Even their houses were besieged by the people, not under any leader, but the 
populace itself was enraged on account of the murder of Caesar, of whom they 
were fond, and especially when they had seen his bloody garment and newly slain 
 
                                                     
74 Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 382-443; Rouland, Pouvoir politique et dépendance personnelle dans 
l’antiquité romaine, p. 345-491. Also Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome, p. 18, 65-123. 
75 Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior. Also see Courrier, La plèbe de Rome et sa culture, p. 505-
510, 519; Lott, The Neighborhoods of Augustan Rome, p. 49-50; Nippel, ‘Die plebs urbana und die politische Gewalt’, 
p. 240. Ziolkowski in the Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rome provided a very ideosyncratic version of this 
theory: “The fundamental rule of the civic life was that the chosen leaders of the community, magistrates and tribunes, 
were its only active element; the people, the fount of power and law, were completely passive. As an institution, they 
existed latently; they came into being at the summons of the magistrate.”, Ziolkowski, ‘Civic Rituals and Political 
Spaces in Rome’, p. 391. 
76 Courrier, La plèbe de Rome et sa culture. 
77 David, ‘Les règles de la violence dans les assemblées populaires de la République romaine’. 
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body brought to burial when they had forced their way into the forum and had 
there interred it.78 
Another fragment by the same source attests the more peaceful demands made of 
Antony by veterans of Caesar, as they appear to have disagreed with his treatment of 
Octavian: 
Then gathering in a great company and reproaching themselves still more bitterly 
they set out for Antonius' house (for he also was relying on them) and made some 
plain statements to him.79 
While elite leadership cannot (and should not) be completely discounted, especially for 
linking several groups, their importance from the perspective of the lower strata was 
often that of figureheads. It was not easy for plebeian groups to direclty effect political 
changes. They had to access the political institutions through the elites, by reproducing 
the public transcript. To engage in contentious politics, if they hoped to achieve 
something, non-elites normally had to produce ‘moral cover’. While initiative could 
come from plebeian groups, for anything short of a complete attack on the system they 
were forced to rely on the elements within the public transcript and therefore on a ‘link’ 
to an elite person. This does not imply identification or subservience. When the elite 
figurehead seemed to turn against the programmes of the plebeian groups, the reaction 
could be quite vigorous. It will be argued in this thesis that the tribuni plebis, because of 
their institutional position, often were picked for this role by non-elite groups. 
Leadership, especially elected leadership, was quite possibly the central feature of the 
public transcript in the late Republic, which explains its importance in producing moral 
cover.80 There are some reasons to doubt the truth of this elite self-representation. For 
instance, Cicero in discussing a trial for maiestas against a person who had ‘employed 
mob violence’ presents the following speech as part of the defence: 
The violence in question was aroused by the just indignation of the public and not 
by the action of the tribune; whereas the majesty of the Roman people, inasmuch 
 
                                                     
78 “πολιορκηθῆναι δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ἡγεμόνος μηδενὸς ἐφεστῶτος, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ 
πλήθους ὑπὸ τῆς περὶ Καίσαρα εὐνοίας δυσχεραίνοντος τὸν φόνον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπειδὴ τήν τε ἐσθῆτα εἶδεν 
ἡιμαγμένην καὶ τὸ σῶμα νεο- σφαγὲς ἐκκομιζόμενον εἰς ταφήν, ὅτε καὶ βιασάμενος θάψειεν αὐτὸ ἐνμέσηι 
ἀγορᾶι.” Nic. Dam., Vit. Caes., fr.130.17.50 (FGrH 90, translated by Hall). 
79 “μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀθρόοι γινόμενοι μᾶλλόν τι κατεμέμφοντο σφᾶς, συνιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν ᾽Αντωνίου οἰκίαν — 
τούτοις γὰρ κἀκεῖνος ἐθάρρει — καί τινας λόγους ἐποιοῦντο ἐκ φανεροῦ” Nic. Dam., Vit. Caes., fr.130.29.115 
(FGrH 90, translated by Hall). 
80 The analysis of the ‘oligarchic school’ has not by accident focussed on the ‘meritocratic’ elements of the 
Roman political system. Especially Hölkeskamp, Rekonstruktionen einer Republik. Also Yakobson, Elections and 
Electioneering in Rome, p. 117. 
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as that means their greatness, was increased rather than diminished in the 
maintenance of its power and right81 
In other words, the person prosecuted argued that he did not completely ‘control’ the 
attendants of his contio. If he would be able to do so, this would even be a diminution of 
the maiestas populi Romani. It comes as no surprise that the person was convicted. This 
interpretation was dangerous for the elites, as it undermined their claim to leadership. 
Domination is costly. Especially senators and magistrates were compelled to play 
their part in front of the populace. Elite rule was based on it, and failing to adhere to 
their self-image would have been punished by the non-elites in the form of mockery.82 
Roman political rituals were not rituals of indoctrination, but scenes of mutual control. 
The non-elites held elites to the public transcript, for instance by protesting corruption, 
the breach of religious norms, even open fissures in familial cohesion.83 This was an 
integral part of infrapolitics.84 Nevertheless, the public transcript does have its own 
power. Oratory could in fact affect the information available to non-elites, and could be 
used in manipulation.85 Laws often were complex, and not all non-elites had the time to 
investigate or the knowledge to discern between true and false information. 
This section has not focussed on the differences between non-elites. The forms of 
domination varied greatly. For instance, slave labourers in the mines were more 
brutally controlled than a slave like Tiro, lowly freedmen tabernarii were possibly 
pressured more by their patrons than rich freedmen negotiatores. The consequence of 
this is mainly that we can expect a rich spectrum of hidden transcripts. This must 
remain an expectation, however, as again we are limited by the sources. 
 
                                                     
81 “populi enim romani dolor iustus vim illam excitavit, non tribuni actio; maiestas autem, quoniam est magnitudo 
quaedam, populi Romani in eius potestate ac iure retinendo aucta est potius quam diminuta”, Cic., Part. Orat., 105 
(translation by H. Rackham). 
82 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 11, 18, 49-50, 57. And Ibid., p. 11, interestingly: “an elected head of 
a republic must appear to respect the citizenry and their opinions”. Habinek: “Speechmaking becomes part of a culture of 
strategic performance in which observance of protocols of manliness and almost obsessive concern with the decorous 
presentation of the body mask an underlying and chronic anxiety over status, both in relationship to other males and, as 
free adult men, in relationship to all those whose voices have been silenced.”, Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory, p. 
6. 
83 Courrier, La plèbe de Rome et sa culture, p. 466-468, 472. For mutual control, Russell, The Politics of Public Space in 
Republican Rome, p. 54-55. 
84 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 18. Also Nicolet: “Mais le système pouvait aussi, dans certaines 
limites, fonctionner en sens inverse : et les masses, à leur tour, pouvaient faire passer un certain nombre de leurs 
revendications essentielles, manifester leurs besoins élémentaires ou leurs préférences, de telle sorte que le système 
politique fût obligé d’en tenir compte.”, Nicolet, Le Métier de citoyen dans la Rome républicaine, p. 525-526. 
85 Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory, p. 4; Laurence, ‘Rumour and Communication in Roman Politics’, p. 64-
65; Williamson, The Laws of the Roman People, p. 94-97. 
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Time-distance to Rome had a significant impact on the political possibilities of non-
elites. The plebs urbana had a privileged position.86 Organisation and mobilisation are 
generally more easy in densely populated regions with several non-elite groups. 
However, conflict between non-elite groups was just as real as competition between the 
elites. The crowds at contiones or other public events could consist of different societal 
and political groups, and often started fights against one another. Peaceful groups in the 
Forum are sometimes seperated into those standing in front and those more at the 
back.87 Aside from the plebs urbana, Peasant farmers in the suburbium had some 
opportunities of visiting Rome, but citizens living across the Apennines, in Gallia 
Cispadana, Picenum, or Apulia, were far less lucky.88 The growth of the Roman territory 
had to some degree severed the citizens of outlying colonies or municipiae from the 
central politics of the Urbs. Some scholars, such as Brunt, even attributed the fall of the 
Republic to the decline of identification with Rome, because the rural plebeians serving 
in the legions had never come into contact with urban politics.89 Patronage was still 
relevant to outlying regions in the late Republic, and the regions where it is still attested 
are mainly Picenum and Gallia Cisalpina. 
In communicating political demands, slaves of course had very little options. They 
were not even legitimate participants in the public sphere, as they were strictly not 
persons. Slave infrapolitics must have been even more defined by stealth and double 
meaning. It was certainly not absent. To quote Morley, “there is evidence of constant 
resistance on an individual basis: shirking, vandalism, petty theft, and running away”90. In 
literature and theatre, freedmen regularly followed the caricature of the trickster.91 We 
see in the large slave revolts that elements of the public transcript were indeed 
appropriated, but with some factors of the hidden transcript such as magic authority 
based on astrology.92 Salvius usurped the regalia of Roman magistrates such as the 
fasces, while Spartacus gave funeral games. The war against Spartacus was very 
influential. Although later it was romanticised, at the time it was a humiliation for the 
Roman leaders, and ‘gladiator’ became a term to depict political opponents.93  
 
                                                     
86 Millar, The Crowd in Rome, p. 27-38; Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior, p. 69-72, 75. For a 
specific case attesting this just before the chosen timeframe, Flower, ‘Beyond the Contio’. 
87 For instance, Ascon., 58C; Nic. Dam., Vit. Caes., fr.130.21.72 (FGrH 90). 
88 Erdkamp, ‘Mobility and Migration in Italy in the Second Century BC’, p. 421-424. 
89 Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 77-78, 257-265. Also Heuss, ‘Das Revolutionsproblem im Spiegel der 
antiken Geschichte’, p. 49-52; Tatum, ‘The Final Crisis (69-44)’, p. 191. 
90 Morley, ‘Social Structure and Demography’, p. 315. 
91 Ibid., p. 309; Shaw, ‘The Great Transformation’, p. 206-207. This is the typical type of the folk hero in 
infrapolitics. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 41, 162. 
92 Shaw, ‘The Great Transformation’, p. 198-205. 
93 Martin, ‘L“insulte ”gladiateur" dans les discours cicéroniens’. 
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3.3 The tribunate and other governmental institutions 
Before starting with the main analysis of this thesis, a last piece of context is the 
tribunate itself. As the formal powers were already discussed in the introduction, here 
we will look at the position of the tribunate within the broad ‘architecture’ of political 
institutions in the late Republic.We will not approach governmental institutions and 
their relation towards one another in a functionalist manner, as for instance Bleicken 
and Thommen did for the tribunate.94 There was no fixed relation between the consuls 
and the tribunes, for instance, they could cooperate with and oppose one another. This 
section will merely look at where the tribunate came into contact with other 
governmental institution. 
One governmental institution with which the tribunate was closely linked, beyond any 
doubt, was the comitia tributa.95 This assembly was predominantly responsible for formal 
legislation in the latte Republic, and therefore a central pillar in the architecture of 
power. The elections of new tribunes, quaestors, and plebeian aediles were decided in a 
vote by the same assembly. A third activity of the comitia, which disappeared early in 
the timeframe, was the iudicium populi for non-capital cases. The tribunes were the most 
active magistrates in leading the comitia tributa and putting questions before it (‘should 
this law be passed’, ‘who should be elected’, ‘is this person guilty’). It has been 
convincingly argued that other institutions (magistrates, the senate) could ask the 
tribunes to introduce measures on their behalf.96 Another institutional actor was even 
more important in the comitia: the persons who answered. They were a symbolic 
representation of the entire populus Romanus, in the comitia tributa divided according to 
the tribes. The comitia tributa was the most ‘egalitarian’ of the popular assemblies. All 
adult male citizens (perhaps excluding patricians) were allowed cast their vote, and that 
vote was not weighted according to an individual’s vote on the basis of property. That 
does not mean that all votes were equal. A formal inequity was caused by the 
distribution of freedmen in the four urban tribes. Time-distance to Rome in 
combination with available time also limited participation. Simplified, the comitia tributa 
can be represented as mostly a series of formal, closed-ended questions by the tribunate 
of the plebs of the symbolic populus Romanus, which by this means made decisions. 
 
                                                     
94 Bleicken, ‘Das römische Volkstribunat’, p. 87; Thommen, Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik, p. 35-
39. For criticism on this functionalist approach, David, ‘Conformisme et transgression’. 
95 Develin, ‘Comitia Tributa Plebis’; Develin, ‘Comitia Tributa Again’; Sandberg, Magistrates and Assemblies, 
passim, esp. p. 97-113. 
96 Sandberg, Magistrates and Assemblies, p. 41-96. 
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The contio was another institution closely linked to the tribunes.97 Contiones were 
closely linked with the comitia tributa: speeches were mandatory at certain stages before 
legislative proposals could be voted on, and even linked to elections and trials. 
Typically, a contio immediately preceded the comitia. Contiones could, however, be called 
at almost any time, even on dies nefasti. The tribunes were, to our knowledge, the most 
frequent popular orators. They talked about political developments, sometimes tried to 
press issues, introduced speakers who were not magistrates (privati) to the contio, and so 
on. They could also gage the reactions of the attending crowd to certain programmes or 
behaviour. Besides the primarily legislative activities in the comitia tributa, the 
dominance of tribunician oratory in contiones also shows that they had important ties to 
communication with large groups of citizens, including non-elites, in Rome. While 
formally this communication was one-sided, in practice this was anything but the case. 
The strong ties of tribuni plebis with these two institutions show how closely the 
institution was intertwined with popular opinion. No other magistrates interacted more 
with the crowds which symbolically represented the populus Romanus than the tribunes. 
As we have seen, these crowds very likely included even parts of the lower strata. As will 
be made clear in the next chapter, there were still other factors which strengthened the 
openness of the tribunate to pressure by non-elite groups. However, these close ties do 
not imply that the tribes in the comitia or the crowds in a contio always did what a 
tribune wanted, or vice versa. 
The assemblies gives us only one dimension. Another institution with which the 
tribunes often were involved was the senate. The senate had very little formal 
authority.98 Its importance primarily lay in bringing together the highest elites of the 
Republic: magistrates, former magistrates, and members of the most influential families. 
Magistrates first had to call together the senate, consulted it on certain issues, and could 
call for a vote which could result in a senatus consultum. These decrees did not have a 
direct legal significance, and their importance mainly lay in the enormous pressure 
which was put on magistrates to act accordingly. 
The tribunes were one type of magistrate which could be asked by senatorial decree 
to take certain actions. In 43, a senatorial resolution asked the tribune P. Appuleius to 
spread the (false) news through Rome that two legions had deserted Octavian.99 In 56, 
the senate expressed its opinion that a legislative proposal should be introduced which 
 
                                                     
97 Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic, p. 38-41; Russell, ‘Speech, 
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98 Cloud, ‘The Constitution and Public Criminal Law’, p. 494-496; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 
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99 App., BC, 3.93. 
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forbade sodalitates and decuriae, probably by the tribunes.100 This is not certain, as 
consuls seem to have introduced bills ex senatus consulto far more often than the 
tribunes. In this case, at least, the tribunes took no action, and only the following year 
the consular lex Licinia followed some elements of the senatorial order. Some 
attestations of the so-called ‘senatus consultum ultimum’ also directed the tribunes to take 
action, even if it was as vague as obeying the consuls or “viderent ne quid detrimenti res 
publica caperet”.101 The ‘SCU’ probably was an agreement which covered the use of 
imperium within the pomerium.102 The tribunes were the only magistrates without 
imperium who were included in these decrees, which emphasises their importance. 
Tribuni plebis could convene the senate and put issues up for discussion, which is 
attested throughout the late Republic. On 13 September 91, for instance, M. Livius 
Drusus convened the senate to complain about the behaviour of the consul L. Marcius 
Philippus.103 In 49, Mark Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus convened the senate outside of 
the pomerium to allow Caesar to address it.104 In December 44 the tribunes called 
together the senators and introduced a measure to provide a bodyguard for the consuls 
and the senate on the 1st of January.105 In calling together the senate, however, the 
consuls again were much more dominant than the tribunes. 
The relation between the tribunes and the assembled senate was not always rosy. 
According to Dio, in 67 A. Gabinius was nearly killed in the senate.106 In the same year C. 
Cornelius had put the question of loans to foreign emissaries on the agenda, but the 
senate rejected his proposals.107 Tribunician vetoes against senatorial proposals are 
frequently reported by our sources.108 Probably in 69, Cn. Lentulus Spinther vetoed a 
decree absolving the Cretans from their crimes and naming them friends of Rome.109 On 
the 14th of January 56 L. Caninius Gallus and C. Porcius Cato vetoed a senatorial 
resolution that no-one should introduce a legislative proposal to the people on the 
 
                                                     
100 Cic., QF, 2.3.5. Flambard, ‘Clodius, les collèges, la plèbe et les esclaves’, p. 120-122; Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics 
in the Late Roman Republic, p. 144, 149-151. 
101 Ascon., 31C. Also Cic., Deiot., 11, Fam., 16.11.2, Rab. Perd., 20; Dio, 40.49.5, 42.29.3. Golden, Crisis Management 
during the Roman Republic, p. 42-43, 10-149; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 89. Thommen 
argues, I think unconvincingly, that this was only in cases where the tribunes themselves were involved. This 
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103 Cic., de Or., 3.2. 
104 Dio, 51.15.2. 
105 Cic., Fam., 10.28.2, 11.6a, Phil., 3.13, 25, 37, 4.16. 
106 Dio, 36.24.1. 
107 Ascon., 57C. 
108 Thommen, Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik, p. 207-216. 
109 Diod., 40.1.2. 
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matter of the restoration of Ptolemaeus XII Auletes110. It was written down as a senatus 
auctoritas, which was primarily a report of the result of the vote. A famous example are 
the vetoes of M. Antonius and Q. Cassius Longinus to the senatorial resolutions against 
Caesar in January 49.111 
The tribunes often became involved with the other official magisterial and priestly in 
the late Republic, ranging from the augurs or the IIIviri capitales to the dictatorship.112 
The authority of the tribunes was not limited to a specific subject matter, which caused 
them to often cooperate with or oppose persons from the entire range of magistrates. 
Already in the late third century, tribunes were prosecuting censors over how they 
revised the lectio senatus.113 Most of the censors in the late Republic came into conflict 
with the tribunate: one was jailed for refusing to abdicate, one was threatened with 
confiscation of his property, many were vetoed while performing their duties.114 In the 
opposite direction, at least two former tribunes were given a nota for their behaviour 
during their tribuneship (M. Lucilius and C. Ateius Capito), at least two were expelled 
from the senate (M. Duronius and C. Sallustius Crispus), and one, C. Scribonius Curio, 
nearly suffered the same fate during his year in office in 50.115 Censors were responsible 
for upholding the integrity of the Roman population, with regard to property 
qualifications but especially with regard to morals. The lex Clodia de censoria notione was 
an important step in this clash between the magistracies, and severely limited the 
power of a censor to act on his own initiative.116 
Another important magistracy was the praetorship. Again, sometimes tribunes and 
praetors were inimical. On two occasions (in 103 and 78) we know of tribunes smashing 
the sella curulis of a praetor.117 In late December 66, C. Manilius Crispus had just ended 
his tribuneship and was indicted before the praetor Cicero, who decided that the trial 
 
                                                     
110 Cic., Fam., 1.2.4. 
111 App., 2.32; Caes., BC, 1.2.7-8, 5.1-5; Cic., Phil., 2.52; Dio, 41.2.1-3.2; Liv., Per., 109; Plut., Ant., 5; Suet., Iul., 31. 
112 For some examples: a law of Sex. Titius in 99 was abrogated by an augur (Cic., Leg., 2.31), between 95 and 91 
M. Terentius Varro Reatinus as triumvir capitalis ignored a summons from the tribune Porcius (Gel., 13.12.6), 
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113 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 549-550. 
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elected: Cic., Phil.¸ 2.99. 
115 Cic., Div., 1.29-30; Dio, 40.63.4-5; Fronto, ad Caes., 5.41-42; Val., Max., 2.9.5. 
116 Ascon., 8C; Cic., Pis., 9-10, Prov. Cons., 46, Sest., 55; Dio, 38.13.2, 40.57; Schol. Bob., 132 Stangl. Astin, 
‘Censorships in the Late Republic’, p. 188. 
117 Auct., Vir. Ill., 73; Dio, 36.41.2. 
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would have to take place just two days later on the last day of the month. The new 
tribunes intervened, and demanded that Cicero explain his actions before the people.118 
Several instances where tribunes and praetors cooperated are attested too. In 85, the 
entire college of tribunes cooperated with the praetors in Rome on legislation 
concerning the currency.119 In 70, M. Quintius Plancinus aided the praetor L. Aurelius 
Cotta in drawing up a lex iudiciaria, while in 62 Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos cooperated 
with Caesar to give Pompey the command against the Catilinarian army.120 Most 
frequently, however, tribunes and praetors were opposed because of either the coercitio 
of the praetors, or because of their legal duties. The main reason for this was the 
tribunician power of auxilium. 
Especially the consuls frequently came into contact with the tribunes. For the entire 
period between 220 and 2, Kondratieff lists 51 instances of behaviour by tribunes which 
could be seen as inimical to one or both consuls, 12 instances where the consuls were 
actively opposing the tribunes, and 27 examples of cooperation.121 If we just look at the 
period selected for this thesis, however (112-23), the numbers become 25 (almost half), 
11 (all but one instance), and 17 (almost two-thirds). While one cannot draw conclusions 
from these numbers, they give the impression that it were the consuls who increased 
their opposition to activities by the tribunes rather than vice versa. In 91, the tribune M. 
Livius Drusus or his viator twisted the neck of the consul L. Marcius Philippus in a contio, 
until blood came from one of his orifices (nose, mouth, eyes, or ears).122 In 88, P. 
Sulpicius Rufus was proscribed by the consuls L. Cornelius Sulla and Q. Pompeius Rufus 
as a result of their enmity throughout the year. Sulpicius was killed, and his head 
displayed on the rostra.123 In 76 Cn. Sicinius was killed as well, possibly through the 
cooperation of the consul C. Scribonius Curio.124 More frequent were attempts by 
tribunes to jail consuls. In 60, for instance, L. Flavius put the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus 
 
                                                     
118 Dio, 36.44.1-2; Plut., Cic., 9.4-5; Schol. Bob., 119 Stangl; Schol. Gron., 322 Stangl. Ramsey, ‘The Prosecution of 
C. Manilius in 66 B.C. and Cicero’s Pro Manilio’, p. 323-324; Ward, ‘Politics in the Trials of Manilius and 
Cornelius’, p. 546-554. 
119 Cic., Off., 3.80; Plin., NH, 33.132. 
120 Plut., Cat. Min., 27; Schol. Gron., 328 Stangl; Suet., Iul., 16.1. 
121 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 550-553. Under tribunes inimical to consuls I have taken together 
“abused, imprisoned, or prosecuted by tribunes”, “opposed by tribunes”, and “”produced” at contiones by 
tribunes”, and the instances in 205, 200, 170, 131/2, 84, 58 under “directed by tribunician decree or plebiscite”. 
For consuls inimical to tribunes the category “opposing tribunes, ex-tribunes, pre-tribunes” was taken. For 
cooperation, “assisted by tribunes”, “assisting or advising tribunes”, “negotiating with tribunes”, and the 
instances in 131, 49, and 44 under “directed by tribunician decree or plebiscite” were selected. 
122 Auct., Vir. Ill., 66; Flor., 2.5.8; Val. Max. 9.5.2. 
123 App., BC, 1.59-60; Auct., ad Herenn., 1.25, 4.31; Cic., Brut., 307, Cat., 3.24, de Or., 311; Flor., 2.9.8; Iul. Exup., 20; 
Liv., Per., 77; Nepos, Att., 2.1-2; Plut., Sull., 10.1; Val. Max., 6.5.7; Vell., 2.19.1. 
124 Cic., Brut., 216-217; Ps.-Ascon., 189 Stangl; Quintil., Inst. Or., 11.3.129; Sall., Hist., 2.22, 3.34.8-10. Marshall and 
Beness, ‘Tribunician Agitation and Aristocratic Reaction 80-71 BC’, p. 367-368. 
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Celer in carcer for opposing his agrarian proposal.125 Tribunes could even threaten to 
expel a consul from his office, as they did with Cn. Papirius Carbo in 84.126 Opposition by 
consuls typically consisted the repealing of tribunician laws, or using violence. In 44, for 
instance, the consul Mark Antony threatened to kill three tribunes if they would 
attempt to attend the senate – at least, according to Cicero.127 An example of 
cooperation between consuls and tribunes can be found in 59, when three tribunes 
aided M. Calpurnius Bibulus by proclaiming auxilium when he was being led to jail.128 
The close links between the tribunate and the consuls are in part a consequence of the 
historical roots of the institution: according to legend, the tribunes had been created to 
counteract the coercitio of the highest magistrates.129 The consuls were the leaders of the 
Republic, but the tribunes were the only regular magistrates over which they did not 
have formal authority.130 The consuls were very closely connected to the senate, and 
were primarily expected to conform to the will of that institution. The tribunes, 
meanwhile, had a much more complex set of principals. On many matters the authority 
of both institutions clashed, so it should come as no surprise that many interactions, 
friendly or hostile, are attested. As a consequence, persons whose consular imperium had 
been extended also often were the subject of tribunician attention. 
 
                                                     
125 Cic., Att., 2.1.8; Dio, 37.50.1. 
126 App., BC¸ 1.78. 
127 Cic., Phil., 3.23. 
128 Cic., Vat., 16, 21; Dio, 38.6.1, 6; Schol. Bob., 135, 146 Stangl. 
129 Bleicken, ‘Das römische Volkstribunat’, p. 93-94. 
130 See for instance Bleicken, Das Volkstribunat der klassischen Republik, p. 77-78. 
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Chapter 4 The tribunate as agent institution 
In the theoretic framework, it was established that the behaviour of tribunes of the 
plebs would have depended on various factors, especially contention by so-called 
‘principals’. In this chapter, a series of cases will be analysed to substantiate these 
claims. The central question is how the tribunate, as an ‘agent institution’, was 
constantly pulled between several societal and political groups. The discretionary 
freedom which consequently remained to individual tribunes will also be considered. 
The chapter will be divided into three sections. First, it will be confirmed that there 
were possibilities for principals to positively and negatively influence the programmes, 
decisions and behaviour of the tribunes; that groups actually acted on these 
possibilities; and that the tribunate was often specifically targeted by various claims. 
Second, there will be a focus on situations in which multiple principals had conflicting 
expectations about the proper behaviour of a tribune. We will look at several factors 
which influenced the relative power of principals. The third and final section will take 
into account the collegiality of the institution. It will deal with contention between 
several tribunes who aligned themselves differently. I will claim that the individual 
characteristics of tribunes could play some part in the outcomes of events of contention, 
but that the pressure by principals remains indispensible in any analysis. We will look at 
how tribunes adapted to the institution and how their improvisation and decision-
making could have lasting influence on the tribunate. 
Step by step, this chapter will move towards a complex interpretation of the relation 
between various societal and political groups (principals) and the tribunate. Only when 
we take this complexity into account, we can arrive at a reliable analysis of the concrete 
behaviour of the tribunes as it is reported by our sources. This behaviour, I will claim, 
depended mainly on contention by different principals, sometimes individuals but most 
frequently groups. The tribunate cannot be presented as populated by swaggering 
demagogues, as tribunes often had to navigate a plethora of expectations. Their 
individual characteristics only rarely had an important impact. The model proposed in 
this chapter will provide a basis to interpret the role of the tribunate in the end of the 
Republic, which is the subject of the next chapter.  
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4.1 Possibilities for contention by principals 
In this section I will defend the important claim that in their capacity as magistrates, 
tribunes did not possess complete freedom of choice in their behaviour. As a 
governmental institution, I will claim, the tribunate was perceived as an agent by various 
groups, and this perception was acted upon. Principals would have attempted to 
manage their unstable relation with the tribunes, and struggled to make the behaviour 
of these important agents coincide more with their own expectations. One goal, 
therefore, is to attest simple cases of contention between a principal and the tribunate. 
A second aim of this section is to demonstrate the plethora of societal and political 
groups which engaged in contention with the tribunes, and the diversity of subjects 
which characterised these interactions. In chapter 2, many rifts within Roman society 
were already identified. Contention with the tribuni plebis, it will be argued here, can be 
an especially fruitful method of identifying friction between societal groups and the 
programmes of political groups. The cases in this first section will be slightly simplified 
to clarify the model of a single principal-agent relation with one tribune. In the 
following sections this will be expanded, and some of the cases will return. 
This section will be divided into three subsections. First, the argument will be made 
using indirect, more abstract evidence which sketches the position of the tribunate in 
the public transcript. Both general expectations and the concrete organization of 
behaviour will be tackled. The second and third subsections will more concretely look at 
case-studies. In the second subsection, examples will be selected in which principals 
tried to ‘rein in’ the tribunes. The case-studies will be organised according to which type 
of behaviour by tribunes became contended. Third, the reverse will be presented, in 
which political groups tried to ‘spur on’ the tribunes to defend their programmes. In 
this last subsection, some attention will be given to a specific subject (legal matters), 
before organising the argument according to different societal groups. 
4.1.1 The tribunes in the public transcript 
This first subsection is meant to give an indication of what was expected from tribunes 
in the official discourse of power. This includes general, vague tenets, but also how their 
behaviour was structured. These two related elements will be analysed here. First, 
several ancient remarks on the tribuni plebis already indicate that these magistrates 
were expected to be swayed in one direction or the other, mostly because they had to 
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act according to ‘the will of the people’.1 There are several indications that this 
expectation was part of the public transcript in the late Republic. Second, some 
possibilities of legitimate interaction with a tribunus plebis will be investigated. It will be 
argued that the institution of the tribunate structured the behaviour of the tribunes in 
such a way as to ensure an openness towards specific types of entreaties. How, where, 
and when interaction with a tribune was possible has implications for how costly it was 
for principals to interact. This access was not equal for all societal groups in the late 
Republic. 
Let us start with the public transcript. One interesting source, Polybius, wrote several 
decades before the start of the chosen timeframe. While important developments had 
occurred since then, his account of the Roman ‘constitution’ is still relevant for the 
tribunate in the late Republic. In his description of Republican politics, Polybius 
described the tribunate as the democratic element and stated “[...] and here it is to be 
observed that the tribunes are always obliged to act as the people decree and to pay every 
attention to their wishes.”2 This sentence fittingly summarises what returns in most of our 
sources. Cicero’s description of his ideal state, which almost perfectly mirrored the late 
Republican political institutions, proposes that one of the duties of the tribunes should 
be: “neve plebem orbam tribunis relinquunto.”3 In his defence of Rabirius for treason, Cicero 
also exclaimed “popularis vero tribunus pl. custos defensorque iuris et libertatis!”4 Plutarch, in 
his own discussion of the tribunate, states that they always had to act on behalf of the 
self-interest of others, especially the ‘οἱ πολλοί’.5 In his biography of Tiberius Gracchus, 
the same author gives the main character a speech in which he says that the tribunes 
were dedicated to the δῆμος.6 A tribune who demolished the Capitol was a bad tribune, 
the character of Tiberius says, but one who went against the power of the people was 
not a tribune at all. Throughout the late Republic, the public transcript identified the 
tribuni plebis with defending the interests of the populus (or the plebs). This of course 
begs the question: who was meant by this group? 
Contemporary late Republican sources refer to many groups influencing the tribunes. 
In the speech he attributes to Licinius Macer, Sallust mentions that in the power 
struggles in the 70s everyone sought to control the tribunician ‘vis’, including the so-
 
                                                     
1 Also see Bleicken, ‘Das römische Volkstribunat’, p. 101-105; Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership and Collective 
Behavior, p. 35. 
2 “ὀφείλουσι δ᾽ ἀεὶ ποιεῖν οἱ δήμαρχοι τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ μάλιστα στοχάζεσθαι τῆς τούτου βουλήσεως”, 
Plb. 6.16.5 (translation by W.R. Patton). 
3 Cic., Leg., 3.9. See Thommen, ‘Das Bild vom Volkstribunat’. 
4 Cic., Rab. perd., 12. 
5 Plut., Quaes. Rom., 81. 
6 Plut., Tib. Gracch., 15.2-3, 5. 
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called pauci.7 In De Legibus, the character of Quintus Cicero expresses the opinion that 
anyone who wished to harm him and his brother, by which he means elite rivals, 
sharpened the ‘mucronem tribunicium’ against them.8 The same character then describes 
the tribune Clodius as a wild beast, spurred on by the passions of the multus, who were 
not the true Roman people.9 In concrete cases, there is variation in describing who 
controlled the tribunes. This will be further explored throughout this chapter. In 
general descriptions of the tribunate, there is far less disagreement.  
Like Polybius and Sallust, but unlike Cicero, the vague group called ‘the people’ is 
often contrasted with the elites. To give but one example, in a speech attributed to 
Cassius before the battle of Philippi, Appian lets Cassius argue that the tribunes were 
elected to allow them the possibility to oppose the elites in the interest of the common 
people.10 One of the claims made in the speech concerned the decreasing power of the 
tribunes: “The senators were deeply grieved at this on your account, for the office of tribune is 
yours, not theirs.”11 The openness of the tribunes towards ‘the non-elites’ was not limited 
to ideology, but was very concrete. Groups of non-elites asked tribunes to act, and the 
tribunes were expected to follow through. One direct attestation falls just outside the 
chosen timeframe, but is very telling. Cassius Dio in his Ῥωμαϊκὴ Ἱστορία talks about an 
event in 2 BCE: 
On one occasion, when the people had gathered together and were asking that 
certain reforms be instituted and had sent the tribunes to Augustus for this 
purpose, the emperor came and consulted with them about their demands; and at 
this all were pleased.12 
Especially at the first ‘gathering’, it is clear that the ‘δῆμος’ had the initiative. Even after 
the tribunes had de facto lost the authority to act on their own, they were first in line to 
hear claims by non-elites, by the broad populace which was not otherwise linked to the 
centres of power. The tribunate was so closely associated with serving non-elite 
interests that it was a trope of Roman politics. Plutarch in his biographies of Caesar, 
 
                                                     
7 Sall., Hist., 3.34.12. 
8 Cic., Leg., 3.21. 
9 Cic., Leg., 3.22. 
10 App., BC, 4.92. 
11 “ὃ καὶ μάλιστα ἐπαχθῶς ἤνεγκεν ἡ βουλὴ δι᾽ ὑμᾶς: ὑμετέρα γὰρ καὶ οὐ τῆς βουλῆς ἐστιν ἡ τῶν δημάρχων 
ἀρχή.”, App., BC, 4.93 (translation by Horace White) 
12 “ἀθροισθέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου καὶ ἐπανορθωθῆναί τινα ἀξιοῦντος καὶ τοὺς δημάρχους διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν 
Αὔγουστον πέμψαντος, ἦλθεν ἐκεῖνος καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐδέοντο σφίσι συνδιεσκέψατο: καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἥσθησαν 
ἅπαντες.” Dio, 55.9.10 (translation by E. Cary). 
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Cato and Pompey insists that Caesar’s consulship was more like a radical tribuneship, 
because he ‘gratified the multitude’ with his policies.13  
Together, these attestations give the impression that the tribunate was, at least in the 
official discourse of power, an institution open to the claims of ‘the people’, usually 
meaning the non-elites. 
As the fragment from Dio already shows, this was concretely organized in public life. 
The tribunate as an institution organized the behaviour of the individuals which 
‘occupied positions’ within it. One peculiar feature was how it guaranteed an openness 
towards appeals. 
Formal powers such as the ius auxilii, the ius intercessionis, and the tribunician 
sacrosanctitas were either directed towards answering pleas, or secured protection for 
the tribunes in defending ‘radical’ positions. The activities by tribunes in legislation, 
their right to issue edicts, and the absence of limits to their area of authority made the 
tribunes particularly ‘useful’ to principals as well. All these powers figured in the 
presentation of the tribunes, in the public transcript, as the guardians of libertas of the 
Roman citizens.14 
Aside from formal authority, the daily routines and even appearances of the tribunes 
were directed towards this accessibility. Most importantly they confirm a particular 
concern with receiving entreaties of non-elites. How the tribunes were dressed and 
where they were seated were two elements which even moved Plutarch to argue that 
they were not really magistrates at all.15 Their toga did not have a purple border, unlike 
that of the other magistrates; they did not have a sella curulis but sat on subsellium; they 
did not have lictores.16 Very interestingly, in then refuting this idea that they were not 
magistrates, Plutarch argues that a tribune was special because the office was instituted 
by the people, and: 
[...] of much importance is the fact that the tribune does not pride himself above 
the rest of the people, but conforms in appearance, dress, and manner of life to 
ordinary citizens. Pomp and circumstance become the consul and the praetor; but 
the tribune, as Gaius Curio used to say, must allow himself to be trodden upon; he 
must not be proud of mien, nor difficult of access nor harsh to the multitude, but 
indefatigable on behalf of others and easy for the multitude to deal with. 
Wherefore it is the custom that not even the door of his house shall be closed, but 
it remains open both night and day as a haven of refuge for such as need it. The 
 
                                                     
13 Plut., Caes., 14.1, Cat. Min., 32.1, Pomp., 47.3. 
14 Arena, Libertas, p. 47-54; Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic, p. 9-14. 
15 Plut., Quaes. Rom., 81. 
16 Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht 1, p. 405-406, 418; Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht 2.1, p. 282; Thommen, ‘Les 
lieux de la plèbe et ses tribuns’, p. 366-367. 
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more humble he is in outward appearance, the more is he increased in power. 
They think it meet that he shall be available for the common need and be 
accessible to all, even as an altar [...]17 
Plutarch directly attests not only the accessibility of the tribunes to entreaties, but also 
that the expected behaviour was meant to comfort the common people in interactions. 
This idea is referred to in De Legibus as well.18 The elites which became tribunes were 
expected to change not only the appearance of being elites, but also part of their elite 
behaviour. The subsellium is one example of the tribunes appearing to be ‘normal’: it was 
just a regular bench of the type used by any person, rather than a decorated chair. The 
simple appearance of the tribunes lowered the threshold for citizens not used to ‘pomp 
and circumstance’. Another element mentioned by Plutarch is that tribunes had to keep 
the doors of their private home open, even at night. Connected to this is the disputed 
claim by Aulus Gellius that tribunes could not be absent from Rome for an entire day 
(counted from midnight to midnight).19 Everything was directed towards face-to-face, 
personal, and especially non-hierarchical interactions. 
This openness was further enhanced by a very recognisable centre where the 
tribunes convened: near the Tabula Valeria, which was attached to the Curia Hostilia in 
the Forum Romanum.20 The tribunes did not have to remain at this location at all times, 
but it did provide a place where Romans could go in order to ask the tribunes to 
interpose their intercessio, ask for auxilium, complain or ask to help their cause, or any 
other form of contention. This location near the Tabula Valeria was also the site where 
individuals would be summoned by the tribuni plebis. Kondratieff even convincingly 
 
                                                     
17 “μέγα τὸ μὴ μεῖζον φρονεῖν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοιοῦσθαι καὶ σχήματι καὶ στολῇ καὶ διαίτῃ τοῖς 
ἐπιτυγχάνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν. ὁ γὰρ ὄγκος ὑπάτῳ προσήκει καὶ στρατηγῷ, τὸν δὲ δήμαρχον, ὡς Γάιος Κουρίων 
ἔλεγε, καταπατεῖσθαι δεῖ, καὶ μὴ σεμνὸν εἶναι τῇ ὄψει μηδὲ δυσπρόσοδον μηδὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς χαλεπόν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ἄοκνον τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς εὐμεταχείριστον. ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ οἰκίας αὐτοῦ κλείεσθαι νενόμισται, θύραν, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ νύκτωρ ἀνέῳγε καὶ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν ὥσπερ λιμὴν καὶ καταφυγὴ τοῖς δεομένοις. ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον 
ἐκταπεινοῦται τῷ σχήματι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὔξεται τῇ δυνάμει. κοινὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦσι τῇ χρείᾳ καὶ πᾶσιν 
ἐφικτὸν ὥσπερ βωμὸν εἶναι”, Plut., Quaes. Rom., 81 (translation by F.C. Babbitt). 
18 Cic., Leg., 3.24. 
19 Gel., 3.2.11. For a differing opinion: Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 50-51, 357, 399, 403, 404, 423, 
425, 435, 481-483, 488, 489, 501, 504, 507. 
20 Ibid., p. 134, 157-158, 161-163, 166-172, 199. Cic., Fam., 14.2.2, Vat., 21; Plut., Cat. Min., 5.1; Schol. Bob., 147 
Stangl. A considerable part of Kondratieff’s thesis was devoted to what he calls “Tribunician Topographies”. 
Ibid., p. 124-226. Also see Dumser, ‘The Urban Topography of Rome’, p. 133-139; Millar, The Crowd in Rome, p. 
38-48; Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic, p. 42-60; Mouritsen, Plebs and 
Politics in the Late Roman Republic, p. 18-37; Patterson, ‘The City of Rome’, 1992, p. 190-194; Patterson, ‘The City 
of Rome’, 2006, p. 354-356; Patterson, ‘The City of Rome Revisited’, p. 217-220; Purcell, ‘Forum Romanum (the 
Republican Period)’; Thommen, ‘Les lieux de la plèbe et ses tribuns’. 
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argues that the Basilica Porcia next to the Curia was their ‘office’.21 If all tribunes were 
absent, citizens could inquire on the Forum where they could be found. The Forum 
Romanum was the central location for the tribunes. The two rostra were situated there: 
the rostra, on the side of the comitium opposite to the Curia, and the rostra built at the 
temple of Castor in 117.22 It was on the rostra that the tribunes organised both contiones 
and comitia. It is telling that Cicero describes three tribunes (Q. Varius Severus Hybrida, 
C. Papirius Carbo Arvina, and Cn. Pomponius) of 90 by mentioning that “hi quidem 
habitabant in rostris.”23 In his own first speech from the rostra, he mentioned that “neque 
hic locus vacuus fuit umquam ab eis qui vestram causam defenderent”.24 During the chosen 
timeframe, the Forum of course underwent many changes, such as the refurbishing of 
the first rostra in 97, the enlargement of the Curia by Sulla in 80, the moving of the 
praetors to the Gradus Aurelii on the other side of the Forum in 75, the rebuilding of the 
Basilica Aemilia starting in 55, the replacement of the Basilica Sempronia by the Basilica 
Iulia starting in 54, the burning down of the Curia and the Basilica Porcia in 52 and the 
subsequent rebuilding of the Curia Cornelia, the building of the adjoining Forum Iulium 
starting in 51, the moving of the first rostra in 45, the replacement of the Curia Cornelia 
by the Curia Iulia in 44, and the addition of the temple of Divus Iulius, a triumphal arch, 
and another rostra in 29 at the opposite end of the Forum. All these changes would have 
had an effect on the activities of the tribunes and their principals. Workmen renewing 
the Basilica Aemilia, for instance, would have had more opportunities in listening to 
contiones. Construction sites could easily provide stones with which crowds could throw. 
Especially when the Curia and the Basilicia Porcia burned down, this must have been an 
important moment for the tribunes. Besides the Forum Romanum and their own homes, 
Kondratieff argues, the Capitolinum and the Campus Martius (including the Circus 
Flaminius) would have been the primary locations to find the tribunes. 
All these locations were located within the direct centre of the Roman Urbs. Despite 
the size of the city, and taken together with the number of tribunes, this vastly 
improved the chances of especially urban residents to seek direct contact with these 
magistrates. Groups living closer to Rome had many direct possibilities to confront one 
of the tribuni plebis near, for example, the Tabula Valeria. The other side of the coin was 
that for groups outside the city of Rome, contention with or via tribunes was much 
harder.25 The tribunes did not have official representatives with the distinct purpose of 
 
                                                     
21 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 135-137, 140-141. Thommen, ‘Les lieux de la plèbe et ses tribuns’, p. 
360. 
22 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 138; Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, p. 28. 
23 Cic., Brut., 305. 
24 Cic., Leg. Man., 2. 
25 Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior, p. 69. 
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roaming the empire or even the Italian peninsula. Other inequalities have already been 
touched upon. Only senators could use the space of the Senate as a platform for 
contention. Only literate individuals with sufficient means could write letters to a 
tribune. Groups in other cities could more easily send a delegation to Rome than 
peasants in small communities, and so on. For persons present in the Urbs the tribunes 
would have been easily accessible. More than any other magistrates in the late Republic, 
the public transcript ensured that the tribunes were open to the entreaties non-elites, 
both by integrating this expectation into official ideology and by concretely organising 
the behaviour of the tribunes in various ways. Of course, this was not the whole story. 
4.1.2  ‘Reining in’ the tribunes: reactive involvement by the principals 
Without evidence that tribunes in concrete instances acted according to the 
expectations established by the public transcript, the general claims of the previous 
subsection can be (and have been) dismissed. This thesis does not look to confirm them. 
It has already been established that the public transcript always is a misrepresentation, 
even if it does have very real consequences for political interactions. The goal of this 
thesis is to attest that there were frequent, concrete instances of contention which 
could lead to adjustments of behaviour. In this subsection, a limited number of case-
studies will be presented with various principals. The focus will be on instances where 
contention between principals and tribunes was ‘negative’: to correct the programmes, 
decisions, or other behaviour of the tribunes. In these examples, contention by 
principals primarily had the consequence of adjusting behaviour by tribunes which did 
not sufficiently conform to the expectations of these principals. The claim that 
principals occasionally could correct the behaviour of tribunes is one which 
acknowledges their reactive involvement: the simple proposal that principals could 
intervene in order to defend their interests and desires. As will become clear, these 
interventions could address all kinds of behaviour by tribunes.  
Here I will look at formal actions (imprisoning a magistrate, calling an assembly, the 
use of intercessio), political programmes (allegiances, known plans), and other forms of 
behaviour (speech, dress, general attitude). Contention after the tribunate through 
litigation will be touched on as well. 
First, there are many attestations that principals intervened in decisions taken by the 
tribunes. For instance, in 60, the tribune L. Flavius had imprisoned the consul Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Celer.26 A large number of senators opposed this, and attempted to 
 
                                                     
26 Dio, 37.50.1-4. 
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thwart Flavius. It was not until Pompey asked the tribune to desist that he complied, 
however. By that time, Pompey even as a privatus had so much authority and power that 
he can be considered a principal in the political field. However, it was even more 
important that Flavius had been claiming to oppose Metellus in order to help Pompey, 
at least in part. Pompey’s intervention therefore put more pressure on the tribune to 
reverse his decision. Few scholars would disagree that this type of contention existed, as 
it neatly fits into narratives of tribunes as servants of the ‘Great Individuals’. A second 
case goes one step further. In 100, as a vote about a lex agraria was called by the tribune 
Saturninus, individuals from the nobilitas (Pseudo-Aurelius Victor) or the ‘city masses’ 
(πολιτικὸς ὄχλος, Appian) shouted that they heard thunder, which would make the rest 
of the day nefas, unsuited for public business.27 By this action, they attempted to block 
the division of the attending citizens into voting groups (tribus), and thereby the 
transformation of the contio into a comitia tributa. In this case their intervention failed. 
In 55, as C. Trebonius was dragging M. Porcius Cato to prison for opposing his law, a 
portion of the πλῆθος followed them, listening to Cato.28 They ultimately frightened 
Trebonius into releasing him. This crowd had been at a contio organised by Trebonius 
himself, but a number of them must not have agreed with his decision in this instance. 
This is one example which challenges the view that attendance at contiones was strictly 
partisan.29 
Other examples attest tribunician vetoes or attempts at vetoes coming under attack. 
In 111, the ‘multitudo’ unsuccessfully tried to intimidate the tribune C. Baebius into 
withdrawing his veto by shouting, looking angry, and making threatening gestures.30 
The tribune, supposedly bribed by Jugurtha, was prohibiting the Numidian king from 
being called upon to speak before a contio. He persisted in his behaviour, however, and 
according to Sallust the crowd saw this behaviour as disrespectful. They very angrily 
left the forum (“populus ludibrio habitus ex contione discedit”)31, probably another attempt 
to increase pressure on the tribune. In 103 another Baebius (Tamphilus) tried to veto a 
law which would redistribute land.32 This time the principals striving for the law 
(probably veterans from the Jugurthine War, but known only under the term ‘populus’) 
were successful, as Baebius conceded when he was pelted with stones. In the same year, 
exactly the same happened to both L. Aurelius Cotta and T. Didius when they tried to 
 
                                                     
27 App., BC, 1.30; Auct., Vir. Ill., 73.3. 
28 Liv., Per., 105; Plut., Cat. Min., 43.3. 
29 Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic, p. 128-136 Mouritsen, Plebs and 
Politics in the Late Roman Republic, p. 49-57; Mouritsen, ‘From Meeting to Text’, p. 71-75; Thommen, ‘Les lieux de 
la plèbe et ses tribuns’, p. 364-365. 
30 Sall., BJ, 34. 
31 Sall., BJ, 34. 
32 Auct., Vir. Ill., 73. 
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veto a iudicium populi against Q. Servilius Caepio.33 In 87, tribunes began to veto the vote 
on a law. The question was whether the communities given the citizenship in the 
aftermath of the Social War should be redistributed among the 35 tribes which had 
existed prior to the war. The veto caused the new citizens to riot and assault the 
tribunes with daggers.34 This was successful in the short term, but soon another group, 
likely consisting of ‘old citizens’, chased the new citizens away. Elites did not shirk from 
directly and violently intervening when tribunes proclaimed vetoes. In 90, a group of 
equites successfully threatened some tribunes into abandonding their intercessio by 
surrounding them with daggers.35 These tribunes had tried to stop the law proposed by 
their colleague Q. Varius Severus Hybrida. So far, these examples for attacks on 
tribunician vetoes have been limited to the beginning of the first century. Similar case-
studies from later years will appear throughout the following sections. 
One of these later cases provides a link to contention of programmes. In 43, Cicero and 
his allies put pressure on the tribune Salvius to give up his vetoes in the senate.36 The 
tribune had intervened when Mark Antony was about to be declared a public enemy. 
The pressure exerted by the political group of Cicero did not only convince the tribune 
to revert this course of action, it also adjusted his political programme. Later, when the 
triumvirate had taken over control of Rome, Salvius became a victim of the 
proscriptions for the very reason that he had become an important collaborator of 
Cicero.37 In 60 the same Cicero had tried to dissuade the tribune C. Herennius from 
transferring P. Claudius Pulcher to the plebs. This failed, and Cicero directly asserts that 
Herennius was ‘lentius’ and did not comprehend the pressure put on  him to abandon his 
programme.38 Another example, more limited in scope, is the speech which M. Porcius 
Cato gave (according to Plutarch) as a 21-year old youth in 74. It was aimed at the plans 
of the tribunes to remove one of the columns of the Basilica Porcia.39 A young, 
undistinguished member of the nobilitas cannot be considered a principal on the societal 
scale. For this specific situation, however, the building was the responsibility of Cato as 
his great-grandfather had given his name to it. In 88, P. Sulpicius Rufus had vetoed a 
proposal by one of his colleagues to recall some exiles of the Varian laws.40 Not much 
later he reversed this programme, and introduced the same proposal with only slightly 
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40 Auct., ad Herenn., 2.45; Cic., Har. Resp., 43. 
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different phrasing. A possible explanation is pressure put on the tribune by principals 
which are unknown to us, perhaps the ‘popular elements’ which increasingly influenced 
him during his tribuneship. Another case: Sallust indicates in the speech attributed to 
the tribune C. Licinius Macer that the other 9 tribunes in 73 would have been bribed by 
the pauci.41 These pauci were an elite political alliance which had almost fully 
monopolised access to political power. They were perhaps, as a political group, the most 
powerful principal in this period, and were according to Sallust’s Macer successful in 
adjusting the programmes of most tribunes. In 67, then, there are two linked examples 
which concerned the preamble to the lex Gabinia. Individual senators like Q. Lutatius 
Catulus and Q. Hortensius Hortalus attempted to convince the tribune A. Gabinius to 
abandon his plans, while most of the other tribunes were scared by the ferocious 
support of the multitude (πλῆθος) into not opposing the law in any way.42 The senators 
were not successful, the plebeians were (for the most part). Cicero by his own account in 
53 convinced the tribune P. Licinius Crassus Iunianus not to support the plan by some of 
his tribunician colleagues to make Pompey dictator.43 In 44, the tribunes were 
supposedly bribed not to interfere with the plans of Antony and Octavian.44 This very 
closely echoes the situation in 73. Special cases of this form of contention are those 
where the very beneficiaries of tribunician programmes interfered. One example dates 
back to 63, when Faustus Cornelius Sulla asked L. Caecilius Rufus to drop a proposal 
which would have allowed him and others to again stand for office.45 Caecilius, who had 
formerly taken violent measures to ensure the success of the law, complied. Sulla’s 
actions took place in a context of contention by other elite groups who wanted to stop 
this scheme, but as an important beneficiary his input seems to have carried more 
weight. This was echoed in the case of Flavius in Pompey which has already been given. 
In another case, in 58, Cicero’s allies (Atticus, among others) harshly criticised a tactic 
by the tribuni designati to recall Cicero, in which they would have used the expenses for 
the provincial commands as leverage against the consuls.46 The soon-to-be tribunes 
were not very happy with the criticism by Atticus, but they submitted and abandoned 
their plan. 
The mannerisms or even look of individual tribunes could be the subject of contention 
as well. L. Licinius Crassus (Orator) in 111 publicly criticised what he called the inflated 
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self-esteem of the tribune C. Memmius.47 Sex. Titius (tr. pl. 99) was criticised for his 
effeminate oratorical style.48 In 90, the entire crowd at a contio deserted C. Scribonius 
Curio because of how he was talking.49 It is unknown if it was because the subject was 
uninteresting, or if his style did not suit the crowds. In 59, then, P. Vatinius attended a 
funeral feast in a dark toga. This was breaking with etiquette, but Vatinius seems to 
have consciously done this to protest certain supplicationes.50 In other words, it was a 
political act as a tribune. When Cicero later attacked him, and implies that there had 
already been pressure on Vatinius at the time of this infringement. In 52, some of the 
tribunes (apparently together with the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica) 
attended the feast of a tribunician viator.51 Valerius Maximus attacks their presence as 
being unworthy of their office, as the party was a drunken debauchery. Again, this 
behaviour by some tribunes was quite likely criticised in Rome at the time. In the same 
year, Cato delivered a speech against the tribune M. Caelius Rufus, criticising his love of 
hearing himself talk, the emptiness of his speeches, and generally how easy it was to let 
him change his opinion for money.52 Even if Caelius had not been bribed, Cato’s criticism 
would have put more pressure on him not to accept money in the future. 
Contention about the proper behaviour of tribunes in general could take place as well. 
This is best illustrated by the widely attested prosecutions of tribunes after they had 
laid down their office. This type of contention is not primarily important for the 
behaviour of the targeted person (as he had already laid down his office), but for that of 
his future colleagues. Other tribunes would have gotten the message: do not act like 
this, or the same may happen to you.53 In the 90 years under consideration, 20 tribunes 
are attested to have been accused in court cases for their behaviour during their 
tribuneship.54 It is quite telling that a popular cause for litigation against them was the 
crimen maiestatis.55 At least 8 tribunes were accused of this, another 3 are probable. This 
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crime can basically be explained as disrespecting a superior entity, which in these cases 
was achieved by a diminution of the honour and dignity associated with the tribunate 
itself, and, even more generally, with the reputation of the Roman people.56 Tribunes 
accused of maiestas were told that they had not behaved as they should have, 
considering their position and responsibilities. Other typical cases against tribunes were 
charges of vis (violence), which stand out with 5 or 6 cases.57 Furthermore, 3 tribunes 
were accused of electoral bribery (ambitu)58 and 2 of extortion (repetundae)59. Only 
persons with sufficient funds and education could afford to bring a case against a former 
magistrate. Individuals bringing the cases in these examples came from the various elite 
societal groups, including members of the Italian nobility without Roman citizenship. 
Groups are attested as well, mostly delegations from other cities, but not for the 
prosecution of tribunes. Because the socio-economic composition of the jury courts 
changed on several occasions during the late Republic, the historical decisions of courts 
could ‘pull’ the tribunes in different directions. In other words, they did not always 
impose the same expectations, and this form of contention could be quite 
unpredictable. Tribunes could have taken possible judicial consequences into account in 
their behaviour as magistrate, but there would have been uncertainty about what they 
could and could not do. 
Societal and political groups had the possibility to influence the behaviour of the 
tribunes of the plebs on various levels, ranging from specific decisions to general 
attitudes. Attempts to block the perceived policies of a tribune are attested as well. Even 
the veto was not free from contention. Principals engaged in contention with the 
tribunes, and tried to make the tribunes comply with their expectations. This often did 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Porcius Cato and Nonius Suffenas (Cic. Att. 4.15.4 (‘maiestatem’), 4.16.5-6 (at least Cato was accused twice)). 
Tribunes for whom we can expect their trials were for the crimen maiestatis: 100: P. Furius (for his acts while 
tribune, likely his veto against recalling Metellus) (App., BC, 1.33; Cic., Rab. perd., 24; Dio, 28.fr.95.3; Val. Max., 
8.1damn.2); 75: Q. Opimius (in front of a iudicio publico for wrongly using his veto) (Cic., Verr., 2.1.155-157; 
Schol. Gron., 341 Stangl); 59: P. Vatinius (for his actions contra Lege Licinia et Iunia) (Cic., Sest., 34, Vat., 33-34). 
56 Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis, p. 1-15, 74-75, 83, 94-95; Ferrary, ‘Les origines de la loi de majesté à Rome’; 
Gundel, ‘Der Begriff Maiestas’. 
57 Tribunes of: 58: P. Clodius Pulcher (Cic., Mil., 40, Sest., 89; Dio, 39.7.4; Plut., Cic., 33.3); 57: T. Annius Milo 
(Ascon., 48C; Cic., Mil., 40, QF, 2.3.2, 5.4, Sest., 95, Vat., 40-41; Dio, 39.18) and P. Sestius (especially Cic., Sest., 
passim; also Cic., QF, 2.3.5-6, Vat., 41; Schol. Bob., 125 Stangl); 52: T. Munatius Plancus Bursa (Cic., Fam., 7.2.2-3, 
Phil., 6.10, 13.27; Dio, 40.55; Plut., Cat. Min., 48.4-5, Pomp., 55.5-6) and Q. Pompeius Rufus (Dio, 40.55; Val. Max., 
4.2.8). Uncertain: 99: C. Appuleius Decianus (Schol. Bob., 95 Stangl: “multa improbe seditioseque committeret”). 
58 Tribunes of: 60: Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica (Cic., Att., 2.1.9; Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in 
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B.C., p. 9. 
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not result in more desirable behaviour by the tribuni plebis, from the point of view of the 
principal. The principal-agent relation was unstable and quite complex, as will become 
ever more clear throughout this chapter. 
4.1.3 ‘Spurring on’ the tribunes: active involvement by principals 
Now, let us turn this around by discussing contention by principals which aimed at 
positively influencing tribunician behaviour, programmes or decisions. This subsection 
will look at, in other words, the active rather than reactive involvement of principals 
vis-à-vis the tribunes. This goes some way beyond the previous subsection: actively 
pursuing a programme generally demands more mobilisation of people and power 
compared to reacting to perceived transgressions. A group pushing a tribune to 
introduce legislation, for instance, can be more difficult to keep on the same page than 
when it reacts to an unwanted bill. Theoretically, however, there is no strict difference: 
both are instances of contention. 
This subsection will be mostly divided according to various strata in the late 
Republic. First, however, we will continue with a thematical case study on legal issues. 
After this, some instances in which members of the senatorial elites tried to incite the 
tribunes to follow a certain course of action will be presented. Next, a few examples of 
equites doing the same will be given. Following this, there will be an exploration of the 
involvement of non-elites in actively pushing the tribunes to adopt certain legislative 
programmes, and the case of grain laws will receive specific attention. The last case-
study of this subsection will look into monetary laws, were a variety of societal groups 
were involved. 
To pick up on the theme with which the previous subsection ended, there are multiple 
attestations of tribunes becoming involved in legal cases or litigation laws, and of 
principals requesting that the tribunes influence the outcomes of trials or grant them 
favours. In 90, for instance, Q. Varius Severus Hybrida proposed a lex de maiestate which 
slightly changed the legal definition of maiestas. It would allow the prosecution of 
individuals who could in any way be held responsible for the Social War.60 This law, the 
sources insist, had been solicited for by groups within the equites. It was they who had 
activated Varius to initiate the legislative process. These were the same equites who 
defended the law against other tribunes intent on vetoing it. While this does not reduce 
Varius to a puppet, it is a case which clearly attests the active involvement of a 
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principal. Another example can be found in the event surrounding the trial against C. 
Manilius Crispus late in 66.61 Plutarch recounts that when Cicero as praetor decided to 
only grant Manilius one day to prepare his defence, the people (δῆμος) were indignant. 
They took their dissatisfaction to the tribunes of the plebs, who were activated to plead 
with Cicero. The praetor was consequently asked to adjust his policy or at least explain 
himself. These acts in support of Manilius were a reaction to Cicero’s behaviour, but the 
choice to involve the tribunes was an active decision by the crowds (unfortunately again 
not further defined), which acted as principal.  
In another example, Cicero himself actively instigated a tribunician action. In his 
speeches against Verres, he recounts that he pleaded with the tribunes not to banish an 
important witness, Sthenius.62 They complied, and issued an edict of banishment which 
excluded Sthenius. Before this, in 74, when Verres had been praetor, a tribune had 
brought a citizen before a contio to show that the man had been beaten with the fasces 
on the order of Verres.63 It is possible, but not directly attested, that this citizen himself 
had instigated the tribunes to act against this injustice. Aside from giving a speech to 
mobilise further indignation, the tribunes had little opportunities to act, because they 
lacked much formal power at the time due to the Sullan reforms. In 83, a man named 
Sex. Alfenus asked the tribunes to settle a dispute between himself, as an agent of P. 
Quinctius, and Sex. Naevius about giving surety for a court case.64 The tribunes were 
asked to resolve the dispute by an edict, and one of them (M. Iunius Brutus) proclaimed 
that no surety should be given before Quinctius returned to Rome. In any case the 
involvement of the tribunes in this case is interesting. These individuals, including 
Cicero, were no societal principals by themselves. Only a broad expectation that the 
tribunes could be called upon in these cases would have allowed them to act in this way. 
It is not unlikely that asking the tribunes to intervene in legal matters was routine in 
the late Republic. The few attested individual examples could make demands because, in 
a cumulative fashion, there was collective contention by various principals which 
continually re-established this expectation. 
A special case of involving the tribunes in legal matters is dated to 54. In that year, a 
trial was being prepared regarding huge electoral fraud. Most candidates for the 
consulship were involved, and so were the current consuls and both Caesar and 
Pompey. Some potential jurors (Cicero names Opimius, Veiento, and Rantius) were 
frightened of the power of these persons and the political groups which surrounded 
them. The jurors were in fact so frightened that they pleaded with the tribunes. Unless a 
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decree by the people specifically demanded their jury duty, they asked that the tribuni 
plebis would prevent them from being called up.65 This was an unusual request for 
auxilium. The jurors had to act as a group to pressure the tribunes in accepting the 
legitimacy of their appeal.  
An important question is which groups could actively pursue their interests or desires 
by influencing the behaviour of the tribunes. That the elites of Republican Rome could 
do this has never been widely rejected. Vanderbroeck perhaps took this the furthest, 
depicting the tribunes as the typical assistants of the ‘Great Individuals’, initiating 
legislation to benefit the top leaders of the populares.66 It is clearly attested by the 
evidence that groups of nobiles and other senators sometimes formed political groups to 
pressure the tribunes into pursuing policies such as, to take one example, granting them 
extraordinary commands. The ‘first triumvirate’ which had Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus 
at its centre is perhaps the most well-known example. Together they were successful in 
convincing both Vatinius in 59 and Trebonius in 55 to grant them extraordinary 
provinciae both in scope and length.67 Perhaps the second most famous coalition was the 
one between C. Marius and the tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus. Together, they took away 
from Sulla the command against Mithridates VI of Pontus and bestowed it on Marius. 
The sources attest that Marius was the instigator, having convinced the tribune to act 
on his behalf.68 Livy, for example, states: “Cum P. Sulpicius trib. pleb. auctore C. Mario 
perniciosas leges promulgasset [...] ut C. Marius adversus Mithridaten, Ponti regem, dux 
crearetur.”69 This case will return later, and will be slightly nuanced. There are other 
events where several cliques tried to create or seize a command through the agency of 
the tribunes. Both in 65 and 56, the possibility arose to create a command concerning 
Egypt, and the kingdom seems to have been a very popular destination. In 65, Caesar 
attempted to be formally charged with the responsibility to annex Egypt.70 According to 
Suetonius, he tried to sway the tribunes to act on his behalf in the matter. Cicero implies 
that he was not the only man who openly sought this responsibility, so there might have 
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been multiple political groups striving for the same goal. They were not successful, 
however. In 56, there were long deliberations about restoring Ptolemaeus XII Auletes to 
his kingdom.71 According to Cicero, there were three distinct proposals in the senate 
about who would be sent: three legati (proposed by Bibulus), Lentulus Spinther 
(Hortensius), or Pompey (Volcatius). At least three tribunes supported the appointment 
of Pompey: L. Caninius Gallus, P. Rutilius Lupus, and A. Plautius. Caninius apparently 
even proposed a law on this issue, while Lupus had made a proposal in the senate 
similar to the one made by Volcatius. Aulus Plautius had read a letter by Ptolemaeus 
himself in a contio, in which the king asked Pompey to restore him. Interestingly, Cicero 
claims that Pompey perhaps did not strive for this himself. He assumes that it was his 
entourage which acted upon their belief of what was best for him. This entourage was 
an influential political group, and sought to attain this command through influencing 
the tribunes. Another tribune, C. Porcius Cato, was also involved. He read the Sibylline 
verses concerning the situation to a contio, which was normally not allowed. According 
to Cicero, he was encouraged to do this not by Pompey or his entourage, as he opposed 
them, but by Crassus and other consulars such as C. Scribonius Curio and M. Calpurnius 
Bibulus. This then was yet another political group. They were putting pressure on Cato 
for their own motives. This situation in 56 therefore nicely attests the complexity of 
political groups and the various pressures they exerted on the tribunes during the late 
Republic. 
So much for the crème de la crème of the elites, the senators and their entourage, which 
have always been known to have had a principal-agent relation to the tribunes (even if 
modern scholars did not use the term as such). Taking a small step down, the same 
remains true for the equites.72 The case of Varius and his lex de maiestate has already been 
mentioned twice. To give another example, during the war against Jugurtha, in 108, 
some of the tribunes read letters on the rostra before the people. These letters 
fulminated against Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, the commander of that war. 
According to Sallust, these letters were written by equites, both those serving in the 
army (milites) and the businessmen in the area (negotiatores). 73 They had been written 
with the explicit intention of being read out by the tribunes, attacking Metellus, and 
making Marius more popular. Another elite group, which did not fully coincide with the 
equites, were the publicani. In their capacity as large-scale tax-farmers and money-
lenders, they influenced the tribunes throughout the late Republic. The attacks on L. 
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Licinius Lucullus are a case in point. Probably from 70,74 the publicani began to 
encourage the tribunes in Rome to pursue a policy of diminishing the supplies, troops 
and responsibilities of the proconsul. As governor of the province of Asia, Lucullus had 
cut the interest rates to 1% monthly, had forbidden the interest from becoming higher 
than the original sum, and had forbidden creditors from extracting more than one 
fourth of the income of the debtors.75 Needless to say, this did not go down well with the 
publicani. The efforts of the tribunes must have satisfied the publicani. We do not know if 
the measures of Lucullus were immediately rescinded. 
The discussion about the tribunes has a long history, but only a few scholars have 
considered the possibility that the lower strata too could actively influence the 
behaviour of the tribunes.76 Evidence for groups below the elites is seldom as clear-cut, 
as can be expected, but there are some cases.77 One attestation is dated to 111, and 
concerns the interaction between the participants of the contiones and the tribunes of 
the plebs. Sallust indicates that in that year, C. Memmius attacked Jugurtha in a 
speech.78 The tribune did not agree, however, when the crowds demanded severe 
punishment of Jugurtha, such as imprisonment or death.79 This case does attest that the 
crowds at the contio did have the possibility to demand a certain course of action, even if 
their pressure did not prove to be sufficient to alter the behaviour of the tribune. In 60, 
the magistri of the vici attempted to organise the ludi Compitalicii. The organisers 
approached a tribune of the plebs to ask for his protection, as there was a senatus 
consultum which either directly forbade the games or, according to Asconius, had 
abolished many of the collegia.80 The active agency of the leaders of the vici can be 
deducted from the concrete terms used: according to Cicero the tribune ordered the 
games to be held “suo auxilio”,81 while Asconius relates that the games were held by the 
magistri vici “auctore tribuno plebis”.82 In other words, this time the plebeians were 
succesful in convincing a tribune. However, when the consul designatus Q. Metellus Celer 
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stopped the games, the tribunes did not follow up on their promise. In 55, parts of the 
non-elites (seemingly including parts of the plebs urbana) were very displeased at the 
levies conducted by the consuls Pompey and especially Crassus, as the latter was to 
leave on a campaign to Parthia. As this was a war without provocation which involved 
great risk, some groups must have feared that they themselves or their families would 
become involved in a senseless campaign. Consequently, the citizenry encouraged the 
tribunes to prosecute the levying officers and to attempt to cancel the mustering.83 
Again, they did succeed in convincing the tribunes to act on their behalf, but they were 
less successful in achieving their overarching goals. Crassus did leave Rome with an 
army, with ultimately disastrous results. There are more individual examples, but a 
thematic approach will perhaps be more helpful. 
If for instance the plebs urbana effectively had the possibility to make demands of the 
tribuni plebis, one would expect to find traces of this in the sources we have on one of the 
most important topics concerning their well-being, if not survival: the supply of food.84 
The first known lex frumentaria was famously instituted by the tribune C. Sempronius 
Gracchus in 123.85 It protected the population of the city of Rome against fluctuations in 
grain prices, at least to some degree. It instituted a monthly distribution of 5 modii, 
almost 44 litres of grain, to an unknown but broad category of the Roman citizenry with 
residence in the city, for the fixed price of 6 and 1/3 asses per modius. Moreover, it called 
for the building of state granaries for storage. The very last known proposal by a tribune 
of the plebs was in 50.86 C. Scribonius Curio talked about such a law, perhaps involving 
measurements (presumably of grain) by the aediles. Besides this, the content of the 
proposal is unknown. It is quite important that Caelius identified the moves made by 
Curio, including this grain law, with deserting “ad populum”. A more direct indication 
that the plebs urbana actively pursued legislation involving the food supply is related to 
the situation in 57.87 The evidence here does attest that the tribunes were not the only 
possible agent. At the time of Cicero’s return from exile, discontent arose concerning 
the lack of food in Rome. Cicero mentions that crowds convened in the theatre, next to 
the senate building, and at night near his house to demand grain. Because crowds 
 
                                                     
83 Dio, 39.39. 
84 General studies on the topic: Erdkamp, ‘A Starving Mob Has No Respect’; Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in 
the Graeco-Roman World; Rickman, The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome Virlouvet, ‘Les lois frumentaires d’époque 
républicaine’. Specifically for the tribunes: Thommen, Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik, p. 55-61. 
85 App., BC, 1.21; Auct., Vir. Ill., 65.3; Cic., Brut., 222, Off., 2.72, Sest., 103; Flor., 2.1.7; Liv., Per., 60; Plut., CG, 5.2; 
Schol. Bob., 2.96, 132, 135 Stangl; Vell., 2.6.3. Also see Garnsey and Rathbone, ‘The Background to the Grain Law 
of Gaius Gracchus’; Roldán Hervás, ‘Contraste político, finanzas públicas y medidas sociales’. 
86 Cael. in Cic., Fam., 8.6.5. Of course, Caesar and Augustus both made adjustments to the grain supply. 
87 Ascon., 48C; Cic., Att., 4.1.6-7, Dom. 12, 14; Dio, 39.9.2-3. Balsdon, ‘Roman History, 58-56 B.C.’, p. 16-18; Ridley, 
‘Pompey’s Commands in the 50’s’, p. 136-139. 
 140 
(ὁμίλου) threatened the senators with death and conflagration (according to Dio), the 
issue became the central political discussion for some time. A proposal was made in the 
senate granting Pompey the cura annonae with extensive powers. Interestingly, Cicero 
suggests that the idea for a powerful command over the supply sprouted first in the 
“sermones plebum”. Although the issue was resolved by a senatorial decree, the role of 
the tribunes was not insignificant. It had been the tribune C. Messius who had offered 
the most far-reaching proposal about Pompey’s powers. Quite likely Messius’s more 
radical proposal was inspired by intense pressure by the plebeians. In general, there was 
an especially close link between the tribunate and claims from non-elite urban 
principals concerning food laws. There were four more tribunician leges frumentariae 
during the timeframe: by Saturninus in 103,88 Livius Drusus in 91,89 Cato in 62,90 and by 
Clodius who organised free grain distributions in 58.91 These tribunician laws or 
proposals are often only known through offhand remarks by the sources, as if it was 
absolutely not out of the ordinary that the tribunes enacted laws concerning the food 
supply. It may be suspected that other, similar laws are not known to us. During the 
chosen timeframe, one tribune opposed large state-sponsored subsidies of grain. M. 
Octavius (tr. pl. anywhere between 99-87), according to Cicero, convinced (or tricked) 
the plebeians by his oratory into replacing an ‘excessive’ lex frumentaria with a less 
costly one.92 Once again, the need for skillful oratory and the mention of this as an 
extraordinary feat does confirm that there was a lot of pressure from the plebeians to 
do the opposite.93 In 73, C. Licinius Macer protested consular measures about the supply 
of grain, the lex Terentia Cassia, not because he opposed grain laws, but because it would 
have pacified the urban citizenry for other programmes.94 If anything, Sallust lets his 
character argue in a speech, the plebeians were satisfied with benefits which were far 
too measly for what they could get. Sallust also provides an example from earlier in the 
70s, where the plebeians demanded cheap grain from the consuls, even attacking them 
on the Via Sacra.95 At the time, the prices had been greatly inflated. This is attested for at 
least the Sicilian grain, and aediles were forced to provide ad hoc subsidies to appease 
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the demands of the city populace.96 The same decade saw another possible consular 
grain law, the lex Aemilia.97 It is not a coincidence that these consular proposals are dated 
to the 70s, a decade in which the tribunes did not have legislative power (due to the 
Sullan reforms) and could therefore not be held accountable by principals for a lack of 
food or for high prices. Caesar during his dictatorship put strict limits on who qualified 
for free distributions. Otherwise, the tribuni plebis seem to have been the first 
magistrates who would have been approached for food relief by the lower strata of the 
city. All the examples, even those not primarily involving the tribunes as agent, indicate 
that the urban populace actively pursued these ends. 
The next category of tribunician activities, monetary laws, does not offer as much 
certainty about the precise identity of the principals. The various tribunician coin laws 
were mainly situated in the first three decades of the timeframe. Some groups which we 
can expect to have been directly involved were day-labourers and soldiers (for small 
denominations), traders (small-scale, local, but also ‘international’ traders if 
debasement was involved), and moneytraders and -lenders (again, both local and across 
the empire). Persons involved in monetary exchanges constituted a socially broad 
spectrum involving both urban and rural groups. One telling case is dated to 85. The end 
result was an edict, possibly later followed by a law, pronounced by the praetor M. 
Marius Gratidianus before the people in a contio.98 As a sign of gratitude, statues of 
Gratidianus were set up in all the vici, and offerings of incense and candles were made 
by the common people before these statues. It is what came before which interests us, 
however. In previous years the relative value of Roman coins had fluctuated greatly. As 
a result, the sources tell us, no-one knew precisely how much a piece of currency was 
worth. Interestingly it had been the tribunes who had approached the praetors to solve 
the problem. The solution covered several aspects, determining: how the intrinsic value 
of the denarius could be measured (or a falsum detected), how much value the Roman 
coins99 were to have and how they related to one another, and which procedures could 
be followed with which penalties against those who did not keep to these regulations. 
Gratidianus remained very popular even after his death, as he had stolen the credit. In 
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this case, it is very likely that the slightly more well-off parts of the non-elites (wealthy 
shopkeepers, traders, local bankers), perhaps through influential positions in the vici 
and collegia, had brought the issue before the tribunes and had afterwards paid for the 
statues.100 It had been the tribunes, after all, and not the more probable aediles or 
praetors who had initiated the formal process. The well attested gratitude and offerings 
imply that poorer citizens in Rome were involved as well. 
Well before these events, there had been three tribunician laws regulating the 
coinage. Probably in 104,101 the tribune Clodius reintroduced a type of money, which 
Pliny calls the victoriatus and Crawford designates as a quinarius value (½ denarius).102 
Crawford links the law to both the recruitment of soldiers from Gallia Cisalpina and the 
settlement of veterans in that province. It is not unlikely that the issuing of this coin 
followed demands of either the soldiers or their commanders. Lo Cascio, on the other 
hand, argues that it was a reaction to a demand for smaller denominations. In 92, the lex 
Papiria established both the weight of the as to the ‘semuncial’ standard and the 
reintroduction of the sestertius.103 This also can be seen as a response to the question 
from the lower strata (for whom the small denominations would have been especially 
important) for some stability in the fluctuating weight of the as, and for smaller 
denominations than the denarius.104 However, Cn. Papirius Carbo opted for a low weight, 
and as the nominal value remained the same, some traders might have been unwilling 
to accept these asses. This, in turn, might very well have been one of the factors which 
made the edict claimed by Gratidianus necessary.105 Finally, in 91, M. Livius Drusus 
decreed that silver coins should all contain 1/8 part of bronze, but like all his laws this 
was rescinded.106 Here, there is no clear principal to be discerned, and it is possible that 
it was meant to finance his agrarian legislation. Be that as it may, it is remarkable that it 
was the tribunes who were attested to have initiated regulations of monetary values. 
Coinage or the markets were not central aspects of the tribunician area of authority. 
This problem is more easy to understand if they were prompted by various principals, in 
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this case most likely varying groups linked to the use of money.107 Although most 
examples of non-elite initiatives involving the tribunes are not as straightforward as 
cases mentioning the elites, the evidence does point towards this possibility. 
Another example of non-elites ‘spurring on’ the tribunes took place in 67, with one of 
the laws proposed by C. Cornelius in his tribuneship. The law concerned ambitus, 
bribery.108 There were actually two parallel legislative proposals on the same subject, 
one by Cornelius and a more lenient one by the consuls C. Calpurnius Piso and M’. 
Acilius Glabrio, drafted on the basis of a senatus consultum. The consular proposal 
determined that persons convicted of bribery had to pay a fine, were expelled from the 
senate, and could no longer hold office. Cicero attests that the lex Acilia Calpurnia was 
passed and remained in effect. Cornelius had had to give up his law. The consular 
proposal had been introduced because the one by Cornelius was considered to be too 
radical by some of the senatorial elites. Quite importantly, the strict law was inspired by 
plebeian demands. As Asconius writes, quoting Cicero’s Pro Cornelio: 
The Roman populus realized, and was informed by the tribuni plebis, that without 
the imposition of penalties on the agents it was impossible to stamp out bribery; 
therefore it clamoured for Cornelius’ law and eschewed the one proposed in 
accordance with the decree of the senate [...]109 
The tribunes had an important role in informing the populus, but the non-elites seem to 
have had some insight in the situation themselves, and demanded the law of Cornelius 
would be put to the vote. Groups of non-elites beyond a doubt played an important part 
in actively (and not reactively) supporting Cornelius, based on their interpretation of 
the situation. It is actually unknown if their pressure would have been sufficient, as the 
senate employed some trickery in having the consular law passed. The upcoming 
elections prevented new legislation from being passed, but the senate issued an 
exemption to the laws for the consuls (and not the tribune). This gave rise to another 
legislative proposal by Cornelius which will be touched upon later. 
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This subsection has proposed that various principals regularly attempted to persuade 
the tribuni plebis to initiate a certain course of action. These principals included groups 
of senators, equites, publicani, and non-elites. Sometimes their contention with tribunes 
succeeded, sometimes it failed, but the important aspect here is that they could initiate 
interaction. It has also been established that contention by principals could be a 
collective, ‘cumulative’ process, which allowed individuals with limited power to bring 
their particular problems to the tribunes. This can be explained through the constant 
re-establishing of expectations in the principal-agent relation. The themes with which 
the tribunes were confronted were very diverse, and included but were not limited to 
legal proceedings, the provinciae of magistrates, the celebration of public festivals, grain 
laws, the monetary system, and laws on bribery.  
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4.2 A complex web of strings: consequences of a model with 
multiple principals 
So far, it has been proposed that interventions by principals did not only limit, but also 
‘push’ the tribunes in certain directions. Taking only one principal into account, 
tribunes were barred from transgressing certain limits while being incited to strive for 
certain behaviour, or face increased contention. The previous section gave some simple 
examples of this. This constant contention, which took place on a broad, societal scale, 
limited the actions which tribunes could take. The discretionary behaviour left to the 
tribunes could be metaphorically described as having shifting margins. 
In the second section of the chapter, a more complex analysis of contention will be 
presented. Multiple principals constantly tried to make the tribunes behave according 
to their own particular expectations. Therefore, a simple model of agency problems 
does not suffice. The metaphor of shifting margins of behaviour becomes one of a 
complex ‘web of strings’. The tribunes were constantly being ‘pulled’ (and 
simultaneously ‘pushed’) in several directions. To continue the metaphor, the force 
exerted on the strings would be an important factor in actual shifts, and so would be 
their alignment to each other. Concretely, in this model, the de facto mobilisation of 
power by principals in their contention with the tribunes becomes more prominent, and 
so does the concrete context of issues and the configuration of power in society. The 
focus will, in other words, shift to situations with multiple principals, the exertion of 
power and its cost in contention with the tribunes, and the societal context. 
This section will be divided into two subsections. The first will establish some case 
studies which verify the complexity which has been proposed, with various principals 
making conflicting demands of the tribunes on the same subject. There will be an 
analysis of the limits of the discretionary freedom of the tribunes, and how some actions 
could incite new groups to intervene as their interests or desires were touched upon. It 
will be argued that the tribunes had to skillfully navigate the various demands of the 
different principals and evaluate the power relations in Roman society. The second 
subsection will look at various factors determining the capacities of political groups to 
effectively exert power: information, resources, organisation, commitment, and 
context. Principals constantly had to re-exert their principal-agent relation to the 
tribunate by claim-making, re-enacting group legitimacy, and contentious political 
actions. We will explore if some distinct relations between certain principals and the 
tribunate can be ascertained. In other words, whether the effectiveness of mobilising 
power concerning the tribunes differed between groups through the structure of the 
governmental institution. 
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Again, the cases presented in this section will be somewhat simplified, as for now 
abstraction will be made of the role of other tribunes or governmental institutions. This 
does not mean that only single tribunes will be considered. Obstruction by their 
colleagues will generally not be included, however. 
4.2.1 Conflicting principals 
This subsection will discuss some concrete examples of contention by multiple 
principals. Their differing expectations would have had important consequences for 
tribunician behaviour. While the ultimate result of the contention is not our primary 
concern, it does become more important in assessing the power which was exerted by 
various principals. Emphasis will be placed on the narrow margins tribunes had in their 
behaviour. Anticipating the second subsection, some elements of difference between 
various political and societal groups will already be touched upon.  
This subsection will not be a comprehensive overview, as the complexity of some of 
the cases will demand more attention. Two major case studies will be explored: first, a 
discussion on the judicial system, concretely the long discussions concerning the juries 
in the quaestiones; and second the case of the tribune M. Livius Drusus. At the end of the 
subsection a small number of case studies will be analysed more summarily to support 
the representativeness of the claims I have made. 
The establishment of the quaestiones perpetuae, the formation of some questiones 
extraordinariae, and the reorganisation of the album of iudices were issues which persisted 
from the mid-second century until 70, and then resurfaced infrequently after this 
date.110 In the iudicium populi, the form of public political trial which had been dominant 
prior to the quaestiones, the comitia had decided the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
The trial had often been overseen by a tribune.111 The quaestiones were a new evolution 
of public criminal litigation in the second century, as juries for the iudicium publicum 
which gradually came to replace this iudicium populi. A quaestio could be introduced for a 
specific occasion, such as the Bacchanalian affair in 186. In this case they are called 
quaestiones extraordinaria. They could also be permanently founded for specific crimes, 
which were the quaestiones perpetuae. The quaestiones perpetuae were the first permanent 
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Roman jury courts, and were formed by a fixed pool of jurors from which the magistrate 
had to draw in selecting a specific jury. They were first instituted in 149 for cases on 
repetundae through the tribunician lex Calpurnia.112 The pool of jurors established at that 
time had probably been exclusively senatorial. The juries for the quaestiones 
extraordinariae would have been drawn from the same group. At the start of the 
timeframe of this thesis in 112, the lex Acilia repetundarum of 122 had supplanted the lex 
Calpurnia.113 It determined that juries for cases of repetundae should be composed of 
members of the equites. The lex Acilia primarily dealt with extortion of provincials. While 
senators could no longer acquit each other for unlawful behaviour as magistrates, many 
of the equites had a finger in the provincial pie as well. Some of them were members of 
companies of publicani, which seems to have been deeply involved in extorting 
provincials, while others were militarily active or worked for the magistrates in the 
provincial administration. In short, equestrian juries might not necessarily be more 
impartial than senatorial ones where provincial extortion cases were concerned. Just 
before 112, a new quaestio perpetua on ambitus had been instituted as well, but there is no 
attestation on which group supplied the jurors.114 
Simply put, between 112 and 70 conflicts continued to arise over whether the album 
of jurors should primarily consist of senators or of equites. Tribunate was involved 
throughout this conflict, and was under pressure by several principals to act in different 
ways. Among the most important laws between 112 to 70 touching on the composition 
for the juries, one was proposed by a praetor (the lex Aurelia in 70), one by a consul (the 
lex Servilia in 106), six by the tribunes of the plebs (the lex Mamilia in 109, the lex Appuleia 
in 103, the lex Servilia Glaucia in 101, the lex Licinia in 91, the lex Varia in 90, and the lex 
Plautia in 89), and several were instituted by a dictator (the leges Corneliae in 81). While 
the issue of the quaestiones was not exclusively a tribunician affair, in all but the 
dictatorial law of Sulla, tribunes are attested to have been closely involved. Several 
other interesting situations involving the tribunes did not directly result in a lex. 
At first glance the two major principals are quite clear: the senatorial and equestrian 
elites had opposing interests concerning the composition of the juries during the 
entirety of the conflict. Both groups were of course not fully unified, and subgroups or 
individuals often differed from the ‘official’ position of their broad group. Furthermore, 
they were not the only societal groups involved. The very broad category of non-elite 
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Romans (unfortunately the sources seldom allow further specification) played an 
important part in the contention with the tribunes. This activity of the non-elite 
Romans is all the more interesting because the iudicium populi was still used 
infrequently, and theoretically could have been considered to be more representative of 
the entire populus. It is quite clear, however, that it rapidly declined as a viable 
alternative. Moreover, an interesting aspect about this struggle is that even groups 
without full Roman citizenship became directly involved in the debates. 
In 111 the crowds in a contio demanded the imprisonment or death of Jugurtha, 
possibly as a reflection of their power in a iudicium populi.115 The tribune C. Memmius 
rejected their call. Nevertheless, the vehemence shown by the crowds against Jugurtha 
was probably one factor which encouraged C. Mamilius Limetanus to introduce a new 
law two years later, in 109.116 His law provided for the assignment of IIIviri to bring 
charges against Romans who had colluded with Jugurtha, charges which could be 
categorised under the category of maiestas. According to the sources the proposal was 
opposed because of the fear that the quaestio would condemn people because of “partium 
invidia”117. Influential members of the senatorial elite secretly opposed the bill through 
their personal networks of Latins and Italian allies. Both the plebes and the equites 
strongly supported the law, and it was passed. The trials were conducted with much 
severity, and many of the foremost senators were condemned. This served as a wake-up 
call for the opponents of the equestrian juries. The situation in 110 set the stage for the 
remainder of the cases: a division between the senators and the equites, with the opinion 
of the non-elites in general being a deciding factor in what was effectively proposed by 
the tribunes. Basically, throughout many of the cases, both ‘camps’ tried to convince the 
plebeians and the tribunes that the other side was the most corrupt. 
In 106, then, the lex Servilia was approved by the populus. This law, proposed by the 
consul Q. Servilius Caepio, reintroduced senatorial members to the album of jurors.118 
Whether or not the lex Servilia reinstated purely senatorial juries or merely mixed them 
with equites is not central to the argument here: in both cases it meant a diminution of 
the influence of the equites. According to Cicero, Lucius Licinius Crassus (‘Orator’) played 
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an important part in convincing the people to support the law, in a contio where he was 
given the time to speak by the tribune Q. Mucius Scaevola, an expert on Roman law.119 
The speech by Crassus defended the authority of the senate and inspired hatred for the 
equites. Unfortunately, we do not know which opinion Scaevola held, but it is not 
unlikely that he cooperated in drawing up the law. Perhaps the tribune took the speech 
of Crassus as an opportunity not to expose himself to the anger of the equites.120 It is 
unclear why Scaevola introduced Crassus, and not Caepio. Usually, it was the magistrate 
who had introduced the proposal who called both proponents and opponents to speak. 
Beyond this, no certain claims can be made about the tribunes of that year, except that 
they did not veto the law. 
Although it did not institute a general rule for the quaestiones, in 103 the lex Appuleia 
de maiestate did decree that for the cases brought under that law, the jury should be 
composed solely of knights, not senators.121 This law by the tribune L. Appuleius 
Saturninus was the first one to institute a quaestio perpetua on maiestas, and is perhaps 
referred to in an epigraphical text, the so-called lex Latina tabulae Bantiae.122 The approval 
of Saturninus’s law ran parallel to the condemnation of Caepio, the consul of 106, by a 
iudicium populi overseen by the tribune C. Norbanus.123 Caepio had become immensely 
unpopular. As proconsul, his poor decisions had caused the destruction of the Roman 
army at Arausio. The families of the soldiers demanded retribution, and larger portions 
of the Roman populace supported this call. Some nobles personally hated Caepio for a 
variety of reasons. And, lastly, the equites detested him for reducing their role in the 
juries. Cicero mentions that the trial arose “ex luctu civium et ex Caepionis odio”.124 While 
the case for perduellio took place before the comitia, Saturninus was encouraged by this 
coalition of principals to combine all of their grievances neatly into his law on maiestas. 
Perhaps it had been set up as a back-up plan. Norbanus was afterwards prosecuted in a 
trial for maiestas himself, charged for the public discord which had arisen during the 
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iudicium populi.125 This discord attests that the broad coalition was powerful, but not 
unopposed. Saturninus, of course, never became popular with the nobilitas again, and 
was later killed in a new seditio. 
Two years later, M. Servilius Glaucia (tr. pl. 101) restored a purely equestrian album 
for the quaestiones de repetundis.126 Given the claims that the equites were dominant in the 
courts after this, it is possible that the law made equestrian juries a purely de facto 
reality in all court cases. Another important aspect of Glaucia’s law was the provision 
that persons with Latin citizenship could become Roman citizens if they successfully 
prosecuted a senator (Cicero: “eius modi praemium quod nemo adsequi posset nisi ex senatoris 
calamitate neque senatori neque bono cuiquam nimis iucundum esse posset”127). This could 
point to pressure by some Latin elites to have their political importance recognised. 
Their involvement in the law may have been necessary to see it passed. Glaucia became 
popular with large parts of the equestrian order for restoring their dominance over the 
quaestiones de repetundis.128 It is clear that their programmes in the jury courts had not 
subsided. A majority of the senatorial order was not amused, and Glaucia became known 
as a demagogue and the “stercus curiae”.129 He was killed together with Saturninus. 
M. Livius Drusus, then, was persuaded by the important senator M. Aemilius Scaurus 
to reinstitute the senatorial juries in 91.130 Scaurus had been prosecuted for repetundae 
by Q. Servilius Caepio, the son of the consul of 106 who did not share the politics of his 
father. Scaurus tried to counter by also bringing a case against Caepio, under a friendlier 
jury. Livy directly attests that the senatorial order had been broadly working towards 
recapturing jury membership for quite some time, and that they convinced Drusus as a 
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tribune to support their cause. However, as the equites would have fiercely resisted a 
simple return to senatorial juries, the tribune proposed some sort of concession: to 
double the size of the senate to 600 members, drawing the most distinguished members 
from the ranks of the equites to fill the seats. The album of jurors for the quaestiones 
perpetuae would have been strictly senatorial, and the remaining equites would have had 
even less power than under the law of Caepio in 106. The law circumvented some 
opposition by appealing to the individual interests of some of the equestrian jurors, 
attempting to split the group. Drusus, however, misjudged the wishes of the majority of 
both senators and equites.131 Large parts of both groups came to despise the tribune. One 
clause of the law made the equites who became senators liable for taking bribes as 
judges, which was unpopular with this groups. Many senators did not like the idea of the 
appointment of many new colleagues. Especially those with a less extensive cursus 
honorum, from new families, or those just hanging on by the skin of their teeth had 
reason to despise the proposal. Despite opposition from these groups, the law was 
passed (Scaurus did prosecute Caepio). This success can be attributed to the support 
Drusus enjoyed with other groups at the time, again mainly the urban commoners but 
also the Italian allies. Non-elites may have actually supported the fact that all jurors 
would become liable for their actions. Like all of Drusus’s laws, however, the jury law 
was later repealed. Appian claims that Drusus’s goal was to satisfy both the senate and 
the equestrian order. The tribune failed because he had misunderstood how they would 
react to his proposals. His failure shows that the margins for action were very narrow. 
Next came the lex Varia de maiestate in 90.132 As the laws of Drusus had been rescinded, 
the lex Appuleia still selected the jurors for maiestas cases from an album consisting of 
equites. The lex Varia did not change this, and it has been argued that it either 
superseded Saturninus’s law or added to it by expanding the definition of what crimes 
fell under the category of maiestas (or, according to Badian, proditio).133 Senators fearful 
of falling victim to the courts put pressure on other tribunes to veto the law. Groups of 
non-elites may have been involved as well. The equestrian juries, as they were not 
accountable for their behaviour, were clearly not universally popular. However, Seager 
has argued that “the people at large” supported the Varian law as an outlet for the 
public anger about the Social War.134 Nevertheless, it was mainly the mobilisation of 
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sheer force by the equites which overruled the opposition. Once more, the use of 
violence by some principals attests how little room the tribunes had for manoeuvre. The 
forceful reaction, the partisan nature of many of the maiestas trials, and the enormous 
influence of the Social War very rapidly changed the situation once more. 
The last tribunician law came only one year later, in 89, in the form of the lex 
Plautia.135 It was an elegant solution with clear tribunician aspects. To appease both the 
senators, the equites, the influential persons who fell beneath these ranks, and the broad 
non-elite sections of the populus, M. Plautius Silvanus drafted a law which allowed each 
tribus to elect 15 persons. These persons would then be added to the pool of jurors. Only 
here we can be relatively certain of the size of the album: 525.136 Senators could count on 
their connections and fame to secure a spot, and probably so could the influential 
equites. However, the radically new element was that the selection included “quidam 
etiam ex ipsa plebe”137, these plebs being synonymous to common people without a 
specific ‘rank’. Non-elites could be jurors, and all citizens now had a vote in the 
composition of the album. The law also avoided the mutual claims of corruption: 
election presupposes the possibility of accountability. This then was a good example of a 
compromise, even if it was not an ideal solution for either the senators or the equites. 
The lex Plautia is the only law on the composition of the juries which was passed for 
which no conflict is attested. 
In 81, then, came the leges Corneliae which repeated the law of Livius Drusus: Sulla 
enlarged the senate to 600 members and made the album consist solely of these 
senators.138 The laws of Sulla included an extensive reform in criminal litigation, and 
many quaestiones perpetuae were probably added during his dictatorship. Because Sulla 
was a dictator, and militarily kept the peace, he did not have to take many civilian 
principals into account. His laws were mainly based on his vision of how the Republic 
should function, not necessarily on pressure by principals.  
It comes at no surprise, then, that after he died his laws immediately became heavily 
contested.139 Due to his other legislation, the tribunes did not have much power 
throughout the 70s, and lacked the ability to freely initiate new laws. Nevertheless, 
several tribunes protested the functioning of the senatorial courts. L. Quinctius Rufus 
(tr. pl. 74), for instance, decided to attack the senators on their performance as jurors. 
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According to Cicero, he was a person “qui omnis rumorum et contionum ventos conligere 
consuesset”.140 In other words, we can expect that his protests were based on the 
dissatisfaction which existed among principals, such as the equites or the plebs urbana. 
During the 70s there were constant rumours about bribery in the senatorial courts. 
Cicero’s own legal orations mention this. Cicero asserts that after Quinctius began 
organising contiones, the demand grew to review a certain court case. In other words, 
while he enjoyed the support of some groups, he tried to deepen their commitment. 
Perhaps he assessed  that the support was not sufficient, or this was his only method of 
strenghtening the pressure on the other political institutions. In 71, M. Lollius Palicanus 
agitated against the senatorial iudices as well, and proposed to select the jurors in a 
novel way. He did not have the opportunity to implement this proposal, but he did pave 
the way.141 In 70, the praetor L. Aurelius Cotta effectively followed Palicanus’s plan. The 
juries were reformed on the basis of three orders: the senatorial, the equestrian, and 
one made up from the enigmatic tribuni aerarii.142 Another tribune, M. Quinctius 
Plancinus, was a close collaborator in drawing up the proposal. 
There were other alterations after this date. For instance, Caesar abolished the role of 
the tribuni aerarii in his dictatorship, while Antony again added another decuria after 
Caesar’s death.143 The different instances from 112-70 provide a good case that the 
tribunes were constantly approached by different sides in the evolving conflict, but only 
rarely had sufficient room for manoeuvre. Those principals directly involved (that is, 
majorities within the equestrian and senatorial orders) seem to have exerted the most 
pressure. The populus ‘in general’ was involved as well. This included groups of non-
elites, and although there is no way of being sure, the plebs urbana were in the best 
position to notice the functioning of the juries. The non-elites were losing their direct 
role as the iudicium populi was employed less and less, but may have used their influence 
in other ways. For most urban plebeians, actively participating in the constant trials 
must have been tedious if not outright impossible. They still had a large say in voting on 
proposals for reform in the comitia. While this is largely speculation, the accountability 
of the juries seems to have been a major concern for non-elite principals.144 One 
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surprising principal were the Latin citizens, or the Italian elites which had no 
citizenship at all. They appear as important factors three times: in 110, in 101, and in 91 
with Livius Drusus. 
The case of M. Livius Drusus substantiates the claim that tribunes were confronted with 
expectations from multiple principals at once, and had to operate within the limited 
margins afforded them. The reason for this is that I believe he utterly failed: he could 
not successfully manoeuvre the many claims which the office of tribune of the plebs 
brought with it. The most reliable sources agree that ideologically, Livius Drusus was a 
firm supporter of the authority of the Senate as an institution, and of the primacy of the 
senatorial elites.145 He was a scion of an ancient and famous plebeian family, was 
perhaps the richest man of his time, and had great skill at oratory. The sources also 
describe him as very ambitious, arrogant, and not quite good at executing plans in the 
long term.146 Cicero mentions that he had four close allies: L. Licinius Crassus, the great 
orator who had co-authored the lex Licinia Mucia (more on this later), M. Aemilius 
Scaurus, the ‘leader’ of the senate at the time, C. Aurelius Cotta, who ran for the 
tribunate of 90 but was removed from the office, and P. Sulpicius Rufus, who as the 
famous tribune of 88 triggered the first Roman civil war.147 As has already been 
established in discussing the courts, one of Drusus’s aims was to restore the purely 
senatorial juries. Despite the strong support of Crassus and Scaurus this was not 
unopposed, and he attempted to split the opposition. His ‘compromise’ was to introduce 
300 additional senators from the ranks of the equites. This proposal was so badly 
received that it made large numbers of both senators and equites despise him, or, as 
Appian put it wittily, they only “were united in hating Drusus”.148 His most bitter enemy in 
the judicial legislation was Q. Servilius Caepio, who was prosecuting important senators 
such as Scaurus.149 The conflict ran deep: at one time Drusus would have threatened to 
throw Caepio from the Tarpeian rock.  
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The lex iudiciaria was not Drusus’s only proposal, and the opponents of that law were 
not the only groups which came to detest the tribune. The most famous proposal by 
Drusus allegedly sought to grant the Italian allies Roman citizenship.150 The Italian 
communities had reasons to be dissatisfied. In 95, the consuls L. Licinius Crassus and Q. 
Mucius Scaevola had introduced a law which dealt with Italians who pretended to enjoy 
Roman citizenship, and restored them to their proper communities.151 According to 
Asconius this greatly displeased the leaders of Italian allies, and it may have induced 
negotiations with Drusus. Modern scholars assert that Italian communities demanded 
this law. Both Plutarch and Valerius Maximus assert that when Drusus was about to 
become tribune or had already entered the office, there were delegations of allies 
begging him to take up their cause.152 One of them, Q. Poppaedius Silo, was even staying 
at his home as a guest-friend. Other sources confirm the direct nature of the requests 
made of Drusus.153 L. Licinius Crassus was one of the tribune’s closest collaborators, 
which makes this slightly odd. Mouritsen doubts the entire story and argues that it were 
the Latins, not the Italians, who desired citizenship and worked with the tribune.154 
However, he does allow the possibility that in the last months of his tribuneship, Drusus 
may have included some provisions for a limited group of Italians. It is not entirely 
unlikely that some Italians would have preferred Roman citizenship: some had tried to 
usurp it and had been ousted from Rome. Alternatively, perhaps the Italian 
communities only wanted the same privileges the Latins enjoyed. The demands may 
have been for equal treatment, as it is not unlikely that Italian communities would have 
complained about the behaviour of Roman magistrates. Regardless of the identity of the 
groups or their demands, they formed a political group promising to support Drusus’s 
other legislative proposals if he would then help them in turn. 
After his law regarding the juries, Drusus continued to estrange many groups. He had 
introduced (or reaffirmed) another law, a lex agraria to settle new colonies on the Roman 
ager publicus. Citizens of the allied communities were using some of this land 
themselves, perhaps even legally covered by the lex agraria of 111.155 The opposition to 
Drusus’s proposal united under the banner of the consul L. Marcius Philippus. The 
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consul called upon Italians, Etruscans and Umbrians to come to Rome to oppose it. 
Drusus and the principals supporting him had to resort to violence to pass the law. 
When Philippus tried to interrupt Drusus, very likely to declare obnuntiatio, the tribune 
had one of his viatores grab Philippus by the neck, twisting it so hard that his nose, 
mouth, and/or eyes bled, before finally dragging him to carcer.156 This incident caused 
outrage with large numbers of the nobilitas. All of Drusus’s allies seem to have 
abandoned him in the first instance, even physically removing themselves from the city. 
The methods of the tribune had not been supported by all the societal and political 
groups which did support the content of his proposals. Although the tribune appears to 
have defended his behaviour quite valiantly for a time, allowing time for the Xviri of his 
agrarian law to be appointed (including himself), he became more and more isolated. 
Facing growing opposition, Drusus had to beg Crassus to come back to Rome to defend 
him in the Senate, which the orator did on the 13th of September. It was to no avail, and 
Crassus died a week later. Philippus ultimately was succesful in claiming – in the 
capacity of augur – that none of Drusus’s laws should be binding on the populus Romanus 
because they had been passed contrary to the auspices.157 By that time a large number of 
senators, equites, and allies opposed Drusus, and Philippus’s opinion was ratified by a 
senatorial decree. For the tribune, who ideologically supported the senatorial auctoritas, 
being overruled by the senate may have been the ultimate humiliation. 
The repealing of Drusus’s laws may have pleased some equites, as they were restored 
to the jury courts. Those who saw a ‘promotion’ to the senatorial order slip by must 
have been seething. The non-elites risked seeing the benefits of the agrarian law 
disappear too, but their demands were quickly met when Saufeius, another tribune, 
authored a similar agrarian law. Drusus himself was appointed to the agrarian 
commission once more. The pressure exerted by the non-elites must have made it 
impossible to totally rescind the promise of leading out colonies.158 Another group, the 
political group which had supported Drusus, was still waiting to collect on the promise 
made to them. The Italian communities now had all the more reason for being unhappy, 
as the buying or confiscation of ‘their’ land would still go ahead. These issues over the 
ager publicus were far more influential leading up to the Social War than not being 
granted Roman citizenship, certainly at this stage.159 According to Dart, Drusus had 
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intentionally deceived this political group of Italians (or Latins) into supporting him.160 
While the motives of Drusus cannot be confidently reconstructed, it is clear that he was 
not in a position to follow up on this programme. 
After his defeat, Drusus seems to have retreated to his home and conducted business 
from there.161 Whatever the reason for his withdrawal from public locations, the 
momentum was now in favour of the groups which had opposed the tribune. It would 
have become quite clear to him, and probably to many of the Italian or Latin elites who 
hoped to benefit from his promises, that Drusus would not be able to introduce further 
legislation.162 The tribune lamented his impossible situation (caught between his 
promises and his failures) and seems to have been afraid of some enemy. He tried to 
incur suspicion against Caepio and Philippus by drinking goats blood, which made him 
pale and at one time made him collapse on the street. He was brought home only half-
alive.163 Although these methods were not very sane, his suspicion was perhaps no 
paranoia. Not much later he was killed in his very home. There were several suspects of 
his murder, which says enough by itself. They were the consul Philippus, his nemesis 
Caepio, the Italian allies, or others still.164 Seneca suspected that he was not murdered at 
all, but committed suicide out of desperation.165 His proposal to enfranchise the Italians, 
or whatever other promise he had made, was probably never even promulgated before 
he died.166 According to Appian and Florus, his death was the immediate trigger for the 
Social War, although many other factors had been leading up to it.167 Some ancient 
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sources accused Drusus of causing it by impossible promises. In 90, Q. Varius Severus 
Hybrida introduced the maiestas law which has been mentioned several times, spurred 
on by the equites who desired to prosecute other prominent members of the nobilitas, 
like Drusus, for assumed involvement in provoking the war. The concrete acts under 
scrutiny were promising citizenship, touching on the ager publicus, or giving advice to 
the Italians.168 These subjects directly refer to Drusus’s programme. 
M. Livius Drusus tried to please too many groups without acknowledging the power 
they could each exert and the interrelated nature of their demands. Some aspects of his 
character, at least how it has been reported by our sources, confirm this. Dio mentions 
Drusus as one of the prime examples of a person who made mistakes in difficult 
conditions.169 The tribune was reputed to be extremely generous, and a saying arose that 
he had nothing left to give “praeter caelum et caenum”.170 This generosity did not stop at 
‘traditional’ largesse, because Florus directly states that Livius Drusus: “dum alium captat 
ex alio, tantum conflavit incendium.”171 When Drusus died only groups of commoners could 
have been happy with his tribuneship, as some of them would have benefitted from the 
lex Saufeia agraria, which was based on Drusus’s promises.172 When the Social War broke 
out in full not much later, much of that gratitude must have evaporated too, as is seen 
by the support for the lex Varia. Drusus was spurred on by several principals, but failed 
to effectively put their demands into legislation which they approved. Already during 
his life all of his laws were repealed. 
Some more examples can be given to confirm that these were not exceptions. Varius, 
for instance, prosecuted nobles under his own law in 90, encouraged by the equites, but 
saw himself forced to free the leader of the senate after the audience in a contio had 
violently expressed their support.173 He was only able to pursue his policies insofar as 
they did not cross certain boundaries. P. Servilius Rullus proposed an agrarian law in 63, 
very well received at first, for distributing public land among the plebeians.174 However, 
Rullus may have miscalculated the support for the law and how far he could go with his 
personal involvement. Cicero cleverly made use of this in opposing him, and turned 
several groups against the tribune (people who hated Sulla, people who supported 
Pompey, people who disliked extraordinary powers, people who were opposed to Italian 
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(Capuan) influences, etc.). This must have become clear to Rullus, as he very likely 
dropped the law. Like him, most attested tribunes seem to have been able to evaluate 
the limits to their behaviour as tribune. In 67, for instance, most tribunes refused 
appeals by political groups to counteract their colleague Gabinius, because they knew 
that the opposition they would face at the hands of the plebeians (πλῆθος) would be too 
great.175 Only two tribunes did not acknowledge this limitation and found out the hard 
way. One of them, L. Trebellius, was almost ousted from the tribunate by the people, 
while L. Roscius Otho was shouted down by the audience at a contio. P. Titius (tr. pl. 43) 
at one point vetoed a motion by Cicero which favoured T. Munatius Plancus. P. Servilius 
Vatia Isauricus succeeded in convincing the tribune that this was not a good idea, 
because he would face opposition by large parts of the senate.176 The next day Cicero 
vehemently opposed the tribune and Servilius, and Titius discontinued his intercessio 
(Cicero: “abiecerim”). The senate and “cuncta civitas” had, according to the orator, 
strongly shown their support his motion. 
Other tribunes were, like Drusus, not as perceptive, or underestimated the power 
which was arraigned against certain programmes. One example of this is C. Manilius 
Crispus (tr. pl. 66). Manilius took up a project left to him by C. Cornelius to redistribute 
freedmen among all 35 tribes, instead of just the 4 urban tribes.177  On the day before the 
start of the new year, only a few days after entering his office, he called for a vote. Many 
non-elites, most notably the freedmen themselves, supported this. Freeborn members of 
the urban tribes may have been happy as well, because freedmen would have become 
less dominant in their tribes. Individuals like Crassus and Cornelius seem to have 
supported the proposal as well. Most elites, however, were not convinced. Some non-
elites may have actively opposed the proposal as well, mostly members of the plebs 
urbana who were members of a rural tribe, or persons who did not want freedmen to 
gain more political power. According to Dio, a large part of the πλῆθος was upset with 
the law of Manilius.178 The methods of Manilius also led to some opposition. He 
disregarded the legal obligation of respecting the trinundinum between the proposal of a 
law and calling the vote, and put the law up for vote during the Compitalia, which was 
nefas. Furthermore, when a kerfuffle (Asconius: “tumultus”)179 broke out between several 
groups Manilius occupied the Capitoline, but was beaten by another group under the 
leadership of the quaestor L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. The senate passed a decree that the 
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law did not stand, and Manilius backed down. This actually turned the groups which had 
supported the law against the tribune, perhaps because some felt he had ‘betrayed 
them’ or had been clumsy. The sources indicate that one of Manilius’s reasons for 
introducing his lex Manilia de imperio Cn. Pompei was to placate the groups he had let 
down. C. Scribonius Curio (tr. pl. 50) was less lucky, even if it could be argued that his 
methods were somewhat more careful. Throughout his year in office, he criticised the 
extensive provincia of both Caesar and Pompey.180 Other groups clearly agreed with his 
policies to deprive both proconsuls of their commands. Groups of non-elites showed 
their support for Curio by pelting him with garlands as he went home. As the year 
progressed, he was pressured more and more by political groups which either favoured 
Pompey or harshly opposed Caesar (these groups did not fully overlap). Curio remained 
stubborn. Groups of equites and senators also opposed Pompey’s dominance, and seem to 
have thrown their weight behind the tribune on several occasions. At a crucial moment, 
Curio won a vote in the senate to disarm both Pompey and Caesar, 370 votes against 
22.181 Curio seems to have underestimated the increasing polarisation in Roman politics, 
however, and the power of some groups. Pompey became the leader of a military 
putsch, and Curio was forced to flee Rome at the end of his tribuneship. 
Throughout this subsection, examples have been given of individual tribunes 
experiencing contrasting expectations by different principals. How they should behave 
as tribune was contested between these principals. The theoretically high potential for 
political action which was inherent to the tribunate was often offset by contradicting 
pressure on individual tribunes. The mobilization of power by different groups and their 
position on issues limited the possibilities of tribunes to act. This does not imply that all 
tribunes fully understood the exact nature of these limitations, or that they had not 
choice but to comply. If they overstepped their bounds, however, the personal 
consequences could be great. Tribunes could more easily act when significantly more 
power was mobilised by one side in a political debate. Sometimes this was facilitated by 
the mobilisation of new groups for a shared political project. The overall behaviour of a 
tribune did not only depend on contention by different groups: his personality, 
resources, and information played a part as well. This will be looked at in the next 
section. First, however, we will look further into contention with the tribunes from the 
perspective of the principals. 
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4.2.2 Power costs of contention 
Being a tribunus plebis implied frequent encounters with different societal and political 
groups demanding contradicting actions. If we shift the perspective to these groups, 
effective contention with a tribune required exertions of power. When there was 
competition (with conflicting interests and desires) between the different principals, 
the ability and willingness to successfully mobilise more power (or use it more 
efficiently) than the rival groups was all the more important. In other words, the 
direction in which a tribune would be pulled or pushed depended (in part) on the 
‘power costs’ expended by different principals. 
As has been established in the theoretic framework, methods of contention and 
specific times and spaces would have been subject to legitimisation or delegitimation in 
the public transcript. To clarify this through an example: throwing stones at a 
magistrate would not have been seen as legitimate, and the same goes for mobilising at 
night or speaking with a tribune about political strategy in private spaces. The latter 
type of communication, at night or during festivals in private, of course was part of the 
stereotype of the conspirator.182 Conspiracy was a perceived threat throughout the late 
Republic, and even non-elites were suspected. Completely legitimate was, for instance, 
the silent casting of votes in an orderly manner on the Forum when a magistrate had 
called for it, on a moment which was fas. The status of a principals in the ‘grid’ of 
politics would have had consequences for contention as well, but this could vary 
between governmental institutions. 
Throughout this subsection, factors which determined the costs and effectiveness of 
contention will be surveyed. A first factor, information, was a vital prerequisite. 
Without information, groups could not even recognise infringements on their 
expectations or calculate the results of engaging in contention. A second factor was the 
concrete methods principals could use to mobilise their resources. A limited overview of 
some methods will be provided. Influence in elections and the use of violence will be 
closely looked at. A third factor was context. A specific element which will be looked at 
here are spaces and times of interactions, and the numbers involved in instances of 
contention. These factors played an important part in the legitimacy of the contention. 
Fourth and finally, mobilisation will be investigated, and its importance will again be 
pointed out. One important form of mobilisation, WUNC-displays, was important for 
‘capturing’ legitimacy in the public transcript, and will be considered more closely. 
To actively engage in contention, access to information is crucial. It has already been 
argued that there was a broad diffusion of information across even non-elite groups in 
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the late Republic. This implies a basic ability to notice ‘transgressions’ against the 
principal-agent expectations by the tribunes. Gathering useful information remained 
costly, however. Principal-agent theory specifically deals, in a very formalised manner, 
with the nature of and the solution to these costs.183 ‘Adverse selection’ means that 
principals could not freely evaluate if the tribunes they voted for or otherwise activated 
for their programmes would actually behave according to their expectations. ‘Moral 
hazard’ can describe the lack of freely available knowledge about the concrete 
commitment of the tribunes to a certain programme. The tribune as an agent had an 
information advantage about his own behaviour. Because of these costs and asymmetry, 
contention with the tribunes was never based on perfect information. While a rich 
farmer may have heard about the plans of a tribune to redistribute parts of the ager 
publicus, he could lack specific knowledge about the concrete plans. 
Information was not equally distributed over society between societal groups, and 
the costs for obtaining it were not equal either.184 Asymmetry existed between principal 
and agent, but also between different principals. An elite person with political ties to a 
tribune could more easily acquire knowledge about the tribune’s behaviour than a 
peasant in the North Etruscan countryside, or a rower of a merchant vessel trading in 
Dyrrachium. Due to limited sources, there is unfortunately not much we can definitively 
determine about the accuracy and extensiveness of information possessed by various 
groups. The one factor which returns throughout the contemporary sources is an 
overabundance of information through rumour. Partly as a consequence of this, there 
was often a very inaccurate perception of the political situation across all layers of 
Roman society. As elite oratory did not hold a monopoly over information distribution, 
non-elites were not necessarily misled or indoctrinated. While the elites had access to 
more channels of information dissemination, their information was not perfect. One 
good example are the letters by Caelius to Cicero, informing the orator during his 
proconsulship in Cilicia of the situation in Rome (51-50).185 Cicero attempted to 
influence politics, including the behaviour of some tribunes, but there appears to have 
been much confusion of what was going on in these attempts. 
The uneven distribution of resources between principals influenced contention with the 
tribunes as well. Some resources were not readily available to certain groups. 
Researching all the resources which were generally available to members of just one 
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societal group would be a complex undertaking. The  access to resources determined in 
large part which methods of contention were available to a principal. Someone with no 
knowledgeof Roman history, whether it was scholarly or traditional,  could not point to 
historical precedents of the tribunate. A day labourer could not bribe a tribune. A child 
on his own would find it hard to intimidate a tribune. Therefore, here we will analyse a 
number of methods of contention enabled by certain resources. While it is somewhat of 
a simplification, elite groups would generally have had access to more and more diverse 
resources than non-elites, and their methods of using of those resources would 
generally have been considered to be more legitimate in the public transcript. 
The most legitimate methods of contention were, beyond any doubt, those which 
employed other political institutions.186 Formal voting on a matter (in the comitia, in the 
senate) or decisions which relied on executive power (imperium, coercitio, edicts, 
auspicium) are the most frequent examples. These will not be the focus of this 
subsection, however. 
Bribery is often cited as an important method in late Republican politics. To use it in 
contention with the tribunes, this  method was only viable for those with access to 
abundant monetary resources. Surprisingly, considering how often it is used in 
explaining tribunician behaviour, Kondratieff only lists 9 instances of bribed tribunes.187 
Even fewer of these cases reliably attest bribery. The cases of T. Labienus (tr. pl. 63) and 
L. Caninius Gallus (tr. pl. 56) is not substantiated: there is no single source attesting that 
they were bribed as tribune. I suggest that these two instances can therefore be 
confidently crossed off the list. Three further attestations are dubious. I have argued 
elsewhere that in one of the most important cases, that of C. Scribonius Curio (tr. pl. 50), 
the tradition of bribery in the imperial sources is potentially misguided and not 
corroborated by his contemporaries.188 Similarly, we only know through Appian that the 
tribunes of 44 would have been bribed by Antony and Octavian.189 A speech of Cicero 
attests that P. Decius Mus (tr. pl. probably in 45) was bribed by Caesar. The credibility of 
this claim is in doubt, as it was part of a slur playing on Decius’s cognomen.190 Two 
tribunes not counted by Kondratieff, Q. Numerius Rufus and Sex. Atilius Serranus 
Gavianus (tr. pl. 57), were also suspected by Cicero of having been bought.191 Again, 
however, these attacks were meant to discredit them, and cannot be taken to have 
represented the truth. One case raises some doubt about the specific nature of the 
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bribery. Perhaps money was promised or given, but blackmail or threats might have 
done the job as well. Several unknown tribunes were attacking L. Licinius Lucullus from 
around 70 on behalf of the publicani and moneylenders. They might have been bound by 
their indebtedness to members of these groups, rather than having outright received 
bribes.192 A. Gabinius Capito (tr. pl. 67) might have been one of them, as some sources 
attest that he had become candidate for the tribuneship to escape his debtors.193 Only 
three instances of outright bribery are reasonably certain. The principals involved were 
foreign rulers, rich and powerful senators, and publicani and moneylenders. P. Vatinius 
(tr. pl. 59) was attacked for his love for money and desire for recompense, again by 
Cicero. Again the speech was meant to defame Vatinius. However, Cicero in that public 
speech mentioned that Caesar had admitted that Vatinius had been given rewards for 
his actions as tribune, which elevates the credibility of these slurs.194 Vatinius probably 
was ‘given recompense’ by at least Caesar and the publicani. Two cases are attested by 
Sallust. C. Baebius (tr. pl. 111) was bought “magna mercede” by king Jugurtha to see to his 
interests in Rome.195 In 73, the tribunician colleagues of C. Licinius Macer were bribed by 
a coalition of the pauci, although here their motivations were more broadly defined as 
“sua gratia aut spe aut praemiis”.196 
This brings us to another method which is traditionally thought to have been 
employed mostly by the rich and powerful: promises for career advancement or other 
personal gains.197  As has been established, many scholars today suspect that advancing 
one’s political career was the main motivation for most senatorial elites, including the 
tribunes. The resources involved here were personal networks, knowing how to 
manoeuvre governmental institutions, a high status in politics... More or less the same 
resources allowed persons or groups to threaten tribunes that they would be stripped of 
rank or would be rejected in elections to further offices. The possibilities of groups to 
decide the fate of a tribune at a later date in elections, jury courts, or special 
assignments may have remained implicit, and in this way formed a constant 
‘background pressure’ in contention. 
Let us look closer at how the power of principals over elections was distributed. 
Yakobson has argued the elite electorate was split over the many candidates, and as a 
consequence the power in elections, even in the comitia centuriata, was spread widely 
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among the populus.198 Even poorer citizens had a say in the matter. However, while the 
power in elections was not monopolised by the elites, it was definitely slanted in their 
favour. To give a fictional example, a tribune would generally have been more 
impressed if Pompey promised to ensure his election to the praetorship (or threaten to 
boycott it) than when freedman tabernarius did the same. The vote of elites had more 
weight in the comitia centuriata, they had more time to attend elections, they had more 
information about the candidates, they generally had larger social circles, and they 
could more easily mobilise their peers. This does not imply that non-elites were 
powerless. The Commentariolum Petitionis here provides a valuable and much-quoted 
source. The author advises Cicero to pay attention to – besides the consulares and 
adulescentes nobiles – the collegia and the leaders of the vicinitates and municipiae, 
including the leaders of the vici, montes, and pagi.199 While there are some cases of former 
tribunes facing the wrath of the electorate, it is seldom clear which parts of the 
electorate were involved and what the reason was for their opposition.200 One exception 
of these deliberate rebuffs in elections is related to Sulla’s consulship in 88. The ‘δῆμος’ 
snubbed Sex. Nonius Sufenas and a certain Servius, respectively the nephew and an 
associate of Sulla, out of protest against the actions of the consul.201 It were their 
relations rather than their own actions which prevented them from attaining the 
tribunate. There were other methods by which direct intervention in the election of a 
tribune were possible. The most extreme method was the nomination and appointment 
of magistrates, first by Caesar, then under the triumvirate and Augustus.202 At that time, 
using career prospects as a method for contention became much more direct and 
presumably far more effective than before. Hurlet has argued that Augustus secured 
himself as the arbitrator aristocratic competition in general, which gave him a lot of 
power in influencing their behaviour. 
A method employed by various groups was direct physical violence or the threat of its 
use. This method could be employed both restrictively and as an encouraging promise 
to ‘shield’ the tribune against other groups. Scholarship on violence in the late Republic 
has a long and extensive history.203 Kondratieff compiled a list of instances of violence 
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involving the tribunate.204 Numerous tribunes (at least 25) had to flee the city of Rome 
during their tribuneship, especially during the civil wars of the 80s and 40s. At least 10 
tribunes were killed during their year in office. Violence was not exclusively used by the 
non-elites. It has already been mentioned how Varius was threatened by equites armed 
with daggers. A. Gabinius (tr. pl. 67) was nearly killed by the senators in the Curia over 
his proposal on Pompey’s command against the pirates.205 He only survived because 
crowds in turn stormed the building and violently dispersed the meeting. In an event 
where L. Cassius (tr. pl. 89) apparently had played the role of agitator, the praetor A. 
Sempronius Asellio was chased through the Forum and killed by faeneratores, 
moneylenders.206 The impact of physical violence depended on resources such as human 
strength and dexterity, access to weapons (which were in normal circumstances strictly 
forbidden within the pomerium), but also on numbers and organisation. The threat of 
violence also required the credible expectation that the group would follow through. 
Violence is the primary attested method by which the ‘powerless’ could put direct 
pressure on the tribunes. In 99, for instance, after he had laid down the office of tribune, 
P. Furius was lynched by a mob for his obstinate behaviour the year before.207 The 
prevalence in our sources of violence as a method employed by non-elites is heavily 
influenced by the narrative established by those sources. It does not imply that it was 
the only form of contentious politics by these groups, and we cannot even know if it was 
the most common form employed by these groups. 
One problem with physical violence as a method was that sometimes it could backfire 
on the groups using it. The potential of deadly violence against the elites in Rome was a 
constant threat, which was exacerbated by the lack of a fixed police force. Because of 
this, the public transcript in Rome appears to have represented urban violence as 
distasteful. The first rule Cicero lays out about the popular assemblies in De Legibus is 
that violence should be strictly forbidden, and the third rule confirms that the presiding 
officer was fully responsible for what happened.208 If violence broke out in an assembly, 
a senatus consultum from 92 confirms, it was the fault of the magistrate leading the 
meeting. Any popular assembly had to be adjourned as soon as the magistrate noticed 
disturbances. As the tribunes were members of the elite strata which had most to lose 
by generalised physical violence, most of them tended to share these opinions 
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(structural complexes) on violence. For instance, this caused communication to break 
down between the tribune C. Cornelius and the crowds at a contio in 67. As has been 
mentioned, Cornelius had promoted a bribery law which was considered too harsh by 
the senate. A senatus consultum then advised the consuls to propose another, more 
forgiving law. As the elections had been announced, it was prohibited to introduce new 
laws, but the senate granted exemption from this rule to the consuls. Plausibly after the 
elections, the tribune introduced a legislative proposal which reinstated the ancient 
custom that only the populus, through a vote in the comitia, could grant exemptions to 
the laws. This was a clear response to the unlawful appropriation of this right by the 
senate against his own proposal. The tribune was supported by a large coalition, 
possibly of the plebs urbana. Granting exemptions had been misused by a few senators 
(‘pauci’) to maintain dominance over Roman politics in previous years. What happened 
when Cornelius called for the vote is particularly interesting: 
The most powerful persons, whose influence was now greatly threatened by 
Cornelius’ proposal, expressed outrage, and a tribunus plebis called P. Servilius 
Globulus was found for the purpose of obstructing Cornelius. The day arrived for 
the passage of the bill, and the herald began to declaim the text of the bill to the 
populus, with the clerk prompting him; Globulus then refused to allow the clerk to 
prompt or the herald to speak. Cornelius himself started reading the text. The 
consul C. Piso then protested vehemently that this was improper, and that the 
tribunus plebis’ veto was being ignored. This was greeted with a huge uproar from 
the populus; Piso ordered those who were threatening him to be arrested by the 
lictor, but his rods of office were smashed and he was pelted with stones from the 
rear of the contio. Cornelius was much upset by the tumult and immediately closed 
the meeting.209 
Even though the plebeians increased the forcefulness of their contention, 
communication between them and Cornelius broke down. This was a consequence of 
the fact that the interaction was a form of secondary contention: their structural 
complexes differed from those of Cornelius. The behaviour of the crowds implies that 
they considered the protests of the consul Piso as illegitimate, or at least as warranting a 
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powerful response. However, their methods did not correspond Cornelius’s expected 
framework for the interaction either. As a result, the methods of the crowds were 
unsuccesful in spurring on the tribune. Cornelius later passed a watered down bill, 
which professed that the senate could provide dispensations from the law if a quorum of 
200 members was reached. This case therefore confirms the importance of moral cover. 
As has been established, moral cover indicates that subaltern groups generally referred 
to the public transcript in order to be able to have their demands heard. It is quite likely 
that non-elite groups used concepts of the public transcript, such as libertas, to have 
common ground with the elite magistrates.210 On most occasions, these groups would 
have been careful in their communication with the tribunes in order to retain this 
moral cover. Despite this possibility of communication breaking down, the institutional 
architecture of the tribunate did tend to favour demands by the underprivileged. In the 
late Republic, there very clearly was a tradition which strongly focussed on the duties of 
the tribuni plebis towards the plebs. Who belonged to these non-elites and who did not 
was partly dependent, however, on the ideas of the individual tribunes. Those not open 
to the demands of day-labourers would have been pushed to listen to them, but they 
were not forced to do so. This will be discussed in the next section. 
Contexts of time and space and the numbers of individuals involved as principal (an 
individual or a group) also had consequences for claims to legitimacy in contention. The 
scope of contention also was affected by these differences: was the principal concerned 
over the behaviour of a tribune as an elite individual or as a tribune? Later on a third 
type will be looked at: contention with a tribune as a member of the political power of 
the Republic itself. 
First, there were several options to interact in private settings, both on a personal as 
on a collective scale. These interactions can be understood as contention with the 
individual. Some examples are making promises of career advancement, bribery, 
blackmail, threats, and all the other types of intricate political games which were 
primarily at the disposal of the elites. Many of these methods were illegal, but this did 
not stop them from being used.211 The requests made by Q. Poppaedius Silo to Livius 
Drusus while staying as a guest-friend are a good example of contention deemed 
legitimate in the public transcript. If a tribune had clients or freedmen, these could 
engage in individual interaction. Other methods were open to various principals, for 
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instance simple face-to-face discussions or writing letters. Letters are complex, 
however, as they could be directed at a public setting. For instance, they could be meant 
to be read out in the senate or in a contio. The example of equites writing letters to the 
tribunes during the war against Jugurtha has already been mentioned. Some letters 
were perhaps meant to be private but became public, such as Caesar writing letters to 
Clodius during his tribunate in 58, others remained private, such as Cicero’s letters to 
Curio as tribune-elect in 51.212 An important phase in personal interaction took place at 
specific times: right before the elections to the tribunate. Candidates for elections 
regularly roamed the Forum, discussing their merit with different groups and 
individuals. They also made electoral promises, and principals could have made use of 
this by demanding certain programmes of the potential tribunes.213 Cicero in his defence 
of Murena attests that the boni had asked Cato (tr. pl. 62) to stand for the office of 
tribune in order to oppose Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos.214 Personally he implored C. 
Furnius (tr. pl. 51) to support his own wishes. Of course, the possibility of adverse 
selection means that the tribunes did not necessarily keep their promises. 
Contention by groups in private settings is another type of interaction. One example 
was the besieging of an elite domus.215 This was an important element in the collective 
repertoire of resistance of the plebs urbana. These methods specifically targeted the 
responsibility of an elite individual. However, there is only one attestation of this for a 
tribune during the chosen timeframe, in the case of T. Annius Milo (tr. pl. 57).216 This 
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may have to do with the public character of the domus of a tribune, which implied that 
the tribune would have had to admit even angry crowds rather than be besieged by 
them. Livius Drusus even worked from the atrium of his house in the later stages of his 
tribuneship.217 Tribunes during their year of office became a symbol, embodying their 
office and through this becoming inviolable. Pressure by groups on tribunes as 
individuals would have been frowned upon in the public transcript, to say the least. 
Another form of collective ‘pressure’ on a tribune as an individual was proscription, 
which called upon all citizens to murder the tribune. 
Another category were public settings. Contention in public settings was often aimed 
at the tribune as a magistrate, not primarily as an individual. Personal public contention 
included harangues by another member of the elites against tribunes. Cato liked to rail 
at anyone, and did it as a privatus against tribunes at least four times: in 74, 64, 55 and 
52.218 A person acting on his own could openly approach the tribune, most often at the 
tabula Valeria. That person could ask for auxilium, demand tribunician involvement in 
certain programmes, request to issue an edict, or simply insult the tribune. Contiones 
could lead to individuals pressuring the tribunes to make adjustments or even not 
initiating a voting assembly.219 
Collective public action reappears most frequently in the sources, at least by non-
elites goups. Some examples are applause or booing in the theatre, demands or physical 
interventions by groups during contiones, or collective violence in various situations.220 
Several examples have already been given of collective violence involving tribunes, and 
the cases are numerous.221 Direct physical violence was not always necessary for 
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collective public action, however. When L. Roscius Otho (tr. pl. 67) tried to make his 
opposition to the lex Gabinia clear in a contio, using sign language to bypass the 
muttering of the audience, the crowd roared so loud in disapproval that a crow 
reportedly fell from the sky.222 Then, Dio says, Roscius kept quiet with his hands too. 
Collective public action of course required the mobilisation of large numbers of 
individuals. Instances where groups mobilised to engage in contention with the tribunes 
can be categorised as contentious collective actions as defined by Charles Tilly and 
others.223 As has been noted in the theoretical framework, mobilisation is often costly. 
Some groups are more easily mobilised than others. Small, hierarchical, geographically 
‘narrow’ groups with a high level of commitment among its members would be the 
easiest to mobilise. Non-elite societal groups in Rome were generally large and blurry, 
however, and intersected each other (meaning that identification with one group did 
not exclude identification with another). Furthermore, political claim-making, while 
important, would normally not have been the primary concern of non-elites in their 
day-to-day lives. Organisations such as the vici (and the montes and pagi) and the collegia 
did provide a reliable basis for the mobilisation and organisation of urban groups.224 The 
rural plebs would have had far fewer possibilities to mobilise broad groups. Village 
communities could be equated to (and were perhaps types of) vici, montes and pagi. They 
were not located at a centre of political decision making, however, and collective 
actions enjoyed a limited visibility due to relative isolation from other groups. Larger 
religious communities centred on rural sanctuaries perhaps had more potential for 
contentious politics.225 After all, these locations were multifunctional, and were used for 
economic, social, and political activities as well. Generally, rural protests figure very 
little in our sources, and it can be guessed that they were easily criminalised or ignored 
by the political elites. Slaves and women had even fewer opportunities to organise, even 
if some did exist. Elite societal groups were more easily spurred to action. These groups 
were much smaller, and while there was a geographical spread, the very top of the elites 
had to have a house in Rome or at least in the suburbium. Wealth and literacy increased 
the possibilities for travel and communication. Large numbers of servants made it easier 
for a small number of elites to reach a large group. Furthermore, as these were generally 
‘leisured’ individuals, defending their interests and desires ranked much higher among 
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their daily concerns. Conversely, envy and social competition were important factors in 
processes of demobilisation. 
In processes of mobilisation, leadership is a crucial factor. Thirty years ago 
Vanderbroeck explored top-down mobilisation, pointing out the importance of 
communication, propaganda, and of course leadership.226 However, I argue that not all 
mobilisation wase organised by pyramid-shaped hierarchies in the late Republic, with a 
prominent member of the senatorial elites at the top. Leadership does not necessarily 
imply hierarchy, nor does it presuppose that all leaders had to be members of elite 
societal groups. Unfortunately, the sources rarely speak of mobilisations by senators 
and equites, let alone about the efforts of a circulator, muleteer, or tabernarius in spurring 
on their equals to attend a collective event of claim-making. There are some rare 
examples of non-elite leaders, even if they were linked to a senator. One group of these 
were the persons identified by Cicero as satellites of Clodius. Even if their humble 
origins can be supposed to have been exaggerated by Cicero, the same is true for their 
total adherence to Clodius.227 During the timeframe, there were also two significant non-
elite individuals who as ‘imposters’ succeeded in mobilising large plebeian groups: 
Equitius the ‘fake Gracchus’ and Amatius/Herophilus the ‘fake Marius’.228 The former 
may have been an escaped slave, and was followed by a large group of non-elites. He was 
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elected to the tribunate, mainly through popular support but also thanks to important 
assistance by Saturninus. Amatius/Herophilus was, according to Valerius Maximus, an 
“equarius medicus”, although Cicero again depicts him as an escaped slave. Whether it 
was the lie of his ancestry or his political views which were convincing, he succeeded in 
securing the backing of several colonies of veterans, municipiae, and importantly almost 
all the collegia. Interestingly, Valerius Maximus claims that he had a bold plan to murder 
the entire senate, while Appian claims he merely wanted to assassinate Brutus and 
Cassius. This was a serious menace, and Mark Antony and the tyrannicides laid aside 
their differences for a while to stop him. This crackdown in turn caused ‘spontaneous’ 
popular protests against Antony and the senate in the Forum. 
‘Spontaneous’ protests in our sources are interesting events, as they can imply that 
mobilisation took place under non-elite leadership. Protests without clear elite 
instigators are attested throughout the late Republic. In 62, after Caesar and the tribune 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos had to give up their programme, Suetonius attests that they 
were both stripped of their office.229  Caesar did not dare to protest this move. A couple 
of days later, plebeian groups spontaneously flocked to his house to offer their 
assistance. According to Suetonius, it was because Caesar surprisingly declined that he 
was reinstated to the praetorship. Tertullian, referring to a work by Varro, claims that 
the cults of Serapis, Isis, Harpocrates, and Anubis were forbidden by the senate in the 
late Republic.230 Popular resistance, however, had forced Gabinius and Piso in 58 to 
accept sacrifices to the first two of those gods. Not much later they changed their minds 
and destroyed the altars anyway, despite ensuing protests by groups of non-elites. The 
following year, as has already been argued, members the plebs urbana organised actions 
to protest the high prices and scarcity of grain.231 Cicero acknowledged the ‘spontaneity’ 
of the demands, even attesting that Clodius’s allies had been driven away by one such 
protest. Around the same time, crowds of bystanders quite unexpectedly interrupted 
the funeral procession of Lucullus and tried to bury him in the Campus Martius, close to 
Sulla, instead of in Tusculum.232 The surprise of the elites again indicates that non-elites 
were responsible for the mobilisation. In 52, crowds demanded through shouts that Milo 
should be convicted of Clodius’s murder.233 Dio attests that there were protests in the 
Forum when Pompey occupied Rome with his army in the same year.234 The groups 
involved even made a sport of being chased out of the Forum by the soldiers, who only 
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used the flat of their swords, until some were wounded and killed. Two years later, the 
tribune C. Scribonius Curio was suddenly celebrated by the δῆμος because he had 
proposed that the provincia of both Pompey and Caesar should be taken away.235 These 
are just some of the many examples of seemingly ‘spontaneous’ mobilisations by non-
elites. 
P. Clodius Pulcher provides a strong case for the importance of effective 
mobilisation.236 Although he was a member of the senatorial elites, and was even born a 
patrician, the tribune of 58 was a gifted organiser of, or so our sources indicate, 
especially non-elite groups. He employed various tactics to mobilise large groups and 
maintain a high level of commitment to his programmes. Amy Russell has argued that 
his tactics to close the shops by edict particularly contributed to a unprecedented 
mobilisation among non-elite groups.237 Perhaps he did form a sort of paramilitary 
structure to support the protests, the ‘decuriae’ and ‘centuriae’ mentioned by Cicero, but 
more likely this was heavily exaggerated by the orator.238 Clodius’s restoration and 
expansion of the collegia certainly did contribute to the higher levels of mobilisation and 
commitment. James Tan has argued that Clodius on several occasions ‘deactivated 
boundaries’ between himself and different plebeian groups, framing himself not only as 
their natural ally but as ‘one of them’.239 He seems to have used rumours to steer 
existing concerns of groups among the plebs urbana to suit his needs.240 He successfully 
employed plebeian repertoires of contention to his benefit. Songs and repetitive slogans 
were used to defame his targets, for instance.241 Throughout the 50s, Clodius enjoyed the 
support of large groups in the city of Rome, while constantly promoting radical political 
proposals. These two aspects cannot be separated from one another: Clodius was as 
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much an ‘instrument’ of non-elite groups as he was a leader. He was not the 
uncontested ‘patron’ of all plebeian groups, or even the plebs urbana. However, only a 
similarly strong mobilisation of a broad range of groups offered the possibility to 
counteract the movement which Clodius had unleashed. In 57 Pompey and a coalition of 
senators, including the consul P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, had to mobilise groups 
both in the Urbs and all over Italy in order to gain an important symbolic victory: 
repealing Cicero’s banishment.242 While some senators argued that a senatus consultum 
would suffice in invalidating the law, primarily Pompey insisted on having a vote by ‘the 
populace’ in the comitia centuriata.243 He seems to have been aware of the importance of 
mobilisation. ThIs political group mainly aimed at breaking the non-elite coalition of 
which Clodius was the figurehead. Recalling Cicero was a symbolic matter, but proved 
important (although not decisive) in gathering momentum. Clodius’s death in 52 again 
provides one of the best attestations of ‘spontaneous’ mobilisations.244 At first, for 
instance, it was only the ‘infima plebs’ and slaves who convened at his house. Two 
tribunes (T. Munatius Plancus and Q. Caelius Rufus) did become involved in the action 
the next day. It was at their suggestion (“hortantibus”) that the ‘vulgus imperitum’ carried 
Clodius’s body to the Forum. It is clear that the tribunes were not able to really control 
the contentious collective actions, however. Not a single source claims that they 
instigated the burning of the Curia, for instance, this was the responsibility of ‘the 
plebeians’. Clodius had become a symbol himself. This leads to a possible interpretation 
of the link between elite and non-elite leadership. To again take Clodius as an example: 
in 57 he played on the already existing concern for the grain supply in attempts to spin 
the narrative against his enemies.245 In this instance, as in that of Plancus and Rufus, and 
possibly in many attested occasions of elite leadership, a ‘dialogue’ took place between 
elite figureheads and mobilised non-elite (or indeed, elite) groups. The metaphor of 
‘figurehead’ does not imply that these elite leaders were passive, only that they were no 
puppeteers of complacent mobs. 
Another example summarising these arguments is linked to Saturninus’s death in 
100.246 The tribune had, possibly in part pressed by the demands of veteran groups, 
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introduced a proposal for an agrarian law. The sources attest that he actively mobilised 
allied Italians and Roman peasants (probably veterans), of which large groups flocked to 
Rome to secure the benefits they would gain from his law. The plebs urbana were less 
amused, as they (apparently) took it as a slight that the allies would receive too much 
benefits from the law. Consequently, they too mobilised, possibly spurred on by elite 
opponents of Saturninus. At the final contio before the vote, different methods were 
used by both sides to press their claims. At first, the supporters of the law physically 
prevented elite opponents from accessing the rostra, while the groups mobilised against 
the proposal claimed to hear thunder, which would prevent a vote being taken. A 
stalemate arose, until both groups began fighting. Eventually, the plebs urbana were 
routed and the law was passed. Saturninus did not completely control the supporters of 
his law, however. After it was passed, the veterans demobilised and returned home. Not 
much later, Saturninus, together with his elite associates such as Glaucia, murdered 
Memmius with a small band of supporters. Appian notes that the δῆμος again gathered 
(seemingly spontaneously) against the tribune. Saturninus fled to the Capitol while the 
senators legitimated the mobilisation through a senatus consultum. The senators even 
armed portions of the populace. At this time the veterans did not have anything to gain, 
and did not come to his aid. Saturninus was quickly captured. Marius and the senate 
wanted to hold a trial, but clearly could not control ‘their supporters’ either. Both 
Glaucia and Saturninus, being imprisoned in the Curia, were stoned to death by 
plebeians against the wishes of the elites. We know through Cicero that a certain 
Scaeva, a slave of Q. Croto (who was certainly not a senator), was set free for killing 
Saturninus. 
The momentum of programmes could influence mobilisation, as could the political 
context in general. Persons engaging in contentious politics had limited time or could 
become motivated or demotivated. Once again, mobilisation was costly, and principals 
often would have failed to mobilise. For instance, L. Roscius Otho (tr. pl. 67) on one 
occasion during his tribunate bypassed opposition. He successfully introduced a law 
which reserved 14 rows of seats in the theatre for the equites, and possibly other rows 
for other categories of elites.247 No struggle is attested, which can possibly be attributed 
to the preoccupation of plebeian groups with the lex Gabinia. Another possibility is, of 
course, that our sources did simply not report the opposition. Protests did arise against 
Roscius’s law a couple of years later.248 
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Context could also be beneficial to mobilisation. In 54, the flooding of the Urbs 
created an environment for popular unrest. Gabinius was blamed for the flood because 
he had ostensibly disregarded the Sibylline prophecies. The former tribune was 
eventually convicted and banished, through strong popular pressure and despite heavy 
bribery and support by powerful elite groups.249 
C. Mamilius Limetanus (tr. pl. 109) successfully introduced a law which appointed 
IIIviri to bring charges against senators who had aided Jugurtha.250 Sallust notes that 
some members of the nobilitas united in order to oppose this law. The enthusiasm of the 
plebes for punishing the nobilitas was so great, however, that the nobles tried to rally 
others (Latin and Italian allies) to act in their stead. These exertions also came to 
nothing. The covert attempts at opposition could be explained by the nobiles noticing 
the hopelessness of their endeavours. 
In 66, Manilius proposed a law to distribute freedmen in all the tribes. He passed the 
law without taking the trinundinum into account, on a public holiday, and apparently 
with violence. The groups supporting the law were dispersed by the quaestor L. 
Domitius Ahenobarbus, and the senate declared that the law did not stand. According to 
Asconius, quoting Cicero's lost Pro Cornelio, the failure of the law had discouraged the 
plebes: “Plebem ex Maniliana offensione victam et domitam esse”.251 
To give another example, Clodius craftily discouraged some of the resistance his 
policies were attracting in 58.252 As has been mentioned, Clodius responded to protesting 
equites and youthful nobiles by telling them to come by his house, but let this be known 
to the labourers of the city as well. These plebeian groups trooped together at his house, 
threw stones at the elites, and threatened them with swords. On another occasion, he 
ordered the shops to be closed in order to mobilise large bodies of craftsmen and leave a 
threatening impression of shuttered tabernae on passers-by.253 The momentum gathered 
from these events obstructed almost all further opposing mobilisations that year. 
A common form of mobilisation were so-called WUNC-displays: claims to worthiness, 
unity, numbers, and commitment.254 These displays could serve to produce symbolic 
capital, which serves as a legitimation of the power and prestige (or ‘worthiness’) of a 
specific group or individual. In that capacity, it could also serve as a method of 
contention, with the possibility of presenting the group as a legitimate principal. 
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Symbolic capital was not limited to the elites, but did depend in large part on past 
successes in conquering positions of legitimated dominance in the public transcript. The 
game was ‘rigged’, in other words, as the possibilities for producing symbolic capital are 
largely imbedded into the public transcript itself. One example is the general 
‘meritocratic’ self-representation of the senatorial elites in the public transcript, in 
which the entire group, persons, or families attempted to produce symbolic capital.255 
Official religious observances, which also re-enacted group ties and legitimacy, were 
often limited to specific societal groups.256 The festival of Bona Dea, for instance, was 
limited to elite Roman women. 
In moments of crisis, senators collectively changed their clothes to mourning 
garbs.257 This could be used to put pressure on the tribunes. In 62, the senate changed 
their attire to protest against the violence between the tribunes M. Porcius Cato and Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Nepos.258 The same happened in 58 to object to Clodius’s law 
banishing Cicero, although the consuls then tried to prevent the display.259 In 56, the 
senate voted on changing their garb as a demonstration against C. Porcius Cato’s delays 
of the elections.260 When Curio in the senate proposed that both Pompey and Caesar 
would have to give up their provincia, the meeting was adjourned by the consuls, and the 
senators again put on their mourning gowns.261 
The equites had typical WUNC-displays of their own. A first example, an 
institutionalised form within the public transcript, was the transvectio equitum. Every 
year a procession of equites equo publico went through Rome, with stops at the temple of 
Castor and on the Capitol. Other symbolic mobilisations by equites are attested 
throughout the late Republic. P. Sulpicius Rufus, for instance, was as tribune 
accompanied by an ‘anti-senate’ of young equites, which not only demonstrated their 
‘WUNC’ to opponents of Sulpicius but also to the tribune himself.262 We know of several 
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demonstrations by the equestrians during Clodius’s tribunate, as they tried to put 
pressure on the tribune and on the consuls.263 At one of these occasions, however, the 
tribune asked the group of equites to come to his house to make their demands, only to 
confront them there with a group of hostile non-elites.264  
This demonstrates that claims to symbolic capital are always in danger of being 
attacked by rival groups.265 Upsetting elite WUNC-displays, attacking statues of elites or 
their houses, disrupting theatre performances (such as the Megalesia in 56)266, 
occupying temples, breaking the chair or the fasces of a magistrate, or overthrowing the 
voting urns all were attacks on the claims of the elites to legitimate rule, and breaches 
of the public transcript. There are several examples of the defacing statues in the 
Forum, but also of people adorning them.267 On one occasion, a triumph was interrupted 
by a crowd of people, aided by some tribunes.268 When Caesar raised statues on the 
rostra, one of himself and one of Victory, it was especially noted that the crowds 
attending the event did not applaud.269 
For the non-elites, who were typically given a position of subservience in the public 
transcript, WUNC-displays often took the form of targeting public space itself. These 
methods were aimed at the socio-political system as a whole. This type of contention 
could influence the agendas of the tribunes or at least their appreciation of the political 
situation. Graffiti on public or private buildings in conspicuous places (temples or 
statues, for example) was almost certainly a common sight.270 Outside of the chosen 
timeframe, it famously was graffiti which above all convinced Tiberius Gracchus to 
pursue his agrarian law. Claims by non-elite groups could take the form of occupation of 
public spaces, or processions through the Urbs.271 A good example of this took place 
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after the murder of Clodius in 52, which has already been mentioned in this 
subsection.272 A procession was organised to carry the body from the house to the Forum 
Romanum, where it was ultimately burned in the Curia. Attacks by non-elites on the 
public transcript were not necessarily democratic or ‘progressive’. When someone was 
caught putting a diadem on a statue of Caesar in 44, for instance, this was an attack on 
the public transcript which was fiercely antimonarchical. The tribunes L. Caesetius 
Flavus and C. Epidius Marullus dragged the perpetrator to prison.273 
To summarise most points made in this subsection, contention by principals was costly, 
and the costs depended on a variety of factors. The elites were de facto privileged in 
many of these factors, as a result of their access to more and more diverse resources, 
while the plebs urbana in general had an advantageous position for non-elite groups. 
Information asymmetry is one example for which this was true, but also shows that in 
practice the differences were much more complex. There was a broad diffusion of basic 
information, but completely reliable information was scarce for all principals. The 
tribunes themselves had an important information advantage in relation to their 
principals. 
Certain methods of contention also could be more effective than others. The use of 
methods was largely dependant on the availability of resources to principals. Bribery 
was far less common in influencing the behaviour of tribunes than what is generally 
assumed. Concerns about advancing along the cursus honorum were a constant pressure 
for the tribunes, but the power in the elections was scattered – unevenly, but broadly – 
among the principals. This changed with Caesar and the triumviri, but this will be 
touched upon in the next chapter. Violence was one method used by all societal groups, 
but mainly associated with non-elite groups such as tabernarii and veterans. The 
prevalence of violence as a method of contention by these groups is probably a result of 
the focus of our sources, however. Direct physical violence against governmental 
institutions was presented as illegitimate in the public transcript. Groups employing it 
could lose their moral cover, which was important in claims to legitimate resistance. 
Without moral cover, it was much harder to effect concrete changes in the behaviour of 
the tribunes. The setting of contention – public or private – and the scale – individual or 
collective – had implications for which methods were used and whether they were 
accepted as legitimate. As the homes of the tribunes became public spaces, for instance, 
there were few possibilities to collectively make claims of tribunes in private settings. 
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Elite groups also had an advantage in being easier to mobilise, as they generally were 
smaller, their members had more time, and they controlled more resources. While it 
was difficult to mobilise large non-elite groups, some plebeian organisations such as the 
collegia and vici made this much less costly, again mainly for the plebs urbana. 
Unfortunately, there are very little attestation of rural organisation for contention with 
the tribunes. Mobilisation was a complex process, which had different aspects. It was 
crucial in order to gather momentum. However, as it was so costly, the process of 
mobilisation could easily fail. Leadership was very important in mobilisation. 
Leadership does not imply hierarchy, or the need for elite leaders. Leaders were be 
important in deciding on strategies and tactics, and in bringing non-elite groups 
together. Clodius is the best known example for leadership over non-elites, although he 
was an elite. Elite leadership was not totalitarian, as leaders were in a ‘conversation’ 
with their supporters. If they were successful, it was mostly because they consistently 
followed the expectations of the supporting groups. They did not fully control them. A 
specific form of mobilisation were WUNC-displays, which could serve to capture 
symbolic capital, which was linked to group legitimacy and status in the public 
transcript. Once again, the elites were advantaged in their WUNC-displays, which were 
partly integrated into the public transcript.  
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4.3 Tribunes and the tribunate: individual factors in 
contention 
In this third section, the dispositions of the individual tribunes will be included in the 
analysis of the contention. By doing this more nuance will be added compared to the 
previous sections. This section will acknowledge that the tribunes did have some 
discretionary freedom of behaviour. Here, then, a fully fleshed out description of the 
relation between various principals and the tribunes will be presented. A tribune not 
only was caught in a complex web of strings which constantly tugged him in different 
directions with varying force, as a person he had a mind of their own and could slightly 
affect the direction in which he moved. To make matters even more complex, he had 9 
colleagues who were largely in the same situation but could have had different personal 
characteristics. This complex interplay then was affected by and in turn constantly had 
the possibility to change the institution of the tribunate. 
This section will be divided into three subsections. The first will look at accounts of 
contention between tribunes, and take into account various personal factors which 
could influence their behaviour. This subsection will address the collegiality of the 
institution, and the disputes which could arise between tribunes. Second, these personal 
factors of tribunician behaviour will be analysed, including ideology, self-interest, and 
loyalties. We will look at how these characteristics could affect the efficiency of using 
certain methods in contention. Different tribunes could also have different 
(dis)advantages for certain principals. The third and final subsection will discuss some 
aspects of tribunician socialisation and role-making. The goal is to analyse the link 
between the tribune and the tribunate. Did persons have to adapt to certain structures 
during their tribuneship, and conversely could individual improvisation affect 
institutional change? 
4.3.1 Struggle between tribunes 
Collegial clashes between tribunes can indicate to which extent tribunes had 
discretionary freedom in their behaviour. The institutional position which each tribune 
occupied was exactly identical to that of his colleagues. Furthermore, contention by 
principals would generally exert pressure on all tribunes equally. Any of the ten 
tribunes could align himself slightly differently, however, and this could lead to 
struggle. As each individual tribune had equal authority, and because the majority did 
not take precedence over the minority, the model again gains in complexity, becomes 
more ‘messy’ than the simple principal-agent model. 
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A tribunus plebis would have had some margin for being more receptive to certain 
methods of contention, or to the claims made by certain principals. This margin does 
not even necessarily imply a conscious or rational choice: a preference often would have 
been unconscious, or emotions might have been a reason to ignore or prefer certain 
forms of contention. A categorisation of different personal characteristics will be 
provided in the next subsection. The margin for discretionary behaviour was limited by 
the concrete exertion of power by the principals. If contention was powerful enough, a 
tribune might be forced to act completely against his wishes, or could be prevented 
from acting at all. More often he would come into conflict with one of his colleagues. In 
the model which has been proposed, this would be the result of different tribunes 
following the differing expectations of different principals. Of course, even this is a 
slight simplification. This type of situation, conflict between tribunes, will be the focus 
of this subsection. Wherever possible we will look at how tribunes outwardly motivated 
their position in these conflicts. 
First, let us consider a series of simple examples for conflict between tribunes. In 110, L. 
Annius and P. Licinius Lucullus were seeking a reiteration of their tribuneship, no doubt 
partly driven by their personal ambitions.274 Their colleagues opposed this plan, finding 
no other alternative than to block all elections for the entire year. Sallust does not attest 
further conflicts between the tribunes during the year. The colleagues of Annius and 
Lucullus may have motivated their intervention by referring to the reiteration by the 
Gracchi, which had been important in civil unrest.  
P. Poppilius Laenas (tr. pl. 86) had a serious conflict with some of his colleagues as 
well.275 He was operating in the context of Cinna’s occupation of Rome. Quite possibly 
spurred on by the victorious ‘Marians’, Poppilius officially banished a number of 
tribunes who had fled to Sulla out of fear for the proscriptions. He also threw the former 
tribune Sex. Lucilius from the Tarpeian rock. Poppilius was inclined to follow the new 
dominant political group, some of his colleagues were not. His behaviour could become 
quite drastic as a result of the military victory and the proscriptions, as other principals 
may have refrained from mobilising in opposition. 
In 67, C. Cornelius also had problems with his colleagues. To quote Asconius: “Alias 
quoque complures leges Cornelius promulgavit, quibus prelisque collegae intercesserunt: per quas 
contentiones totius tribunatus eius tempus peractum est.”276 
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M. Lucilius (tr. pl. probably 64) threw a citizen in jail despite the protests of his 
colleagues.277 We are only informed about this by Fronto, and the information we have is 
rather limited. One conjecture is that Lucilius defended this move from personal hatred, 
and his colleagues may have protested that this was abuse of his office. 
In 60, the tribune C. Herennius proposed to transfer P. Claudius Pulcher to the 
plebs.278 Groups among the senatorial elites quickly made clear that they disagreed, and 
some of Herennius’s colleagues were prepared to veto the proposal. There are no direct 
attestations of Herennius’s reasoning. Cicero claims that the tribune was worthless and 
poor, had little understanding of politics, and did not comprehend the pressure Cicero 
was putting on him. However, Cicero’s close involvement in the case does not really 
permit a neutral analysis. There must have been some overt claims that Clodius should 
be supported, as the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer also unsuccesfully proposed some 
measures to the same effect. The other tribunes must not have been convinced by the 
unknown reasons, as they successfully opposed Clodius’s transfer to the plebs. 
Two years later, the tribune L. Antistius attacked Caesar for his actions as consul, but 
Caesar appealed to the other tribunes to veto the charges while he was absent “rei 
publicae causa”.279 Most of these other tribunes appear to have granted Caesar’s request. 
Antistius had been spurred on by the political groups opposing Caesar’s policies as 
consul. Caesar’s influence among political and societal groups, and the prospect of his 
help in further career advancement may have been some elements which convinced the 
colleagues of Antistius to help the proconsul. The public reason, which had power of its 
own, probably was that Caesar indeed was formally absent in service of the Republic and 
refused to return to the city (as he would have to give up his imperium). This reasoning 
had legal backing under the tribunician lex Memmia which was passed between 123 and 
114.280 Antistius did not press his attack. The principals which he preferred had other 
issues on their hands, mainly Clodius’s behaviour as tribune. When Vatinius made a 
similar appeal, only Clodius provided auxilium.281 Vatinius, unlike Caesar, was not absent 
“rei publicae causa” as he had not yet been formally appointed to his legatio. According to 
Cicero the former tribune could only escape through the mobilisation of plebeian 
groups and their violent methods. Clodius had political reasons to intervene: Vatinius 
was attacked for ignoring the leges Aelia et Fufia, and Clodius was about to severely 
restrict these laws. 
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In 56, the tribune L. Racilius brought the topic of prosecutions against Clodius, who 
then was aedile, to the attention of the senate.282 Racilius proposed that these court 
cases should be prioritised over the elections. One of his colleagues, Antistius Vetus, 
supported the idea that the trials should be held first, and called for a vote of the senate. 
C. Porcius Cato and Cassius, two other tribunes, immediately opposed this suggestion. 
The meeting was interrupted when Clodius complained about the behaviour of Racilius, 
and crowds standing outside of the Curia then scared the senators away. The most 
obvious reason for the difference in opinion between the tribunes was their personal 
opinion of Clodius, but other matters (how the elections would go, for instance) may 
have played a significant role as well. In a letter to his brother and in his defence of 
Plancius, Cicero again was one of the principals for the tribunes attacking Clodius, and 
directly attests his tactics of putting pressure on them in a letter to his brother and in 
his defence of Cn. Plancius. This Plancius was another tribune that year, and followed 
Cicero’s advice completely, while Cicero says that Racilius inherently had the best 
character and that Antistius was friendly inclined towards him. Plancius, Antistius, and 
Cassius do not reappear in our sources, but Racilius and Cato fought one another 
throughout the year. Another run-in occurred when Cato attacked the proconsul P. 
Lentulus Spinther by attempting to deprive him of his imperium. Again according to 
Cicero, Racilius displayed much affection for Spinther.283 Yet another conflict occurred 
when Cato attempted to delay the elections.284 Cato is reported to have been working for 
the political group including Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar, as he attempted to get the 
first two elected to the consulship. As the consuls of 56 had made it clear that they 
would not allow the election of both potentates, as they had broken the electoral rules, 
Cato protested by vetoing all elections. To put pressure on the tribune, groups within 
the senate proposed to change their garb to mourning. As the vote was about to begin, 
Cato tries to bring non-senators into the Curia, which would have automatically stopped 
the meeting. The other tribunes prevented this by physically blocking the entrance. 
Racilius very likely was one of these tribunes. This joint action by Cato’s colleagues does 
not necessarily mean that all of them agreed with his opponents, merely that they did 
not condone this specific attempt to disperse the senate. In that moment Cato was not 
receptive to the senate as a principal, the other tribunes were. In the same year, Milo 
beccame a principal in a very small-scale, symbolic event. He spurred Racilius on in 
humiliating Cato, and personally facilitated this behaviour.285 Cato had sold bestiarii to 
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an agent of Milo’s, and Milo had given them to Racilius. Racilius gratefully accepted the 
gift and used it to start a joke that Cato would even sell his own familia. Again this is an 
insinuation that Cato might have been bribed, but not very reliable. The clash between 
Cato and Racilius may have acquired a logic of its own as a motivator for their 
behaviour. As for principals, Racilius was more open to pressure by the clique around 
Cicero and Lentulus Spinther, and may have had ideological reasons such as defending 
the power of the senate. Cato, conversely, throughout his tribunate showed to be 
receptive of demands by the plebs urbana (as was apparent in his forcing sibylline verses 
to be translated for their benefit)286 and by a clique around Crassus, Clodius, Curio, and 
Bibulus. The importance of this last principal for Cato is directly attested by Cicero, who 
at least reports it as a theory which Pompey held.287 
Principals were an important factor in conflicts between tribunes. In 62, M. Porcius Cato 
specifically sought election to the tribuneship with the intention to oppose Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Nepos.288 Cato was spurred on and supported by an elite coalition which 
counted Cicero among its ranks. Metellus seems to have been mainly influenced by 
Caesar, Pompey’s friends, and a political group which opposed Cicero’s actions during 
his consulship, including executing the Catilinarians. The opposition between Cato and 
Metellus began early in their year in office.289 Metellus proposed, aided by the praetor 
Caesar, to recall Pompey from the east. A new provincial law would give Pompey 
extensive powers and order him to deal with the last remains of the Catilinarian armies. 
Cato, together with his his other colleague Q. Minucius Thermus, opposed this with the 
claim that the proposed powers were excessive. According to Plutarch, at first Cato 
criticised Metellus in a gentle, helpful manner, but Metellus reacted vehemently. The 
struggle was not just a discussion between two tribunes, as they were both supported 
and incited by various groups. Plutarch gives information on some of these groups: 
When the people were about to vote on the law, in favour of Metellus there were 
armed strangers and gladiators and servants drawn up in the forum, and that part 
of the people which longed for Pompey in their hope of a change was present in 
large numbers, and there was strong support also from Caesar, who was at that 
time praetor. In the case of Cato, however, the foremost citizens shared in his 
displeasure and sense of wrong more than they did in his struggle to resist, and 
great dejection and fear reigned in his household, so that some of his friends took 
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no food and watched all night with one another in futile discussions on his behalf, 
while his wife and sisters wailed and wept.290 
Plutarch attests that the elite principals were not fully committed to support Cato 
through mobilising themselves. While the ‘better citizens’ did organise themselves, they 
did not fully commit. The identity of the non-elites is, as always, more in doubt, but the 
identification of citizens who longed for change is interesting. On the day of the vote, 
these principals had occupied and surrounded the temple of Castor to ensure that a vote 
would be called, but they did let Cato and Munatius pass. Interestingly Plutarch then 
reports how this action changed the pressure the different principals were putting on 
the tribunes. 
Caesar and Metellus were disconcerted, but the better citizens, seeing and 
admiring the countenance, lofty bearing, and courage of Cato, came nearer, and 
with shouts exhorted him to be of good heart, while they urged one another to 
stay and band themselves together and not betray their liberty and the man who 
was striving to defend it.291 
The behaviour of Cato and Thermus emboldened the ‘better citizens’, and this is a good 
example of the importance of leadership in dialogue with principals. When the law was 
about to be read aloud, Cato and Thermus interposed their intercessio in a physical way, 
snatching away the draft from Metellus and clapping their hands over his mouth. This 
action in turn provoked a reaction from the supporters of the law. They chased away 
the ‘better citizens’ and attacked Cato. 
But his [Metellus’s] opponents, quickly recovering from their rout, advanced again 
upon him with loud and confident shouts, so that his partisans were overwhelmed 
with confusion and terror. They supposed that their enemies had provided 
themselves with arms from some place or other in order to assail them, and not a 
man stood his ground, but all fled away from the tribunal. So, then, when these 
had dispersed, and when Cato had come forward with commendation and 
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encouragement for the people, the majority of them stood prepared to put down 
Metellus by any and every means, and the senate in full session announced anew 
that it would assist Cato and fight to the end against the law, convinced that it 
would introduce sedition and civil war into Rome.292 
The violence by the supporters of the law ultimately rallied its opponents and deepened 
their commitment. Metellus had to concede to this exertion of power. In a very physical 
manner, it were the principals who decided the outcome of the struggle through their 
mobilisation and commitment. The tribunes had an important impact, at least according 
to Plutarch, as Cato’s obstinacy played an important part in organising the opposition. 
After these events Metellus saw that his own support was insufficient, railed agains 
Cato, and fled the city, looking for more direct assistance by Pompey. While he was 
victorious and had the momentum with him, Cato was not suddenly free to do anything 
he pleased. The principals who had supported the law remained in Rome, and remained 
an important force. Cato proved to be quite aware of this, and proposed a grain law to 
placate the poor.293 While he clearly did prefer certain principals, he was never 
completely shut off from the demands by others, in this case those who had supported 
his colleague and adversary Metellus. 
A lack concrete backing by principals could prohibit tribunes from acting at all, no 
matter what their personal preferences were. A case in 59, during the consulship of 
Caesar, makes this very clear.294 Caesar’s colleague, Bibulus, attempted to block Caesar’s 
proposals for an agrarian law. Bibulus was aided by three tribunes (Q. Ancharius, Cn. 
Domitius Calvinus, and C. Fannius). P. Vatinius and C. Alfius Flavus supported the 
proposal. When Bibulus and the other tribunes tried to oppose the lex Iulia agraria, they 
were forcefully attacked and driven away from the rostra by veterans and non-elites 
who would benefit from the law, and it was passed. Dio attests that when opponents 
tried to annull the law on the following day, nobody would listen. The enthusiasm of the 
πλῆθος for the measure was too great. At one time during the year, Vatinius attempted 
to lead Bibulus to prison, which the other tribunes attempted to prevent by providing 
auxilium. The concrete support of the people present in the Forum again proved to be 
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the decisive factor. They helped Vatinius by forming a bridge of benches which directly 
led to carcer. This allowed the tribune to walk over it with Bibulus, while the other 
tribunes were physically restrained from reaching them. Bibulus was quickly released, 
but the point was made. The three tribunes opposing the lex agraria were prevented 
from doing anything at all during the remainder of the year. The principals which 
influenced them, mainly the rich senators, did not mobilise their resources to give 
support. This effectively made them non-tribunes, and Vatinius jokingly called them 
privati.295 
The Lex Trebonia of 55 and the consecutive protests against Crassus’s mustering of 
troops present a similar situation.296 C. Trebonius introduced legislation which provided 
extraordinary commands to Pompey and Crassus and an extension of the command of 
Caesar. He was opposed by M. Porcius Cato, M. Favonius, and two tribunes: P. Aquillius 
Gallus and C. Ateius Capito. Dio literally attests, that their opposition initially did not 
have any teeth: “since they were fighting a few against many, their outspokenness was of no 
avail.”297 Even if the personal conviction of these four opponents was strong, they were 
not sufficiently supported by societal or political groups. They were forced to employ 
stalling manoeuvres, which had little effect. Gallus was shut inside the Curia for an 
entire day by some supporters of the law, while Ateius was shut out of the Forum 
entirely. Ateius was then forced to sit on the shoulders of another person in order to be 
heard, and was then attacked and driven away. The tenacious behaviour of these two 
tribunes in opposing the measures did turn some heads and thereby succeeded in 
mobilising some support. Both Gallus and Ateius were wounded even though they were 
tribunes, which turned some people against Trebonius. It was far too little too late, 
however. The opponents of Trebonius’s actions were still limited to symbolic actions 
such as pelting Pompey’s statues with stones. Only when Crassus started to levy new 
troops for his war against Parthia, larger number of non-elites banded together in 
opposing him. To again quote Dio: “Then, indeed, the majority repented of their course and 
praised Cato and the rest.”298 Ateius again tried to veto the war and the mustering, brought 
charges against the levying officers, and even attempted to rescind the lex Trebonia. and 
Trebonius now disappeared into the background. Crassus would not submit, however. 
Ateius then tried to physically restrain the consul, which caused other tribunes to 
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intervene. During this new conflict between tribunes, Crassus simply left the city, but 
not before Ateius could publicly curse him.299 
The case of Clodius has already been touched upon. During his tribuneship in 58 he 
came into conflict with his colleague L. Ninnius Quadratus, mainly over the banishment 
of Cicero.300 At the start of the year, Clodius made clear which direction his programmes 
would follow by introducing three legislative proposals (the restoration of the collegia, 
the free distribution of grain, the requirement for censors to formally accuse senators in 
order to take away their status).301 Two of these three laws were in favour of the plebs 
urbana, the last secured some interests of impoverished or politically radical nobiles. He 
was also encouraged to banish Cicero, according to Dio by “Caesar and the others.”302 
Ninnius, then, was a close collaborator of Cicero. Together they tried to organise 
opposition to a new proposal by Clodius to banish anyone who had put citizens to death 
without trial. They mainly tried to mobilise the senatorial elites and the equites. Ninnius 
was expected to use his status as a tribune to organise parts of the non-elites. The 
πλῆθος was not convinced by the entreaties of Ninnius, however. The crowd in a contio 
heckled some supporters of Cicero such as Q. Hortensius Hortalus and C. Scribonius 
Curio. Cicero became anxious about his prospects and went into voluntary exile. Ninnius 
continued his opposition to Clodius’s programmes, but a lack of concrete support by 
principals made this ineffective. The conflict continued the following year.303 Most 
tribunes kept a promise they had made as designati to propose a law to recall Cicero. Sex. 
Atilius Serranus Gavianus and Q. Numerius Rufus turned against this objective, however. 
According to Cicero they had been bribed, but once more his account is anything but 
reliable. Other forms of pressure by principals must have been in play. As has been 
noted above, the coalition to recall Cicero had been organised by then. Opposition 
remained quite strong as well, mainly by the non-elite plebs urbana. The vote had to be 
taken in the comitia centuriata, a rarity in the late Republic, which says a lot. Serranus 
objected to the proposal, but did not outright veto it. He did attempt to postpone the 
debates and votes. The conflict between the tribunes again led to violence between 
groups of principals: the Forum, Comitium, and Curia were occupied, groups clashed, 
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and several people were killed. Some of the tribunes, from both sides of the debate, 
were targets in the fighting. Cicero was successfully recalled by a decree of the comitia, 
even if some tribunes supporting the law were almost murdered. 
Serranus and Numerius Rufus were not the only tribunes who changed their ‘allegiance’ 
through pressure from principals. In 63, the proposal on a lex Agraria by P. Servilius 
Rullus at first united all the tribunes on the side of the law.304 However, a group of elites 
(including Cicero) succeeded in altering the behaviour of the tribune L. Caecilius Rufus 
concerning a completely different topic. As a consequence, Rufus started to agree with 
them in other programmes as well. From then on he opposed his colleagues on the 
agrarian law and even proclaimed that he would veto it.  
Another example can be found in 52, after the murder of Clodius at the hands of 
Milo.305 The tribunes M. Caelius Rufus and Q. Manilius Cumanus supported the political 
group defending Milo, while T. Munatius Plancus Byrsa, Q. Pompeius Rufus, and C. 
Sallustius Crispus (the historian) attacked Milo and were being spurred on by angry 
groups of plebeians. Appian claims that the crowds at Caelius’s contiones were bribed, 
but Milo certainly had support among parts of the plebs urbana in part thanks to his 
munificence. According to the sources, he was mainly supported by groups from the 
plebs rustica and equites. Appian mentions that the groups seeking vengeance on Milo 
specifically were looking to kill individuals wearing quality clothing and golden rings. 
Those groups opposing Milo mainly drew from the city populace, according to Asconius 
they were maxima pars multitudinis. Some of them besieged the houses of the elites, killed 
the rich, and went on sprees through the city plundering and burning. These methods 
and the subsequent senatus consultum ultimum (the request that the consuls and tribunes 
should see to it that the Republic suffer no harm) caused two of the tribunes opposing 
Milo – Pompeius Rufus and Sallustius – to moderate their behaviour, to the degree that 
they “in suspicione fuerunt redisse in gratium cum Milone ac Cicerone”.306 They do not appear 
to have given up their policies completely, but did become less receptive to pressure by 
the rioting plebeians. Like Cornelius, it is quite likely that they were baffled by the steps 
this principal had taken. Plancus did continue to attack Milo relentlessly, however, so he 
may have had a higher tolerance for these methods. On the other side of the conflict, 
Caelius confidently continued to attack even Pompey. Immediately after their 
tribuneship, both Plancius and Pompeius Rufus were tried, convicted, and banished. 
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Caelius successfully defended himself, and Sallustius, who later repented having been 
dragged into this commotion, was expelled from the senate by a censor less than two 
years later. 
In this section, some examples of conflict between tribunes have been analysed. While 
discretionary behaviour clearly did have an effect, it has been established that 
principals remained very important. Most conflicts between tribuni plebis seem to have 
been the result of different attitudes towards principals or the methods these principals 
employed. In a few cases, principals actively encouraged a tribune to oppose one or 
multiple of his colleagues. Tribunes interacted with principals, and their personal 
preferences could be important when they were involved in mobilising groups, as 
leaders or as figureheads. Once a college of tribunes had split over an issue, there was 
some degree of path dependency, but tribunes did change their behaviour if too much 
pressure was put on them. In general, tribunes were caught in a complex web of 
expectations which made any course of action potentially dangerous. The most 
prevalent individual factors of tribunes which are reported by our sources will be 
discussed in the next subsection. 
4.3.2 The individual tribune as a factor 
How did the aspects of individuality of a tribune concretely have an impact on the 
outcomes of contention? This question is difficult to answer, mainly because it can 
imply an attempt to psychologise the subject despite very limited sources. As there are 
few documents written by tribunes or former tribunes (Sallust (tr. pl. 52) is one 
exceptions), there is no way to directly gain an impression about their personality. In 
this subsection, therefore, claims resulting from an interpretation of a tribune’s 
psychology will be avoided, and some attention will go to the limits of these 
interpretations. Some objective personal characteristics such as family background or 
publicly expressed motives can sometimes be reconstructed. The ancient sources do 
present an opportunity to look into the expectations of ancient writers about which 
could motivate a tribune. Even then we have to be critical, for example it has already 
been argued that imperial sources were very eager to explain behaviour by bribery. In 
general, any interpretation is necessarily limited to assessing the actions of a tribune 
within the concrete political context, and critically combine this with attestations by 
the sources. 
The main goal of this subsection is to attest that individual aspects were important 
especially for contentious politics involving the tribunes. To quote Cicero: “aediles 
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quicumque erunt, iidem mihi sunt ludi parati: tribuni plebis, permagni interest, qui sint.”307 In 
contrast to some simplifying interpretations over tribunician behaviour, complexity has 
been underlined throughout this thesis. Kondratieff is just one researcher to have 
claimed that the goal of any tribune was “trying to make an impact in a civil office without 
annoying the wrong people”.308 An example can easily be found which contradicts this. 
Asconius says about C. Cornelius (tr. pl. 67): “Cornelius praeter destrictum propositum animi 
adversus principum voluntatem cetera vita fecerat quod magnopere improbaretur; [...]”.309 The 
goal here is not to look into the heads of tribunes, but merely to assert that complex 
diversity between some aspects of individuality could play some part in political 
conflicts involving the tribunate. Ideologies, interests, desires, hate and ‘infatuation’, 
the resources available to a tribune, and other aspects could make contention by certain 
principals or contention through certain methods easier or more difficult. Based on 
information about a college of tribunes, principals could focus their contention on 
specific individuals. 
The case of M. Porcius Cato (tr. pl. 62) is a good example of both the limits and 
possibilities which are faced when assessing the consequences of individuality of a 
tribune for contention. Much is known through the biography written by Plutarch some 
150 years after the death of Cato, which makes his descriptions rather unreliable on 
their own. However, not only did Plutarch use contemporary sources now lost to us 
(perhaps the various texts on Cato written by Cicero, Caesar, Brutus, and Octavian), 
many of his descriptions are fully corroborated by Cato’s contemporaries Cicero and 
Sallust. While this does not mean that we can know Cato’s personality, the conformity 
between the sources presents some possibilities at assessing interpretations of Cato’s 
personality by contemporaries. It is mainly this public persona which is important here. 
According to these sources, Cato was fiercely loyal to his family and best friends, whom 
he also held to his own high standards. He was a disciple of stoicism, and placed 
virtuousness on the highest pedestal.310 He was considered to be stubborn and severe, 
not responsive to flattery, bribery or threats, or to any entreaties by anyone other than 
his close friends and family.311 Somewhat more suspect is Plutarch’s description of 
Cato’s outlooks on his duties as a magistrate: 
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For it was neither for the sake of reputation, nor to gain riches, nor accidentally 
and by chance, like some others, that he threw himself into the management of 
civic affairs, but he chose a public career as the proper task for a good man, and 
thought that he ought to be more attentive to the common interests than the bee 
to its honey.312 
While this type of description is often exaggerated or merely presented to make a 
certain point about the ‘morals of the day’, in the case of Cato there are some concrete 
actions which again give some credence to these claims. The most important one was 
his public claim that he only stood for the tribuneship in order to oppose Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Nepos.313 The primary task to which he devoted himself throughout his career 
was that of keeping the public treasury filled. He also battled all kinds of corruption in 
finance and elections.314 Even after his quaestorship, he reportedly continued to keep 
accounts of the treasury, and in his praetorship he mainly battled electoral bribery. This 
occasionally made him clash with the publicani, money-lenders and bankers, however. 
He also came into conflict with the equites over supporting punishments for jurors 
taking bribes.315 He was known for holding the law in high regard, and publicly prided 
himself in following it consistently.316 This consistency was not perfect, as is clear by the 
actions he took. Such as when he proposed Pompey’s sole consulship in 52. He 
specifically trained on popular oratory, and according to Plutarch he often shared in the 
toils of common soldiers.317 A last factor which consistently returns in the sources is 
Cato’s public grudge against Caesar.318 
Cato’s behaviour as a tribune and as tribunus plebis designatus corroborates many of 
these descriptions. As designated tribune he is reported to have criticised the populus in 
a contio for taking bribes in the consular elections. He vowed to prosecute anyone but 
his brother-in-law and consul elect D. Iunius Silanus, and actually brought a case against 
the other elected consul, L. Licinius Murena.319 This is fully in line with his 
characterisation as someone opposed to corruption in Roman politics, but open to the 
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interests of family members. Cato also opposed granting Pompey extraordinary 
honours, measures which were campaigned for by Caesar.320 Perhaps most important of 
all, he vehemently protested Caesar’s proposal of imprisonment as the punishment for 
the Catilinarian conspirators. Cato argued for the death penalty even if that opinion was 
far from popular.321 While putting citizens to death without a trial was illegal, Sallust 
implies that Cato feared total chaos. In line with the character which is painted in the 
sources, he even attacked his brother-in-law Silanus because he had changed his 
opinion under pressure by Caesar. 
When he had entered his tribuneship, then, Cato clashed with Caesar and Metellus on 
their proposal to recall Pompey. Cato was not very impressed by threats or violence in 
the clashes about this proposal. This method of contention appears to have rather 
strengthened his resolve. In another attested event, much later in the year, Cato was not 
impressed by Pompey’s entreaties to him to postpone the elections, and even vetoed all 
motions on the subject.322 He is reported to have been alone in this opposition. Cato also 
proposed and passed, together with the tribune L. Marius, a law which investigated and 
punished generals who submitted false reports about the number of casualties on either 
side of a battle.323 
So far, all these events largely corroborate both the reports by our sources of Cato’s 
personality and the importance of these individual factors in his behaviour as tribune. 
He opposed Caesar at every turn, did not allow violence or entreaties of powerful men 
to sway him, and focussed mainly of maintaining the status quo and on battling 
corruption. But his personal preferences did not decide everything. The grain law which 
he proposed and enacted during that year contradicts mainly his reported concern for 
the treasury. According to Plutarch, the law imposed the cost of 1250 talents each year 
(probably around 30 million sestertii), which meant a significant drain on the public 
finances.324 
There are many similar attestations of the personal dispositions of tribunes. In the 
discussion about M. Livius Drusus, an overview of some of the ancient views on his 
personal characteristics has already been given. Drusus’s overt ideological support of 
the senate probably was one factor which made him reluctant to veto a senatorial vote 
rescinding his own laws, for instance, while his ancestral background may have 
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contributed to his apparent disdain and stubborn resistance to any who opposed his 
programmes. 
P. Sulpicius Rufus (tr. pl. 88) was a member of the same clique of famous orators, 
friends and tutors/pupils coming from established senatorial families which together 
were a dominant political group in the 90s. This group is known mainly from Cicero’s de 
Oratore, and included, besides Sulpicius and Livius Drusus, L. Licinius Crassus ‘Orator’, 
Marcus Antonius ‘Orator’, and C. Aurelius Cotta.325 This political group was linked to C. 
Marius as well. The banishment of Cotta under the lex Varia may have been one of the 
reasons why Sulpicius proposed a recall of the Varian exiles.326 However, Sulpicius had 
first vetoed a similar law, which again warns us against going too far in making claims 
about personality. Velleius mentions that Sulpicius had achieved his influence in society 
through, among other factors, his wealth (“opibus”), but Plutarch remarks that he left 
behind a debt of 12 million sestertii (3 million drachmae).327 This would have clearly 
clashed with his law forbidding senators from being more than 8.000 sestertii in debt. 
Sulpicius, his friends and mentors all were from very wealthy families, however, so this 
may have more to do with the structural complexes inculcated as a child and the 
ideology of his immediate circles than with his concrete interests. Like his friend 
Drusus, Sulpicius during his tribunate began to allow more violent methods in support 
of his programmes. His transfer of the command against Mithridates from Sulla to 
Marius was notorious for physical clashes, and so was his proposal to integrate the new 
citizens (from the Italian allies after the Social War) into the 35 tribes which already 
existed.328 According to some sources, this mostly was the result of advice by Marius. 
One group specifically became more successful in influencing Sulpicius during his 
tribunate: the ‘popular elements’. Cicero mentions that the tribune was carried away 
from the best policy by the breeze of the people (“popularis aura provexit”).329 
Sometimes sources indicate the prevalence of ideology. A first example is the 
candidature of M. Iuventius Thalna Laterensis for the tribuneship in 59.330 Laterensis 
actually dropped his candidature, and according to Cicero he made it widely known that 
he did this to avoid taking the oath to observe the lex Iulia agraria. In a letter to Atticus 
the orator says that Laterensis was praised for his virtue, which we can rather interpret 
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as his ideological sensitivities. When Cicero later was defending Plancius against 
Laterensis, he of course attacked him on this. He claimed that the populus considered the 
withdrawal of his candidature cowardly or as showing that he was not attached to the 
people. This is of course not very reliable, but indicates how public self-representation 
could be reinterpreted in the late Republic, and how unreliable our sources can be. 
A. Pompeius (tr. pl. 102), who agitated against Battaces, a priest of Magna Mater from 
Pessinus who had come to Rome to talk to the consuls and senate.331 Plutarch states that 
the priest made a prophecy that the Romans would win a victory, while Diodorus 
Siculus in a more extensive description attests that Battaces asked the Romans to pay 
for a purification of the temple. The latter source says that Pompeius initially prohibited 
the priest from wearing his golden crown in the city, as this went against Roman 
sensibilities. Another tribune then brought Battaces on the rostra, where the priest 
began an apocalyptic oration. Pompeius again intervened and chased him away. We can 
only guess at why this tribune had such a vehement reaction. Some of the possibilities 
are that he was – more than his colleagues – concerned with traditional Roman religion 
and customs, abhorred the religious awe which the priest inspired in the populace, or 
possibly just believed that Battaces was an imposter. The event is not well attested, and 
only known because Pompeius died not much later. 
A tribune about whom we are quite well informed is C. Licinius Macer (tr. pl. 73). 
Macer also represents a missed opportunity in a certain way, as he was a historian but 
none of his works have survived. Sallust in a preserved part of his own ‘Histories’ gives 
his interpretation of Macer’s character by giving him a speech. We do not know if 
Sallust had read Macer’s ‘History of Rome’, but the speech in any case is a description 
through the eyes of Sallust. Macer is described as brave (or stubborn) in the face of 
overwhelming opposition, as a person who resisted bribery, and as someone who had 
more consideration for public well-being than for personal interests.332 Cicero adds that 
Macer did not have much auctoritas, did have bad mores, but was quite ingenious and not 
a bad orator.333 It is clear that while some of these descriptions were based on how 
Cicero and Sallust had experienced Macer themselves, most of it is highly conjectural. 
Despite this uncertainy, Macer provides a good case for the importance of the plebs 
urbana for the tribunes, as it is clear from his actions that he considered them to be the 
foremost principal. In the speech attributed to him, his character frequently berates the 
plebeians from not seeing more to their own interests themselves, seeing that they were 
so inherently powerful. The figure of Macer especially criticises them for not fighting 
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for the restoration of the powers of the tribunate. Without their support, however, he 
could not himself have posed any effective opposition to the ‘pauci’. As the speech 
indicates: “Sed praeter spem bonam ex uobis, quae metum uicit, [...]”.334 Again these words 
and motives are conjecture, but may have been based on how Sallust had experienced 
Macer himself as a young boy in Rome. Macer carried the struggle for the restoration of 
the tribunate, but without the support he received from the plebs urbana this would 
have been impossible, and he would perhaps not have taken the risk. Interestingly, the 
sources attest that he tried to further mobilise them. Macer is one example in a list of 
tribunes in the 70s who are portrayed as active proponents of the restoration of the 
tribunate (Cn. Sicinius, 76; Q. Opimius, 75; L. Quinctius Rufus, 74; M. Lollius Palicanus, 
71). All of these men are attested as orators suited for lowly ears and as quite vehement, 
although the true motives of Quinctius later seem to have become suspect.335 
Another possible example of the importance of ideological factors is L. Novius (tr. pl. 
58). In 58, of course, the plebs urbana strongly had the momentum in their favour, partly 
through Clodius’s leadership capabilities. One praetor, L. Flavius, prosecuted the 
freedman and apparitor of Clodius, Damio. Damio appealed to the tribunes, and it was 
Novius, not Clodius who provided the answer. Despite being himself having been 
injured by Damio (“vulneratus sum”), Novius claimed that he would not take his 
character into account, and effectively vetoed the trial.336 Asconius says to have copied 
this directly from the acta urbana of that day, so this is one rare example of a rather 
reliable speech. Novius thus claimed that he held the formal elements of the institution 
in higher regard than his own desires. Of course, this position would have been all the 
more attractive because the alternative could have been more violent pressure from the 
plebs urbana. 
Ideological factors were not clear-cut. In the case of Cato, a school of philosophy 
could have partly steered his behaviour in certain ways and made him less open to 
certain forms of pressure. In the 70s, the lack of power for the tribunate drew radical 
persons to its ranks. To take Macer as an example, his views on the tribunate probably 
strongly influenced both his overall behaviour and his receptiveness to contention by 
certain groups. For A. Pompeius, it is possible that factors of ideology spurred the 
tribune into opposing certain behaviour. Lastly, L. Novius is attested to have claimed 
that he had a reverence for the Republican institutions. Even if we can take a guess at 
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what ideological factors could have motivated tribunes, however, it is clear that these 
individual aspects did certainly not negate contention by societal and political groups. 
Other personal factors which may have been important were personal relations, such as 
friendships and family ties. C. Memmius during his tribunate (54) aided his stepfather P. 
Cornelius Sulla in prosecuting Gabinius for ambitus.337 Memmius was considered proud 
for disregarding the pitiable entreaties of the son-in-law of Gabinius, Sisenna. This 
behaviour is said to have caused a reaction by one of his colleagues. This colleague, D. 
Laelius, interposed in favour of Gabinius, causing him to be acquitted for this trial.338 
Memmius quite likely was influenced by familial ties. D. Laelius seems to have claimed 
that Memmius’s behaviour was illegitimate for a tribune. 
Labienus in 63 restored the law which called for elections by the people to appoint 
persons to most priestly colleges.339 Most sources claim that this was due to his 
cooperation with Caesar during that year, as Caesar desired to become pontifex maximus 
after the death of Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius. They seem to have worked together on the 
case against Rabirius too, and Labienus would become one of Caesar’s most important 
legates in Gaul. It is not unlikely that they had been very close at the time, and that this 
had played a part in Labienus’s programmes. However, it is very important too that 
these were both measures which favoured the power of the populus to decide.340 
Rivalry and enmity could be important as well. In 57 and 56, a number of actions were 
undertaken by tribunes against former tribunes. The grudge between Clodius and Milo 
of course has become legendary. The latter twice tried to prosecute the former during 
his tribunate in 57, while the former again sued the latter the year after that.341 Cicero 
argues that Milo did not act out of private enmity or a hope for rewards, or because 
someone had requested it (“nullis inimicitiis, nullis praemiis, nulla hominum postulatione”), 
but out of particular concern for the Republic (“proprie rei publicae causa”).342 These 
claims of course should be taken with a grain of salt, given the actions of the tribunes. 
Another tribune interfered and forbade court cases before the elections to aedile, in 
which Clodius was a candidate. In response, Milo organised his own groups to violently 
counter Clodius. Plutarch attests that the continuing violence caused parts of the δῆμος 
to turn away from Clodius. Friction between societal or political groups led to some 
degree of polarisation. It is quite clear that Clodius’s judicial attack on Milo in 56 was 
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largely inspired by enmity. The trial descended into bouts of mutual insults, supported 
by larger inimical groups present at the scene. The groups attacked each other, first by 
spitting and then by physical violence. Clodius and Milo were not the only individuals 
who were involved, however. The tribune C. Cato also proposed bills against Milo in 
56.343 Still in the same year, Antistius Vetus, L. Racilius, and possibly Cn. Plancius again 
tried to push for trials against Clodius.344 Cicero says that they openly claimed that the 
prosecution of the former tribune was the most important political issue. Both Cicero 
and Milo were spurring these tribuens on, but they may have hated Clodius themselves.  
In 52, Q. Pompeius Rufus imprisoned the aedile M. Favonius, possibly out of 
vengeance for having been imprisoned by him in 53.345 
C. Scribonius Curio (tr. pl. 50) quite clearly detested Pompey, and fiercely opposed 
him during his year in office.346 While Curio was not particularly friendly to Caesar, the 
increasing polarisation of politics leading up to the civil war and his fierce hatred of 
Pompey eventually led him to choose Caesar’s side. Curio’s friendship with Mark Antony 
may have contributed to this as well. 
In 43, the tribune Salvius prevented Antony from being voted a public enemy by the 
senate.347 There was a considerable backlash, but the tribune withstood great pressure 
from Cicero, his allies, and the majority of the senate. Together with the friends of 
Antony and those of L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus he demanded that the proconsul 
should be put to trial. Cicero and his faction attempted to incite the plebs urbana against 
the tribune, but backed out as they realised that the principal could turn against them. 
Appian claims that Salvius’s main motive for supporting Antony was personal 
friendship. There are some reasons to doubt this, however, as Salvius appears to have 
later cooperated with Cicero and even, according to Appian, became the first victim of 
the proscriptions.348 If had had enjoyed a friendship with Antony this had soured, but 
perhaps he strongly believed that he was doing the right thing, or still other, unknown 
elements were in play. This again shows that this kind of interpretation is always very 
precarious. 
 
                                                     
343 Cic., QF, 2.3.4. 
344 Cic., QF, 2.1.2-3. 
345 Dio, 40.45.2-4. Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 475, 477. 
346 App., BC, 2.31, 80; Caes., BC, 2.25.4; Cic., Att., 6.3.4, 7.5.4, 10.4.6-12, 8.2, Fam., 2.12.1, Cael. in Cic., Fam., 8.11.3; 
Dio, 40.66.5; Plut., Ant., 5.2, Pomp., 59.2; Suet., de Rhet., 1. Hayne, ‘L. Paullus and His Attitude to Pompey’, p. 153, 
n. 21; Lacey, ‘The Tribunate of Curio’, p. 326, n. 88; Logghe, ‘The Alleged Volte-Face of Curio’; Vanderbroeck, 
Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior, p. 49. 
347 App., BC, 3.50-52; Cic., Phil., 6.2-3, 7.14, 12.20. 
348 App., BC, 4.17. 
  201 
Personal background and interests are generally easier to analyse. There have been 
many different interpretations about tribunician families: Martin and Thommen saw 
long lines specifically interested in the office until Sulla’s reforms, while Gruen argued 
that the tribunate was specifically interesting for families which had long not held the 
consulship.349 It should be argued that not only familial background mattered, but the 
concrete lived experiences when growing up. Still, families and familial relations could 
have an impact. Cn. Plancius (tr. pl. 56) was the son of one of the most influential 
publicani and equites. He was supported by them electorally and was well-known for 
having advanced their interests during both his tribuneship and quaestorship.350 To 
quote Cicero:  
or that my client’s own great services to the equestrian order during his 
quaestorship and tribunate were universally recognized, or that the members of 
that order thought that an honour paid to Plancius was an honour to their own 
body and a means of securing advancement for their children.351 
Another good example is the tribune Sex. Pacuvius (or Apudius) Taurus (27), who 
revered Augustus ‘in Spanish fashion’ and asked others to do the same.352 The Princeps 
resisted, but Taurus ran out of the senate and made the crowds follow his example. He 
then ordered everyone to make sacrifices and made Augustus his heir. Clearly this was a 
consequence of his background and ‘infatuation’ with the Princeps, but Dio suspects 
that he also did this with the goal of receiving benefits (in his career and as gifts, 
presumably), which was successful. 
An interesting case for looking at the influence of individual factors surrounds the 
proposal by Cn. Cornelius Dolabella to abolish all debts (tr. pl. 47).353 The civil war 
between Pompey and Caesar had upset many arrangements. Debtors and creditors 
found each other on the other side of the conflict, many rich persons had fled Rome and 
attempted to collect their assets, both sides of the war were demanding taxes from the 
provinces, ships had been confiscated, some economic activities had halted, the danger 
made interests go up... The consequences were not limited to the elites. Many persons 
had been already drowning in debt before the civil war. Dolabella was opposed by his 
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colleagues L. Trebellius and C. Asinius Pollio, who were probably spurred on by the 
creditors. His proposal immediately had quite a large impact on the political stage. Even 
if we are not informed about the procedural details, it is likely that Trebellius and Pollio 
vetoed his call to a vote, which in turn caused the crowd at the contio to revolt.354 The 
opponents of the law were present as well. Both sides carried weapons, fought, and 
besieged houses.355 Another important principal was Mark Antony, who as magister 
equitum controlled an armed garrison in Rome. It seems that both Dolabella and 
Trebellius had supporters among the soldiers as well, so this group was not monolithic 
or absolutely loyal.356 At first, Antony and the senate both remained neutral. Dio then 
argues that Antony was quickly losing support with the “πλῆθος” to Dolabella, and to 
reap the benefits sided with the tribune. Antony brought official charges against 
Trebellius. Then, Dio says, Antony noticed that this did not make him popular with 
either the people or the senate. Furthermore, he would have been cuckolded by 
Dolabella, and started to support Trebellius.357 Riots were still taking place. When the 
Vestals had to evacuate the sacred vessels from the Aedes Vestae, the senate voted that 
Antony should keep the peace.358 The groups supporting Dolabella’s law seem to have 
become desperate. Dio attests that it was the crowds (“ὄχλος”) who took the initiative to 
erect barriers and towers on the Forum.359 The law was then passed, but a senatus 
consultum ultimum was passed, and Antony charged the Forum. According to Livy 800 
people were slain, some thrown from the Tarpeian Rock.360 This did not stop the 
struggle. Indeed, the survivors seem to have deepened their commitment. It was only 
when Caesar returned to Rome with his army that Dolabella and the groups supporting 
his law stopped their contention, quite probably out of fear for unforgiving reprisals.361 
The riots in Rome concerning this issue was one of the reasons for Caesar to abolish 
many of the collegia, which at least potentially curbed the power of the plebs urbana.362 
There was a carrot beside the stick too: Caesar promised to personally pay all interests 
and rents for up to 2000 sestertii per person for a year.363 
In this case, the tribunes involved (mainly Dolabella and Trebellius) experienced very 
strong contention to adjust their behaviour in certain ways. It is clear that the 
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mobilisation of power was substantial on both sides of the debate, and that these sides 
were diametrically opposed. Only individual reasons can explain why Dolabella chose to 
strive for debt cancellation, while Trebellius chose to fiercely oppose him. What is quite 
fascinating, is that personal interests do not seem to have been a factor of difference. 
Both were heavily indebted. Cicero in 43 snidely remarked “Trebellium vidit sine tabulis 
novis salvum esse non posse.”364 Dio remarks that Dolabella had become tribune to deal 
with his debts, and Cicero confirms these debts.365 Dolabella had been Cicero’s son-in-
law, and had constantly demanded the payment of Tullia’s dowry, despite having 
cheated on her.366 As there was no difference between both men in interests, an 
important factor may have been ideology. Dolabella was a patrician, and had been 
adopted the year before (like Clodius) in order to be eligible for the tribunate.367 This 
hints at an openness for radical proposals by the non-elites, and Dolabella indeed seems 
to have taken an example in Clodius, even owning or setting up statues of him.368 
According to Plutarch, Dolabella aimed at change in society and was quite mad 
(“μανία”).369 Dio’s opinion was that he was mainly inspired by a quest for immortal 
fame, even if it would kill him.370 These two last testimonials are less trustworthy than 
Cicero’s, who knew Dolabella himself. Whatever Dolabella’s personality, once he had 
committed to make a law for debt relief he could not take a step back. The pressure by 
the plebeians was too fierce. 
4.3.3 Socialisation and role-making 
In this final subsection of the chapter I will discuss socialisation and role-making in the 
tribunate. These terms concern the question of how the behaviour of an individual 
tribune interracted with the institutional structures of the tribunate and how both 
reproduced one another. Socialisation is adjustment of behaviour to, in this case, 
comply with institutional habits, while role-making refers to individual deviations 
which can become a precedent on which other tribunes would base their own 
behaviour. Tribunes did not only engage in conflicts with each other, they also copied 
behaviour of predecessors or colleagues, made innovations on the basis of institutional 
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habits, or responded to certain practices by their colleagues.371 As has been claimed 
throughout this thesis, this happened within the context of contention by principals. In 
other words, these aspects of the tribunate did not occur within a vacuum. While the 
importancec of principals has been focussed on throughout this chapter, here they will 
not be front and centre in order to clearly look at how the tribunes and the tribunate 
interacted. 
Socialisation here relates to adjustments in behaviour by an individual tribune as he 
‘learned’ the institution of the tribunate (‘secondary’ socialisation). As has been 
established, the tribunate carried with it expectations about how an individual tribune 
should behave vis-à-vis, for instance, non-elites. Socialisation started already before a 
tribune entered his office, as candidate and as tribunus designatus. Many tribunes would 
have prepared much earlier, some of them from childhood. Nevertheless, it was only 
when a person became a tribune that the various pressures by principals would have 
been concretely felt. Tribunes were pushed by principals to adjust their behaviour on 
concrete issues, as has been the main subject of this chapter. Here it is important that 
principals could enforce their general expectations of the tribunate as well, through the 
same methods of contention. If non-elite principals considered the behaviour of a 
person as too haughty for a tribune, they could have tried to correct him on this 
through contention, or another tribune might have intervened.  
Learning the institution of the tribunate is not the same as learning formal rules, but 
rather the practical habits of persons in the institution. The difference is demonstrated 
by a case in 82. A lost text by M. Terentius Varro is cited by Aulus Gellius, and states that 
Varro during his tribuneship never summoned people and provided aid to those 
summoned by his colleagues. Formally, the tribunate did not grant the right to summon 
persons or magistrates, but this had become an institutional habit:  
The tribunes of the commons have no power of summons, nevertheless many of 
them in ignorance have used that power, as if they were entitled to it; for some of 
them have ordered, not only private persons, but even a consul to be summoned 
before the rostra.372 
Using the power of summons, even if it had been ‘unlawfully’ usurped, had become an 
institutional habit. In this instance it was Varro who ‘innovated’ by strictly applying the 
law. L. Novius is a good example of a tribune adhering to institutional habits.373 In 
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providing auxilium for Damio, he followed what was expected of a tribune, and claimed 
that he completely effaced himself. As has been established above, this behaviour could 
also have been partly impelled through pressure by the plebs urbana. 
Aside from general expectations of behaviour, there were some specific repertoires 
linked to the tribunate which could acquire a logic of their own. The most common 
trope which is reported in our sources is that of the ‘radical tribune’. Once again, this 
should not be confused with what has been described as popularis tribunes, meaning 
either loyalty to a factio, a specific ideology, or a strategy of garnering power through 
the assemblies. A tribune could see to the interests of the non-elites despite behaving 
stern and dignified, and another adhering to the tropes of the radical tribune could 
advance legislation which favoured the senatorial elites. The trope involved specific 
repertoires in behaviour, which can be best described as flashy: meant to attract 
attention through grand gestures, peculiar mannerisms, and inflammatory rhetoric. 
Quickly and extensively talking in contiones was another characteristic element, as was 
the frequent use of humour. One example is L. Marcius Philippus (tr. pl. 94).374 Cicero 
describes his style as inventive, humorous, and fiery if provoked. Cicero also implies in 
‘de Officiis’ that this might have been the result of assimilating the style of ‘the radical 
tribune’ during his tribuneship. Cn. Sicinius (tr. pl. 76), a ‘homo impurus’, was particularly 
noted for his witticisms as a tribune, which together with his programme to restore the 
tribunate may even have cost him his life.375 There are other tribunes which are known 
for their adherence to these tropes, mainly thanks to a just a few paragraphs in Cicero’s 
‘Brutus’.376 There were two possibilities in adopting a look as a radical tribune. The first 
was the trope of the ‘old-style’ tribune, with a beard and torn clothes, like Rullus (tr. pl. 
63) as tribunus plebis designatus and as tribune proper, or Saturninus as tribunus designatus 
in 101.377 Rullus provides one of the best examples of socialisation, as he is described by 
Cicero: 
As soon as he was elected, he practised putting on a different expression, a 
different tone of voice, and a different gait; his clothes were in rags, his person 
was terribly neglected, more hair about him now and more beard, so that eyes and 
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aspect seemed to protest to the world the tribunician power and to threaten the 
republic.378 
The second possible ‘look’ was the complete opposite, with very colourful and 
conspicuous clothing. Saturninus may have employed this during his tribuneship, but 
the best example is probably L. Quinctius (tr. pl. 74), who wore robes “ad talos demissam 
purpuram”.379 One of the most interesting features about the trope of the ‘radical 
tribune’ is given by Caesar. When talking about the flight of Mark Antony and Q. Cassius 
Longinus from Rome, he says: 
Instead, seven days into January they were forced to think about their own safety, 
something that the most tumultuous tribunes of the past were generally attentive 
to and worried about only after eight months of all kinds of action.380 
So there was even an expected ‘term’ after which radical tribunes had to beware of their 
safety, because they were so eager to get caught up in all kinds of struggles which 
caused principals to increase the pressure. 
But not all tribunes felt the need to emulate these repertoires. The tribunate was 
often one of the first political magistracies of a person, and in any case the most 
political. Tribunes were expected to hold up the general public transcript as well. A 
tribune who misbehaved could damage the ‘good name’ (existimatio) of the entire 
institution of the tribunate or even the dominant societal groups, of which he was a 
part.381 This could even be inaction: M. Terpolius, for instance, was ‘contemptissimum’ as a 
tribune, presumably because he did not act at all.382 According to Cicero, L. Marcius 
Philippus (tr. pl. 104) deserved to be banished from Rome because he had implied a 
redistribution of wealth in the Republic.383 The orator thought that Philippus by that 
had gone against the ‘prime directive’ of a magistrate: to ensure that everyone could 
hold on to his property. 
Role-making, then, concerns how improvisation by tribunes could change the 
institutional habits. The repertoires of the tribunate were generally characterised by 
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constant innovation, copying, and the decline of certain methods in behaving as a 
magistrate. There is ample evidence for this.  
For instance, the strong pressure by principals sometimes pushed tribunes to ignore 
the veto of their colleagues. Strategies for dealing with this could vary. In 67, when L. 
Trebellius persisted in announcing his veto to the lex Gabinia, Gabinius introduced a vote 
in the comitia whether he should be expelled from the tribunate. Asconius directly refers 
to the similar move by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 133, which must have been an 
influence for Gabinius’s actions.384 Another strategy seems to have been initiated by C. 
Cornelius and copied – and taken further – by Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos. In 67, P. 
Servilius Globulus vetoed the clerk prompting the text of the bill and the herald 
speaking it out loud. Cornelius then read out the law himself, which caused much 
protest.385 In 62, then, M. Porcius Cato and Q. Minucius Thermus followed the same 
strategy to block the proposed law by Metellus Nepos. They went further, as they took 
away the law from Metellus, and when Metellus began to declaim it by heart, Minucius 
clasped his hands around Metellus’s mouth.386 The strategy by Metellus Nepos to ignore 
the veto therefore went somewhat further than the actions of Cornelius, but may have 
been based on them. 
Another example is calling for the occupation of public spaces to secure the passing 
of a tribunician law. In 62 and 58 there were occupations of the temple of Castor, where 
the last contio before vote would have taken place and where the pontes for the voting 
process would have been erected. Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos called for the occupation 
of this temple in 62 (together with the praetor Caesar), and P. Clodius Pulcher did the 
same for possibly an extended period in 58.387 Caesar did the same as consul in 59, 
perhaps through the help of Vatinius.388 This might not have been new, and these cases 
might just be the tip of the iceberg. In 57, then, T. Annius Milo succeeded in mobilising 
enough people to occupy the Campus Martius and the Comitium on several occasions.389 
P. Aquillius Gallus attempted to counter the occupation of the Forum by C. Trebonius 
and the supporters of his proposed lex Trebonia by sleeping in the Curia, but this proved 
counterproductive when he was shut inside.390 Again we do not know how often 
Trebonius’s strategy to occupy the entire Forum was followed, but it is very unlikely 
that he was the first to do so. Some cases which went even further concerned the law by 
P. Cornelius Dolabella on debt relief in 47, and the agrarian law by L. Antonius Pietas in 
 
                                                     
384 Ascon., 71-72C. Also Dio, 36.30.1-2. David, ‘Conformisme et transgression’, p. 221-222. 
385 Ascon., 58C. Ibid., p. 221-222; Griffin, ‘The Tribune C. Cornelius’. 
386 Dio, 37.43.2; Plut., Cat. Min. 28.1. 
387 Cic., Sest., 34, 62; Plut., Cat. Min., 27.4; Schol. Bob., 134 Stangl. 
388 Dio, 38.6.2. 
389 Cic., Att., 4.3.4. 
390 Dio, 39.35.3-5; Plut., Cat. Min., 43.4. 
 208 
44, as at these moments the entrances to the Forum was even barricaded.391 The 
occupation of public spaces requires solid mobilisation. The increasing scale which can 
be seen here possibly was the consequence of the increasing population of Rome, and 
perhaps of an increased dedication of non-elite groups to certain political programmes. 
There are many other examples to be found. In 103 L. Appuleius Saturninus smashed 
the sella curulis of the praetor Glaucia because he was distracting from the contio of the 
tribune by his activities.392 M’. Acilius Glabrio copied this action in 78, breaking the chair 
of the praetor Lucullus, because the praetor had not risen when Glabrio had passed 
by.393 On 31 December 63, the tribunes Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos and L. Calpurnius 
Bestia both prevented the consul Cicero from giving his final speech in office.394 P. 
Clodius Pulcher copied this strategy when he vetoed the speech of Bibulus on 31 
December 59.395 Another action by Clodius in 58, his shutting of the tabernae to mobilise 
large numbers among the plebs urbana, was copied by T. Munatius Plancus Byrsa in 52 
during the trial against Milo for the murder of Clodius.396 Russell has argued that, while 
unusual, this strategy was perhaps no so new as was depicted by Cicero, as it was 
perhaps already carried out by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus.397 
An interesting case for role-making is Vatinius. This is not because he was especially 
resourceful in innovations, but because Cicero specifically attacks him on this point in 
the ‘in Vatinium’.398 Cicero criticises the tribune for setting a precedent in allowing 
legates to be appointed without a resolution of the senate, which was followed (in 
Cicero’s opinion with disastrous results) by Clodius the next year. Another ‘innovation’ 
which is pointed to is that Vatinius ignored the auxilium extended by his colleagues to 
Bibulus, by leading him to carcer over a bridge made out of benches by the crowd in the 
Forum. Cicero asks Vatinius if anyone before him had done so, “ut sciamus utrum veterum 
facinorum sis imitator an inventor novorum”.399 Another attack by Cicero was against 
Vatinius dragging Bibulus from his home to carcer, which the orator again depicts as 
unprecedented. 
Tribunes were not always free to adopt certain strategies. Amy Russell has 
convincingly argued that in the case of Sex. Titius, there was a conflict over the framing 
of his actions: an elite political group opposed to his agrarian law attempted to frame 
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his behaviour as copying that of Saturninus the year before, while Titius tried to frame 
himself as a reformer but not like Saturninus.400 Certain actions, methods, programmes, 
and even styles could have a variety of meanings for principals. In the case of Titius, his 
agrarian proposal caused suspicion with many people, mainly elites. When a statue of 
Saturninus was found in his house, everyone turned against him and he was convicted. 
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4.4 Principals, tribunate, and tribuens: conclusion 
This chapter has analysed several aspects of the tribunate of the plebs, from the starting 
point that a variety of societal and political groups had different expectations of how 
tribunes should behave (in the broad sense of the word). These ‘principals’ engaged in 
contention with the tribunes in order to have them meet these expectations. In the first 
chapter, a number of cases have been presented which substantiate this claim, that the 
tribunate as an institution can be described an agent in a simple principal-agent 
relation. In the second section this has been expanded to include competition between 
the various principals about the behaviour of the tribunes. The tribunes were pulled 
between the expectations of these societal and political groups. This more complex case 
of a principal-agent relation, with multiple principals and one agent (the tribunate), has 
been presented under the metaphor of a complex web of strings with the tribunate at its 
centre. To further complicate the metaphor, the principals pulling the string did so with 
a varying amount of force, some strings were more easy to pull, and the principals could 
‘move around’ to align themselves differently over time. The third section further 
expanded this, with a principal-agent relation including not one but several agents, ten 
tribuni plebis, who nevertheless did all occuply the same position within one 
governmental institution, the tribunate. To follow through on the metaphor, the 
tribunes as persons could have some influence by either resisting the pull in certain 
directions or embracing the force exerted by certain principals. When enough power 
was exerted, however, individual dispositions did not matter as much. Furthermore, the 
tribunes during their year in office were strongly influenced by the institutional habits 
of the tribunate. 
Contention, as it has been defined in the theoretical framework, are demands about the 
behaviour of another person in interaction, enabled by the exertion of power. Various 
persons and groups in the late Republic engaged in contention with the tribunes. This 
could both actively and reactively influence the programmes, decisions, and general 
behaviour of the tribunes. In other words, a person in the capacity of tribune had limits 
to his behaviour, which could however shift. 
In what has been defined in the theoretical framework as the public transcript (more 
or less official public discourse), tribunes were expected to be especially attentive to the 
demands of non-elites. This was reflected in some attributes of the tribunes, such as 
their formal powers, how they were dressed, their types of seats, when they could be 
approached (always, even in their homes), and in the Forum Romanum as the 
recognisable main centre of their activities. Tribunes were expected to be very open to 
face-to-face non-hierarchical interactions with any individual. This does not mean that 
everyone had equal access in practice, however. 
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The tribunate was involved in a wide variety of subjects. Some of these became 
closely associated with the tribunes, such as grain laws, but none were their sole area of 
authority. The subjects with which the tribunate became involved were mainly 
provided by the principals themselves. The range was very broad because a wide variety 
of individuals and groups engaged in contention with the tribunes. 
When these various principals are taken into account, the situation becomes much more 
complex, but also can better explain the behaviour of the tribunes. All of these 
principals could engage in contention, and thereby demand conflicting behaviour of the 
tribunes. If a tribune made concessions to one of them, he could transgress a line with 
another. Not only were principals in competition with one another, sometimes they 
could cooperate, or change their position on certain issues. A tribune had to be skilled in 
maneuvring this minefield of expectations, because the personal consequences could be 
disastrous. While a tribune theoretically had extensive authority, these various 
principals severely limited their possibilities to act. 
Which way a tribune would sway his behaviour, and especially the result of a struggle 
over a certain issue, depended in large part on the relative exertion of power by the 
different principals which were involved. We have seen that tribunes should be 
attentive to the claims by non-elites, but elite groups in general had an advantage in 
exerting power. These two factors may have partly cancelled each other out. A concrete 
consequence of this was, however, that for non-elites the tribunate was the most easily 
accessible governmental institution. In this sense the tribunate indeed was, in a very 
limited capacity, a ‘beachhead of resistance’ for the non-elites within the Roman 
governmental institutions. 
There were several important factors which were important in how principals could 
exert power on the tribunes. The first is access to information, which was distributed 
among principals in a complex way, with factors of wealth and time-distance mainly 
differentiating groups. The methods an individual or group employed mattered as well. 
Tribunes were elite individuals, and their structural complexes (dispositions) were 
important in contention. Physical violence against a magistrate, for instance, was not 
considered to be legitimate, and could take away the moral cover of the principal. The 
most legitimate methods in the public transcript were those through formal 
institutions, such as votes in the comitia. Context was important as well, such as factors 
of time, location, and the scale of the interaction. Momentum was important in the 
organisation of a group, including the commitment of its members to a programme. 
Mobilisation was a very important factor. It was costly, however, and could easily fail. 
Leadership was important in mobilisation. Both elite as non-elite leaders were active in 
mobilising societal and political groups, and groups were not necessarily hierarchical. 
Despite the importance of leadership, groups often remained largely independent from 
the leader. Group legitimacy in the public transcript (which can be described as 
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symbolic capital) was important as well. This was in part produced by WUNC-displays, 
and again the elites were in an advantaged position as their legitimacy was already part 
of the public transcript. 
Another element of the behaviour of a tribune was, of course, the individual 
characteristics of the tribune himself. While all ten tribunes could experience the same 
pressure by varying principals, their limited discretionary freedom could cause them to 
align differently. This could happend consciously or unconsciously, because of self-
interest or for emotional reasons. Tribunes generally had more information than their 
principals, which gave them a slight advantage in their behaviour. These ‘splits’ within 
the tribunate in turn could lead to one of the many examples we have in the late 
Republic of conflict between tribunes. These conflicts could acquire a logic of their own, 
as there was a certain level of path dependency. Through this, individual tribunes could 
make some difference in the outcomes of a struggle, but generally they were very much 
limited by the power exerted by the principals. The more powerful the contention of 
principals, the smaller the impact of an individual tribune on the outcome. 
The concrete individual factors which influenced the alignment of individual 
tribunes are very difficult to confidently reconstruct. It has been argued that these 
factors were complex, however, and not limited to self-interest and ambition. Ideology, 
the availability of resources to a tribune, his desires, his relation to others (enmity or 
loyalty) all could play an important part. 
Individual tribunes also could play a part in the reproduction of the tribunate. 
Institutional habits were constantly reproduced, but this also implies the possibility for 
changes. Tribunes could create new precedents or copy one of their colleagues or 
predecessors. Institutional habits were ‘learned’ by prospective tribunes even before 
they entered the office, and could carry this with them after their term had expired. 
These habits also had specific subsets of repertoires, such as the trope of the ‘radical 
tribune’ which could be mirrored. 
All of these factors have important consequences for our interpretation of the tribunate, 
and even for our interpretation of Roman politics in general. The more ‘strings’ there 
were, that is, the more different principals with differing expectations, and the more 
force each principal could exert, the more the tribunate became an institution caught in 
conflict and chaos. In the last chapter, it will be argued that this was largely what 
happened in the late Republic. 
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Chapter 5 The end of the Republic 
Why did the Roman Republic fall? Behind this simple question of course lurks a complex 
of interrelated problems.1 One is when the fall would have happened: was Augustus the 
perpetrator, or was it the triumvirate that done the deed? Had the Republic died when 
Caesar was dictator, or had Pompey or even Sulla already ushered in ‘a new age’? There 
is no definitive symbolic event which is accepted among ancients and moderns as the 
breaking point, and it is quite clear that the evolution to the Principate was a lengthy 
process, but at the same time sometimes very sudden and quick, and very uneven. Many 
different societal changes in the late Republic contributed to the instability of the 
regime, but all had varying temporal dimensions of their own. Changes had begun 
before 112, and they continued after 23. 
A second problem is what is meant by ‘falling’. In other words, did the changes unfold 
automatically, were they already set in stone, or was it the consequence of schemes by 
devious or visionary individuals? Or did perhaps certain groups push for changes? 
Throughout this thesis, a method has been employed which implies that it was all of 
these, in varying degrees. There were broad factors which effected change, such as 
demography and economy, while individual but especially group agency could greatly 
influence the concrete outcome, especially at certain points in time. In a way, the 
Republic could not remain exactly as it had been in the second century BCE, but the 
outcome of the process of transformation might have been very different.  
Furthermore, what does it mean to say that ‘the Republic’ fell? It never had been a 
static system. Many Republican institutions survived the first century BCE, and the 
formal powers of the senate even expanded. If the Republic was an ‘ideal’, what was 
meant by it? Or should we see the violent struggles of the Republic as an intrinsic 
feature of the system, rather than as a sign of crisis? The question is made all the more 
difficult because Augustus of course maintained an ideology of the res publica restituta. 
However, as in the rest of this thesis, we shall focus mainly on the tribunate and on how 
 
                                                     
1 Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein, ‘The Transformation of the Republic’. 
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it was involved in whatever changes there were. Rather than look at all the Republican 
institutions, we have only to take account of the changes which occurred to one, albeit 
very important, magistracy. 
Theories about the end of the Republic, partly as a consequence of this complexity, have 
been many. The role of the tribunes in its demise is described in various ways as well. 
Some authors saw the tribuni plebis as violent agitators in the late Republic, destabilising 
the system and paving the way for the ‘Great Individuals’. Others depicted them as the 
very henchmen of these leaders. The magistracy has been described as particularly 
useful for corrupt, ambitious young men who wanted to overturn tried-and-true values 
and/or customs. The passing of the Republican institutions has even been portrayed as a 
consequence of the growing influence of the tribunes and the comitia tributa, as laws 
made the system too rigid to operate in the changeing society.2 
Many of these theories can be traced to narrative strands in the sources, which in 
general embrace moralistic explanations.3 The idea that the tribunes were to blame for 
the end of the Republic was proposed by, to take one example, Tacitus. The senatorial 
historian who wrote mainly at the start of the second century CE professed that these 
magistrates through promises and lies were more than any other responsible for 
disturbing the Republic. He constructed a narrative in which laws disturbed stability, as 
they were often self-contradictory or were misused for base means. 
For succeeding laws, though occasionally suggested by a crime and aimed at the 
criminal, were more often carried by brute force in consequence of class-
dissension – to open the way to an unconceded office, to banish a patriot, or to 
consummate some other perverted end. Hence our demagogues: our Gracchi and 
Saturnini, and on the other side a Drusus bidding as high in the senate's name; 
while the provincials were alternately bribed with hopes and cheated with 
tribunician vetoes. Not even the Italian war, soon replaced by the Civil war, could 
interrupt the flow of self-contradictory legislation; until Sulla, in his dictatorship, 
by abolishing or inverting the older statutes and adding more of his own, brought 
the process to a standstill. But not for long. The calm was immediately broken by 
the Rogations of Lepidus, and shortly afterwards the tribunes were repossessed of 
their licence to disturb the nation as they pleased. And now bills began to pass, 
 
                                                     
2 Hölkeskamp, Rekonstruktionen einer Republik. 
3 Levick, ‘Morals, Politics, and the Fall of the Roman Republic’; Lintott, ‘Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline’; 
Lintott, ‘The Crisis of the Republic: Sources and Source-Problems’, p. 6-10. 
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not only of national but of purely individual application, and when the state was 
most corrupt, laws were most abundant.4 
Another historian who advanced the same theory was Florus: His epitome of Livy’s work 
includes the following passage: 
The original cause of all the revolutions was the tribunicial power, which, under 
the pretence of protecting the common people, for whose aid it was originally 
established, but in reality aiming at dominion for itself, courted popular support 
and favour by legislation for the distribution of lands and corn and the disposal of 
judicial power.5 
As is the case with all theories about the final century of the Republic, however, a great 
difficulty for analysing the tribunate and its ‘role’ lies in the fact that the institution was 
constantly evolving, even if the changes were not linear or smooth. Furthermore, as we 
saw in previous chapters, the tribunate was involved in various struggles by various 
individuals and groups, which was a result of its very institutional features. 
In this chapter, we will look at various theories about the tribunes and the end of the 
Republic. It will be divided into three sections. The first section will specifically look at 
the idea that the tribunes were puppets of the ‘Great Individuals’ of the late Republic, 
and served them through granting privilegia. While powerful individuals could indeed be 
important principals for the tribunes, especially after the civil war between Caesar and 
Pompey, the tribunes should not be seen as loyal to them. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that other institutions, particularly the senate, were perhaps more involved in granting 
special rights to individuals. The second section will again consider if the tribuni plebis 
were either violent demagogues who caused more problems than any other magistrates, 
or were a systemic safety-valve which itself became disfunctional in the last century. It 
will be argued that the tribunes were not the cause of political conflicts, yet that they 
also cannot be described as a mechanism to release pent-up societal pressure. The final 
section concerns the concrete decline of the tribunate itself, the path to the Principate, 
 
                                                     
4 “nam secutae leges etsi aliquando in maleficos ex delicto, saepius tamen dissensione ordinum et apiscendi inlicitos 
honores aut pellendi claros viros aliaque ob prava per vim latae sunt. hinc Gracchi et Saturnini turbatores plebis nec minor 
largitor nomine senatus Drusus; corrupti spe aut inlusi per intercessionem socii. ac ne bello quidem Italico, mox civili 
omissum quin multa et diversa sciscerentur, donec L. Sulla dictator abolitis vel conversis prioribus, cum plura addidisset, 
otium eius rei haud in longum paravit, statim turbidis Lepidi rogationibus neque multo post tribunis reddita licentia 
quoquo vellent populum agitandi. iamque non modo in commune sed in singulos homines latae quaestiones, et 
corruptissima re publica plurimae leges.”, Tac., Ann., 3.27 (translated by Moore and Jackson). Hölkeskamp’s 
depiction of laws undermining the mos maiorum does not stray far from this narrative. 
5 “Seditionum omnium causas tribunicia potestas excitavit, quae specie quidem plebis tuendae, cuius in auxilium 
comparata est, re autem dominationem sibi adquirens, studium populi ac favorem agrariis, frumentariis, iudiciariis 
legibus aucupabatur.” Flor., 2.1.1 (translated by Forster). For a discussion of the passage and other similar 
sources, see Russell, ‘The Tribunate of the Plebs as a Magistracy of Crisis’, p. 128-129. 
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and the relevance the institution had under the new system of rule. In all these sections, 
the interpretation of the tribunate as it has been established throughout this thesis will 
be used in the hope of achieving a better understanding of this crucial period in Roman 
history. The cases remain very complex and deserve a lot of nuance, and it will become 
clear that gradual, linear, and clear-cut evolutions can nowhere be discerned.  
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5.1 The tribunes as puppets: privilegia 
First, let us look at the most important instances where tribunes played an important 
role in drawing up laws which provided benefits for specific individuals. The theory that 
the tribunes were particularly useful for the ‘Great Individuals’ has been around for a 
long time. Appian, for instance, proposed that the original spark leading to civil wars 
and consequently to the next stage in the fall of the Republic had been provided by the 
transfer of the command against Mithridates from Sulla to Marius by P. Sulpicius Rufus.6 
This type of narrative neatly fits into a model focussing on a few powerful individuals. 
Tribunician subservience to these individuals is often depicted as inexorably leading to 
the rise of the Principate.7 
The previous chapter has already argued that tribunes were never merely the 
‘manservants’ of any individual, no matter how much power such individuals could 
wield. In this section, we will again look at this relationship between tribunes and the 
‘Great Individuals’. More specifically, privilegia will be analysed, laws which concerned 
specific individuals. If it could in fact be demonstrated that the tribunes systematically 
allowed the interests of only a limited number of individuals to prevail over those of 
other principals, they could be depicted as directly responsible for the Principate. If this 
turns out not to be the case, such an assertion could be questioned. 
This section will be divided into four subsections. The first will look at extraordinary 
military provincial commands. These are sometimes identified as the innovation in the 
late Republic which more than anything else allowed for the centralisation of military 
power in the hands of a few individuals. The second subsection will discuss other special 
commands, not necessarily tied to a specific provincia with imperium and a military 
component. These could range from diplomatic missions to land commissions. Thirdly, 
we will look at personal prerogatives and honours, which elevated the dignitas of 
specific individuals above that of the other elites. The fourth and final subsection will be 
a short recapitulation. 
 
                                                     
6 App., BC, 1.55, 60. 
7 Syme, The Roman Revolution, p. 16; Tatum, ‘Roman Democracy?’, p. 227; Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, p. 17; 
Thommen, Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik, p.  41, 99-100, 140-147; Thommen, ‘Volkstribunat und 
Ephorat’, p. 27. Even, in some way, Millar: Millar, The Crowd in Rome, p. 12. 
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5.1.1 Extraordinary military commands 
In this first subsection, we will look at the case-studies of extraordinary military 
commands. These are sometimes depicted as important watersheds in the history the 
late Republic.8 A significant number of tribunes are known to have proposed such 
legislation: T. Manlius Mancinus (107), P. Sulpicius Rufus (88), unknown tribunes in 69 
and 68, A. Gabinius Capito (67), C. Manilius Crispus (66), Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos (62), 
P. Vatinius (59), P. Clodius Pulcher (58), C. Trebonius (55), C. Lucilius Hirrus (53), 
unknown tribunes (44), P. Titius (43), and again unknown tribunes in 37. This subsection 
will argue that despite these laws, the tribunate was as an institution not specifically 
advancing the dominant position of a single person. Some legislation introduced by 
tribunes broke up extensive provincial commands, and tribunes were often found on 
both sides of the discussion. Most importantly, however, it was the senate which 
introduced many innovations during the 70s, when the power of the tribunate had been 
constrained. Some of the tribunician measures in this subsection will be explored in 
depth, especially the tribunate of Sulpicius Rufus. Other laws will be taken together to 
provide more background, specifically the laws early in the 60s and in the first half of 
the 50s. 
First, an important law was proposed by T. Manlius Mancinus in 107, which would 
transfer the command of the war against Jugurtha from Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus 
to C. Marius, who had become consul for that year.9 According to Sallust, widespread 
dissatisfaction by all of Roman society except the nobilitas had caused Metellus to 
became highly unpopular. Equites sent letters to Rome to protest his actions. The non-
elites in Rome mobilised on a high level: 
At length the commons were so inflamed that all craftsmen and country folk, 
whose substance and credit depended upon the labor of their own hands, left their 
work and flocked to Marius, regarding their own necessities as less important 
than the success of his candidacy. 
[...] And afterward, when the tribune Titus Manlius Mancinus asked the people 
whom they wished to conduct the war with Jugurtha, a packed assembly chose 
Marius. To be sure, a little earlier the senate had voted Numidia to Metellus, but 
the decree was without effect.10 
 
                                                     
8 Hurlet, ‘Pouvoirs Extraordinaires et Tromperie’; Thommen, Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik, p. 
96-102. 
9 Gel., 7.11.2-3; Sall., Jug., 73.2-7, 84.1, 85.10. 
10 “Denique plebes sic accensa uti opifices agrestesque omnes, quorum res fidesque in manibus sitae erant, relictis operibus 
frequentarent Marium et sua necessaria post illius honorem ducerent. [...] Et postea populus a tribuno plebis T. Manlio 
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Normally a vicious struggle concerning this law could be expected, because a large part 
of the senatorial elites vehemently opposed it. The senate itself had already made a 
different decision. The evidence for dissensions is scanty, however. Sallust only attests 
the great power mobilised by the commons, who were demanding a change of the 
command. In this example, power was not centralised into the hands of one person. One 
person with a consular command was merely replaced by another. As we will see, 
precedents for the comitia switching around commands went back quite some time. 
However, this is the first known transferral by tribunes of a consular command after the 
important lex Sempronia de provincii consularibus. 
The provincial law by P. Sulpicius Rufus was similarly quite simple, but according to 
some sources directly triggered the first civil war. Therefore, the context will receive 
much more attention here. The plebiscite transferred the command of the war against 
Mithridates from the consul L. Cornelius Sulla to the elderly C. Marius, at the instigation 
of the latter. Seen in this light, it could be an excellent example of radical tribunes being 
stooges of the ‘Great Individuals’ in the late Republic. Upon closer inspection it becomes 
quite clear, however, that the situation was much more complex. The conflict during 
Sulpicius’s tribunate was the result of conflict between several political and societal 
groups. It was not only and perhaps not even primarily a conflict about the command 
against Mithridates: more important issues were the recall of the Varian exiles and the 
distribution of the sons of freedmen and the new citizens among all 35 ‘original’ tribes. 
More than who was sent to which war, the conflict at the political level concerned the 
legality of Sulpicius’s laws and frictions between the consular and tribunician authority. 
This also more clearly explains Sulla’s reaction concerning the tribunate, both when he 
returned to Rome as consul and later as dictator. 
There is not much which allows for a confident assessment of Sulpicius’s personality, 
even less than usual. Cicero admired his skill in oratory, which he described as 
intelligent and delivered with much concentration, even if it was slightly extensive and 
luxurious.11 According to Velleius, he was (or had been) wealthy, had influential friends, 
and was an able and energetic politician.12 One possible feature suggested by his actions 
is a lack of consistency. Sulpicius as tribune first opposed the recall of those banished 
under the lex Varia and later made a similar proposal of his own. He also vehemently 
opposed the consul Q. Pompeius Rufus, who according to Cicero had formerly been his 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Mancino rogatus quem vellet cum Iugurtha bellum gerere, frequens Marium iussit. ed paulo ante senatus Metello 
Numidiam decreverat; ea res frustra fuit.” Sall., Jug., 73.6-7 (translated by Rolfe and Ramsey). 
11 Cic. De Or., 2.89., 96-97, Brut., 203, Har. Resp., 41 . He did not like writing down his speeches: Cic., Brut., 205. 
12 Vell., 2.18.5 . Plutarch sketches a far less positive picture, because his main character is Sulla. In the 
biography of Marius he is slightly less critical: Plut., Mar., 35.1, Sull., 8.1. 
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very close friend.13 Furthermore, he seems to have changed his position from 
vehemently attacking popular politics, as a younger man in a court case, to being very 
open to entreaties by non-elites during his tribunate.14 This could have been the 
consequence of socialisation as tribune of the plebs. As has been established, these 
elements of what others thought about Sulpicius’s personality can only be used as 
indicators, not as hard evidence. 
As has been established in the previous chapter, Sulpicius was part of a political 
group including M. Livius Drusus, L. Licinius Crassus, who both had died two years 
before, L. Aurelius Cotta, who had been banished under the lex Varia, and Marcus 
Antonius Orator, who been prosecuted under the same law but acquitted.15 The Social 
War and the lex Varia had left this group shattered. Sulpicius had other friends and 
supporters, however, such as an entourage of young equites which he called his ‘anti-
senate’. This group included the young T. Pomponius Atticus.16 This once again attests to 
the complexity of societal groups in Rome: other equites had fiercely defended the lex 
Varia, while Sulpicius had a large group of equestrian friends and nevertheless passed a 
law to recall the Varian exiles. He also kept an escort about his person consisting of 
three thousand ‘swordsmen’, according to Plutarch. A rival political group seems to 
have attempted to become a dominant force in Roman politics after the group around 
Crassus and Antonius had declined in importance. It consisted mainly of Sulla, Q. 
Pompeius Rufus and his son, and L. Iulius Caesar and his brother C. Iulius Caesar Strabo 
Vopiscus. C. Caesar attempted to become candidate for the consulship even if he had not 
been praetor yet, which Sulpicius opposed together with another tribune, P. Antistius.17 
Sulla and Pompeius, who were consuls in 88, opposed both tribunes. Violence soon 
started to be used in the dissension. 
Sulpicius had a very ambitious legislative programme, spanning several subjects. To 
quote Velleius, it were “aliasque leges perniciosas et exitiabiles neque tolerandas liberae 
civitati”.18 It has already been mentioned that Sulpicius formulated a rogatio on the recall 
of the Varian exiles, although at first he had opposed a similar proposal.19 According to 
 
                                                     
13 Cic., Am., 2, de Or., 3.11. Powell convincingly argues that this was not a volte-face, but his argument that 
Sulpicius had always been the puppet of Marius is less convincing. Powell, ‘The Tribune Sulpicius’. Against 
Mitchell, ‘The Volte-Face of P. Sulpicius Rufus in 88 B.C.’. 
14 Cic., de Or., 2.124, Har. Resp., 43; Vell., 2.18.5-6. 
15 Cic., de Or., 1.25-26, 88-89. Mitchell, ‘The Volte-Face of P. Sulpicius Rufus in 88 B.C.’, p. 197-198; Powell, ‘The 
Tribune Sulpicius’, p. 449. 
16 Cic., Am., 2; Nepos, Att., 2.1-2; Plut., Mar., 35.2, Sull., 8.2. Powell, ‘The Tribune Sulpicius’, p. 447-448. 
17 Ascon., 25C; Cic., Brut., 226-227, Har. Resp., 43; Quintil., Inst. Or., 6.3.75. Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican, p. 
45-46; Lintott, ‘The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus’, p. 446-449; Mitchell, ‘The Volte-Face of P. Sulpicius Rufus 
in 88 B.C.’, p. 198-203; Powell, ‘The Tribune Sulpicius’, p. 452-453, 457-458. 
18 Vell., 2.18.6. Also see Plut., Sull., 8.2. 
19 App., BC, 1.37; Auct., ad Her., 2.45; Cic., Brut., 205; Liv. Per., 77. 
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the sources his reasoning had been the formulation of the measure, but another distinct 
possibility is that pressure by societal or political groups had swayed his behaviour. 
Sulpicius also proposed a law that senators could not have more than 2000 denarii in 
debt.20 The tribune’s proposal to abrogate the imperium of Sulla and giving Marius the 
command against Mithridates is the focus of most sources. According to Plutarch, this 
support of Sulpicius for Marius was contrary to expectations, and the δῆμος was divided 
on the issue.21 It is quite clear, however, that Marius himself had been a principal on this 
issue.22 While Marius gave advice, this does not mean that Sulpicius was ordered by him 
to propose to transfer the command, or that Marius’s request was the prevailing factor. 
There were other factors in play, such as Sulla’s support for C. Caesar’s candidacy, or his 
opposition to redistributing freedmen and new citizens among the 35 tribes. As can be 
attested by examples from later years (e.g. in the case of L. Flavius in 60), taking away 
the command of a consul or threatening to do so could be a form of pressure exerted by 
a tribune. 
The chronology of 88 is not certain, but most likely Sulpicius had already proposed to 
distribute the new citizens from the Social War and the sons of freedmen among all the 
previously existing tribes before introducing the law on the Mithridatic command. 
According to Asconius, this too had been an important prelude to the civil war.23 It is 
quite likely, in fact, that the proposal to distribute the new citizens had been a more 
important cause of conflict than the proposal concerning the eastern provincia. The next 
year, a similar law about redistributing these groups among the tribes would cause the 
hostilities to resume between Cinna and Octavius.  
Sulpicius’s reasons for introducing this law are uncertain. Plutarch claims that the 
tribune “sold the Roman citizenship to freedmen and aliens at public sale, and counted 
out the price on a money-table which stood in the forum.”24 A strictly monetary 
motivation should always be considered with caution. There were actually good reasons 
to advance these laws. Integrating the new citizens would have been important in 
preventing further dissatisfaction among the Italian communities. Not without reason, 
this issue and the the issue of the freedmen votes would return at different times 
throughout the late Republic. Sulpicius’s proposal on the freedmen could have been 
 
                                                     
20 Plut., Sull., 8.2. 
21 Plut., Mar., 34.1. 
22 Ampel., 40.1; App., BC, 1.55; Auct., Vir. Ill., 75.8; Diod., 37.29.2; Flor., 2.9.6; Iul. Exup., 18; Liv., Per., 77; Plut., Mar., 
35.1, Sull., 8.2; Val. Max., 9.7.romil1; Vell., 2.18.6. 
23 Ascon. 64C; also see App., BC, 1.55; Liv., Per., 77. Elster, ‘Die römischen leges de civitate von den Gracchen bis 
zu Sulla’, p. 205; Lintott, ‘The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus’. 
24 “Ῥωμαίων πολιτείαν ἐξελευθερικοῖς καὶ μετοίκοις πωλῶν ἀναφανδὸν ἠρίθμει τιμὴν διὰ τραπέζης ἐν ἀγορᾷ 
κειμένης,” Plut., Sull., 8.1 (translated by Perrin). 
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directly related to the Social War, in which (according to Macrobius) twelve cohorts of 
freedmen had fought valiantly.25  
These laws nevertheless split Roman society.26 Among the nobility, some must have 
held the traditional fear that Sulpicius would be able to do anything through the loyalty 
he bought by this great favour. The ‘old’ citizens would moreover have lost some of the 
power of their votes, at least if they were themselves inscribed in one of the 31 rural 
tribes. 
As a consequence of these disagreements, fights broke out in the comitia. The consuls, 
probably additionally motivated by a desire to get back at Sulpicius for his opposition to 
C. Caesar’s consulship, declared a public festival as the day of the voting approached.27 
This made any public business illegal, and was of course disagreeable to Sulpicius. The 
tribune then ordered the consuls to abrogate the holiday, as he considered it to be 
illegal. This possibly happened in front of a crowd, in a contio held at the rostra in front 
of the Temple of Castor and Pollux. The consuls refused.28 This provoked the crowd, 
mostly composed of persons who supported Sulpicius’s programme, to start a riot. They 
threatened to kill the consuls, with some even showing that they carried daggers. The 
son of the consul Q. Pompeius Rufus, who was also married to Sulla’s daughter, was 
actually killed in the violent struggles which ensued, according to Appian because he 
spoke his mind too openly.29 He might have insulted freedmen or new citizens. The 
consul Q. Pompeius fled, and afterwards remained inactive while he mourned his son. 
Sulla first fled to the house of Marius and hid there, or, according to his own memoirs, 
went there to consult with Marius. He was later forced to rescind the edict which 
declared the public festival.30 He then immediately left Rome and went to Nola, near 
Capua, where the armies designated for the eastern command were stationed. 
With this obstacle apparently removed, Sulpicius started to put his laws up for vote. 
He passed all his proposals, possibly through the use of force by those who approved of 
his programmes. He also deposed Q. Pompeius from the consulship, as he had refused to 
back down.31 As Marius had now been endowed with the command over the army at 
Nola, the tribunus militum Gratidius (and perhaps another one of his colleagues) was sent 
to the camp to assume control.32 Sulla had already given his version of events to the 
 
                                                     
25 Macrob., Sat., 1.11.32. 
26 Katz, ‘Studies on the Period of Cinna and Sulla’, p. 497-498. 
27 Plut., Sull., 8.3. 
28 App., BC, 1.56; Plut., Sull., 35.2. 
29 App., BC, 1.56; Liv., Per., 77; Plut., Mar., 35.2, Sull., 8.3; Vell., 2.18.6. 
30 App., BC, 1.56; Plut., Mar., 35.2-3, Sull., 8.3, 10.2. 
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soldiers, however, and the troops stoned the military tribunes to death.33 The possible 
reasons for their actions can be quite interesting. While Valerius Maximus suggests that 
they opposed Marius because he was a privatus while Sulla was a consul, Appian argues 
that they were afraid that Marius would conscript other soldiers for his campaign, and 
they desired the spoils.34 Both accounts are very dubious, as Marius was the most 
famous general of his day and raising another army was not an easy feat, nor even 
allowed in many circumstances. I think it to be more likely that they detested the real 
reason for Sulla’s flight: Sulpicius’s laws, and specifically the one about the new citizens. 
These soldiers had fought in the Social War, and many of them might have held grudges 
against their one time opponents. It is quite likely that Sulla spun the tale to depict 
Sulpicius as the leader of a coup of the former Italian allies. The law recalling the Varian 
exiles could also have contributed to this story. Unlike the soldiers, who seem to have 
actively pushed Sulla to march on the Urbs, all but one of his senior officers were less 
convinced, and fled the camp.35 
When the news of this mutiny reached Rome, the reaction was not forgiving. The 
political group of Sulla was relentlessly attacked. Both L. and C. Caesar were murdered 
“a satellitibus Mari”36, Q. Pompeius fled Rome and went to Sulla, and the homes of several 
others were plundered.37 The senate attempted to negotiate with Sulla on several 
occasions. The praetors Brutus and Servilius were sent, but their fasces were broken by 
Sulla’s soldiers, they were stripped of their senatorial togas, insulted, and threatened 
with death.38 Nevertheless, as the city was defenceless, new delegations attempted to 
come to an agreement with the consuls. Sulla tricked them, however, besieged the city, 
and captured the most important gates.39 When he entered Rome, his forces were 
attacked by the city populace, who were throwing stones and tiles from the rooftops. He 
then started to burn the houses and shoot people from the roofs, and they desisted. A 
short battle followed. Marius unsuccesfully attempted to rally the slaves to fight for 
him, was quickly defeated, and driven from the city.40 
What followed is quite important to understand the context of the first civil war. 
Sulla and Pompeius convened the people and, interestingly, in a speech legitimated 
their own actions by claiming that the Republic had been taken over by tribunes.41 They 
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rescinded all the laws made by Sulpicius with the argument that the voting had been 
illegal. To quote Cicero: “Sulla cum Sulpicio de iure legum quas per vim Sulla latas esse 
dicebat”.42 The consuls also instituted rules which determined that legislation by any 
magistrate should first be accepted by a senatus consultum, and that it then had to be 
passed in the comitia centuriata rather than in the comitia tributa. This too were measures 
aimed against the tribunician power. Sulla and Pompeius then convened the senate, 
which decreed that twelve people were made enemies of the Republic, including Marius, 
his son, and Sulpicius. Sulpicius was betrayed by a slave and killed, and his head was 
displayed on the rostra.43 
Our most reliable sources, such as Asconius and Cicero, describe these events as a 
conflict between Sulpicius and the two consuls (or specifically Sulla), not as a defeat of 
Marius.44 Valerius Maximus also attests that Sulla’s main goal was to destroy his 
tribunician adversary, even more than defending his own interests. Sulla had primarily 
been harassed by the “tribunicio furore” of Sulpicius.45  
The conflict between the consuls and the tribune was the main theme of the first act 
of the first Roman civil war. While it could be used in an argument that the tribunate 
caused major conflicts (which will be considered in the next section), it does not agree 
with narratives portraying them as servants. Despite the conflict clearly getting out of 
hand, something which was possible due to the grudges left by the Social War, it had 
started off as a typical Republican quarrel between various societal and political groups. 
It involved important interests regarding political access by disenfranchised groups, 
desires expressed by entire strata of Roman society which were caused by fresh and 
deep rifts, and the influence and the very lives of some of the senatorial elites. Sulpicius 
as a tribune suddenly became very receptive to demands by non-elites, and allowed 
violence on a large scale. At the time, the struggle was masquerading as dissension 
about formal legislative rights. It was not primarily a conflict about the personal 
interests of the ‘Great Individuals’ of the time, Sulla and Marius. 
In the 70s, the temporary diminishing of the tribunician powers for a while put a stop to 
tribunician laws granting extraordinary commands. In the first half of the 60s, however, 
several tribunician laws were again introduced on this subject. Two are quite famous as 
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they attracted much criticism: the lex Gabinia in 67 and the lex Manilia in 66.46 Gabinius 
actually proposed two provincial laws during his tribuneship. The second one 
(chronologically), the main subject of analysis, gave Pompey the sole leadership against 
the pirates over the Mediterranean, and included extensive powers. The first law took 
away the command over Bithynia et Pontus from Lucullus and gave it to the consul M’. 
Acilius Glabrio. This law figured in a long line of similar plebiscites, to which the lex 
Manilia of 66 was the conclusion. Discussing all of these laws together can provide 
important insights, especially in the case of Gabinius. If we would consider the pirate 
law as an innovation towards centralising power in the hands of an individual, the other 
provincial law by Gabinius was a step in the opposite direction. 
First, let us sketch the context of Gabinius’s law on Bitynia et Pontus and the lex 
Manilia. In 74, when L. Licinius Lucullus and M. Aurelius Cotta were consuls, Mithridates 
VI of Pontus invaded Bithynia, which started the third war between him and the 
Romans. Bithynia had just been bequeathed to the Roman people by Nicomedes IV, a 
move which Mithridates would not allow. At the time, Lucullus had been selected to 
become proconsul of Gallia Cisalpina. With the outbreak of the war, the consul 
succeeded in convincing the senate to transfer to him the command against Mithridates 
with the territories of Asia as his provincia.47 Not much later L. Octavius, the proconsul of 
Cilicia, died in his province. Lucullus’s provincia was expanded to include these 
territories and the armies attached to them. We do not know what command had 
initially fallen to Cotta: the lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus determined that this 
had to be arranged before the consuls were elected.48 His duty to reorganise Bithynia as 
a province and defend it from incursions could therefore not have fallen to him under 
this law, as the testament (and the death) of Nicomedes had become known to the 
senate only later. As a commander in the Mithridatic war, Cotta seems to have been 
subservient to Lucullus. In 70, he returned to Rome, which confirmed the de facto 
situation of Lucullus being responsible for Bithynia et Pontus as well.49 Given this 
situation, the commands of both consuls were extraordinary. They had been instated as 
specific measures for specific individuals, and directly went against the lex Sempronia. 
From 69 onwards, with the power to initiate legislation restored to the tribunate, 
various persons in the office started to break up Lucullus’s command. In 69, unknown 
tribunes gave the province of Asia to the praetor P. Cornelius Dolabella.50 In 68, the 
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consul Q. Marcius Rex was assigned the province of Cilicia, again through a plebiscite, 
and a part of Lucullus’s army was disbanded.51 Then, in 67, Gabinius took away the 
province of Bithynia et Pontus and another part of the army, giving this to the consul 
M’. Acilius Glabrio.52 Lucullus officially did not have jurisdiction over any Roman 
territory anymore, and his provincia only still included “the war against Mithridates” 
and a significantly diminished number of troops. This too was taken away from him, in 
66, and through the lex Manilia bestowed on Pompey.53 Pompey’s command was also 
expanded by again adding the provinces of Cilicia and Bithynia et Pontus. 
At the time of his replacement by Pompey, Lucullus had been in command of a large 
number of troops, with far-reaching powers, for around 8 years. According to Cicero, 
the main legal arguments which had been used to take apart Lucullus’s command had 
been that commands should first and foremost be limited in length.54 Furthermore, 
Plutarch attests that the praetor L. Quinctius (who had been tribune in 74) had argued 
that Lucullus should not have had an extraordinary command over vast territories 
including Cilicia, Asia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Pontus, and Armenia.55 Several 
other reasons are attested. One is, of course, that the publicani sought to avenge 
themselves on the proconsul because he had constrained usury in the Anatolian 
provinces, especially Asia.56 This powerful group influenced the tribunes and other 
magistrates to act on their behalf. Gabinius, who apparently had been heavily indebted, 
is a likely candidate for a tribune who adjusted his actions to fulfil their expectations. 
Another factor was that Lucullus’s soldiers were actively pushing for another 
commander, as they were unhappy from being forced to spend winters in the field.57 
According to Plutarch, who names Sallust as his source, they pressured the tribunes to 
act on their behalf as well. Another attested complaint is that Lucullus unnecessarily 
prolonged to war to make his victory seem greater and to gather more spoils for 
himself.58 Lucullus also well known for becoming fabulously wealthy from this war. 
Gabinius played on the dissatisfaction over this, and on at least one occasion in a contio 
displaying a picture of the proconsul’s luscious villa.59 So at least two of these factors are 
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known to have influenced Gabinius’s behaviour in taking away a part of Lucullus’s 
command. Some of the same elements may have influenced Manilius. 
There is little reliable information about the personality of Gabinius, all the more 
because the historical evidence is tainted by attacks on his consulship in 58. Cicero 
certainly changed his opinion quite radically. In 66 Gabinius was depicted as someone 
whose law restored dignity and safety to the Roman people.60 Ten years later, the orator 
portrayed him as a debauched anti-senatorial dandy who sold himself to the operae. 
These workers as a group then saved him from being prosecuted for his debts, by 
electing him to the tribunate.61 Cicero without any doubt was slandering the proconsul 
at the time, and provides a good case why descriptions of character are seldom useful. 
Still, there is likely some truth to what the sources say about Gabinius’ debts and his 
frosty attitude towards the senate as a political institution, as it is corroborated by his 
attested behaviour in 67. Other sources such as Dio portray Gabinius as being only 
motivated by a wish to satisfy Pompey, and that he did not care one iota for the 
‘common good’.62 It is doubtful that this typical depiction as a puppet of a ‘Great 
Individual’ would have corresponded to reality. One other interesting source is a speech 
by Gabinius in Dio’s discussion of the lex Gabinia.63 Of course, speeches in the works of 
Greek or Roman historians are rarely a trustworthy source concerning the opinions or 
personality of the individual who is supposed to have made the speech. The speech in 
Dio presents Gabinius’s reasons as respect for the character of Pompey and for his skill 
as a general. The focus is on the usefulness of Pompey to the people. The information 
that the sources provide with regard to the personal motives of Gabinius is not very 
useful. 
There definitely were many reasons why the war against the pirates would have been 
an important issue for a broad section of the Roman citizenry.64 For one, the raiding had 
caused large population displacements in the provinces, and allies of Rome had not been 
properly defended, which was a big blow to Roman pride. Shipping armies from 
Brundisium had become problematic. Embassies, Roman elite individuals, and even 
magistrates had been taken captive by the pirates (Caesar is a famous example). Trade 
and travel were severely affected. Italian harbours such as Caieta, Misenum, and even 
Ostia had been attacked and plundered, and Roman fleets had been destroyed. The taxes 
flowing to Rome were being stolen, and, perhaps most disconcerting for many, the food 
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supply of the Urbs had been disrupted. It is no coincidence that the first thing which 
Pompey did when the law had been instated was securing the grain supply from Sicily, 
Africa, and Sardinia.65 This clearly had been the main problem for the plebs urbana, and 
therefore had become a political issue for the elites. But other non-elites were directly 
affected as well. Not only wealthy traders, but the plebeians who were active as rowers 
were under a direct threat of capture or death. Day labourers, who probably flocked to 
Rome during the sailing season to work in the docks, will have been desperate for work. 
Craftsmen exporting their produce were in similar trouble. The vehemence with which 
Gabinius was defended by crowds and the fear of most tribunes to oppose his proposal is 
quite telling. Very strong pressure was exerted by various groups in favour of the law. 
This pressure had possibly even inspired Gabinius’s proposal. 
When Gabinius proposed his law, he was opposed by a part of the senate.66 It is highly 
unlikely that the entire senate opposed Gabinius67. The next year, Cicero names 
important consulars (P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus, C. Scribonius Curio, Cn. Cornelius 
Lentulus Clodianus, and C. Cassius Longinus Varus), who, besides himself, openly 
supported the lex Manilia.68 Servilius Vatia had in the past fought the pirates as well. 
There is no certainty, as the context had changed by then, but as the opposition to both 
laws remained the same, it is certainly possible that the same persons had supported the 
lex Gabinia as well. The influential group within the senate which fiercely attacked the 
law included the consul C. Cornelius Piso and the consulars Q. Lutatius Catulus and Q. 
Hortensius Hortalus. One senatorial session became so heated that Gabinius was nearly 
killed in the Curia. The ‘οἱ πολλοὶ’ which were gathered on the Forum raised a clamour 
and stormed the building in response. They would in turn have killed Piso, had Gabinius 
not intervened. The coalition around Piso then attempted to convince the 9 other 
tribunes to oppose Gabinius, but only succeeded in getting L. Trebellius and L. Roscius 
Otho to take action.69 The others were afraid to contradict the wishes of the πλῆθος. 
Trebellius had promised in the senate to die before he would allow the law to pass, and 
attempted to veto the rogatio. For this he was almost deposed as a tribune, however, and 
he gave up when 17 of the 35 tribes had already voted in favour of his dismissal. Roscius 
then tried to make his opinion clear through hand signals, that two commanders should 
be sent instead of one. The crowd in response shouted so loud that he discontinued his 
efforts as well. The law was clearly very high on the agenda of those present at these 
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contiones, and was eventually very enthousiastically passed in a very crowded Forum 
Romanum.70 Before that happened, however, Q. Lutatius Catulus also expressed his 
objections to it. It is in the objections made by Catulus, as it is reported by our sources, 
that we find the argument that the law would have meant a dangerous novelty to 
Roman customs. As will become clear, Catulus probably opposed it for very different 
reasons. 
Before addressing this, let us take a look at the content of this lex Gabinia de piratis 
persequendis.71 It gave Pompey a provincia for three years, with the goal of fighting the 
pirates which menaced the Romans and their allies. He would command the 
Mediterranean fleets, all Roman harbours, and his command included the coasts of the 
entire region for up to 50 miles (probably some 80km) inland. On top of this, he had the 
right to levy troops. He was given 36 million denarii and the freedom to collect money 
from the provinces. He had the same powers as the proconsuls in the region, had the 
right to negotiate with all other nations in the region. He could select either 15 or 25 
legates to help him in this task, although the senate does seem to have been involved in 
approving these legates. Pompey requested Gabinius to be one of his legates, but this 
was rejected by the senate.72 In 65, however, Gabinius would be effectively appointed as 
a legate under the lex Manilia. The command against the pirates was quite extensive, but 
there were limits. Importantly, given the attacks on Lucullus, Pompey’s command was 
limited in time to three years. The same was true for the lex Manilia, as is attested by 
Quintillian, even if we do not know the exact length of that command.73 Pompey does 
not seem to have needed three years, as he rapidly made progress in his war against the 
pirates.74 Personally he was mainly engaged in attacking the pirate strongholds in 
Cilicia. Controversially, his victory was in part secured through generosity towards the 
pirates, as those who surrendered were given land and were settled in cities.75 Pompey 
also directly came into conflict with another proconsul, Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus. 
This man had been fighting the Cretan pirates for two years, a war which had a much 
longer history, when some of the Cretans decided to surrender to Pompey.76 The two 
men argued quite vehemently, and this caused more questions concerning the nature of 
Pompey’s command. However, his command was clearly not superior to that of the 
other proconsuls, and fights between commanders are prominent throughout Roman 
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Republican history. One feature of the lex Gabinia was that it gave imperium to a privatus, 
which was quite unusual.77 
Given the contents of this law, let us take a step back to the criticisms by Catulus and 
Hortensius.78 Both men opposed the proposition that one man would have such an 
extensive command. The sources give some of their arguments. One was the possibility 
that Pompey would be killed, which would have endangered the war. The most 
important argument of course was that it instituted a novelty in the nature of military 
commands, and was detrimental to the republican institutions. According to Cicero, 
both men repeated the same criticism the next year, in debates concerning the lex 
Manilia.79 In discussing their opposition, Cicero takes an interesting turn in his speech, 
and begins to criticise their objections. At first he repeats their words: “at enim ne quid 
novi fiat contra exempla atque instituta maiorum.”80 Contradicting this, he claims that 
innovation in itself was a Roman tradition. Then Cicero again flips his argument, and 
says that the real innovators were not Gabinius or Manilius, but Catulus and the 
senate.81 As a supporter of Sulla, Pompey had been allowed to raise an army as a private 
individual, to command it, and to lead it to victory.82 While he was even too young to 
become quaestor, he was entrusted the command over Sicily and Africa, and celebrated 
a triumph while having no senatorial rank.83 Pompey had been granted another 
command pro praetore against Lepidus. When Lepidus had been defeated, Pompey 
refused the order by Catulus (then consul) to disband his army. The consularis and 
former supporter of Sulla L. Marcius Philippus then suggested that Pompey should be 
granted a proconsular command in the war against Sertorius, as there were no other 
candidates. Philippus even implied that he should become the sole commander there.84 
This was not adopted, but Pompey was sent to help Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius. To all 
these innovations and still more, Cicero says, Catulus had agreed. As a consul, Catulus 
had been responsible for allowing Pompey his command in Hispania. Some innovations 
had even been personally initiated by Catulus himself. This is mentioned in the 
following fragment concerning Pompey’s irregular candidacy for the consulship: 
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What so unparalleled as that he should be exempted from the laws by a decree of 
the Senate and be made a consul before he would have been entitled by the laws 
to hold any lower office? What so incredible as that a second triumph should be 
awarded by a decree of the senate to a Roman knight? All the departures from 
precedent which, since history began, have been made in individual cases, are less 
in number than these which our own eyes have seen in the case of this one 
individual. And all these important and striking innovations were brought about 
in favour of Pompeius on the initiative of Quintus Catulus and the other 
honourable men of the same rank.85 
Cicero quite clearly attacks the hypocrisy of the political group which is often called the 
pauci in our sources, but was reasonably large for a political group. This was a mostly 
pro-Sullan collection of influential senators and their allies. After the dictator’s death, 
especially in the 70s but well into the 60s, they had constantly fought to secure their 
position of dominance in Roman politics. Pompey was not the only former Sullan 
general on whom extraordinary commands had been bestowed, even if the combination 
of his extraordinary propraetorships in 83-79 and 77, his extraordinary proconsulship 
between 77 and 71, and the extraordinary allowance for him to stand for the consulship 
in 71 was indeed quite remarkable.86 Lucullus too had been allowed to stand for the 
praetorship before it was allowed by the law.87 Crassus had been given an extraordinary 
proconsular command against Spartacus.88 Perhaps the most far-reaching command had 
been the one bestowed on M. Antonius Creticus in 74, a command which was very 
similar to the one given to Pompey under the lex Gabinia.89 Cicero called it an “infinitum 
imperium”,90 and Velleius directly asserts, concerning the lex Gabinia: “sed tamen idem hoc 
ante septennium in M. Antonii praetura decretum erat.”91 These commands had been 
established by the senate. The command against the Cretan pirates was passed on, and 
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eventually came into the hands of the proconsul Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus, who still 
held it when Gabinius proposed his plebiscite.92  
If this command against the Cretan pirates had been so similar to that of Pompey, 
why did Catulus and Hortensius oppose Gabinius’s proposal? Velleius suggests that it 
was the personality of Pompey which caused the opposition.93 Throughout the 70s the 
pauci do seem to have become less eager to gratify Pompey, according to Hillman 
because of his growing popularity, but they never turned their backs on him.94 They still 
had allowed his second triumph and his candidacy for the consulship. The cumulation of 
different special commands and allowances to Pompey may very well have been an 
important reason for the growing objections of some senators. But as we have seen, 
Cicero suggests in his ‘pro lege Manilia’ that Catulus and Hortensius had never seriously 
opposed innovations, even to Pompey, as long as they themselves had controlled them 
through the senate. The two consulars only objected, Cicero argues, because the 
tribunes and the ‘populus Romanus’ had now regained the authority to do the same which 
they had done: 
Let them beware therefore lest it be unjust and unendurable that, as concerns the 
high deserts of Cnaeus Pompeius, their authoritative judgement has been 
approved by you, but that your judgement about the same man and the authority 
of the Roman People should be disapproved by them – and that, too, when now in 
the case of Pompeius the Roman People is able of its own right to defend its own 
authority against all those who disagree95 
From the moment the tribunician power had been restored by Pompey (and perhaps 
Crassus) in 70, the freedom of the pauci or other political groups to control provincial 
policy through the senate had been severely reduced.96 Attacks on the command of 
Lucullus started immediately. C. Cornelius in 67 introduced a law which prevented small 
groups from granting exemptions from the laws in the senate, but had originally 
intended to do away with this completely. As has been established, his original proposal 
was a return to ‘tradition’ rather than an innovation. Apart from Pompey’s command 
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against the pirates, the tribunician laws in the 60s only served to take away the 
command of Lucullus and bestow it (except the lex Manilia) on regular magistrates.  
Another attempt at expanding Pompey’s powers in the 60s should be mentioned: Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Nepos’s proposal in 62 to give him another extraordinary command, 
this time against the Catilinarian armies.97 It was fiercely attacked and defeated by other 
tribunes, specifically Q. Minicus Thermus and M. Porcius Cato. The case also shows that 
plebeian groups were far less united in favour than when the Gabinian and Manilian 
laws had been proposed. While Metellus Nepos certainly was supported by a large 
group, fights broke out. This had, to our knowledge, not happened in 67 or 66. 
Furthermore, he stood alone as a tribune. While he had cooperated with his colleague L. 
Calpurnius Bestia in attacking Cicero, he did not receive his help in this matter. 
It remains to be seen whether the tribunate in its essence lent itself to centralising 
power into the hands of one individual, as a consequence of the broad popularity of that 
individual. We see that the lex Gabinia gave Pompey a large (if not unprecedented) 
command, while with the lex Manilia the populus Romanus, the equites, and the Roman 
allies again pushed to replace Lucullus with Pompey specifically. Some parts of the 
nobilitas opposed both laws.98 According to Plutarch, they argued that these laws 
established a “τυραννίς” in Rome.99 Furthermore, some were dissatisfied that Lucullus 
had been slighted by the tribunes. Yet another complaint against the lex Manilia was that 
the proconsuls Q. Marcius Rex and M’. Acilius Glabrio were being replaced before the 
term of their command had expired. As has been mentioned, only Catulus and 
Hortensius dared to oppose it openly, and the law was overwhelmingly approved by the 
comitia tributa. At this time, a strong momentum had gathered against the nobilitas in 
general and the remnants of the pauci (which had all but split into several political 
groups by this time) in particular. By itself, the lex Manilia gave the same or even less 
power to Pompey as had been bestowed on Lucullus, but the combination with the lex 
Gabinia and the reliance of the Roman military success on one man was thought to be 
dangerous. In this instance, then, it could be argued that the tribunes were treading a 
dangerous path. If the lex Caecilia had been passed, and Pompey had been again called 
upon as the singly person able to deal with military threats, perhaps a threshold would 
already have been reached. But the lex Caecilia failed, in part because parts of the 
populace were turning against these honours for Pompey, in large part because of the 
tenacious opposition by some of the tribunes. 
 
                                                     
97 Cic., Att., 1.13.3, Fam., 5.2.8, Mur. 81, Sest., 62; Dio, 37.42.2-43.4; Gel., 18.7.7; Plut., Cic., 23.2-3, 26.7, Cat. Min., 
26.2-29.1; Quintil., Inst. Or., 9.3.50; Schol. Bob., 82, 134, Schol. Gron., 289 Stangl; Suet., Iul., 16.  
98 Cic., Man., 5, 13, 27, 67-69; Dio, 36.43; Liv., Per., 100; Plut., Luc., 35.7, Pomp., 30. 
99 Plut., Pomp., 30.3. 
 234 
So, in sum, both the command of Pompey against the pirates and the one against 
Mithridates were not extraordinary by themselves, as very similar powers had been 
granted in the 70s to other commanders. The opposition by parts of the senatorial elites, 
especially groups within the nobilitas, can be explained by their reduced say in the 
matter. During the 70s the so-called pauci had often dominated senatorial decisions, 
where they had approved many extraordinary measures through senatus consulta. In the 
60s, the restoration of the tribunate shifted political power, as this institution was less 
exclusively open to contention by the pauci as a political group. However, the career of 
Pompey by that time could very well be considered dangerous to the survival of the 
Republican institutions. Nevertheless, some safeguards were installed by limiting the 
duration of Pompey’s commands, a precaution which apparently was not regularly 
taken in other cases. Furthermore, as Hurlet has argued, not a single source suspects 
Pompey of aiming to use the extraordinary commands to overthrow the Republic.100 
After the passing of the lex Manilia new proposals for extraordinary commands for 
Pompey or for others were shot down by some of the tribunes. 
Moving to the 50s, Cicero seems to have become much more critical of tribunician 
provincial legislation. On several occasions he contested the very right of tribunes to 
transfer commands from one individual to another by means of legislation in the comitia 
tributa. This presents an opportunity to address this claim, that the tribunes would not 
have had this right, which had been mentioned by some of our sources when they 
talked about the laws of Sulpicius, Gabinius, and Manilius as well. To quote Cicero’s 
protests in an attack on Vatinius: 
You had deprived the Senate of the right of assigning provinces, of sanctioning 
the appointment of commanders, of administering the Treasury. These 
prerogatives the Roman people has never desired for itself, nor has it ever 
attempted to transfer to itself the control of high policy of state.101 
Suffice to say that Cicero is exaggerating somewhat here, and he does admit this not 
much later. Besides the examples which have already been presented in this subsection, 
Kondratieff notes 12 other laws passed in the comitia tributa which changed 
arrangements about the provincial commands, starting in 215.102 Although conferring 
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commands by plebiscite was not a novelty, the laws of these tribunes in the 50s did 
introduce new elements. 
For this decade, we will discuss the laws by P. Vatinius, P. Clodius Pulcher, and C. 
Trebonius, the only tribunes in the 50s who passed extraordinary provincial legislation. 
After Trebonius, only 3 more provincial plebiscites would be passed, all in 44.  
First, let us tackle the lex Vatinia.103 In 59 P. Vatinius was cooperating closely with the 
consul C. Iulius Caesar on his agrarian laws. Caesar and his colleague Bibulus (who was 
supported by a majority of the senate and the tribunes Q. Ancharius, Cn. Domitius 
Calvinus, and C. Fannius) had clashed over these laws from almost the very start of the 
year. The confrontation had started out as discussions in the senate and in contiones, but 
very soon Bibulus had been physically accosted by crowds in the Forum. After this, he 
and the three tribunes continuously used obnuntiatio in an attempt to block all public 
business throughout the year. Caesar chose to ignore this. Vatinius, who would 
otherwise have been prevented from doing anything during his tribunate, did the 
same.104 This meant that both men ignored the Aelian and Fufian laws. In a sense, 
Vatinius’s close cooperation with Caesar was a matter of protection. The popularity of 
Caesar’s agrarian laws would somewhat protect him from elite retribution the next 
year, and so long as Vatinius’s only actions involved these laws, the same popular zeal 
would somewhat shield him from prosecution. Without reducing the tribune’s 
sentiments to these elements, it is possible that he calculated that it would not prove to 
be enough. In the previous year, anticipating Caesar’s election, the senate had 
minimised the possible commands for the new consuls, according to Suetonius to the 
“silvae callesque”.105 Vatinius introduced a law to alter this, giving Caesar the provincia of 
Gallia Cisalpina et Illyricum with three legions for five years. It included a provision that 
the proconsul could assign his legates without any intervention by the senate. This 
clearly points to an agreement between Vatinius and Caesar in which the latter would 
appoint the former as one of his legates, offering increased protection to the tribune 
after his office would end. Vatinius actually became legate under his own law.106 This 
certainly was contrary to certain laws, which prevented persons or their family from 
benefitting from their own proposals. Not coincidentally it is especially this which 
Cicero presents as an intolerable innovation. Ironically, however, Cicero had made 
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exactly the opposite argument regarding Gabinius.107 But again, even if Vatinius was 
possibly seeking to profit himself from his legislation, the tribune was not the primary 
cause of Caesar’s extensive command. After the lex Vatinia had been approved, the 
senate altered its own arrangements of the previous year and added Gallia Transalpina 
and another legion to Caesar’s provincia. This is quite odd given the fierce opposition 
many had offered concerning the agrarian laws. But it was supported by influential 
persons who had allied themselves to Caesar in a new political group, including Pompey 
and Crassus. This senatorial command seems to have ensured a minimum span of time 
as well. From the ‘de Provinciis Consularibus’ it seems that the command of Gallia 
Transalpina could not be transferred to another commander before 1 March 55.108 By the 
time of this senatorial speech by Cicero, the lex Vatinia had come under attack as well, 
and as can be expected it was deemed by some to have been illegal, as it had ignored the 
auspices. Vatinius quite likely was not a mere puppet of Caesar, as it is attested that he 
demanded recompense for his services, either by favours such as appointing him as 
legate, or by purely monetary bribes.109 If his fear for prosecution was a factor, it did not 
prove to be imaginary. Vatinius was prosecuted under the praetor of the following year, 
possibly before he had been appointed as legate, and could only escape conviction 
through the help of Clodius. 
The next year, Clodius too altered the commands of the consuls L. Calpurnius Piso 
Caesoninus and A. Gabinius.110 According to the, given his own involvement, 
untrustworthy report of Cicero, these laws figured in an agreement concerning the 
banishment of Cicero and several other of Clodius’s laws. Gabinius and Piso would 
receive the provinces they preferred, which were at first respectively Cilicia and 
Macedonia. Later, Clodius would introduce another law changing Gabinius’s province 
yet again, this time to Syria. Both consuls would be given an army and large funds from 
the treasury, which apparently clashed with the needs of the lex Iulia agraria. They had 
the right to declare war, enlist more troops if they so preferred, and, as in the case of 
the lex Vatinia, select their own legates without referral to the senate. Piso also had 
jurisdiction of Achaia, Thessaly and Athens, even if Caesar in the previous year had 
made them free by law.111 Gabinius, on the other hand, was free to engage the 
Nabataeans in war, as according to Appian they had been harrassing Syria in the 
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previous years.112 Cicero called the power of both men an “imperium infinitum”, but again 
this could be propaganda, as he does appear to use the term variably.113 The orator 
makes a fuss about the fact that Clodius’s laws were privilegia, as the consuls were named 
for their respective provinces. The specific arguments are quite weak, however. Cicero 
argues that in the past provincial privilegia were justified because they had been 
bestowed on worthy individuals, while Gabinius and Piso certainly did not belong in this 
category. It is clear that his account, which was largely taken over by later sources, was 
far from disinterested. Therefore, there is little we can say about the actual extent of 
their commands. It is a certainty that Clodius was not a puppet of the two consuls, 
however. 
Trebonius in 55 proposed a law to switch the commands of Pompey and Crassus 
around.114 The former had first been given Syria, the latter Macedonia. Pompey had for 
some time made clear that he preferred Hispania. The lex Trebonia gave Pompey both 
Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior, and Crassus Syria. The commands were to last 
five years, and both men had the freedom to declare war, recruit more troops, and 
request the aid of allies. It is quite likely that they too had the right to freely appoint 
their legates, as those assigned to Pompey (L. Afranius and M. Petreius) were his friends 
and would execute his command in his stead, and Crassus appointed his son, although 
his relation to his other legates, Octavius and Vargunteius, is not known.115 It is quite 
likely that Pompey’s decision to rule Hispania from Rome, and not going to his province, 
was his own. This important innovation which would be copied by Augustus can 
therefore not be attributed to the tribunate.116 Another law by either Trebonius or 
Pompey and Crassus extended Caesar’s command by five years as well (Caesar names it 
the lex Pompei et Crassi).117 
Taken together, these cases do show some evolutions in tribunician laws on provincia 
in the late Republic. A specific factor, apparently started by the lex Vatinia, was the right 
of a proconsul to select legati according to his own wishes, ignoring the opinion of the 
senate. The use of military legati was a new phenomenon in the late Republic, and could 
prove valuable in provincia too extensive to be managed solely by the magistrate with 
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proconsular imperium. Cicero’s argument that assigning legates without the consent of 
the senate was contrary to tradition is therefore somewhat odd, as the phenomenon 
itself was an innovation. The precedents of the lex Vatinia and the leges Clodiae did 
contribute to the professionalisation and individualisation of Roman warfare. These 
were broad societal developments, and the involvement of the tribunes in the 
legislation concerning extraordinary commands may have been the consequence of 
these broader developments, rather than of their subservience to specific powerful 
individuals. In general, however, the main principals for the tribunes proposing these 
laws do seem to have been the consuls themselves. Unlike the extraordinary commands 
for Pompey in the first half of the 60s or the breaking up Lucullus’s provincia in the same 
period, no broad societal groups are attested to have been pushing for this type of 
legislation in the 50s. The lex Vatinia and the leges Clodiae were passed without much 
opposition by large groups, and opposing tribunes were quickly rendered powerless. It 
does seem that the societal groups supporting the measures were mainly sympathetic 
due to the laws being linked to very popular legislation (Caesar’s lex agraria, Clodius’s 
legislation). With the lex Trebonia, there was more opposition, if only after some time. 
When Crassus started to levy troops in Rome, opposition started to rise. While large 
groups of both elites and non-elites still supported provincial legislation by the 
tribunes, it is clear that their popularity declined, in part because the context differed 
significantly from the early 60s. After the lex Trebonia, it appears that the support for 
these laws had vanished. 
The principals in the 50s seem to have been mainly the persons who would profit 
from these commands. The reason for their success, even if many tribunician proposals 
did fail, seems to have been the influence of these individuals through powerful political 
alliances, but also self-interest of the tribunes (both Vatinius and Trebonius would 
become legates directly after their tribuneship), and the need to placate possible 
political opponents (which is the traditional narrative about the leges Clodiae). The 
increasing importance of political alliances centred around individuals does seem to 
have been influential for the behaviour of the tribunes. Nevertheless, the opposition 
increased as well. In 55 tribunes are attested to have been important in opposing the 
proposal of Trebonius, and they arguably were responsible for making this type of 
legislation very unpopular with large strata of the population. So the tribunate ‘in 
essence’ did not favour subservience to the ‘Great Individuals’ on these issues. As has 
been argued, the institutional ‘architecture’ made that very different positions were 
taken by different tribunes. The political context of large, powerful alliances did have an 
impact, but provoked a tribunician response as well. Furthermore, without the 
agreement of other, non-elite principals, the tribunes would not have been able to act in 
the way they did. Unfortunately, our sources are either very limited (as in the case of 
Trebonius) or hostile (for Vatinius and Clodius). 
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An important transitional phase can be discerned starting from 53. Already in the 
previous year, rumours were noted about a law making Pompey dictator.118 Already it 
was evident that the majority of the nobilitas outright disapproved of it. The reason was 
a deadlock concerning the elections, which could not be held, and consequently of 
politics in general. The deadlock was caused by the investigations into electoral bribery 
by the consular candidates, bad omens (such as a devastating flood), and general unrest 
in the city. As tribunus designatus C. Lucilius Hirrus was thought to be the one preparing 
the law to make Pompey dictator, and this proved to be true in 53.119 He was supported 
by M. Coelius Vinicianus. Another tribune, P. Licinius Crassus Iunianus Damasippus 
would have joined his colleagues in promoting the law, but was persuaded by Cicero 
that it was not a good idea. The orator also mentions in one of his letters that many 
tribunes were already in December of 54 declaring that they would veto any such 
motion, and that the populus did not really care one way or the other. Two years later, 
however, both Hirrus and Coelius were still widely resented by large groups and could 
not secure election to the aedileship. There may have been more to the proposal of 
these tribunes than a wish to satisfy Pompey. For one, all of our sources, including 
Cicero, repeat that Pompey and Pompey’s friends constantly professed that they did not 
want Pompey to be appointed dictator. He even intervened to allow the consuls to be 
elected. As most of the time Pompey’s friends are held accountable by our sources for 
any rash plans on Pompey’s part, it is quite likely that these tribunes were in fact not 
puppets of Pompey. Dio asserts that their proposals were attempts at further stalling 
the elections. The tribunes during 53 took care of the duties of many other magistrates, 
and some even suggested that consular tribunes should be appointed. Proposing 
Pompey as dictator may have been an attempt to radicalise politics. After the death of 
Clodius at the start of the next year, when elections had still not taken place, the 
proposal resurfaced. This time, parts of the plebs seem to have demanded the 
dictatorship of Pompey as well.120 At any rate, the only magistrates active for the most 
part of 53 were the tribuni plebis. As the proposal in favour of Pompey’s dictatorship was 
never passed, it can only have been the other tribunes who resisted these plans. 
Ultimately it was a senatorial measure which gave Pompey the sole consulship in 52, 
and a unilateral consular action which made Pompey the ‘defender’ of the Republic in 
50.121 At the former occasion, some of the tribunes do seem to have advanced the 
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interests of Caesar, while in 50 C. Scribonius Curio strongly protested the move by the 
consul. 
The later plebiscites on provincial matters were proposed in a political context which 
had significantly changed due to the civil war between Caesar and Pompey. In 48, Caesar 
was appointed dictator while Mark Antony received the office of magister equitum for a 
year. ‘Traditionally’ this was not possible, but it was legalised by a plebiscite following a 
senatus consultum.122 This is important, as the political initiative here clearly did not lie 
with the tribunes. The appointment of Antony was apparently opposed by the augurs, 
but it is clear that nobody really dared to contradict Caesar’s wishes at this point.  
In 44, Caesar was granted a command against the Parthians, possibly also through a 
plebiscite.123 Dio mentions that the granting of this command was in part motivated by a 
desire among the populus to avenge Crassus, and for some, wishing Caesar to be away 
from Rome might have been a factor as well. Caesar at this point was so powerful as a 
principal that his requests were very difficult to ignore. After his death, the command of 
Syria was switched over by tribunes from the praetor C. Cassius Longinus to the consul 
suffectus P. Cornelius Dolabella.124 This apparently had been part of an agreement with 
Antony, who eventually (or perhaps by the same law) received Gallia Cisalpina through 
a plebiscite.125 Antony had originally asked the senate for this command, but they had 
refused. These laws proposed by the tribunes ignored laws by Caesar establishing that 
proconsular commands could be granted for a maximum of two years. Antony and 
Dolabella received longer commands of five or six years.126 Some tribunes, such as 
Nonius Asprenas, interjected against these proposals for provincial commands by their 
colleagues. At this point, the presence of troops in the city rendered the objections 
futile, and the tribunician vetoes were now just ignored. The relations of power had by 
then severely shifted. 
In 43 P. Titius formalised the triumvirate, which certainly was an innovation. The lex 
Titia established IIIviri rei publicae constituendae for five years, and named M. Antonius, C. 
Iulius Caesar Octavianus, and M. Aemilius Lepidus as the beneficiaries of that new 
‘office’.127 P. Titius had been active as a tribune earlier in 43, and this gives some insight 
in which principals he preferred. He appears to have been very loyal to some members 
of the later triumvirate. Together with the consularis P. Servilius Isauricus he had 
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opposed senatorial motions in favour of L. Munatius Plancus.128 Titius and Servilius 
Isauricus were in this case defeated by Cicero, at least according to the orator himself. 
Furthermore, Titius had removed P. Servilius Casca Longus from the tribunate, as Casca 
had fled Rome right before Octavian had become consul suffectus.129 Then he proposed 
the lex Titia after the agreement between the new triumvirs, and later died in office. 
Each of the triumvirs had brought a legion to Rome, and the soldiers encircled the 
comitia as it immediately voted on the matter (without regard to the trinundinum or any 
kind of ‘proper’ procedure whatsoever).130 It is clear that the legalisation of the position 
of the triumviri was just constitutional window dressing. In 37, the triumvirate was 
extended for another five years, yet here it is less clear if this actually involved a 
tribunician law.131  
Summarising this long section, one can definitely detect changes in tribunician 
legislation concerning military commands. There is, however, very little evidence which 
supports claims that the tribunes were merely the pawns of ‘Great Individuals’ in 
proposing this type of legislation, at least until the civil war between Caesar and 
Pompey, or that the tribunate in essence lent itself or was instrumental to the 
concentration of military power in the hands of individuals. There were all kinds of 
innovations in commands during this era, which, however, were not always the 
responsability of the tribunes. 
The law by T. Manlius Mancinus was not very special, and does not seem to have 
invited much criticism either by contemporaries or by our sources. This was different 
for Sulpicius. His provincial law was not really a central issue, however, and can be seen 
as a political tool to put pressure on the consul Sulla. The criticism in our sources of 
Sulpicius’s provincial law can be explained by a desire of Roman authors to fit his 
legislation into a grand narrative. While Sulpicius would have been influenced by 
Marius, he certainly cannot be described as his servant. The 60s then saw a series of 
provincial laws, first to break up the command of Lucullus, then to quickly resolve the 
piracy problem, and then to put an end to the wars in the east. All of them had been 
established through pressure by a broad section of Roman society. Criticism by 
contemporaries, taken over by the sources, is probably best explained by infringements 
on the plans of erstwhile dominant senatorial elites. The tribunate had regained its 
powers, which it had then used to change military commands by  means of legislation in 
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the comitia tributa, rather than through senatus consulta. The proposal by Metellus Nepos 
encountered vigorous opposition by other tribunes, as the cumulation of different 
commissions and the reliance on one person was increasingly seen as dangerous by 
other groups beyond the elites as well. In the 50s, tribunician legislation was influenced 
by increasingly strong political groups. Criticism to the legislation in the sources is 
however somewhat distorted by the overbearing presence of Cicero, who held a 
personal grudge against both Vatinius and Clodius. Little is known about Trebonius 
aside from his provincial law, which faced heavy opposition by (among others) tribunes. 
This opposition to provincial laws had increased in the 50s. The fights which 
accompanied the lex Trebonia and later the protests against the levies show that Roman 
society was split more than ever about this type of legislation. The proposals to appoint 
Pompey as dictator are very curious and do not really concern the same type of 
legislation. They might very well have been part of political manoeuvres by the 
tribunes. Until 44 no more military commands would be granted through tribunician 
laws. In that year, the power of individuals, sustained by an army, already put them in a 
position to exert so much pressure on the tribunes that the latter could not effectively 
resist. By this time, tribunes who attempted to oppose provincial legislation by their 
colleagues were simply ignored. This was confirmed the next year, when Titius had little 
choice in advancing the programmes of the triumvirs established by his law. By 37, 
tribunician autonomy had finally become but a mirage. 
5.1.2 Other extraordinary commissions 
Military commands were not the only type of magistracies or commissions which could 
be granted through plebiscite. The tribunes could propose adjustments to the rules of 
commands or offices and even establish entirely new, temporary commissions. Some of 
these were not innovations at all, but were necessarily linked to the execution of certain 
laws. Agrarian laws, for instance, implied the assignment of a number of men “agris 
dandis adsignandis”. Judicial laws could imply new temporary duties, such as being the 
president of temporary jury courts. Normally, however, these were not laws which 
assigned particular people to these positions, privilegia. Here, some examples will be 
considered which do fall into this category. 
Our knowledge of tribunician proposals on such extraordinary commissions which 
named individuals begins in 65, although this does not imply that it was an 
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innovation.132 The sources simply do not permit us to make great claims about the 
novelty of this type of law. Many of the tribunician proposals listed here failed to 
become law. The limited number of attested cases can lead one to conclude that there 
were but few of these laws. Another possibility is that the sources simply were not very 
interested in this type of laws, because they did not concern military exploits and 
because they were generally less potentially threatening.  
What we know of the proposals in 65 is very limited. It concerned an extraordinary, 
presumably non-military provincia to annex Egypt. Attempts were made by various 
persons, including Caesar, to be named in the enabling law, so it would have been a 
privilegium. The proposals did not come to fruition, however, even if some tribunes 
supported some candidates.133 
Clodius in 58 did introduce a similar provincial law, although it concerned the 
annexation of the kingdom of another Ptolemaeus: Cyprus.134 The plebiscite specifically 
named M. Porcius Cato as the person on whom the duty would fall, with the power of a 
quaestor pro praetore. Apparently, like the command for the annexation of Egypt, many 
persons had been campaigning to be assigned this duty, although Cato probably had not 
been one of them. The law was quite irregular, far more so than the ones which Clodius 
passed with regard to the provincia of the consuls. This is because aside from annexing 
Cyprus, the law also ordered Cato to restore the exiles of Byzantium, who had been 
ejected after a stasis. Cicero argued that the law was contrary to the lex Caecilia Didia, as it 
contained two unrelated issues. The orator also attacked it as an extraordinary 
command without real purpose. However, this law seems to not have been debated as 
much as the provincia of Piso and Gabinius. The lack of sources does not allow us to 
establish if this was purely a matter of pragmatism or the consequence of some legal 
loophole. The sources indicate that the commission was not intended as a favour, but a 
trap which aimed at removing Cato from Rome. This apparently was admitted by 
Clodius himself. In a contio, he read a letter sent to him by Caesar, which congratulated 
him on that achievement. The commission would have been quite popular among 
several strata in society, as it would bring a lot of money to Rome and annex a new 
province without the need for war. 
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In the following year, 57, C. Messius introduced a law on the powers of Pompey for the 
cura annonae.135 It surpassed the consular proposal which was ultimately adapted. The lex 
Messia would have granted complete budgettary authority, and army and a fleet, and a 
command greater than that of the provincial governors (‘maius imperium’). This had 
been lobbied for by Pompey’s friends, not so much by Pompey himself. Quite likely, the 
radical proposal was the consequence of the dissatisfaction of the plebs urbana 
concerning the grain supply. It does indicate a very big step in tribunician proposals, 
even including the military commands. It was immediately shouted down, however. It is 
not even known if Messius formally promulgated it, but that is unlikely as Cicero only 
mentions ‘conscribere’. Messius quite likely discontinued his proposal immediately. If he 
would have persisted, it is quite likely that other tribunes would have been pushed to 
veto it. 
The next example started in the same year, but carried on to 56. As Ptolemaus XII 
Auletes had, according to the Egyptian population, not properly responded to Rome’s 
annexation of his brother’s kingdom of Cyprus, he had been driven out of Alexandria. 
He fled to Rome, and there lobbied for his restoration through Roman help. The debates 
probably began before December 57.136 First, Bibulus proposed to assign 3 legates who 
without an army would go to Egypt and restore the king. The next proposal was to 
assign the duty to the proconsul of Cilicia, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who similarly 
without an army would go to Egypt. The third proposal was to send Pompey, originally 
proposed by the consularis L. Volcatius Tullus, but also by the tribune P. Rutilius Lupus. 
The need to restore the king without an army was inspired by a reference in the 
Sibylline verses, but also be an unwillingness to allow Pompey an army if he would 
secure the legation. L. Caninius Gallus, probably as soon as he had entered his office as 
tribunus plebis in December 57, proposed a law to give Pompey the commission. The 
proposal seems to have been vetoed by some of the other tribunes, as Cicero remarks 
that he could only carry his law through violence. The debates became quite heated in 
January of 56.  
Caninius engaged in a furious debate in the senate with the consul Lentulus 
Marcellinus on the 13th of January, and most of the day was wasted in their discussion. 
Cicero’s group was securing a decree which stated that no proposal could be brought 
before the people, but Caninius and one of his colleagues, C. Porcius Cato, vetoed it. The 
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next day, however, they themselves promised not to bring a proposal to the people 
before the elections. The motives of both tribunes probably were not the same: Cato was 
one of the tribunes opposed to granting Pompey this new command. He therefore might 
have been one of the tribunes vetoing the proposal of Caninius. He was supported in his 
opposition by a political group including C. Scribonius Curio and M. Licinius Crassus. 
Crassus had still a different proposal to restore the king, by sending 3 legates, but unlike 
Bibulus’s proposal his would see them selected from those who already held imperium. 
Pompey was not formally excluded, but it is unlikely that he would have allowed that. 
The debate in the senate on the restoration of Ptolemaeus was postponed time and 
again. The campaign for sending Pompey was dropped by February. A resolution was 
passed that Ptolemaeus should not be restored at all. Ultimately, it was Gabinius who as 
governor of Syria restored the king. The case attests the complexity and opacity of the 
tribunician loyalties, and the many political groups which could be involved in such 
issues. While some tribunes favoured a certain programme, the tribunate as an 
institution did not particularly favour the increase of power of one individual. 
From there, it is not until 48 that there is another example. In that year, some very 
extraordinary rights were bestowed upon Caesar, quite likely through plebiscites.137 The 
dictator was given the right to decide on the fate of citizens which had chosen Pompey’s 
side in the war, he became arbiter of all wars by and between the Romans (he had the 
right to make war or peace with anyone) without even having to communicate this to 
the people or the senate. Furthermore, Caesar was granted the consulship for five 
consecutive years besides already being dictator for a year, he assumed some 
tribunician rights for life (such as sitting with them on their subsellia), he presided over 
all elections except for those of the plebeian aediles and tribunes (and the elections 
were postponed to allow this), he could freely distribute the provinces which had not 
fallen to a consul, and he was granted a triumph for the war against Juba, even if he had 
not even participated in it. Needless to say, this were very special commissions, possibly 
granted through tribunician agency. Of course, this took place in a very irregular 
poliltical situation, which makes it not very suited to judge the ‘inherent aspects’ of the 
tribunate. The senate voted many special honours to Caesar as well. For instance, he was 
made overseer of public morals, although he was not granted the title of censor.138 
The death of Caesar did not stop the granting of these privilegia through tribunician 
laws, even if blatant infringements against the Republican institutions did become less 
frequent. One special command was instituted for the consuls Antony and Dolabella, 
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who became IIviri actae Caesaris confirmandae.139 The death of Caesar had left a void, and 
annulling all his acts would have caused dissatisfaction with many different groups. The 
IIviri were meant to decide if his acts were legal after his death, and would have to 
resolve those issues which had not yet been brought to an end. The law which 
appointed this commission was passed on the second of June, and was based on a senatus 
consultum. Once more, the tribunes can therefore not be presented as the initiators for 
this commission. 
Concluding this subsection, not many extraordinary commissions as privilegia are 
known to us. Before the civil war between Pompey and Caesar, they do not seem to have 
benefitted the usual ‘Great Individuals’ in any meaningful way. At least, this is true for 
those that were passed as a result of tribunician proposals. Extraordinary commissions 
seem to have become more important in the first years of Caesar’s control over Rome. 
Generally, however, this type of legislation does not attest a general institutional 
inclination of the tribunate towards centralising power in the hands of individuals. 
5.1.3 Personal prerogatives 
Besides formal commissions, military or otherwise, persons could also be given 
extraordinary rights, as positive dispensation from the laws or as specific honours. As 
the foremost legislators in the Republic, the tribunes can be expected to have played a 
part in the special prerogatives which were increasingly given to a few individuals 
during this timeframe.140 However, what we can reconstruct seem to contradict this 
slightly. It is quite clear that – again – the sources are very selective in this respect. Only 
the protagonists of the overarching narratives regularly receive any attention when it 
comes to special honours, and it can be expected that many similar laws, edicts, or 
decrees have just not been recorded. Only a few relatively ‘unimportant’ characters are 
known to have received special honours in this entire period. Of course, these were only 
relatively unimportant in retrospect, and the absense of attestations does not imply an 
absence of prerogatives. 
Let us take a look at the cases which are known for the less well-known persons. After 
the tribune A. Pompeius had died in 102, it did not take long for some superstitious 
persons to link his death to his attacks against the dress of Battaces, a priest of Cybele. 
Frightened by this, or spurred on by others who were, the tribunes had to introduce a 
solution. The law still did not allow this type of regalia in Rome. Therefore, some of the 
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tribunes introduced a plebiscite to grant the priest dispensation from the law, to allow 
him to sport his outfit.141  
In 67, C. Papirius Carbo was granted the right to consular trappings, although he had 
only been tribune of the plebs (in 69), because he had successfully prosecuted M. 
Aurelius Cotta for appropriating the booty from his siege of Heracleia Pontica.142 The 
case is apparently randomly selected by Dio, as an example for a wider habit at the time. 
In 54 the triumph of Pomptinus was illegally ratified through a plebiscite.143 Some 
tribunes presided over the voting process, which started before dawn and was therefore 
illegal. Aproving of the triumph through a tribunician law was probably preferred over 
a senatorial vote because some of the praetors (M. Porcius Cato and P. Servilius 
Isauricus) and a tribune (Q. Mucius Scaevola) had announced to reject the grant by any 
means. Some of the other tribunes, quite likely including Scaevola, would later object 
and attempt to disturb the triumph. Here, the method was unusual, but the law itself of 
course was quite regular. 
Other individuals given some honours through tribunician actions are known better, 
but do not figure as much in the narrative leading up to the Principate. In 104, Marius 
was possibly given the right to wear the vestis triumphalis and the calcei patricii, against 
the wishes of the senate.144 Quite possibly there were restrictions on this, which Marius 
disregarded when he entered the senate in this dress. At the same time dispensation 
was given which allowed Marius’s election in 105 to his second (104) and then later to 
his third (103), fourth (102), fifth (101) and sixth (100) consulship. This was contrary to 
the laws against iteration and election in absentia, and like Kondratieff has argued it is 
quite likely that this was made possible through a plebiscite.145 Another possibility is 
that the senators were ghastly afraid of the war with the Cimbri, and therefore allowed 
Marius’s consecutive consulships. It is clear that large sections of the populace were in 
favour of this course of action, and the opposition mentioned by Plutarch and Cicero 
was not necessarily very strong (Cicero mentions L. Licinius Crassus Orator, M. Aemilius 
Scaurus, and the Metelli). In any case, the senate later agreed to the command of Marius 
in the war against the Cimbri, so if tribunes were involved, it cannot be claimed that 
they acted on their own for this quite unusual iteration of the consulship by one person. 
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In 64 a possibly extraordinary vote in the comitia tributa was taken on whether 
Lucullus was to have a triumph.146 C. Memmius had fiercely opposed the proconsul’s 
family, political allies, and now the man himself. As the vote was probably obstructed in 
the senate, perhaps a friendlier tribune introduced the matter in a rogatio. The first tribe 
voted against the triumph, which spurred Lucullus and his allies on to mingle with the 
crowd and convince them to change their mind – successfully, eventually. This was 
therefore more of an emergency measure than a great honour. Finally, Antony’s brother 
L. Antonius was granted statues by various groups in 44 as thanks for his lex agraria. One 
of these was gifted by the 35 tribes, which made Kondratieff suspect that it was granted 
through a plebiscite.147 
Then, of course, there is a whole range of attested prerogatives which were granted to 
just three persons, them being Pompey, Caesar, and Octavian. Interestingly, some of 
these are known merely through the history of Dio, who seems to have paid much 
attention to this type of laws if they involved one of these persons. 
One related case was the death of Iulia, Caesar’s daughter and Pompey’s wife, in 54. 
While Pompey planned to bury her in his villa in the Alban hills, according to Plutarch 
the πλῆθος/ δῆμος snatched her body after the traditional eulogy in the Forum and 
carried it to the Campus Martius to bury her there.148 The tribunes initially protested 
this, as did the consul L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. They must have stopped their protests 
and perhaps ratified it by decree or law, as she was effectively buried there and a tomb 
erected. 
In 63 the two tribunes are known by name, T. or L. Ampius Balbus and T. Labienus, 
who gave Pompey by a lex the right, according to Velleius, to wear a golden crown both 
in circus games and in the theatre, and his triumphal robes on the former occasions and 
a purple-bordered robe on the latter.149 According to Dio, the honour consisted of 
wearing a laurel wreath at all public games, with the garb of a general usually or the 
triumphal robe at horse races.150 As he was absent Pompey could not directly refuse, but 
according to the sources he did not take advantage of the right often. 
For Caesar, more special dispensations are known. In 52 a law by all ten tribunes gave 
Caesar the right to stand for the consulship in absentia, even if he did not receive the 
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right to enjoy consecutive consulships, like Marius.151 In the ‘commentarii de bello civili’ 
the ‘patience’ of Caesar to observe the minimum timespan of ten years between 
consulships is even commented upon. The law of the ten tribunes was supported by 
powerful elite groups, which is attested not only by the cooperation of all tribunes but 
also by that of the consul sine collega Pompey. This common ground between all tribunes 
did not occur regularly. As Cicero attests, it was only obtained through many exertions: 
“cur tanto opere pugnatum est ut de eius absentis ratione habenda decem tribuni pl. ferrent?”.152 
Pompey later confirmed Caesar’s right in a law of his own concerning elections. Even if 
he had first made a mistake by forgetting Caesar’s special case, he later corrected this. 
The law of the ten tribunes was opposed: openly and vehemently by Cato, and 
apparently behind the screens by Cicero in conversations with Pompey. The latter’s 
involvement ultimately was quite actively in favour of the measure, however. The 
orator himself attests that he was asked by Caesar and Pompey to use his influence with 
the tribune M. Caelius Rufus to convince him to introduce the bill.153 Then later he 
defended its execution, as it had been guaranteed by law in legal circumstances. Caesar 
later wanted to give up the privilege in the negotiations directly prior to the civil war, 
but as we know these ultimately broke down.154 The law had a complex context. One 
theory is that Caesar did not wish to return to Rome as a private citizen, because he 
feared to be put on trial for his actions as consul in 59. He had only barely escaped in 58 
by claiming to be absent rei publicae causa. Others have dismissed this theory, and 
Morstein-Marx convincingly suggests that Caesar wanted to be certain that he would be 
able to celebrate a triumph, an honour which he had had to give up prior to his first 
consulship.155 Of course, both reasons could have played some part. Another important 
factor was of course Pompey’s very unusual position as sole consul for a long time 
during 52. Only quite late another consul was appointed, but that colleague was chosen 
by Pompey himself. According to Suetonius, there was a political group which desired to 
see Caesar become consul together with Pompey to ensure the parity established as a 
principle in the so-called ‘first triumvirate’, but this was impossible because of the war 
in Gaul.156 The law of the ten tribunes apparently would have been a consolation, and 
would allow Caesar to remain in his province until he could become consul and ratify 
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his arrangements in these provinces. Compared to Pompey’s sole consulship, in which 
he was appointed by the senate rather than elected, Caesar’s privilege of standing for an 
election in absentia is quite irremarkable, especially because there are some 
precedents.157 
It was only after he took power and returned after the battle of Pharsalus in 48 that 
many prerogatives were voted to Caesar.158 A triumph was voted to him for the war 
against Juba, in which he had not personally participated. This would of course become 
customary in the Principate, where only the Princeps and his family celebrated 
triumphs. Dio notes that Caesar at that time received tribunician authority for life. At 
this time, this probably meant the right to sit on the tribunician subsellia during games 
and to be ‘counted among their number’. This is an odd and very important innovation, 
which will be commented on later in this chapter. Possibly, these rights were only given 
later, by 44. By that time, he had also received tribunician sacrosanctitas, and he could 
grant auxilium. Among other honours, sacrifices, games, paintings, and statues had been 
voted to him, also in the comitia tributa. Some noteworthy prerogatives were a throne 
made of ivory and gold, the right to wear his triumphal garb when he performed his 
functions as pontifex maximus, the celebration of his victories by making the dates 
holidays, the organisation by priests and vestals of public prayers for his safety every 
five years or even every year, and an addition to the oath of magistrates when they 
entered office which said that they would observe his decrees. There were other rights, 
such as the right of always adding laurel wreaths to the fasces of his lictors, the right to 
always sit next to the consuls in the senate, and the right to wear of several honourary 
crowns, and other tributes such as building a new rostra in his honour. Caesar was even 
proclaimed to be divine. Most of these prerogatives, however, were not introduced 
through tribunician measures. They were either decreed by priestly colleges, the senate, 
or other political institutions. Unfortunately, the institutions responsible for these 
measures are not often specified in our sources. This makes the story much more 
confused. We know that the senate was responsible for most of the decrees such as 
proclaiming him pater patriae, for instance, but it is possible that some were then 
confirmed by the comitia. One factor is that the senate simply did not have the formal 
authority for many of the measures, but many others were certainly not introduced 
through tribunician initiatives in the comitia tributa either. There are some exceptions. 
The tribunician rights of Caesar such as his sacrosanctity could not have been bestowed 
on him by any other institution than the comitia, on a tribunician proposal. In 44, L. 
Antonius as tribune gave Caesar the right to propose half of the available positions for 
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every magistracy at the elections, except in the elections for the consulship.159 Leaflets 
were divided among the tribes which implored them to vote for a candidate supported 
by Caesar. In practice, this made it possible for Caesar to appoint half of the magistrates 
besides the consuls. It is clear that control over such an important aspect of Republican 
tradition was quite radical, and meant an obvious change to the political system. 
Another tribunician law was introduced by the tribune L. Cassius Longinus, and decreed 
that Caesar could appoint the patrician rank to certain families.160 It is quite remarkable, 
to say the least, that a tribune of the plebs introduced a law which bestowed the right to 
make new patricians. Another peculiar right was voted on the initiative of a tribune, C. 
Helvius Cinna, and decreed that Caesar could practice polygamy with any woman he 
wanted.161 Dio claims that the very intention of this law was to ridicule Caesar’s 
acceptance of special honours and to make him hated. This is quite possible, as Caesar 
had always been a notorious adulterer. 
After Caesar’s death, many more honours were given to him. The tribune Rufrenus, 
for instance, possibly in 42 advanced a law to erect statues of Divus Iulius.162 
Octavian and his family were granted countless privileges as well, although mostly by 
the senate. An equestrian statue was granted by the populus in 41, which does possibly 
point to a plebiscite introduced by the tribunes.163 The equity established by the 
triumvirate, however, seems to have long prevented extraordinary prerogatives being 
voted on any of the three men. Only in 36, after the defeat of Sex. Pompeius, the 
surrender of Lepidus, and at a time when the hostility with Antony was growing, laws 
began to be introduced in Rome which elevated Octavian above the others. Plebiscites 
were introduced on the basis of senatus consulta¸ the most important of which gave 
tribunician sacrosanctitas to Octavian and the right to sit on the tribunician subsellia.164 A 
house was given to him at public expense, and this was granted through a law passed in 
the comitia, likely on a tribunician proposal. Besides this, statues, the front seat at public 
events, a laurel crown, a triumphal arch, and many other special rights were granted to 
him. Again, most of these were probably bestowed by the senate. The next year, likely in 
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the same manner as with his own sacrosanctitas, this tribunician attribute was voted on 
both Livia and Octavia.165 They also received statues and the right to manage their own 
affairs without a guardian, although this did not necessarily follow from a plebiscitum. 
Likewise, the triumph and the triumphal arches, together with many special symbols of 
gratitude granted to Octavian in 31 after the victory at Actium, were likely voted to him 
by a decree of the senate and perhaps only ratified through a plebiscite.166 In 31, the ius 
auxilium was bestowed on Octavian through plebiscite.167 In his case it extended for one 
mile beyond the pomerium, which according to Dio was not a right possessed by the 
tribunes. After this, a plethora of special grants were voted upon him. Tribunes still 
played a part. Sex. Pacuvius (or Apudius) Taurus in 27 took the lead in dedicating 
himself to Octavian ‘after Spanish fashion’, and decreed that everyone should follow his 
example.168 In the same year the title of Augustus and his clipeus virtutis, a golden shield 
displayed in the Curia, were ratified through a plebiscite as well ex senatus consulto.169 
Finally, in 23, Augustus was given by a tribunician law (again, on the basis of a decree by 
the senate) the tribunicia potestas for life.170  
What is remarkable here is that tribunician initiatives to honour the ‘Great Individuals’ 
actually decreased rather than increased. The very few examples which we have before 
Caesar’s dictatorship either indicate that the sources were not concerned with symbolic 
prerogatives given to other individuals, or that the tribunate had never been very active 
in advancing the honours of the elites. It was the senate which played the most 
important part in granting privileges to Caesar and his heir. It was mostly those 
privileges which could not be granted but by a law that were introduced by the tribunes, 
and even then often they were based on a senatus consultum. Possibly through 
establishing a close symbolic link with the Princeps, the influence of the senate waxed 
as that of the tribunate gradually waned. It is important to remember that the senate 
had not originally had the right to grant privilegia, but had usurped this right before 
Cornelius attempted to stop the practice in 67. Through the concrete situation then, it 
was a tribune which had given the senate the formal power to grant exemptions from 
the law, which they frequently used after this. Remarkably, many of the known 
plebiscites concerning Caesar and Octavian either could not be granted but through the 
comitia tributa, or (in the case of Caesar) were in some cases actually subversive traps. 
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5.1.4 Servants of the “Great Individuals”? 
Throughout this section we have investigated the aspect of privilegia. Contrary to some 
theories found in the ancient sources, it seems that even in this form of legislation the 
tribunes were not the servants of the ‘Great Individuals’ of late Republican history. It 
has been argued in the previous chapter that tribunes were in a very complex position 
relating to their office and different principals, and it would be highly reductive to view 
the tribunes solely as the ‘puppets’ of powerful individuals. There was no inherent 
characteristic of the tribunate as an institution which inexorably pushed towards the 
centralisation of commands in the hands of certain individuals. Only when these ‘Great 
Individuals’ were supported by large and powerful groups, these individuals could 
mobilise enough power to exert pressure on the tribunes and make them comply to 
certain programmes. In almost all the cases before the civil war between Pompey and 
Crassus, the tribunes were not united, but opposed one another on proposals for 
privilegia. 
If we look back at the laws establishing extraordinary military commands, we can see 
that it proves impossible only in the case of a few tribunes to establish other reasons for 
their legislation than doing favours for the beneficiaries. These are Q. Caecilius Metellus 
Nepos in 62 and Trebonius in 55. Metellus failed, however, because of strong opposition 
by his colleagues Q. Minucius Thermus and M. Porcius Cato. Trebonius, then, is poorly 
attested. He did, however, receive a legation immediately after his tribunate. Personal 
motives may have been more important to him than pleasing the three potentates 
Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey, just as this had been the case for Vatinius in 59. 
Very few extraordinary commissions which were also privilegia are known, possibly 
because the sources were not very interested in them. Nevertheless, some of them 
would prove to be quite important, such as Pompey’s cura annonae. A more radical 
proposal by the tribune C. Messius did not win out against a more moderate consular 
law, but there is too little information to make overarching conclusions for the 
tribunate. Quite likely, Messius had as a tribune just experienced far more pressure from 
the non-elites to make sure that the grain supply would be secured. It is still quite 
unlikely that his proposal would have been able to pass. 
There are only few attestations of personal prerogatives before Caesar’s occupation 
of Rome as well. Pompey’s tenure as consul sine collega was perhaps the most remarkable 
innovation, and it was allowed through a decree by the senate, not through a plebiscite. 
Once more, only once the civil war had started did the flow of prerogatives to Caesar 
start. It was then put on hold until the second triumvirate had started to crumble. It is 
often unclear which political institution had granted privilegia in his sense, but the 
tribunes certainly were not the most active. 
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One element that returned in all subsections was that the tribunician grants of privilegia 
did change dramatically after 49, when the military power of those occupying Rome left 
little room for resistance.171 Tribunes on certain occasions still attempted to prevent 
various measures, but they were generally unsuccessful. This situation better fits with 
the model of the tribunes which has been proposed in this thesis than with an 
essentialising description of the tribunate. It was the effective mobilisation of power by 
the various leading figures in Rome which made it possible force the tribunes to behave 
in ways which were acceptable to these leading figures as principals. Even then, as we 
will see again in the next section, their control over tribunician behaviour was not 
absolute. 
Furthermore, tribunician laws on privilegia were not the only way in which 
individuals were granted special prerogatives. Even before the civil war between Caesar 
and Pompey the senate granted many privileges. In the 70s, for instance, their 
innovations concerning extraordinary military commands were far more remarkable 
than even the lex Gabinia. The gradual downfall of the Sullan pauci in the 60s explains 
their objections to the tribunician laws giving Pompey his extraordinary commands. 
The advent of strong political groups in the 50s was reflected in plebiscites as well, but 
the decade also saw increasing popular resistance against extraordinary military 
commands. The military occupation of Rome from 52 onwards was another determining 
factor, especially once the civil war had started. It not only caused an increase in power 
for a few individuals, but also a decreasing regard for political procedures. By 37, the 
authority of tribunes to actively engage in politics seems to have been reduced to an 
illusion.  
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5.2 The tribunes as demagogues: destructive agitators, or 
release valve for popular dissatisfaction? 
Theories about the tribunes being the cause of political conflict go back to the late 
Republic itself.172 In Cicero’s ‘De Legibus’, the character of the orator has a short 
discussion with his brother Quintus precisely on this matter. Quintus Cicero’s attack on 
the tribunate is perhaps best summarised in the following statement: “Nam mihi quidem 
pestifera videtur, quippe quae in seditione et ad seditionem nata sit.”173 The tribunate, by these 
words, was an office made of and for sedition. The character of Marcus Cicero responded 
with the safety valve theory: “'Nimia potestas est tribunorum plebis.' Quis negat? Sed vis 
populi multo saevior multoque vehementior, quae ducem quom habet interdum lenior est, quam si 
nullum haberet.”174 
In this section, both of these theories will be discussed. Given that there were deep 
rifts between societal and political groups in Roman society, the constant contention by 
various principals and the great power which the tribunes enjoyed meant that small 
mistakes by individual tribunes could cause a violent response, that a split within the 
college of tribunes could cause struggle between groups, and that increased contention 
towards one or more tribunes could have large consequences for Roman politics. But 
the tribunes were seldom the cause of these conflicts, as they often had little 
discretionary freedom in their behaviour. 
The section will be divided into three subsections. In the first, some cases will be 
presented to dispel the theory of the tribunes as inciters of conflict. Two of these cases 
will focus on periods when the tribunes became less influential, the 70s and during the 
triumvirate, while the third case will show that the cause of the civil war between 
Caesar and Pompey was not the behaviour of one tribune, Curio. The second subsection 
will then focus on the tribunes as safety valves, and show that contrary to these claims 
it was the tribunes who often showed that unopposed rule or a consensual status quo 
was not as tranquil as it appeared. The third section will argue that the specific political 
and institutional frameworks of the tribunate had the consequence of highlighting rifts 
in society, even though this was not by design. While the tribunes were not a release-
valve for or the cause of societal struggle, they could by their behaviour indicate the 
issues and potentially focus attention on them.  
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5.2.1 Tribunes as the primary cause of conflict? 
First, a very simple matter must be established: that the tribunate was not responsible 
for all conflicts in the sphere of Roman politics in the late Republic. This might seem a 
truism, but in some ancient sources, as has been already indicated, this claim was 
effectively made. Three cases will be presented to contradict this claim. In the 70s 
societal conflict did not subside. During the triumvirate there were many riots and 
mobilisations, despite the significantly diminished role of individual tribunes. Finally, 
contrary to many theories in ancient sources and modern literature, C. Scribonius Curio, 
one of the most famous instigators of a most famous conflict, the civil war between 
Caesar and Pomepy, was in fact looking to establish peace and even reverse certain 
steps towards concentrating power into the hands of individuals. 
Conflict could break out despite the absence of influential tribunes, and this was quite 
clear in the period when that influence was severely limited: the 70s. The source 
situation is problematic, and we know less about this decade than about the 60s or 50s. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that there were indeed fewer instances of conflict between 
magistrates. The decade was, after all, characterised by a rather stable dominance of a 
small fraction of the senatorial elites. If there would be no difference in politics at all 
between this decade and periods where tribunes did have power, the position of the 
tribunate could be described as rather marginal. However, the 70s did see its fair 
number of struggles, and when these did break out they were no less fierce than many 
conflicts involving tribunes outside of this decade. 
Almost immediately after the death of Sulla another civil war broke out, even if it was 
quickly concluded.175  According to Sallust it started over something trivial while Sulla 
was still alive: a discussion between the consuls over the appointment of the city 
prefect. That such a petty quabble could lead to civil war of course points to other 
factors. One was that the consul M. Aemilius Lepidus did not agree with some of Sulla’s 
actions, while Q. Lutatius Catulus was an ardent ideological supporter of Sulla. The 
status of the citizenship of the Italian and Latin allies was still an issue as well. 
Furthermore, the proscriptions had caused new rifts to appear. If Sulla had abrogated 
the grain subsidies, this possibly was another element of discontent.176 Nevertheless, 
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Sulla died and was buried without much backlash.177 It is possible that if the tribunate 
had been intact, the dissatisfaction over the dictator’s rule would already then have 
resulted in a more overt uproar. 
While the squabble between the two consuls was still ongoing, some disaffected 
peasants from Faesulae in Etruria attacked Sulla’s veterans. These people had been 
driven from their land by Sulla’s land grants to his soldiers, and their revenge was not 
long delayed. It is possible that this group chose direct violence because their 
grievances could not be addressed in any other way, for example through demands 
made of the tribunes. Both consuls were sent to deal with them, but Lepidus 
surprisingly chose their side. This would cause a definitive break with Sulla’s followers 
in Rome. Lepidus then promised the populus to introduce many measures to undo Sulla’s 
acts. While earlier in his consulship he had refused to restore the tribunician authority, 
as the tribunes had requested this of both consuls, now he changed his mind and 
included this among the promises of repealing the Sullan reforms.178 Lepidus, first 
already as consul and then as proconsul, took up arms in an attempt to seize the city. 
Lepidus was no Einzelgänger. Catulus during his consulship had passed a law 
concerning violence, according to Cicero “armata dissensione civium rei publicae paene 
extremis temporibus tulit”.179 Aside from the dissension by his colleague, there must have 
been broad groups within Rome who were at least expected to be ready to oppose the 
dominance of Catulus and his political group.  
Lepidus’s military defeat did not resolve the issues. Pompey, who had been one of 
Sulla’s generals and now had helped in defeating the rebellious proconsul, now refused 
to disband his army. At the time, he probably had a command pro praetore. The senate 
could not oppose this move of Pompey, and ultimately decided to answer him by 
elevating his command as if he were a consul (pro consule), and sending him to Hispania 
to aid in the fight against Sertorius. This war had been fought quite ineptly, and 
apparently there were not many candidates beside Pompey to take up the command. 
Still, the move of the senate was indicative of their lack of power against dissension. It 
also shows that they were not really confident that they could resist elements 
threatening their rule, or feared that changes to Sulla’s arrangements would again form 
the societal basis for another civil war. 
Overall, the 70s seem not to have been a very good decade for Roman society, even if 
the senate was dominated by a rather stable group and the tribunes had but little 
power. Piracy became rampant in this decade, other insurrections such as the slave 
revolt of Spartacus originated in the Italian heartland, and large-scale extortion in the 
 
                                                     
177 For the fear of the citizens during the funeral: App., BC, 1.105-106. 
178 Marshall and Beness, ‘Tribunician Agitation and Aristocratic Reaction 80-71 BC’, p. 364-365. 
179 Cic., Cael., 70. 
 258 
provinces (like Verres) became even more widespread and generally went unpunished. 
Food shortages or high prices of grain led to riots. On at least one occasion, crowds 
attacked the consuls, quite possibly accusing them of negligence.180 The restrictions on 
the tribunate made worthless tribunes such as Terpolius possible (tr. pl. 77, “Catulus’ 
favourite”), as there would conceivably have been less pressure on the tribunes to act, 
but it also unleashed a struggle to restore the capacities of the office.181 We know of one 
tribune (Cn. Sicinius, tr. pl. 76) who was killed because he strove for the restoration of 
the tribunate and had insulted the consul, one (Q. Opimius, tr. pl. 75) who was convicted 
and ruined because he had used his veto contrary to the lex Cornelia and had offended a 
noble, and one shunned from later standing for the consulship (M. Lollius Palicanus, tr. 
pl. 71).182 
Civil dissension did not stop with the clipping of the tribunes’ powers, but the 
dominant coalition did have more possibilities to partly cover up their own behaviour 
and prevent political dissatisfaction from constantly springing up. Ultimately they were 
unsuccesful, of course, as the Sullan system crumbled and ultimately gave way. 
Even when the triumvirate had assumed power in Rome, mobilisations and contentious 
political actions did not stop. The tribunes at this time are no longer attested as figuring 
in political struggles, so it is very unlikely that they were involved in the riots which 
occurred. Especially when famine struck the city did violence and demands by the plebs 
urbana resurface. When the grain supply was cut off by Sextus Pompey, for instance, 
groups of plebeians attacked the Forum and chased the magistrates from their seats and 
threw down statues of Antony and Octavian.183 When the same happened later they 
demanded that Octavian make peace. When they the triumvirs instead decided to raise a 
new tax to defeat Pompey, people tore down the edicts, mobilised in groups, stoned 
those who did not agree, and threatened to plunder and burn the houses of the 
opposing groups. The discontent went beyond food, as the lust for power and the 
endless wars of the triumvirs are cited by our sources. When Octavian and his friends 
tried to calm the crowds in the Forum, people threw stones at them as well, and the 
same happened to Antony when he was coming back to Rome. Ultimately, however, the 
mobilised groups were slaughtered by the soldiers of Antony. Nevertheless, groups of 
plebeians still put pressure on the triumvirs until they agreed to negotiate with Sex. 
Pompey. Before Lucius Antonius rebelled, the soldiers had already mutinied because 
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Octavian had not given them enough land.184 When he complied with their demands the 
people started to riot and fight the soldiers throughout Italy, until Octavian remitted 
the rents for many of the urban population. During the Perusine War, the grain storages 
were attacked (although there was not necessarily a shortage at the time) and people 
denounced Octavian.185 In 38, groups of non-elites attacked tax-gatherers and those who 
accompanied them.186 It is quite clear, therefore, that the triumvirs provided anything 
but safety, and that the tribunes in these instances could not be held responsible for 
these serious dissensions. 
Theories pointing at the tribunes as being responsible for the greatest conflicts of the 
late Republic go back to antiquity. For the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, for 
instance, arguably the conflict which more than anything else brought single rule closer 
than any other event, Velleius Paterculus asserted the following: 
It was Gaius Curio, however, a tribune of the people, who, more than anyone else, 
applied the flaming torch which kindled the civil war and all the evils which 
followed for twenty consecutive years.187 
Other imperial sources put at least part of the blame for the civil war on C. Scribonius 
Curio as well. Looking into his case, however, shows a far more complicated situation. It 
is also a good example that the tribune, despite sources from the Principate depicting 
him as first being allied to Pompey and then to Caesar, did not in fact serve either of 
these ‘Great Individuals’.188 In the traditional explanation, taken over by most modern 
researchers, Curio was bribed by Caesar or at least released from his massive debts in 
exchange for support during his tribuneship in 50. By switching sides in this way and 
promoting Caesar’s interests through trickery, he first prevented Caesar from being 
replaced in his provinces before he was elected as consul in absentia. When it became 
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clear that this election would not take place, Curio would have sought to establish 
reasons for starting the civil war. 
The contemporary sources allow us to question this narrative, and especially Cicero’s 
letters show differences with the later sources.189 For one, while the authors from the 
Principate confidently claim that Curio was in financial trouble on the eve of his 
tribunate, the contemporary sources do not attest this in any way. Furthermore, while 
the later sources believe that Curio was at one time allied to Pompey, this is quite 
unlikely. In 59 he had been one of the most prominent public opponents of the three 
pontentates, and was lauded by mainly elite social groups for this.190 While this mainly 
implies enmity towards Caesar, he was also implicated in the Vettius-affair. This event 
ostensibly revealed a plot to murder Pompey, but may have been an attempt to frame 
the presumed conspirators.191 Among those who were named first were Curio, but also L. 
Aemilius Lepidus Paullus and Q. Servilius Caepio Brutus. These two had every reason to 
hate Pompey, as he had banished the father of Paullus (Lepidus, the consul of 78), and 
murdered the father of Brutus (an ally of Lepidus in his revolt). This again is an 
attestation of how long these grudges could continue. Curio, in the meantime, had 
loudly declared to Cicero that he hated the “proud kings”, them being all three of the 
potentates. So both his own words and his association with these two in the Vettius 
affair show that he had always hated Pompey. It was only from the end of 51 that a rift 
between Caesar and Pompey was becoming ever more clear.192 
It was mainly hatred against Pompey which came to the foreground during Curio’s 
tribuneship. More than being confronted with unreasonable demands by Caesar, Curio 
very concretely came into contact with Pompey’s control over Rome through his troops. 
At first it was thought (by Caelius, one of Cicero’s correspondents) that Curio’s spite for 
Caesar would be his most important motivator, but soon it became apparent how the 
tribune despised Pompey’s power.193 Curio introduced many measures as a tribune, 
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many of which did not take the wishes of either Pompey or Caesar into account at all.194 
He also had to take account of the problem which was the senatorial debates on the 
provinces, which would very soon prevent him from introducing more legislation. The 
previous year debates about Caesar’s provincia had for a long time blocked politics, until 
a senatus consultum established that they would be postponed until the Kalends of March 
in 50. Curio attempted to postpone this date by proposing an intercalary month 
between February and March, but this failed. This apparently caused a turnaround in 
the behaviour of the tribune, but it is quite likely that he just attempted to get his 
proposals passed quickly. Curio also at this time may have revealed his stance in the 
provincial debates: to take away the provincia of both Caesar and Pompey.195 
The debates started, as planned, on the 1st of March. From the get-go, Curio 
demanded that the commands of both men would be discussed on the same terms. 
Despite harsh criticism and opposition, he continued to work together with the consul 
Paullus (the same who had been suspected of the Vettius affair) to achieve this goal of 
disarming both potentates, while avoiding suspicions of being anti-senatorial or of 
boycotting any solution.196 There were in fact expectations that if Curio was dealt with 
too harshly, Caesar would defend the tribune. This does not point to direct 
collaboration, however, as Curio’s defeat would mean an even worse situation for the 
conqueror of Gaul than his success. Ultimately the tribune succeeded in having a vote 
taken on his proposal.197 First it was introduced as separate measures by the other 
consul, C. Claudius Marcellus. Caesar was resoundingly defeated in the separate vote, 
with almost every senator voting in favour of taking away his command while almost 
none voted for cancelling Pompey’s provincia. Curio did not veto the vote. Only after this 
result he introduced his own proposal, that both men would give up their commands or 
be declared outlaws, and this was approved by almost everyone. Marcellus disbanded 
the senate, however, which rescinded the legality of all decisions taken that day. Curio 
was celebrated like a victorious athlete by large groups of urban plebeians while going 
home, because he had dared to oppose both powerful proconsuls.198 He was actually 
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doing what he had said he would do, and was supported by a large majority of the 
senatorial elites and by large groups of urban non-elites. When not much later a false 
rumour spread in Rome that Caesar had crossed the Alps, Marcellus called for a vote in 
the senate to make him a public enemy.199 Curio vetoed the motion, as this would 
definitely have brought the civil war very close. Marcellus furiously stormed out of the 
senate, went to Pompey outside of the pomerium, and offered him his sword, asking him 
to defend the Republic. The two designated consuls confirmed this move by edict not 
much later, but this was clearly a coup by a small group. Curio still opposed the call to 
war, as he tried to prevent the conscription of a new army, aided by some elite 
individuals or groups.200 
Before his tribuneship ended, Curio fled to Caesar.201 This of course has been used to 
attest to his subservience in the first place, probably a theory which originated at the 
moment itself. But he fled out of necessity: both the consules designati were hostile, as 
was one of the censors and the designated leader of a military coup, Pompey. As soon as 
he was not protected by his office, he would have faced trial, in the best case. Caesar was 
the only option, especially because the proconsul had surprisingly made clear through 
letters that he (more or less) agreed to the terms of Curio’s proposal.202 Curio not much 
later returned to Rome as an emissary of Caesar, and repeated his demand for mutual 
disarmament (probably his personal preference), or alternatively the acknowledgment 
of Caesar’s right.203 When this was refused and Curio, together with the tribunes Mark 
Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus were chased from Rome, the war definitively started. 
Further peace offers were mocked by Curio.204 Rather than stay with Caesar, Curio 
gathered his own troops in Etruria and Umbria and seems to have moved relatively 
independently.205 In April he had a long and open discussion with Cicero, in which he 
criticised Caesar (who just did things to suit himself, not for the Republic), but also 
declared his hatred for Pompey.206 
Curio had as tribune been under attack by a numerically small but rather powerful 
political group, including Pompey, the Marcelli (the consul C. Marcellus, the consul 
designatus C. Marcellus, and the consuular M. Marcellus), and the censor Appius Claudius 
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Pulcher. He was defended by the other consul, Paullus, and by the other censor L. 
Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, while the overwhelming majority of senators agreed with 
him and large groups from the plebs urbana had mobilised to show their support. His 
proposals could be seen as very reasonable, and he does not appear to have brought 
matters to a crisis. If anything, it had been the consul C. Marcellus who had pushed 
towards war by making violent and unorthodox moves. Even if the civil war had not 
broken out, offering his sword to Pompey could have marked a point of no return for 
the Republic. It is not correct to depict Curio as the primary person to have kindled the 
civil war. He is therefore an excellent example of how tribunes were often not the prime 
cause of conflict, but were depicted as such because they could go against powerful 
political groups. 
5.2.2 Breaking claims of a status quo 
In this subsection, it will be argued that tribunes more than any other magistrates often 
punctured claims of leading persons or groups of a new stable political dominance. 
Discourses claiming a new or restored status quo in Roman society were remarkably 
often shown to be illusory by actions of tribunes. This was not primarily the 
consequence of self-representation by young elites in the tribuneship, but of the 
political position of the institution itself. When societal or political groups received 
blows on the political stage, were frustrated in their interests or desires, or were 
humiliated by other groups, this could provide an incentive to focus on the tribunate, to 
increase the mobilisation of power in contention with the tribunes. The institutional 
power of individual tribunes, their inviolability, and the institutional openness of the 
office towards entreaties made it the ideal agent to break the perception of unity 
displayed by dominant individuals or groups. Not every disenfranchised group would of 
course have been able to mobilise for this. However, the multiplicity of principals 
ensured that tribunes engaged in this type of programme very frequently. The tribunate 
of the plebs did not, in this sense, have the ‘function’ of a safety valve.207 
Breaking the hegemony of a political group, mainly consisting of members of the 
nobilitas, featured heavily in Sallust’s narrative on the Jugurthine War. The war did not 
take place immediately after the destruction of C. Sempronius Gracchus and his 
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followers, but Sallust argues that it would provide the ideal setting for breaking the 
dominance claimed by the groups which had established themselves after these events. 
I am going to write an account of the war which the Roman people waged with 
Jugurtha, king of the Numidians: first of all, because it was a great and terrible 
conflict of varying fortune; secondly, because then for the first time opposition 
was offered to the insolence of the nobles. That struggle threw everything, human 
and divine, into confusion, and progressed to such a pitch of frenzy that finally 
war and the desolation of Italy put an end to civil contentions.208 
One driving factor for this evolution seems to have been widespread dissatisfaction with 
the corruption of these elites, as foreign rulers were paying members of the elites rather 
than the Roman treasury. Another factor was that many people were still indignant 
about the slaughter of the Gracchi and their entourage a decade before, and Sallust 
argues that the audacity of the dominant groups kept these wounds open. C. Memmius 
gave a voice to this dissatisfaction both as tribunus plebis designatus and as a tribune 
proper.209 According to Sallust, he further informed the populus Romanus and aided in the 
mobilisation of non-elites, which in turn spurred the senate to adjust its policies 
concerning one case, Numidia. The fate of Jugurtha quickly became a symbol for the 
wider problems in Roman society. When the proconsul appointed by the senate, L. 
Calpurnius Bestia, again accepted a bribe disguised as a surrender, the plebs did no 
longer accept this. In a positive feedback loop with Memmius, the crowds in contiones 
became ever more radical in pushing for Jugurtha to be dealt with. Sallust then 
‘reproduces’ a speech which Memmius would have made when Bestia had returned to 
Rome. It clearly indicates enmity towards the factio which had dominated post-Gracchan 
Rome. Memmius introduced a plebiscite which ordered the praetor L. Cassius to bring 
Jugurtha to Rome, so he could answer for his crimes. The tribune C. Baebius attempted 
to obstruct the proceedings, and once the king had arrived vetoed a court case against 
the king. Nevertheless, the case would prove to be the start for the great struggle 
between a large part of the nobilitas and both the non-elites and the equites in the years 
which followed. Memmius had not been the cause of this conflict, but his actions did 
contribute to bringing hidden grievances to the surface and mobilising the non-elites. 
Again over a decade later, the death of Saturninus and Glaucia never did provide an 
opportunity to any political group to seize the reins. The situation was quite awkward 
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for many of those who had brought down the tribune. Marius, for instance, had been 
implicated by having benefitted from Saturninus’s behaviour during both his 
tribuneships.210 Another factor which prevented claims for dominance were again the 
tribunes. In 99, Sex. Titius among other measures introduced an agrarian law.211 He 
came into conflict with the consul M. Antonius Orator over this, and ignored the 
declarations of unfavourable auspices. Titius was considered to be yet another tenacious 
tribune and, what was worse, a disciple of Saturninus. It is unclear if this was the truth, 
or a strategy used to smear him. He was later exiled for having kept an image of 
Saturninus in his house. Whether or not Titius was actually a follower of the dead 
tribune, the elite groups who had opposed Saturninus clearly did not think themselves 
very secure. Keeping an image was seen as a dangerous example which could lead 
‘imperiti’ to regret the death of an enemy of the state, and could again lead to 
mobilisations in opposition to their policies. Titius’s agrarian law was rescinded by 
another tribune as it had been contrary to the auspices. The anxiety about Titius’s 
behaviour during 99 did indicate that the death of Saturninus, Glaucia, and their 
accomplices at the time was not uncontroversial. The lack of consensus continued up to 
and beyond the Social and first civil wars.  
Sulla’s return to Rome and defeat of the Marian factio in 82-81 did lead to the 
announcement of a new status quo. It was not to last. As has already been discussed, the 
watering down of the formal capacities of the tribunate contributed to the fact that it 
was consul Lepidus, not a tribune, who would give voice to widespread dissatisfaction 
with the new Sullan ‘order’. Tribunes did indicate their dissatisfaction with the new 
system, but only in a limited way by asking to restore the powers of the tribunate, and 
without any success.212 
The subsequent attacks against the Sullan pauci would be primarily be effected 
through tribunician agency, however.213 Again, the rule of the dominant faction caused 
much dissatisfaction among many groups in society. Problems were often exacerbated 
instead of solved, the courts were disfunctional... Sallust seems to designate C. Licinius 
Macer (tr. pl. 73) as an important turning point.214 The historian makes a close parallel 
between Macer and Memmius, the tribune of 111, for instance by making the discourse 
in their speeches very similar. Besides his general attack on the legitimacy of the 
political status quo, Macer also indicted C. Rabirius for desecration of holy places. A 
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strong argument could be made to rather designate 70 as the most important shift, 
when the former Sullan generals Pompey and perhaps Crassus restored the tribunate 
during their consulship. An important actor in convincing Pompey had been M. Lollius 
Palicanus (tr. pl. 71), who had (perhaps together with his colleagues) worked towards 
convincing mostly Pompey of the problems which would be resolved through restoring 
the tribunate.215 In 70 the tribunes immediately started taking apart the dominance of 
the pauci. The tribune M. Quinctius Plancinus helped the praetor L. Aurelius Cotta to 
draft a law to reform the juries, based on the proposals of Palicanus.216 Plautius 
introduced a law recalling the adherents of Lepidus who had fled to Sertorius, trying to 
mend yet another rift in society.217 The lex Cornelia on exemptions from the law, in 67, 
was another important step. In 64, then, it was the quaestor Cato who began to reclaim 
money which had been distributed by Sulla in the form of rewards for the 
proscriptions.218 The men who were to repay the money were then immediately 
persecuted, however, and it is possible that both the tribune M. Lucilius (who led 
someone to carcer despite auxilium provided by other tribunes) and C. Memmius were 
involved in this.219 Memmius tried to indict L. Licinius Lucullus, who was waiting outside 
the walls on the permission to celebrate his triumph.220 He then attempted to prevent 
this triumph. The definitive blow to the Sullan supporters came the year after, when 
Catulus died and Rabirius, the same man who had been indicted for sacrilege by Macer, 
was accused for killing Saturninus, under the crime of perduellio, by the tribune T. 
Labienus (tr. pl. 63). Labienus also introduced a law making the priesthoods open for 
popular election once more, according to the lex Domitia which had been abrogated by 
Sulla. His programmes during his tribuneship can be seen as a symbolic end to any 
claims to dominance by the group of Sullan supporters, which had already received a 
blow by the death of Catulus.221 
The defeat of the Catilinarian conspiracy then rooted out some remnants of the Sullan 
supporters, and was meant (in the mind of Cicero, at least according to his statements) 
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to usher in a new ‘concordia ordinum’.222 This again quickly turned out to be a mirage. 
Cicero was prevented from giving his closing speech as consul by the tribunes Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Nepos and L. Calpurnius Bestia.223 Cicero’s actions had caused 
frustration among large parts of the elites and non-elites alike, and would ultimately 
lead to his banishment by Clodius in 58. In 60 the proposed lex agraria by L. Flavius 
proved to be another hurdle for Cicero’s dream, and one which made it abundantly clear 
that it would remain but a dream. Although Cicero tried to amend the law to keep the 
peace, the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer attacked it vehemently, which again caused 
much discontent with several groups.224 Metellus was brought to carcer by Flavius. The 
consul then asked the senate to convene there, upon which Flavius blocked the 
entrance by sitting in front of it on his subsellium. Metellus then ordered the wall to be 
broken down, after which Pompey asked Flavius to desist. Metellus, however, did not 
agree upon being freed by the other tribunes. He similarly did not budge when Flavius 
threatened to take away his provincia for the coming year. Riots broke out over the 
refusal of the consul to concede. The stubbornness of both men thoroughly destroyed 
Cicero’s ideal of cautious negotiations and practical politics. Cato only made matters 
worse for him by preventing the senate to give an answer to a request by the publicani to 
relinquish some of the obligations of certain state contracts, and by proposing a 
measure that everyone, including the equites, should be taken to trial if they had as a 
member of the jury accepted a bribe. 
In 59 there were already some signs which pointed to dissatisfaction with the three 
potentates of the ‘first triumvirate’.225 By April, criticism was steadily increasing, with a 
number of young nobles including C. Scribonius Curio and the new candidate for the 
tribuneship P. Clodius Pulcher belonging to the foremost group of disgruntled persons. 
It was a sign of much more widespread criticism: Cicero, for instance, promised Atticus 
to write a secret book to criticise the three men. The orator also thought that this would 
soon become abundantly clear: 
For if the dominance or the Senate was unpopular, what do you think the reaction 
is going to be now that power has been brought down not to the people but to 
three exorbitant individuals? So let them make Consuls and Tribunes whom they 
please, let them drape Vatinius’ scrofulous back with a priest’s double-dyed toga – 
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you will soon see not only those who never put a foot wrong but Cato himself, the 
one who blundered, emerge as national heroes.226 
Only Curio continued to attack Caesar, Crassus and Pompey very openly, while Clodius 
under their pressure somewhat lessened his efforts. By July, however, large-scale but 
mostly anonymous criticism had arisen against the new dominant coalition. The 
definitive strike against the potentates came again in the next year, in August, when 
Clodius as tribune was suspected of planning to murder Pompey and others, and later 
was involved with the groups besieging Pompey in his house.227 
The next year it became clear that tribunes were not only in the position to pierce 
narratives depicting uncontested elite dominance. While the dominance established 
under Clodius’s tribuneship was certainly not anything like that of a modern popular 
movement, compared to ancient Roman standards, parts of the plebs urbana did have an 
exceptionally strong position within it.228 But the non-elites were far from united, and 
the front of dominance quickly fell. The main agents in this were again the tribunes of 
57, mainly T. Annius Milo, Q. Fabricius, and P. Sestius.229 According to Plutarch the start 
of the turnaround was a trial instated against Clodius by Milo. The tribunes of 57 
adopted some of Clodius’s strategies, and by favouring contention by the disaffected 
parts of non-elites and elites alike made it abundantly clear that the unification of the 
plebeians against the elites was an illusion. The definitive blow was the recall of Cicero, 
which was effected by large, varied groups. 
In 55 the renewed ‘first triumvirate’ was again attacked. The sources mainly point to the 
importance of Cato and Favonius, but again the actions of tribunes of the plebs (P. 
Aquillius Gallus and C. Ateius Capito) were indispensible.230 The dispute first arose over 
the commands voted to Pompey and Crassus through the lex Trebonia. As there were few 
people who dared to oppose the potentates, who were more powerful still than in 59, 
they originally had little success. But the displeasure was present, and came to the fore 
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when opposition to the law was brutally surpressed: not only was Cato prevented from 
speaking and led to prison, but Aquillius was violently shut inside the Curia and then 
severely wounded, and some among their group were wounded and some even killed. 
Aquillius Gallus was wounded and presented himself to the crowd in the contio, which 
struck a nerve with many. Only then some people started to throw stones at statues of 
Pompey, and stronger opposition was given to the law extending Caesar’s command. 
Nevertheless, the consuls prevailed for the time being through intimidation. When 
Crassus then started to levy new troops for his planned campaign against Parthia, the 
tribunes (mainly Ateius Capito) were once again relied upon to oppose these moves and 
even attempt to repeal the vote on the consular commands. Crassus ultimately was 
cursed by Ateius and about to be thrown into carcer, and had to take advantage of the 
consecutive confusion between several tribunes to leave Rome. This again made very 
clear how vulnerable the dominance of these men really was. 
It would not take long for a new dominant ‘order’ to arise, as after Clodius’s death in 52 
normally inimical political groups in the senate were motivated by popular riots to 
throw their collective weight behind Pompey as consul sine collega. Pompey took control 
of Rome by his troops, and a number of laws were introduced to remove unwanted 
political adversaries. Of course, the use of force to guarantee quiescence betrayed 
weakness, and this was once again made abundantly clear by a tribune. In 50, C. 
Scribonius Curio completely broke the mirage of a unified political scene.231 As has been 
established in the previous subsection, he ferociously attacked Pompey during his 
tribunate, supported by the consul L. Aemilius Paulus and the censor L. Calpurnius Piso 
Caesoninus. He was protected by the entire senate on one occasion, when the consularis 
M. Claudius Marcellus proposed to ‘deal with’ the tribunes. Curio ultimately succeeded 
in getting a vote in the senate on taking away the command of both Caesar and Pompey. 
The overwhelming majority of the senate supported him, and he was celebrated by 
parts of the populace who threw garlands at him. As tribune Curio had shown that a 
strict dichotomy between Pompey and Caesar was not relevant for most Roman citizens, 
and that both Caesar’s demands and Pompey’s supremacy were highly unpopular among 
broad sections of society. The illusion of order under Pompey’s troops broke down, 
violently, into a civil war which presented only two alternatives for Roman politics. This 
had not been Curio’s programme, however. While he did show the weaknesses of the 
Pompeian hegemony, he had not directly caused the civil war. 
In the next year, 49, tribunes again had a part in attacking both the status quo at 
Rome and the aspiration for dominance by Caesar. Mark Antony as a tribune gave a long 
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speech attacking Pompey, especially his condemnation of political opponents and the 
military subjugation of Rome in 52.232 He also informed the plebs urbana of the situation 
and of Caesar’s proposals, attempting to establish that it was the present dominant 
group which was perhaps trying to stir up conflict. He and his fellow tribune Q. Cassius 
Longinus vetoed senatorial decrees proclaiming Caesar a public enemy. They were 
driven from the senate, again indicating the weaknesses of Pompey’s putsch and 
dispelling its strength or claims to legitimate rule. However, when Caesar then entered 
Rome with his army, he was opposed by another tribune who did not want to submit to 
this ‘new master’. L. Caecilius Metellus obstructed Caesar’s actions, most notably when 
the proconsul attempted to access the treasury of Saturn.233 Metellus physically 
obstructed the doors, interposing his inviolable body as tribune. He only desisted when 
Caesar effectively threatened to murder him. This episode was one which directly 
caused Cicero to (wrongly) prophesise that Caesar would not hold his position for long, 
as Metellus’s actions had caused two of his masks to fall: 
As I see it, Caesar cannot last very long without falling by his own impulse, even 
though we are ineffective. Look how with all the advantage of novelty and 
brilliant success he has in a week become an object of bitter hatred even to the 
needy and reckless mob which supported him – how in so short a space of time he 
has lost two masks, the mask of clemency in dealing with Metellus and the mask of 
riches in the matter of the Treasury.234 
Caesar had promised clemency to give the impression of legitimate behaviour, but this 
action, again by a tribune, had punctured this discourse. Groups of non-elites showed 
ther dissatisfaction, and his glorious ‘liberation’ of Rome was seen as the military 
occupation which it was. 
In 45, the tribune L. Pontius Aquila would be the first to directly indicate dissatisfaction 
with Caesar’s new regime.235 When the dictator approached the tribunician benches 
during his triumph, Aquila refused to stand up to honour him. According to Suetonius, 
Caesar would have called out: “repete ergo a me Aquila rem publicam tribunus!”.236 For some 
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days afterwards, he did not give any favours without saying: “si tamen per Pontium 
Aquilam licuerit.”237 Suffice to say, he was not really amused, as this was one of the only 
writing on the wall that his position was not universally approved. Caesar took away 
some of Aquila’s villas as punishment, and gave them to Brutus’s mother Servilia. Aquila 
himself would later be one of the first to join the conspirators, and the senate after his 
death in the subsequent civil war set up a statue of him. 
The actions of Aquila were only the appetizer for tribunician actions which dispelled 
Caesar’s narrative of legitimate, undisputed rule, however. In 44, L. Caesetius Flavus and 
C. Epidius Marullus made clear that Caesar could not be both so powerful and 
unopposed. Their actions ultimately had the result of radicalising groups which were 
already dissatisfied with the dictator.238 At the start of the year a diadem, the symbol of 
kingship, had been placed on a statue of Caesar on the rostra. Marullus and Caesetius 
had ordered this to be removed and thrown away, and arrested the person which they 
thought responsible for it. Appian and Dio attest that a second event took place, where 
someone proclaimed Caesar king and the tribunes again led this person to prison. In this 
they formally followed Caesar’s proclamation that he would punish anyone who 
depicted him as king. Caesar, however, argued that the tribunes had staged the entire 
event themselves to insult him and fix suspicion on him. He then ejected Marullus and 
Caesetius from their tribuneship, banished them from the city, as he argued that they 
had made people hostile to him. According to some sources, this was one of the most 
important triggers for the conspiracy against Caesar, as from then on, the sources claim, 
he could not shake the suspicion of wanting to stay sole ruler. Seeing how closely 
Caesar’s death followed the event, this was quite likely the case. After the dictator had 
been killed, both men were recalled from banishment by some of the conspirators. In 
the next election for consul, even if they were not candidates, the names of Caesetius 
and Marullus were apparently found on the ballots in large numbers. 
5.2.3 Indicating rifts in society 
In this last subsection, we will take a broad look at the programmes of tribunes in the 
late Republic, and attempt to discern some evolutions throughout this timeframe. A 
wide range of important issues will be touched upon. It will be established that the 
tribunes were involved in policies pertaining to rifts across society. The political and 
societal developments caused differentiation in interests and desires between societal 
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groups, and influenced programmes by political groups. The many principals to the 
tribunate caused the tribunes to act on a very broad range of these issues in the late 
Republic, more so than any of the other magistrates. The behaviour of tribunes could 
make these rifts in society much more visible, especially when (and this happened quite 
frequently) different tribunes found themselves on opposing sides of a debate. This 
could draw attention to certain issues, and increase mobilisation by groups. 
Alternatively, tribunes could resolve problems. New rifts appeared over the course of 
the final century BCE, while few were mended. Some attention will also be given to 
evolutions in how tribunes could behave in struggles, so far as this is possible with the 
available sources, which do not offer consistent information for different periods of 
time. 
One important feature in the day-to-day experiences of individuals in the late Republic 
concerned the generally high mobility of the Italian population. This was closely linked 
with the integration of the Italian communities into the Roman community and the 
cosmopolitanisation of Italy and especially the Urbs. On these topics concerning 
mobility the tribunes were not the only magistrates to act, however. The consuls often 
were involved as well. Tribunes and consuls can often be found on different sides of the 
debates, as they sometimes cooperated and sometimes opposed on another, while on 
many occasions the magisterial colleges were split. 
Some tribunician laws concerning these issues were unambiguously opposed to the 
interests of non-citizens in Rome. A law by the tribune C. Papius in 65, for instance, 
made it possible to indict persons for falsely claiming to be Roman citizens. It also 
ejected non-Italian non-citizens from Rome.239 30 years earlier, in 95, the consular lex 
Licinia Mucia had already restored Italian non-citizens living in Rome to their ‘proper’ 
communities, and banished them from the city.240 The law by Papius quite likely gave 
out large rewards to cities successfully prosecuting their own citizens. Cicero 
immediately after his consulship defended A. Licinius Archias from a prosecution under 
this law. Cicero later did the same for L. Cornelius Balbus, who would become the first 
naturalised Roman citizen to attain the consulship. Another tribunician law, by a certain 
Minicius, regulated citizenship for children from mixed marriages.241 Kondratieff dated 
it to either 91 or 121. It stated that those born of one citizen and one non-citizen parent 
did not receive Roman citizenship, regardless of the sex of the parent and regardless of 
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conubium. This law clearly was a step back for intermarriage between Italian and Roman 
elites (or non-elites), and may have caused much discontent. If it was effectively passed 
in 91, it would have been an important trigger for the Social War. The law could have 
easily been seen as a slight to the allied citizens, especially if their status was framed in 
the law as ‘deterior’. 
Other laws did take the concerns of non-citizens into account. The lex agraria of 111, a 
tribunician law, is an important document. Not only was a large part of it preserved as 
an epigraphic text, but it also involved a significant decision for the Latin and Italian 
allies.242 The document is complex and has many lacunae, but one of the central 
measures was to give large parts of the ager publicus in private possession to those 
occupying it, including Italian or Latin allies, as long as this did not exceed the legal 
limits of possession. The law also determined the status of property in colonies or 
territories outside of Italy. It was probably intended to be the conclusion to long 
discussions about the rights to ager publicus, which had particularly arisen from the 
Gracchan land laws. Of course, it did not end the question of the ager publicus. Some 
lands were exempted from the law, and the last of the ager publicus in Italy was not 
privatised until the time of Caesar’s consulship. Interesting passages in the lex agraria of 
111 indicate, besides concerns for allied lands, that the cases of mobile pastoralism and 
perhaps even road maintenance were taken into account as well. The public nature of 
pasture lands was protected, and the law shows that the growing trend of large-scale 
transhumance was met by taxing large flocks making use of these lands. The complexity 
of the law and the exemptions provided by it attest the many principals which may have 
had an influence on its drafting. It also points to the lengthy debates which had been 
waged in Roman politics before the tribuni plebis ultimately came forward with this law. 
We not know if this law was contested, as it does not directly indicate conflicting 
interests between groups of citizens and allied Italians. Only the legal text itself is 
known. We can certainly expect that the law was intended to resolve issues of 
uncertainty which had existed since at least the lex Sempronia. It is not impossible, 
however, that it did in turn cause new friction. Eleven years later, when Saturninus 
proposed an agrarian bill, parts of the urban populus Romanus protested the law because 
it favoured the allied soldiers too much in the distributions. The lex agraria of 111 may 
have caused similar sentiments.243 The agrarian laws definitely were a very important 
cause of the Social War, perhaps even more so than citizenship. 
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As has been discussed in depth in the previous chapter, the content of the measures 
promised by M. Livius Drusus in 91, and even to which groups he promised them, 
remain quite unclear. The assurances may have been quite indeterminate, such as a 
promise to look after the interests of the allies, or the promise to grant Latin 
prerogatives to all Italian communities, or something else entirely. We can be fairly 
certain that direct requests were made of Drusus by Q. Poppaedius Silo, among others, 
and that he ultimately failed to act on the promises he made. Before Livius Drusus’s 
proposal, some tribunician laws had already looked at giving allies citizenship for 
specific services to Rome. M. Servilius Glaucia’s lex de repetundis of 101 included the 
provision that Latin citizens winning a trial under this law would be granted Roman 
citizenship.244 A proposed law by L. Appuleius Saturninus in 100, establishing colonies of 
veterans in Sicily, Achaia, and Macedon, included the provision that Marius could grant 
Roman citizenship to three persons in each colony.245 The law was annulled later and 
the colonies were not established. Quite likely the reasoning was to grant citizenship to 
some allies for their services in Marius’s armies, and this may not have been so irregular 
in the second century BCE. This principle was generalised in 90. The tribune L. 
Calpurnius Piso by a law made it possible for soldiers to be granted citizenship as a 
reward for courage.246 This law was proposed in the context of the Social War, as an 
incentive for loyal allies to remain loyal. 
The lex Varia in 90 was, on the other hand, a mixed bag for the allies.247 As an 
extension of the definition of maiestas, it enabled the prosecution of those who had 
caused the allies to resort to arms in the Social War. The offences against Roman 
maiestas which it investigated were directly assisting the allies in declaring war or 
advising them to do so and promising them citizenship. This clearly laid the blame for 
the war with the Italian communities which had revolted and had dared to ask for 
citizenship (if they had done so). However, the law also called for an investigation into 
those attempting to make changes to agreements concerning the ager publicus which the 
allies held in possession. This reason to rebel was therefore perhaps considered to be 
legitimate. It therefore is interesting in revealing different attitudes concerning the 
allies. However, the lex Varia should probably be seen as mainly an attack against the 
programmes of Livius Drusus during his tribunate. Several tribunes attempted to veto 
the motion, but were violently coerced by groups of equites to halt their opposition. 
Trials under the law soon got out of hand, among other reasons because all other courts 
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were suspended on account of the war for a long period in 90. This suspension of the 
courts was fiercely attacked by tribunes in contiones, possibly because various other 
offenses (such as repetundae) caused unrest in Italy and in the provinces as well. Trials 
under the lex Varia continued. Deprived of other means, it is not impossible that various 
cases were made to fit the description of offenses under the lex Varia. Varius himself was 
exiled the next year under his own law.  
Regardless of the causes of the Social War, citizenship did become an issue once the 
war had started. The tribunician lex Plautia Papiria (or, as Cicero called it, the lex Silvano et 
Carbone) closely followed the consular lex Iulia which was passed at the end of 90, and 
quite likely was based on this law and expanded its intentions.248 The lex Iulia most likely 
was an attempt to both secure the loyalty of those communities which had not joined 
the rebellion, and to divide the Italians on a community-by-community basis by 
extending a carrot to those who laid down arms. What we know of the lex Plautia Papiria 
is based on Cicero’s ‘pro Archia poeta’, and it entailed that allied citizens, resident in Italy, 
could within sixty days report to the praetor and receive Roman citizenship. In the same 
text it is apparent that Heraclea Lucania, of which Archias claimed to have received the 
citizenship, was involved in the Social War, as its archives had been burnt down. It does 
not really matter if the city was allied with the Lucani, had been defeated, or had 
remained loyal to Rome. The lex Plautia Papiria put pressure on the allied communities to 
ratify the grant of Roman citizenship, as rich and influential individuals (who were quite 
important for euergetism) were able to leave the community altogether if they did not. 
If this was the case, the tribunician law shrewdly enhanced the appeal of the consular 
one. By prying away mostly elite individuals with the means of travel, it could divide the 
Italian rebels within the communities as well as between communities. In the same year, 
the consul Cn. Pompeius Strabo placated the Transpadane communities of Gallia 
Cisalpina by offering them Latin rights.249 They would receive full citizenship only by 
the time of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, through the lex Roscia and 
possibly the lex Rubria.250 
These laws, while ostensibly benefitting the allied communities by giving them 
citizenship, could be regarded as not positive for them at all. The theoretical right to 
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vote did not prove to be very useful in the comitia tributa. First in 90, possibly to 
integrate the loyal Latin communities which had been promised citizenship, the tribune 
L. Calpurnius Piso proposed a law ex senatus consulto to create two new tribes, together 
with the possibility of veterans to become Roman citizens.251 The next year, another 
tribunician law increased this number to a total of ten new tribes.252 These new tribes 
always voted after all the other tribes, an element which had perhaps already been 
present in the lex Calpurnia. This made it possible for the ‘old citizens’ to reach a decision 
before the new tribes were even called upon to vote. Throughout the 80s, then, the 
distribution of the new citizens among the tribes became a political issue. Already in 88, 
Sulpicius Rufus introduced a proposal to deal with the dissatisfaction of the new 
citizens. New citizens (and, in another law, freedmen) were to be distributed among the 
35 tribes which had existed before the Social War.253 The law was effectively passed, 
although not without violent opposition by groups among the ‘old citizens’. These 
plebeians, probably mostly belonging to the rural tribes, may have disliked the 
curtailing of their power by the addition of so many new voters. It is quite likely that 
grudges built in Social War were an important factor as well, as was a feeling of 
‘superbia’. Sulpicius came into conflict with the consuls P. Cornelius Sulla and Q. 
Pompeius Rufus, and the vote on the law was the direct trigger for the first civil war. 
Sulpicius’s law was repealed when the consuls took Rome by force. That did not stop the 
discussions. Again in the next year, the issue resurfaced. The consul L. Cornelius Cinna 
proposed a law to the same effect (for the ‘new citizens’) as the one by Sulpicius, but this 
time some of the tribunes and his colleague Cn. Octavius opposed it, while six tribunes 
and the friends of the exiled Marians supported the law.254 Some tribunes vetoed the 
proposal (spurred on by the ‘old citizens’) and riots broke out. Octavius together with a 
group of armed citizens then attacked the Forum. Some of the ‘old citizens’ attacked the 
‘new citizens’ and killed many of them. This then again was a trigger for the second 
phase of the first civil war. The tribunes again were closely involved, as Cinna together 
with six tribunes was driven from Rome and deposed from his consulship, and they 
from their tribuneship. 
Large parts of the ‘old citizens’, probably mostly consisting of non-elite inhabitants of 
Rome and its environs, opposed the integration of the allied communities. This is a 
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possible indication of xenophobia, but the sources mainly claim that these ‘old citizens’ 
valued their political power in the comitia. The redistribution was ultimately decided in 
85 through a senatus consultum, which ordered the next censors to be appointed to 
concretely redistribute the new citizens.255 In practice this did not happen until 70, 
however. 
Of course, the differences did not stop with the integration of the ‘new citizens’ into 
the 35 tribes. Differences and grudges remained, and we can sometimes take a peek at 
them through remarks in Cicero’s speeches or because there were several rebellions in 
Etruria. The lex Papia indicates a lasting resentment of ‘foreign elements’ in the city, and 
policy would only start to change with Caesar’s dictatorship. Italian unification was not 
completed by the time the Republic fell, and the lack of unity may very well have 
contributed to its demise as armies were drawn from different regions. The civil war 
resulting from the citizenship issue caused its own scars among the population. At the 
eve of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar, for instance, only one legation by 
Pompey was vetoed by the tribune L. Marcius Philippus in the senate: the one given to 
Faustus Sulla, the son of the former dictator.256 
The various agrarian laws of the late Republic are the best example of top-down 
attempts to regulate the population flows. As the prices of farmland, especially in 
central Italy, drastically rose in this timeframe and Rome itself became ever more 
populated, these laws often had the effect of moving peasants or urban plebeians from 
the Italian heartland to the edges of the peninsula or to the provinces. But this was not 
always the case. The redistribution and privatisation of the ager publicus and later on 
large public works such as the draining of parts of the Pontine Marshes allowed for 
some new settlements in the most densely populated regions of Campania and Latium. 
The mobility to the provinces became ever more important as the first century 
progressed. The agrarian laws were – in a sense – redistributive measures. Furthermore, 
they played an important part in the transformation of veterans into a separate societal 
group. Military colonies were not a frequent occurrence before the timeframe, but 
gradually became the dominant form of land grants. 
Agrarian legislation was absolutely dominated by the tribuni plebis.257 Nearly all laws 
which are attested were tribunician measures. Nearly all of them were also opposed by 
one of the consuls and by the senate. There are only two exceptions to the tribunician 
dominance: at least one law by Sulla during his dictatorship establishing colonies for his 
veterans, and the two famous agrarian laws by Caesar in his first consulship. Caesar’s 
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behaviour was very unusual, and even provoked comparison with radical tribunes.258 
This again attests how closely tribunes were connected with this type of answer to 
several issues. 
The lex agraria of 111 is a bit of an oddity, as it was quite conservative. Its primary 
goal was not to change the existing situation of land occupation, but to confirm it. As 
has been established, it privatised the rented-out ager publicus, established some rules 
about the public land which remained, and punished those who had illegaly taken 
control of land or had lied about its acquisition. This type of law was perhaps much 
more common than we know, as the literary sources must not have been very interested 
in attesting them. 
For transformative agrarian laws, there appear to have been two types: those which 
primarily resettled citizen populations, and those meant to settle veterans. 
Among the laws of the first type, the agrarian law which followed the one of 111 was 
possibly one of the most radical. In 104, the tribune L. Marcius Philippus proposed an 
agrarian law which sought to divide farmlands somewhat more evenly.259 Cicero even 
mentions – in horror – a speech in which Philippus said that goods should be shared 
equally among all the citizens. The tribune had mentioned that the inequality of that 
time was unbearable. Most likely, the law would either enable the confiscation or the 
buying up of the properties of Roman elites of a certain census class and distribute this 
among a part of the population. This was unthought of for most elites, and the law was 
defeated. 
Five years later Sex. Titius introduced another lex agraria. The law is not known to 
have included specific attention to veterans.260 It was ferociously and for a long time 
opposed by some of Titius’s tribunician colleagues, by the consul M. Antonius Orator, 
and by the augurs. Although the law was passed, it was later abrogated for having been 
passed against the auspices. Titius had become very popular because of the law. 
However, when images of Saturninus were found in his home, he was (probably in a 
iudicium populi) found guilty and exiled. 
The lex Livia agraria and the lex Saufeia agraria, both passed in 91, were probably very 
similar to each other.261 Saufeius’s law was after all introduced to fill the void left by the 
one by Drusus. Regrettably, apart from the lower number of special magistrates (Vviri 
instead of Xviri), little is known about the lex Saufeia. The only source on it is an elogium 
on Livius Drusus. The lex Livia quite likely was a distribution of parts of the ager publicus 
 
                                                     
258 Plut., Caes., 14.1, Cat. Min., 32.1, Pomp., 47.3. 
259 Cic., Off., 2.73. 
260 Cic., de Or., 2.48, Leg., 2.14, 31; Obseq., 46; Val. Max. 8.1.damn.3. 
261 Ampel., 19.6; App., BC, 1.35-36; Ascon., 68-69C; Auct., Vir. Ill., 66.4, 10; Cic., Dom., 41, Leg., 2.14, 31; Diod. 
37.10.3; Flor., 2.5.6; Inscr. It., 13.3.74; Liv., Per., 71; Val. Max., 9.5.2; Vell., 2.13.2. 
  279 
in Italy, as colonies to both Italy and Sicily are attested by Appian. This clearly went 
against the interests of groups within the allied communities. The beneficiaries were 
the plebs (or the δῆμος). The law was again opposed by a consul, in this case L. Marcius 
Philippus, and by some groups of allied communities which travelled to Rome. It was 
passed, but after long discussions abrogated because Drusus had ignored the obnuntiatio 
by consul Philippus and had attacked him. The lex Saufeia very likely remained in effect. 
In 83, a lex Iunia agraria by M. Iunius Brutus established a colony at Capua, but it was 
not much later destroyed by Sulla.262 It was most likely a civilian lex Agraria, not one to 
settle veterans. 
The agrarian law of P. Servilius Rullus is, besides the one in 111, perhaps the most 
well-known with regard to content, even if Cicero may have misrepresented its 
contents.263 We have three speeches from Cicero, one of the consuls of the year 63, in 
opposition to the law. The rogatio seems to have been primarily aimed at distributions to 
regular citizens. At Capua, for instance, a colony was to be established of 5000 settlers 
and their families, receiving 10 iugera each. The law provided for the sale or distribution 
of ager publicus as it had been defined in 81, in addition to territories which had been 
conquered since 88. Other lands were to be bought and distributed or sold again. The 
money for this would be provided by the spoils from all generals. The exception was 
Pompey, but the revenues from the laws he conquered would directly be at the disposal 
of the agrarian law. Besides selling land, colonies were to be established both in Italy 
and in the provinces. Xviri with (apparently) quite extraordinary powers were to be 
elected by a minority of the tribes. These men would serve for five years together with 
quite large a staff. Cicero was the foremost detractor, and used many arguments against 
it, including one that decisions by previous agrarian laws would be opened up to 
changes. His colleague C. Antonius supported the proposal. Rullus probably dropped his 
proposal when his tribunician colleague L. Caecilius Rufus declared that he would stop 
the law by all means. Another possibility is that it was actually rejected by the comitia. 
The law seems to have been very popular at first, but Cicero used many different 
arguments, including some about the enormous costs and some invoking xenophobia, to 
convince the crowds at contiones that it was against the interests of the Roman urban 
population. This certainly gives us some clues about the position of various groups in 
agrarian legislation. 
Other laws were mainly aimed at settling veterans. The first such law in the 
timeframe was by L. Appuleius Saturninus, in 103, for the veterans of the war against 
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Jugurtha.264 It would give 100 iugera in Africa to each soldier, which was a huge stretch of 
land. These soldiers quite likely were present at the contiones and forced the law through 
despite opposition. When another tribune, M. Baebius Tamphilus, attempted to veto the 
law, he was driven from the rostra when the crowd in the contio started to throw stones 
at him. 
Three years later Saturninus proposed a similar law, this time for the veterans of 
Marius who had fought the Cimbri. The law would divide the land taken from these 
tribes in Gaul.265 Foreseeing opposition by the senatorial elites, the law demanded an 
oath to be taken by them in which they vowed to obey the decision of the people. 
Caesar’s law four decades later would include the same stipulation. Senators refusing to 
take this oath were to be expelled from the senate and fined. According to Appian, large 
groups of the plebs rustica and veterans of Marius flocked to the city to support the law. 
The urban plebeians were opposed to it. Apparently the law gave too large a share to the 
allied soldiers, which the Romans would not accept.266 Initially, as elite opponents of the 
law were driven from the rostra, groups among the plebs urbana attempted to stop the 
comitia through obnuntiatio. The assembly turned violent, with the opposing groups 
fighting each other. Ultimately the proponents of the law won out. Possibly by the same 
law, colonies of veterans were established in Sicily, Achaea, Macedon, and possibly 
Africa.267 Although the plebiscites were later repealed after Saturninus’s death, some 
colonies were effectively established in Liguria and Corsica. 
The lex Plotia agraria by A. Plautius in 70 settled the veterans from the wars in 
Hispania, both those who had served under Pompey as those who had under Metellus.268 
The law benefitted the consul of that year, Pompey, and was apparently approved by the 
senate. We could then expect little opposition. The execution of the law was postponed, 
however, as the treasury had been drained and the measures could not be paid. 
Nevertheless, Plutarch in his biography of Lucullus does make reference to the rich 
lands given to Pompey’s veterans, possibly already by 69. This then is the only law 
settling veterans where no protest by non-elite groups is known. 
The lex Antonia agraria of 44, introduced by L. Antonius Pietas, probably also was 
primarily designed to give lands to veterans, both in Italy and in the provinces.269 The 
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problem with the law is that most of it is known to us through the very coloured lens of 
Cicero’s Philippics. In these speeches, the law is presented as having been used to 
distribute and primarily sell land to all kinds of persons, at the whim of the 
commissioners. Veterans were still the primary beneficiaries of the grants, but promises 
to give land to the general citizenry seem to have come to nothing. Instead, Cicero tells 
of the grants to various friends of the VIIviri who were appointed by the law. The orator 
complains multiple times of the 2000 iugera of land given to Antonius’s teacher in 
rhetorics, Sex. Clodius, in the area of Leontini. Among the beneficiaries there were also 
many elites, including equites and military tribunes. The land itself seems to have been 
obtained in three ways: land which had been confiscated by Caesar’s decrees, land 
which was confiscated by the VIIviri themselves, possibly including land of the former 
propraetorian legates of Pompey (including Cicero himself), and land which was bought 
by the commissioners. It included allotments in Campania (some of it perhaps still 
having the status of ager publicus), much to the dissatisfaction of the Campanion 
populace, land in Sicily, and the Pontine Marshes. Quite possibly, properties in the city 
of Rome itself were distributed or sold as well. Some of the colonies sent out by the 
commissioners infringed on the colonies established by Caesar in his first consulship, 
including a colony at Capua. The lands distributed by the VIIviri were furthermore 
exempted from any taxes. The senators and even the tribes were required to swear an 
oath to obey the law, and it was not very popular with the plebs urbana at all. In the same 
year, the law was annulled through a senatus consultum on a motion by L. Caesar. In later 
peace offers to the senate, Antony fiercely protected the land law, even if he does seem 
to have admitted to some of the wrongdoings of the commissioners. Although it should 
be emphasised that this is through Cicero’s depiction of the situation, the Perusine war 
three years later was in part the consequence of these land distributions, and those 
organised by the triumvirs. 
The establishment of veteran colonies seems to have not been very popular with the 
plebs urbana. Before the Social War, one of the reasons seems to have been the grants to 
allied soldiers. Afterwards, it is possible that these grudges endured. Another very 
important reason for the dissatisfaction of the urban Roman population was of course 
the great expense which these laws brought with them. Through one offhand remark of 
Cicero, it appears that land which was to be sold for the establishing of colonies was 
deliberately embellished with some expense in order to sell it much above its worth.270 
Fezzi has argued that land laws were seen as politically exclusive to grain laws, as the 
cost of both measures was difficult to combine.271 As veteran colonies could for these 
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and possibly many other reasons draw more opposition in the city of Rome, ‘mixed’ laws 
were on two occasions introduced. 
The first can be dated to 60, when a plebiscite on agrarian distribution failed. This 
time, the rogation had been introduced by L. Flavius.272 The primary goal of the law was 
to provide land for Pompey’s veterans of his campaigns in the east. Interestingly, 
however, Dio explicitly states that Flavius added provisions for the citizenry as well, in 
order to make the law more popular. As has been proposed, military colonies were not 
quite popular with the plebs urbana. With this law, once again, a consul (Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Celer) opposed Flavius quite vehemently. Ultimately, talk about the proposal 
subsided and it was dropped by request of Pompey himself. 
The law quite likely was the inspiration for Caesar’s first land law, which of course 
was consular. From the start, the lex Iulia agraria was meant to distribute land both to 
Pompey’s veterans and to the urban poor.273 It instituted XXviri for the buying of land 
and leading out of colonies. The law distributing land in Campania to the fathers of 
three children (at least 20.000 of them) was introduced later in the year. Both laws 
required the senators and all the tribes to swear a vow that they would abide by the law. 
Because they combined military with civilian distributions and were funded by 
Pompey’s booty, Caesar’s laws were incredibly popular with the plebs urbana and a large 
number of veterans. They were, of course, incredibly unpopular with a majority of the 
senatorial elites, whose villas in Campania were quite numerous. The local population 
might have been opposed as well. As the tradition of agrarian laws would have it, Caesar 
was opposed by his consular colleague Bibulus and by large parts of the senate, who 
were also aided by three of the tribunes. Caesar himself received some aid of Vatinius 
and other tribunes, such as C. Alfius Flavus. The opposition did not stop when the law 
was passed, nor even at the end of the year, despite the vows the senators had taken. In 
56 the tribune P. Rutilius Lupus made a very long speech attacking Caesar’s campanian 
lex agraria. It appears to have been a very difficult topic for many senators who were 
reluctant to comment, until the opinion was given that the presence of Pompey was 
necessary before it could be discussed.274 Similarly, when C. Scribonius Curio as tribunus 
designatus in 50 proposed alterations to the Campanian arrangements, Pompey was 
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more worried than Caesar.275 The reason for this was that the former did not want it to 
be ‘vacuus’ when the latter returned. 
The same year 59 perhaps saw another tribunician measure by P. Vatinius, although 
it is highly uncertain that the tribune was ever involved. Suetonius mentioned that the 
citizenship status and the establishment of Novum Comum had been allowed through a 
rogatio Vatinia.276 It is therefore possible that Vatinius added a measure pertaining to 
Caesar’s right to establish new colonies in Gallia Cisalpina. This citizenship was later 
contested, as a magistrate of Comum was flogged by consul M. Claudius Marcellus in 51. 
It is unknown which groups benefitted from Vatinius’s law, although a 500 Greek 
families were among the colonists at Comum. 
In conclusion, there were quite a lot of agrarian proposals by tribunes in the late 
Republic, although not all of them were passed and some were abrogated. Not a single 
law was uncontested. Members of the elite and Italian communities were often, if not 
always, directly opposed to these laws, as their use of the ager publicus or even their 
entire domains could be threatened by appropriation by these laws. At the start of the 
late Republic as it has been defined in this thesis, agrarian redistributions certainly 
contributed to the conflicts between Rome and its Italian allies. The gradual (and 
uneven) shift to provincial land grants also exported these problems from Italy. 
Nevertheless, even under the triumvirate it would lead to bitter conflict and even war. 
Another conflict surrounding these laws was the one between veterans and groups of 
regular citizens. The plebs urbana on multiple occasions did not agree to the settlement 
of former soldiers. The soldiers themselves, on the other hand, seem to have 
increasingly considered grants of land as a part of the payment for their service. 
Especially after Caesar’s death this would become a decisive factor in Roman politics. By 
that time, however, the tribunes were no longer directly involved in agrarian 
legislation. This too is of course a significant development. 
A third crucial evolution which had started much sooner but continued to be a major 
issue in the late Republic was the consequences of the increase of slave labour. The 
swelling number of freedmen or descendants of freedmen in the Roman population did 
bring with it a factor of political inequality, as these persons were inscribed in one of 
just the four urban tribes (Collina, Esquilina, Palatina, and Suburana). While the 
influence of the non-elites in politics surpassed the practical strength of their votes, this 
indirect constraint remained an important factor for these groups. Pushed by, we may 
assume, influential freedmen members of the community, the tribunes at two points 
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during the chosen timeframe introduced measures to distribute the freedmen among all 
35 tribes.277 
The first, by Sulpicius Rufus in 88, went hand in hand with (and was perhaps the same 
as) his law to distribute the new citizens into the 35 tribes.278 The law was partly 
inspired by the use of freedmen in the army. As has been mentioned, Sulpicius was 
fiercely opposed by the consuls Pompeius and Sulla, and probably by groups within the 
plebs urbana inscribed in the rural tribes, and the violent passing of the law caused the 
first civil war. When Sulla victoriously returned, it was immediately rescinded. Cinna in 
the following year proposed the same measure, but was again driven away. According to 
Livy’s epitomator, the freedmen were in fact registered in all tribes in 85.279 This is not 
attested by other sources, and it definitely did not establish a general rule. 
The issue was put on ice for a while, in part because of the diminishing of the 
tribunician powers or perhaps because of the redistribution of new citizens in 85. In 67, 
it was picked up by C. Cornelius.280 As the tribune already had to contend with 
opposition to his other proposals, he did not succeed in formally introducing a rogatio 
during his tribuneship. Rather, he passed the law along to C. Manilius Crispus who was 
tribune in 66. The law provided for the redistribution of freedmen to the tribes of their 
patrons.281 Manilius introduced the law in the comitia on the day of the Compitalia, the 
last day of December. As he had entered the tribuneship not long before, this vote 
disregarded the obligatory trinundinum between a proposal and a vote. A crowd of 
freedmen and perhaps slaves supported Manilius, but a riot broke out with other 
groups. The tribune fled to the Capitol with a number of supporters. Domitius as 
quaestor was then involved in driving Manilius, killing some among the groups 
accompanying him. The senate on the very next day, the 1st of January, issued a 
resolution that it disproved of the proposal. This did not immediately impact the law, 
but it did contribute to Manilius giving up efforts to promote it. Another strong factor 
was that other parts of the plebs were, according to Dio, indignant as well. Manilius 
must have faced very powerful principals which disapproved of his behaviour, as he 
went so far as to disavow the law and put the blame on other persons, including Crassus. 
The fallout of the “Maniliana offensio”282 was quite important, as it showed a split within 
the plebs urbana. This split was quite complex. Members of the plebs who were inscribed 
in the rural tribes would not desire this redistribution of the freedmen, while those 
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inscribed in the four urban tribes would benefit from it. The interests of the various 
groups which were involved were in this case clearly determined by their familial 
history, not by socio-economic factors. During the 50s, the votes in the comitia tributa 
were most often determined by mobilisations. At the end of the decade, during his 
campaign for the praetorship, Clodius again promised to redistribute the freedmen in all 
tribes, but his death prevented this proposal to become concrete.283 
Other laws point to the involvement of the tribunes in the proliferation of the urban 
economy and, connected to this, of urban forms of organisation and the status and 
livelihood of the plebs urbana. In the previous chapter the various coin laws were already 
discussed. Many of these were introduced by tribunes as a result of contention by 
primarily urban societal groups. The coin laws touched upon many more groups in 
Roman society, however, and were in part the result of the ever increasing monetisation 
of Roman society in this period. Another type of tribunician legislation which has 
already been discussed are the leges frumentaria. As has been argued, these were the 
consequence of pressure by the plebs urbana. The urban population of especially Rome 
needed grain subsidies to keep life in the Urbs viable, but the grain subsidies and later 
distributions also confirmed their extraordinary position as a separate status group. The 
plebs frumentaria became an important group in Roman politics for a long period in the 
late Republic, and especially starting in the 50s, because the subsidies allowed them 
more resources to mobilise. Another very important law was the lex Clodia de collegiis. It 
protected the existence of the collegia against the senatus consultum of 64, and allowed for 
the establishment of more of these associations.284 Perhaps the law even included active 
recruitment of new collegiati. The collegia were without a doubt an important group for 
the non-elite Romans, especially in urban contexts. They were also linked to the 
political power of these groups. Clodius as tribune would be the one person to advance 
the collegia. Caesar abolished many of them in response to the urban violence in his 
absence, with Augustus at first repeating this abolition. Augustus’s lex Iulia de collegiis, 
just falling outside of the time frame, made them legal entities under very strict 
conditions, which in practice implied that they were made docile. The peak of the 
possibilities of the plebs urbana to act as a principal for the tribunate therefore lay 
between 58 and Caesar’s dictatorship. 
Another issue divided groups across the social spectrum: the issue of debt. It was a 
prominent feature in the late Republic, in part because the many domestic struggles 
confused arrangements. Not many tribunician actions concerning debt are known, as 
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the topic was somewhat taboo in Roman politics. Again, tribunes appeared on several 
sides of the debates. They were certainly not the only political institution involved with 
the issue, as praetors could affect it by edicts and provincial governors had a large effect 
on provincial debts. 
In 89, the tribune L. Cassius was potentially involved in the lynching of the urban 
praetor A. Sempronius Asellio, who had applied ancient laws outlawing usury.285 
According to Valerius Maximus, the tribune had stirred up the creditors to attack the 
praetor as he was sacrificing in front of the temple of Castor. This mobilisation, if true, 
was most likely effected through a contio. It is possible that the behaviour of the tribune 
had been influenced by pressure from the lenders. The context for the actions of the 
praetor Asellio is also important, of course. Most likely the Social War had stopped the 
payment of interests by many debtors, and Asellio could have chosen to favour them 
when the creditors brought cases against their clients before him. 
Other actions by tribunes concerned the abolition of debts. According to Dio, one 
such official tribunician proposal came in 63.286 It is possible, however, that no such 
proposal was ever made by a tribune, but that it refers to a programme of Catilina for 
debt relief. The Catilinarian cause does attest to the problem of debts, however, even 
without major civic upheavals. In 49, tribunes had lowered the rates of interest to ease 
the debt crisis which had arisen from the civil war.287 The war had caused moneylenders 
to collect their loans, while debtors were of course often unable or unwilling to 
immediately pay their loans back. This caused a lot of friction, and Caesar attempted to 
resolve this by appointing special commissioners to resolve the issues of sureties. This 
of course did not resolve the situation, and in 47 Dolabella proposed to cancel all debt.288 
He was opposed by two other tribunes, L. Trebellius and C. Asinius Pollio. The 
disturbances caused heavy clashes with many deaths between groups within the plebs 
urbana, indicating the deep rifts in Roman society. The law was not passed, but when 
Caesar returned he did relieve some the plebs urbana through the pay of interests and 
urban rents for up to 2000 sestertii. Quite importantly, Caesar subsequently attempted to 
ban many of the collegia, in order to restrain the possibilities of the plebs urbana to 
mobilise. 
Developments strictly concerning the elite societal groups of Roman society gave rise to 
tribunician programmes as well. Generally, the most significant development was the 
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growing importance of some of the existing elites (such as the equites) and the rise of 
new societal groups such as Italian and provincial elites, wealthy merchants, high 
ranking officers...289 This put pressure on the status of the dominant strata, especially 
the nobilitas. The distaste of these dominant strata be seen, for example, in the actions of 
the tribune Q. Mucius Orestinus, who in 64 attacked Cicero for being unworthy of the 
consulship.290 Some tribunes belonged to the established senatorial families (the 
nobilitas), others were newcomers, but this personal identity did not always determine 
their programmes. On most of these issues tribunes can be found on different sides of 
the debate. Compared to most programmes concerning non-elite societal changes, 
however, the tribunes did not dominate the politics involving issues of elite competition 
as much. 
The long conflict between groups of equites and senatorial families from the start of 
the timeframe until the 70s has already been explored in depth. It was a consequence of 
a desire for more political influence by the equestrians, while the dominant senators 
would generally have attempted to retain their privileges (or recapture them).  
Closely related to this was the issue of the size and membership of the senate. The 
proposal by Livius Drusus in 91 to expand the senate with some of the most influential 
equites caused dissatisfaction within both groups.291 Many senators would probably have 
been dissatisfied with the inclusion of new members who had not ‘earned’ the rank of 
senator. According to Appian, they feared that these newcomers would form a political 
group to oppose them. Groups of equites would have disliked the loss of control over the 
courts. The group of equites would have been internally divided as to who was worthy of 
being promoted and who was not. A last important measure on membership of the 
senate was the lex Clodia de censoria notione.292 It prevented the censors from ejecting 
persons from the senate, the equestrian order, or issuing a nota without formally 
accusing (and therefore hearing) the subject of their actions. Even then, these actions 
were only possible when both censors agreed to it. This plebiscite protected senators 
from being excluded for political reasons. Furthermore, families which became 
impoverished could no longer be easily driven from the senate. These measures were 
abolished in 52 by the consul suffectus Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica.  
This provides a link to sumptuary laws, measures against certain behaviour by the 
elite members of Roman society. These laws were protection against out of control 
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competition through conspicuous consumption, which in turn could and did lead to 
corruption.293 There are four tribunician actions known in the timeframe under 
consideration.294 M. Duronius probably in 97 actually abrogated a sumptuary law, the lex 
Licinia, which had regulated expenses for banquets and the maximum use of meat and 
salt.295 Duronius may have been influenced by new elites which disliked the limits on the 
expression of their wealth. He was ejected from the senate after his tribunate. A law by 
P. Sulpicius Rufus (tr. pl. 88) prohibited senators from having more debts than 2000 
denarii. It can be considered a sumptuary law as well.296 Possibly it was a measure to 
dissuade senatorial families from going too far in indebting themselves for the sake of 
conspicuous consumption. In 68, C. Antius Restio introduced a law which again instated 
rules for banquets, and forbade magistrates or magistrates-elect from dining anywhere 
except for a few marked exeptions.297 It is quite likely that persons were indebting 
themselves in order to raise their status with magistrates, or perhaps even in order to 
lobby for certain positions. The law was not obeyed by most elites, according to 
Macrobius, while Cicero reports that it in fact was obeyed. The last proposal was a 
sumptuary law by C. Scribonius Curio concerning luxury during travel.298 It taxed either 
the number of slaves or the number of vehicles for a rate of 100 sestertii per unit. It is 
unknown of Curio succeeded in passing this law. Given the general trend during his 
tribunate, this is quite unlikely. His proposal quite clearly targeted new, rich elites, 
something which Cicero directly asserts in the one letter which is the only source on 
Curio’s proposal. 
Some other measures on elite status and differentiation included an important one by L. 
Roscius Otho in 67.299 This law reserved the first 14 rows of seats during ludi for the 
equites, and thereby was an important sign of their status in the public life of the late 
Republic. It also laid a penalty on those who did not possess the equestrian property 
criterion and nevertheless sat in these rows. A law by L. Cassius Longinus in 44 allowed 
Caesar to give families the patrician rank.300 This was at the time quite unique. The rank 
of patrician did not matter much anymore, which is attested by at least two patricians 
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(Clodius and Dolabella) giving up this status in order to become tribunes. Because of this 
right bestowed on Caesar, the title might have regained some of its relevance, even if in 
a very different form. 
Other laws which were quite important for the elites were those regulating elections.301 
The tribunes were quite active on this matter. Two tribunes, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus 
in 103 and T. Labienus in 63, passed laws which introduced elections to the priestly 
colleges. The lex Domitia provided that all priesthoods (including the augurs) should be 
chosen by the people from a number of candidates. this election would not be 
performed by the entire comitia tributa, but only 17 tribes appointed by lot could 
choose.302 This would safeguard the fiction that the people only gave advice, which the 
priestly colleges then accepted by coopting the elected candidate. Cicero in the pro 
Cornelio notes that it was not opposed by anyone, but this can be doubted. While this 
could be seen as a move which opened up the priesthoods to new groups, instead of 
them being monopolised by the established elites, it is not so simple. Domitius was 
member of the nobilitas, after all, and his motivation seems to have been that he 
personally had not been chosen to fill the place of his own father. The law was rescinded 
by Sulla, but the lex Labiena in 63 reinstated it.303 The organisation of the colleges of 
priests may have been a broad issue in the 60s, as there might have been a law 
forbidding persons of the same gens from being members of the same college.304 The 
tribunes did not regularly engage in general electoral laws, however. At the latest 68 a 
law was passed by an anonymous tribune, prohibiting the use of nomenclatores by 
candidates, but it was not obeyed by many.305 The proposal of Cornelius in 67 to punish 
bribery was never passed because the senate preferred a consular proposal ex senatu 
consulto.306 Another tribunician law which is known to us is the lex Fabia of 64, which 
limited the size of the escort a candidate for an election could run around with.307 In 61, 
then, M. Aufidius Lurco proposed a law, again ex senatu consulto, which would oblige 
those who promised money to the tribes and effectively paid it, to continuously pay 
3000 sesterces to each of those tribes for the entirety of his life, probably to prove that 
he was a patron.308 It was in the 50s, however, that the most vehement conflicts about 
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elections seem to have taken place, and the tribunes in some cases seem to have added 
fuel to the fire rather than smothering it. In 55 the consular lex Licinia de sodaliciis gave a 
huge advantage in selecting the juries to the prosecution in trials against sodalicii who 
had employed electoral malpractices. The possible tribunician proposals we know of do 
not go quite so far at all.309 
Another category of fissures having an effect on Republican politics were primarily 
political in nature. The late Republic saw political murders and banishments on a scale 
which had been unknown in Rome until that time. The proscriptions of Cinna in 87 and 
Sulla starting in 82, and those by the triumvirs from 43 onwards were the largest 
organised events, but many more cases are scattered throughout the timeframe. This 
only served to strengthen the many grudges held by many persons and political groups 
against others, making what had once been disputes into political vendettas. The 
tribunes were mostly involved in banishing persons or groups, aside from often being 
the target of similar measures or murder. Tribunician laws or edicts seem to have been 
the normal procedure for banishing persons or groups of people, or for establishing it as 
punishment for infractions against certain laws.310 Clodius’s laws exiling Cicero, first by 
rule and then by name, were definitely no exceptions. 
However, tribunes were also involved in recalling persons from banishment.311 This 
could be seen as mending rifts, but often it was mostly a matter of recalling people 
friendly to the political group calling for the measure. From the moment Caesar had 
taken Rome in 49 until his death, for instance, various persons were recalled through 
laws introduced by the tribunes.312 An exception was made for some people, including 
Milo. Most banishments which were annulled concerned trials under Pompey’s laws in 
52, such as the lex Pompeia de vi and the lex Pompeia de ambitu. Another important law 
recalled the children of those persons proscribed by Sulla, and gave them back their 
citizenship.313 This example neatly indicates how long these vendettas could last. These 
laws recalling persons, while large in scale, were probably handled on a case-by-case 
basis. Thanks to some letters by Cicero, we know that exiles were still hoping to be 
recalled or only just returned in 46.314 In 88, P. Sulpicius Rufus passed a law to recall 
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those ejected by violence under the lex Varia who had not been allowed to plead their 
case.315 When the consul Cinna returned to Rome the next year together with Marius, 
the latter refused to enter the city before a law was passed revoking his banishment.316 
The tribunes promptly complied. Florus attests that a proposal for recalling Marius and 
his political group from exile had been in the works even before Cinna had to flee the 
city, and that it was one of the reasons why he had had to do this. In 70, a lex Plotia, 
which Caesar had supported as candidate for the quaestorship, recalled those who had 
supported Lepidus and/or Sertorius.317 Other tribunician laws only pertained to one 
person, such as the recall by Q. Calidius in 99 of Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus,318 the 
tribunician proposals to recall Cicero in 57, or the proposals to recall Memmius by 
Curio.319 
This subsection, together with the previous two subsections, has reaffirmed that the 
tribunate of the plebs was indeed involved in many conflicts during the late Republic. 
Rather than indicating an essential institutional characertistic which spurred the 
tribunes on to start sedition, or showing that these conflicts were necessary to relieve 
pent-up pressures, this shows that the tribunes indeed were the agents of diverse 
principals which could all have different expectations. In this last subsection we have 
seen in some cases that the consequence of tribunician actions could indeed be a 
deepening of rifts in society. When it became clear to societal or political groups that 
their interests were opposed to those of other groups, the evocation of these differences 
could secure further mobilisation in the future. In other words, the involvement of 
tribunes in societal conflict could stress an atmosphere of conflict. Nevertheless, this 
too was not an essential feature of the institution, as tribunes often tried to resolve 
certain grievances. 
The most important rifts were created by the political and economic evolutions 
which had started in the second century BCE, and which were closely connected to one 
another: the integration of the Italian allies into the Roman political system and the 
overpopulation of the Italian heartland. More broadly, both issues were also connected 
with the high mobility of the Italian population and the cosmopolitanisation of Rome in 
the final century BCE. Tribunes took varying sides in these debates, spurred on by 
various principals. Citizens of the Italian allied communities could also engage in 
contention with the tribunes. The Social War was a breaking point in these debates, and 
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were in part ‘caused’ by various tribunes, especially Livius Drusus, who by their actions 
and failures made clear how large the gap was between the expectations of most Roman 
citizens and the Italian allies. Various tribunes also played an important part in the 
discussions about fully integrating the new Roman citizens. This group had immediately 
become an important principal, in other words, and strove to receive the same political 
rights as the other Roman citizens. The conflicts over this issue then was an important 
element leading up to the first civil war, which again deepened the grudges between 
groups of non-elites and elites alike. These broad societal conflicts therefore became 
very political, and even a form of factional strife. 
The debates about the tribunician agrarian laws also indicate how veterans 
increasingly became important principals for the tribunate. Agrarian laws in favour of 
the common people as citizens were generally opposed by broad coalitions of elites, 
while those establishing veteran colonies were opposed by the plebs urbana as well. 
These groups became increasingly powerful as well. By the end of the 60s and the start 
of the 50s, it had become clear that it was impossible to exclude the plebs urbana from 
distributions of land, and ‘mixed laws’ which were very expensive and large in scope 
had to include both veterans and citizens as beneficiaries. After this date, Caesar and the 
triumvirate did not count on tribunes for land laws. The lex Antonia agraria shows how 
contested these laws had become. Land attributions became increasingly more 
personalised between a general and his veterans because of this, and the tribuni plebis 
were cut from the equation. 
There were other rifts in which the tribunes were very active. Freedmen did not have 
equal political power to the other plebs, because they were only divided into the four 
urban tribes. We know of two occasions where tribunes attempted to resolve this 
situation, but both were rescinded. Given the growing importance of rich freedmen, 
there is perhaps remarkably little attested conflict on this issue. The tribunes were 
closely involved in societal changes resulting from the urbanisation of Italy, and 
especially the growth of Rome. They were instrumental in the proliferation of the plebs 
urbana (and the creation of the plebs frumentaria) as influential groups in politics. The 
influence of thse groups as principals for the tribunate then began to severely diminish 
from the moment that Rome became militarily occupied, from 52 onwards. 
Debt involved principals from all social strata, and the tribunes were influenced by 
both debtors and creditors. Conflicts on debt were mainly connected to civil conflicts 
and wars. 
Struggle between elite groups for influence and status also was an important rift in 
late Republican society, and often had important consequences for civil conflicts. The 
tribunes were most often involved in laws pertaining to the senatorial elites themselves 
(and then especially the nobilitas) and those concerning the equites. General sumptuary 
laws were introduced by them as well. There were some tribunician electoral laws, 
which were mainly important for competition between senatorial elites, but the laws 
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trying to curb electoral bribery proved to be very ineffective. The rifts between elite 
political groups were mostly worsened by the tribunes, mostly by their involvement in 
banishing people from Rome. Sometimes tribunes were involved in recalling people or 
groups as well, but mostly this followed factional lines. The tribunes were not very 
active in resolving elite factional conflicts.  
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5.3 The relevance of the tribunate in the last decades of the 
late Republic 
In this final section, we will look at the period after the civil war between Caesar and 
Pompey started. As we have seen, this was a crucial period for the Republican political 
institutions, and the period in which many of them would lose significance with the 
advance of the rule of the first Princeps. Without any doubt, the tribunate was one of 
these institutions. From being a central factor in late Republican politics, the majority of 
tribunes we know of by name after Cicero’s death are attested only through epigraphy, 
which means that we are far less well informed about their politics. This difficulty is 
compounded by the fact that Appian, Dio, and Suetonius, our most important remaining 
sources, do not offer that much information after a certain point either. 
While the individual tribunes stopped being a relevant part of politics, perhaps the 
same cannot be said about the tribunate as an institution. The years of an emperor’s 
rule were counted by the annual reaffirmation of his tribunicia potestas. Caesar already 
usurped some of the tribunician powers and rights, and Augustus’s acceptance of the 
tribunicia potestas for life is the symbolic end of the timeframe of this thesis. 
This section will be divided into just two subsections. The first will establish some 
highpoints of the tribunate, but will mainly give an overview of tribunician activity 
from directly prior to the civil war to the grant of the tribunicia potestas to Augustus. The 
second section will look at what socio-political developments caused the decline in the 
importance of the tribunate as a Republican institution, but restored it as a locus of 
power during the Principate. 
5.3.1 The path to the Principate 
So how can the last decades of the tribunate be described? Was the ‘downfall’ already 
set in stone, and was it a gradual decline? Can we point to a specific moment when the 
tribunate ceased to have a central influence in Rome? During the late Republic, after all, 
it is quite clear that the tribunes had been central to political contention for a very long 
period of time. The 70s had been an exception, but even then the powers of the 
tribunate had been a central issue. In the late Republic, the many rifts in society gave 
power to new and larger societal groups which, sometimes very briefly, became major 
players in the Republic. Some tribunes were the central protagonists of politics in their 
year in office, such as Sulpicius Rufus (88) and Clodius (58), and quite arguably Memmius 
(111) and Curio (50). None of these relied on support by the same groups. Memmius had 
advanced the programmes of undefined non-elites and the equites, Sulpicius Rufus of 
  295 
newly integrated citizens, freedmen, and a part of the old nobilitas, Clodius on the plebs 
urbana and among these apparently mainly groups of craftsmen, while Curio had had to 
call in the help of groups across the socio-economic spectrum. But by the start of the 
Common Era, almost nothing seems to have remained of the former tribunician power 
and influence. 
It is hard, if not impossible, to quantify the loss of influence of a political institution 
in such a complex society. From the moment the triumvirate was established by the lex 
Titia, there appears to have been a significant drop in tribunician activities. From 41 
(after the battle of Philippi) to 23, only 6 named tribunes are known who displayed 
behaviour wich was noteworthy enough to receive some mention by the sources.320 Of 
course, this can be partly explained by the death of Cicero, our best informer on Roman 
politics for a large part of the period. But this is not all. The appointment of the tribunes 
rather than their election by the plebs, already in a limited manner under Caesar but 
continued and expanded under the triumviri, radically shifted power to one principal. 
Tribunes did not ‘answer’ to voters anymore, even if these voters only in a symbolic 
fiction represented the entire plebs, and we can expect this to have a profound effect on 
their behaviour. Their area of authority was later changed by the Princeps, and while 
their formal authority was not diminished, they were given the duty to oversee specific 
sections of the city of Rome.321 
But let us look in concrete terms at some important moments for the tribunate in the 
last three decades of what has been defined here as the late Republic. A good starting 
point is 53, for a variety of reasons. In 54 the consular elections were postponed as a 
result of large-scale bribery in the elections and trials resulting from this, bad omens, 
and a large flood in the city and the surrounding countryside.322 Consequently, all but 
the tribunician elections (which had already been concluded) were postponed as well. 
There were already rumours about appointing Pompey dictator. As has already been 
mentioned in this chapter, in late 54 and early 53 some tribunes (C. Lucilius Hirrus, M. 
Coelius Vinicianus) were introducing a law to effect this. Some of their colleagues were 
vetoing the proposal, however, and Cassius Dio suspects that the proposal was an 
attempt to delay the elections.323 Until July, the tribunes were the only magistrates in 
office, and therefore took care of the duties of all others, such as organising games. 
Apparently this suited some of them quite well. Q. Pompeius Rufus, as tribunus designatus 
 
                                                     
320 Kondratieff, ‘Popular Power in Action’, p. 497-503. 
321 Ibid., p. 111-114. Also see Dio, 53.21.6-7. 
322 Ascon., 33-34C; Cic., Att., 4.18.3, Fam., 8.4.3, QF, 3.4.1, 7.2, 8.4, 9.3; Dio, 40.17.1, 45.1-46.1, 49.5-50.5; Obseq., 63; 
Plut., Pomp., 54.2-3. 
323 Dio, 40.45.1-46.1. 
 296 
for 52, was involved in the activities preventing the elections, but was ultimately put in 
carcer by the senate.324 Some of the tribunes in 53 proposed to appoint consular tribunes 
rather than consuls, perhaps as a permanent measure. The senatorial elites were not 
responsive to the suggestion, but we are not informed about the signals given by other 
groups. The next elections were immediately postponed as well, in this case because of 
violence between the candidates and unrest in the city. The following year, in 52, the 
same situation ensued. The tribunes and the interrex were the only magistrates in office, 
as the latter was unable to organise elections because of the riots following Curio’s 
death. Only once Pompey was appointed consul sine collega by the senate could the 
elections proceed. In these years, then, the tribunate probably had more formal 
authority than in any other year of the late Republic. The very radical proposals by 
some of the tribunes indicate the strong pressure which was put on them from different 
sides. This pressure seems to have worked as a deterrent for action rather than that it 
allowed more discretionary freedom. Rather than a gradual move towards sole 
rulership, the tribunes were suggesting very different measures. The Republic perhaps 
was not set on a fixed path, and historians can only speculate as to how history would 
have unfolded if consular tribunes would actually have been reinstated. Perhaps it 
would have made no difference at all. But these years of crisis were important for the 
tribunate. It was, in any case, not the tribunes who broke the deadlock by breaking 
precedent and appointing one consul without a colleague, but the senate. 
In the next years, pressure on Caesar’s command was mounting, and a resolution to the 
long debates in 51 was made difficult through political manoeuvring by various political 
groups and the vetoes of several of the tribunes. On the 29th of September four of the 
tribunes, C. Coelius, P. Cornelius, C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus and L. Vinucius, vetoed 
restrictions to the debates which would be postponed to the next year, 50.325 The vetoed 
resolutions concerned a ban on the tribunician veto during the debates, a recall of a 
large part of Caesar’s troops, and the assignment of former praetors to some of the 
provinces. The tribunes do appear to have protected Caesar’s interests in this matter, 
but it may have been the case that they desired honest debates as well: the recall of 
soldiers would have implied that Caesar’s war was over and his provincia unnecessary, 
while the appointment of the praetors would have limited the choice of provinces for 
the new proconsuls to either Pompey’s or Caesar’s provinces. In this chapter, we have 
already discussed the tribuneship of C. Scribonius Curio in 50 in depth. This tribune used 
the power of his office to advance a programme which would have ended the command 
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of both Caesar and Pompey, and could be seen as the most important political force of 
the year. He was not directly responsible for the civil war, and if he had been successful 
he may have even reversed some of the decisions which had made Pompey and Caesar 
occupy extraordinary positions by this time. 
The start of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey did not immediately overturn 
Roman politics either. Even when Mark Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus had been driven 
from the Urbs, this did not stop political business as usual for some. The tribune L. 
Marcius Philippus, for instance, vetoed only the assignment of Faustus Sulla to go to 
Mauretania pro praetore.326 This might have been the result of the grievances many 
groups still held against the dictator Sulla. L. Caecilius Metellus, already mentioned, 
tried to hold back Caesar as if he was a regular magistrate and not a general occupying 
Rome.327 He failed to do this, but in this way did make the position of Caesar more 
obvious. After Pompey and most of the magistrates had fled Rome, the tribunes again 
indirectly received more formal authority. They performed the duties of the aediles, as 
all of them had left.328 The tribunes would again be responsible for organising some of 
the games in 47 when the elections were once again delayed. This time the reasons for 
the delays were he riots accompanying Dolabella’s proposal for debt cancellation and, 
again, adverse omens.329 
The two tribunes who had already fled to Caesar remained in office, but on top of that 
were granted imperium as legates of Caesar.330 This caused a very strange situation. 
Antony became tribunus plebis pro praetore, remained in Italy, and travelled around to 
keep the peace. While being the commander of troops he still introduced laws as well, 
with one of them declaring Pompey and his allies enemies of the state. Q. Cassius 
Longinus, meanwhile, was also given (probably) praetorian imperium and sent to 
Hispania with two legions, although he still was a tribune. 
The struggle over debt cancellation, in which the tribunes C. Asinius Pollio, P. 
Cornelius Dolabella, and L. Trebellius were all involved, shows that the institution of the 
tribunate could still work exactly in the same way as it had done in the previous decade. 
The groups involved were very committed and retained high levels of mobilisation, 
which was mirrored by the behaviour of the tribunes. For the most part, however, the 
tribunician activities known to us did involve Caesar as the most important principal. 
The proposal of debt cancellation does seem to have been an important crossroads, 
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given that Caesar subsequently banned many of the collegia. The laws recalling exiles 
and those granting the dictator privilegia have been mentioned. Another example is A. 
Hirtius, who in 48 introduced a law which in some form punished persons who had 
chosen Pompey in the civil war.331 Hirtius, according to Cicero, later disapproved of his 
own proposal. L. Antonius in 44 introduced a plebiscite which let Caesar ‘nominate’ part 
of the magistrates.332 These are only some of the examples of tribunician behaviour for 
Caesar’s sake, but it is also important to once again note that it was tribunes (L. Pontius 
Aquila, L. Caesetius Flavus, and C. Epidius Marullus) who by their behaviour began to 
indicate the discontent with Caesar’s rule. 
Almost from the moment Caesar had died, some of the tribunes re-asserted their 
independence and the importance of the office. Kondratieff lists 11 tribunes for 44, 
something which would have been possible because L. Caesetius Flavus and C. Epidius 
Marullus were banished and C. Helvius Cinna was lynched.333 These posts would have 
been filled by tribuni suffecti, of which two may be unknown. Half of the initial tribunes 
for the year had been nominated by Caesar, but the elections in the comitia tributa were 
not presided over by him.334 
An interesting case is L. Antonius Pietas. When Caesar was still alive and preparing 
for the war against Parthia, L. Antonius had introduced one of the most innovative 
measures during his entire dictatorship, and arguably the most important one: the right 
to appoint at least half of the magistrates in advance for three years.335 According to 
Cicero, L. Antonius “est enim patronus quinque et triginta tribuum, quarum sua lege qua cum 
C. Caesare magistratus partitus est suffragium sustulit”.336 After the death of Caesar he 
appears to have mainly supported his brother Mark Antony, but actively began to look 
out for his own interests as well. The legislation altering the provinces of both Mark 
Antony and Dolabella appears to have been a straightforward service.337 The more 
interesting tribune involved in these proposals was Nonius Asprenas, who attempted to 
halt the measure through the declaration of unfavourable omens. He was ignored by 
Mark Antony, however. Lucius’s lex Antonia agraria, on the other hand, did not primarily 
benefit his brother. While Mark Antony was one of the VIIviri, one of the main 
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principals were the veterans of Caesar’s campaigns.338 Furthermore, rather than bestow 
credit for the law on other people, Lucius used it to establish himself as the patron of 
those who benefitted, as is attested by Cicero. L. Antonius consequently became one of 
the most important figures in Roman politics, and it was this base which would allow 
him to revolt three years later. Interestingly, of course, the Perusian revolt was aimed 
against his own lex agraria. L. Antonius appears to have held many contiones, some of 
them ‘horribilis’, and he attacked D. Brutus, was the one expected to allow Octavian to 
give a speech in a contio, but also wrote Cicero not to worry about the safety of the 
tyrannicides.339 But other tribunes were active in 48, and some of them directly opposed 
to Antony and his political group. L. Cassius Longinus, D. Carfuleius, and Ti. Cannutius 
were threatened by Antony with death if they came to a senate meeting, most likely 
because by May they were vigorously opposing the consul and possibly vetoing his 
policies.340 Ti. Cannutius was actually attacking the consul so fiercely that his speeches 
were depicted by Velleius as the superlative of Cicero’s Philippics.341 According to 
Appian, Cannutius praised Octavian in contiones only to spite Antony, and later even 
introduced the young man to speak in contiones himself.342 Cannutius became a target of 
verbal assaults by Antony, and might have been the first victim of the proscriptions. 
Other tribunes prohibited Octavian from displaying Caesar’s ivory chair, which Cicero 
heartily approved of.343 Still others supported Antony, for instance by postponing the lex 
curiata for Octavian’s adoption.344 A proposal was also introduced by tribunes, based on a 
senatus consultum, to appoint Antony and Dolabella as IIviri actae Caesaris confirmandae.345 
Octavian’s attempts to be elected to the tribuneship are telling too. A position had 
opened up after the murder of C. Helvius Cinna by the crowd, and Suetonius attests that 
because Octavian saw he could do little without a formal position, he became a 
candidate despite being too young and perhaps having to give up his adoption by the 
patrician Caesar.346 Other sources mostly point out that Octavian made this move to 
become more well-known and popular among the non-elites. Appian asserts that 
Octavian really supported another candidate, L. Flaminius Chilo, but the δῆμος wanted 
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to elect Caesar’s heir. Despite an edict by Antony forbidding Octavian’s election, the 
plebs voted for him in the comitia. The voting assembly was interrupted, or the results 
were declared invalid because of his young age, and no other tribune was appointed. 
Octavian’s candidacy does confirm the analysis that the tribunate rapidly regained its 
influence in politics after Caesar’s death. Again, had Octavian been elected tribune, 
history may have been different, as he would have been more directly confronted with 
the varying expectations of many principals. 
The resurgence of the tribunician influence does not appear to have lasted very long. It 
should be noted that for 43 and 42 the tribunes had already been appointed, half of 
them directly by Caesar, early in 44.347 Nevertheless, in the first half of 43 there was still 
some political conflict between various groups and political institutions. After August, 
however, when Octavian had seized the consulship, little remained of tribunician 
politicking. On 27 November the lex Titia established the triumvirate. By the end of the 
year the military occupation of Rome, combined with the proscriptions, had destroyed 
almost every opportunity for the tribunes to act against the wishes of the triumvirs. 
Many tribunes and former tribunes were among the most noteworthy victims of the 
proscriptions, and this may very well have served as a deterrent for tribunician 
behaviour which was not approved by the three men. 
There is a very limited attestation of tribunician activities which did not suit the 
triumvirs. M. Servilius together with the other tribunes convened the senate on the 20th 
of December, and introduced a motion to supply the consuls with a bodyguard and 
protect the senate from the 1st of January.348 Later, he called Cicero to a contio to defend 
his proposal favouring C. Cassius Longinus. P. Appuleius was a friend of Cicero. He 
introduced Cicero to a contio to deliver his sixth Philippic, and the tribune in a contio 
dispelled the rumours that Cicero was planning to be made dictator.349 Appuleius 
perhaps fled to Brutus by the middle of the year. Salvius clearly is a good example as 
well. He vetoed a senatus consultum making Antony hostis, perhaps because he supported 
the demand by L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus and half of the senate that Antony should 
at least be put to trial. Salvius was later convinced by Cicero and his political group to 
side with them.350 He is the other person, besides the tribune of 44 Cannutius, who is 
reported to have been the first one killed in the proscriptions. 
But there were other tribunes which did advance the interests of those who would 
become triumvirs, as the power exerted by these individuals became very difficult to 
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ignore. P. Titius was the most important, as his lex Titia established the unprecedented 
office of the IIIviri rei publicae constituendae. Other actions included vetoing honours 
proposed for L. Munatius Plancus when Munatius was still assuring Cicero that he would 
try to attack Antony, and expelling P. Servilius Casca Longus from the tribunate.351 
Another tribune of this year, who was undoubtedly loyal to Octavian, was M. Vipsanius 
Agrippa.352 In the same year anonymous tribunes, spurred on by Octavian, introduced a 
plebiscite to repeal the senatus consultum which had declared Dolabella hostes to the 
Republic.353 
From then on, the tribunes only rarely made a splash. The tribunes and consuls for 42 
had been appointed by Caesar already in early 44, and by this time the triumvirs were 
making appointments too.354 Gaps may have opened up due to the proscriptions, which 
would have had to be filled. In 42 or 41 C. Falcidius proposed an inheritance law which 
was passed.355 In 37 the triumvirate was renewed for a new term, by a vote by the people 
(quite likely on a tribunician proposal), but based on a decree by the triumvirs 
themselves.356 In the next year the tribunes again exercised the duties of the aediles, 
together with the praetors, because no one had been a candidate for that office.357 The 
aedileship was a very expensive office, after all, and not a necessary step in the cursus 
honorum. The lack of real elections made the popularity which could be reaped from 
giving games not immediately useful. In 32 there was again some dissension in Rome, 
arising from the growing enmity between Antony and Octavian. The consul C. Sosius 
attempted to enact senatus consulta against Octavian, but the tribune M. Nonius Balbus 
vetoed the proposals.358 In this instance, then, the loyalty of the tribune was firmy to the 
status quo in Rome. In 27 the tribune Sex. Apudius/Pacuvius Taurus called upon the 
populace to dedicate themselves to Octavian after Spanish custom.359 After this, no 
named tribunes are known for any political measures. In 14, after the end of the 
timeframe under consideration, there were not enough candidates for the tribuneship, 
so former quaestors were to the appointed by lot.360 Two years later Augustus made the 
magistrates in office co-opt candidates among the knights who were sufficiently rich to 
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fill the tribunician places.361 Suffice to say, the independent influence the tribunes had 
once had on the political stage was completely gone. 
5.3.2 A new dominant coalition and the role of the tribunate 
Combining all the elements which have been explored, how can this apparently very 
sudden demise in influence be explained? In this subsection, there will be a short 
analysis of the basis of power of the new dominant coalition, which would continue to 
evolve over the next centuries but in this phase can already be described as the 
Principate.  
Political changes at the end of the Republic, it can be argued, were taken quite far in a 
short span of time. The outcome was not set in stone for the contemporaries, and the 
situation may have developed in any other direction at various points in time. However, 
there were some broad societal changes which had effected a destabilisation of the 
dominant coalition in the late Republic. The late Republican political institutions were 
not static either, but often evolved, were altered, and transformed again. The changes 
which Sulla made to the tribunate are but one example. While some of the ‘rifts’ in 
society became the topic of tribunician actions, other issues were not addressed by 
them as often, or we at least do not have information on this. Many of these topics were 
handled by other institutions, such as the consuls or the senate. 
One important evolution was the rise of soldiers and veterans as a separate societal 
group from the rest of the non-elite population, and of officers and generals of the rest 
of the elite strata.362 Before the late Republic, the tribunes had been closely involved in 
military matters. They had defended the interests of soldiers, for instance in the wars in 
Hispania halfway the second century BCE, had stopped conscriptions of individuals at 
several times, and had introduced legislation concerning the rights of commanders and 
the levying of soldiers. The lex Sempronia of 123 had been an important law for the 
assignment of consular commands. In the late Republic, then, legislation on the matter 
was very scarce.363 In 55, C. Ateius Capito, P. Aquillius Gallus, and other tribunes 
attempted to stop conscriptions by Crassus for his Parthian campaign.364 C. Scribonius 
Curio tried the same with regard to Pompey’s levies for the civil war at the end of 50.365 
Both of these attempts failed. In 109, tribunes successfully prevented the proconsul Sp. 
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Postumius Albinus from taking command of his army in order to lead it to Africa.366 In 
the same year or one of the prior years, tribunes had introduced one or multiple 
measures which had imposed limits on the ‘militiae stipendia’.367 The laws were abrogated 
in 109 by the consul M. Iunius Silanus on the basis of a senatus consultum. These 
abrogated plebiscites were the only general tribunician laws on the matter known to us 
in the late Republic.  
Some actions of tribunes played a part in the growing importance of military leaders, 
even if that probably was not an intended consequence. The tribuncian agrarian laws on 
the settlement of veterans, for instance, seems to have mainly resulted in some loyalty 
by these groups to their generals, not to the Roman people let alone the responsible 
tribune. This effect was only strengthened when veteran colonies were increasingly 
founded by the generals themselves. One of the first paragraphs we have of Caesar’s 
books on the civil war describes how many of Pompey’s veterans immediately flocked to 
his banners when the war was seen to be imminent, “spe praemiorum atque ordinum 
evocantur”.368 Some of Caesar’s former soldiers were in Rome too, and this was seen as an 
important fact for the voting in the senate. Octavian’s influence in Roman politics was 
largely based on support by some of Caesar’s veterans.369 Soldiers and veterans became 
one of the most important societal groups in the late Republic. While they were very 
important actors in many conflicts, they appear only rarely as direct principals for the 
tribunate, for instance in the agrarian laws. Laws constraining the influence of the 
soldiery or their commanders do not appear in our sources. As far as we know, there 
were no laws introduced about who could be recruited, as the recruitment of proletarii 
was a de facto innovation by the consuls. Apart from the laws abrogated in 109 there 
were no tribunician proposals in the late Republic regulating the payment of the 
soldiers, their deductions for equipment and other costs, or the gifts they could receive 
for their services. Tribunician concerns about officers seems to have been restricted to 
giving more liberty to generals to select legates with imperium. These innovations were 
part of laws on extraordinary military commands. General legislation limiting the 
length of commands did exist, but was introduced by Pompey as consul in 52 and by 
Caesar as dictator in 46.370 Any tribunician laws on the length of provincia were ad hoc, 
and while limits were a concern (the command of Lucullus, perhaps the lex Gabinia and 
lex Manilia), in the 50s the lex Vatinia and lex Trebonia granted minimum terms of 5 years. 
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Generally, therefore, the tribunes seem to have either contributed to the growing 
importance of veterans, soldiers, and their commanders, or ignored it. In this, of course, 
the tribunate was not alone. The senate too was responsible for many innovations on 
the matter, as has been explored. 
Tribunes did introduce some legislation to counteract the violence which 
characterised the late Republic, but these laws clearly were not enough. A general law 
was the lex Plautia de vi, which was passed in 70.371 It followed the consular lex Lutatia 
which had been introduced by Catulus, but apparently expanded the definition of vis. 
The lex Plautia provided punishments agains persons who carried arms and seized public 
areas or positions which commanded an area. It also included a provision that anything 
which was acquired through force could never become legal property, even after a long 
time. However, Caesar and Augustus together passed several laws on violence, which 
imposed greater penalties and again expanded what could be understood under the 
term. One other tribunician law is known. The number of gladiators used in funeral but 
also public games was steadily increasing, but the fighters were also often used as 
bodyguards or as shock troops in struggles between groups in the city. In 65, unknown 
tribunes for this reason introduced a law to limit the number of gladiators any one 
person could accomodate in Rome.372 According to Suetonius, this was specifically aimed 
at Caesar who was bringing a lot of them to Rome in his aedileship. 
The integration of the new citizens into the voting populace after the Social War had 
been something which the tribunes had been involved in. However, there do not seem 
to have been any active policies whatsoever in integrating Italian or provincial elites 
into the political institutions of the Republic. Especially Caesar and later the triumvirs 
would institute a deliberate policy of advancing the careers of these groups and even 
directly granted magistracies to them. Especially Octavian is a good example, both for 
his personal background and for that of his close associates, and for his policies.373 He 
seems to have had more attention to Italian elites, however, and less interest in 
provincial senators. His well-known ideological foundation was that of ‘tota Italia’, an 
idea that already is present in Cicero’s writings.374 Unlike these potentates, the tribunes 
heavily depended on strong principals. Pressure from other groups, such as parts of the 
nobilitas, the plebs urbana, or other ‘old citizens’ which had had Roman citizenship before 
the Social War could have prevented the tribunes to facilitate the careers of these new 
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elites in the late Republic. Very little was actively done to mend the wounds left by the 
Social War.375 
The frustrations caused by these unresolved issues allowed for the formation of a new 
dominant coalition which would become the Principate.376 The army obviously was one 
of the most important pillars of the new order. The army’s professionalisation only 
further increased, both of the soldiers and of the officers drawn from the elites. 
Innovations expanded the influence of this societal group in politics, and included the 
creation of urban cohorts and later the vigiles for peacekeeping, and the expanded role 
of the praetorian guard and the institution of the Germanic bodguard for the personal 
safety of the Princeps.  
The military presence in the Urbs, already under Pompey’s sole consulship, severely 
lessened the political power of the plebs urbana. This important group became restricted 
in mobilisations and contentious political actions, even if their influence did not 
completely disappear.377 On top of this, the collegia were at several times forbidden by 
both Caesar and Augustus, until the latter issued a law which made their existence 
possible again if they met certain conditions and accepted the status of a legal entity. In 
practice, this meant a disciplining (in Foucauldian sense) of these organisations. 
Something similar happened to the vici in Rome.378 While these organisations were 
never forbidden to our knowledge, Augustus did absorb them into the official 
administration of the Urbs. The vicomagistri became minor magistrates, were all elected 
under the same rules, and became linked to the central political power. They strongly 
contributed to the disciplining of the entire population through the inclusion of the 
genius Augusti in the cultus of the lares Compitales.379 Of course this was not an 
uncontested success. The vici and collegia still had the reputation for violence and 
struggle, and the non-elites still engaged in political activites. This was, however, not as 
impactful as in the late Republic.380 These groups appear to have been the big losers of 
the new coalition, as it is far from unimagineable that the growing socio-economic 
influence of parts of the plebs urbana could have become the basis for an alternative 
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political coalition. The city of Rome was not the only urban centre were Augustus 
reformed the political organisation. The various communities in Italy (municipia, 
coloniae) were further regulated, with common rules for the decuriones and local 
magistrates being ordained, such as minimum property qualifications. The Tabula 
Heracleensis includes many of these provisions, also for organisation of Rome itself, and 
was based on Caesar’s legislation. 
Local leaders such as vicomagistri could have contributed to the demise of the 
influence of the tribuni plebis in political disputes by circumventing them and directly 
bringing issues before the permanent praefecti appointed by the Princeps or the new 
curatores in the city. While the curatores were of senatorial rank, Augustus increasingly 
made use of praefecti drawn from the ranks of the equites.381 Other activities of certain 
elites were constrained, such as those of the publicani. The integration of new elites was 
a deliberate policy, and a necessity given the instability during the late Republic.382 The 
claims to legitimate dominance by the nobilitas had crumbled, in part due to the rise of 
new elites and the growing indebtedness of parts of the old ones through conspicuous 
consumption, in part due to their responsibility in the many violent conflicts, in part 
because these families were hit with proscriptions and confiscations of property. Under 
the Principate, the senatorial group more open than in the Republic.383 The Principate 
incorporated more elite groups in positions of power. Not only the equites, but also local 
Italian elites, and even provincial elites came to occupy positions of dominance. 
Noteworthy is, for example, the case of P. Ventidius Bassus, who had been marched as a 
captive through Rome after the Social War but was, after a military career, appointed 
praetor by Caesar, consul by the triumvirs, and was the first to celebrate a triumph 
against the Parthians.384 Another example is L. Decidius Saxa, who had been born in 
Hispania, became Caesar’s metator castrorum, and then was tribune of the plebs in 44.385 
Arguably, the senate formally became a more powerful institution than ever before, as 
senatus consulta to some degree acquired legal authority for the first time. The senate 
became symbolically linked to the Princeps, and through this acquired much more 
influence in comparison to the other Republican institutions. Augustus also presided 
over aristocratic competition, not in the least through controlling elections.386 
 
                                                     
381 Nicolet, L’ordre équestre 1, p. 423-434. 
382 Brunt, ‘Princeps and Equites’; Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 192-193. Also, according to Nicolet, 
Cicero had mainly been a proponent of the novi homines, and was not ‘organically’ bound to the ordo equester. 
Nicolet, L’ordre équestre 1, p. 694-700. For a differing view: Berry, ‘Eqvester Ordo Tvvs Est’. 
383 Hopkins, Death and Renewal, p. 120-200. 
384 See for instance Dio, 43.51.4-5. 
385 Cic., Phil., 11.12, 13.37, 14.10. 
386 Hurlet, ‘Concurrence gentilice et arbitrage impérial’. 
  307 
But at the centre of this new dominant coalition of the army, local sub-elites, and 
new elites, which were all embedded in a series of institutions, there was of course the 
Princeps and his familia. His position was reinforced by the institution of religious 
status, and the ‘re-introduction’ (but really introduction of innovations) of many 
religious observances in general, the monopolisation of large-scale euergetism in Rome, 
the privatisation and control of public space, the creation of a personal bureaucracy, 
and the combination of formal institutional positions.387 One cornerstone was the 
imperium maius, for the first time a power which superseded the imperium pro consule. 
Furthermore, the Princeps had a provincia which spanned half of the provinces and most 
of the legions, which he entrusted to legati. Another cornerstone was the tribunicia 
potestas. 
What was the role remaining for the tribunes, and why was the tribunicia potestas so 
important to the new rule of the Princeps? At first, the tribunes may still have been 
relevant magistrates for the urban population of Rome for claims which could not be 
directed at the Princeps in any other way. Dio makes reference of an event in 2, when 
the tribunes acted as intermediaries between the plebeians, who desired the institution 
of some reforms, and Augustus.388 Augustus then consulted with the plebeians 
themselves, however, again making clear that the concrete influence of the tribunes had 
been severely diminished. Many of the issues which had been the subject of tribunician 
policies were taken over by new officials, such as curatores and praefecti. The familia of 
the Princeps possibly took over the duty of centralising entreaties, even if this probably 
was quite inefficient at first. There is no way of knowing for how long the tribuni plebis 
still remained functional magistrates in a way somewhat reminiscent of their former 
authority, or were still considered by parts of the populace as important for contention 
over political matters, under the Principate. Practically, the tribunes were already quite 
early very limited in their behaviour.The Princeps had overwhelmingly become the 
most important principal. 
The laws granting tribunician authority to Caesar and Augustus were significant 
steps. Interestingly, both men first received purely symbolical rights: sitting with the 
tribunes on the subsellia, and therefore, our sources say very vaguely, being reckoned 
with them for some other purposes. Caesar was granted this right in 48, Octavian 
received the same right twelve years later, in 36.389 This right was a novelty when Caesar 
received it. Its importance quite likely lay in the symbolic link the tribunes had with the 
 
                                                     
387 Courrier, La plèbe de Rome et sa culture, p. 705; North, ‘Religion and Politics, from Republic to Principate’; 
Russell, The Politics of Public Space in Republican Rome, p. 48, 153, 156, 191-192. 
388 Dio, 55.9.10. 
389 Dio, 42.20.3, 44.4.2, 49.15.6. 
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plebs.390 The subsellia was symbolic for the openness of the tribunes to the entreaties of 
all citizens, no matter how poor or insignificant they were. It therefore was an 
important symbol for claims to legitimate rule. Furthermore, it may have been an 
attempt by Caesar to be closely associated with the tribunate itself. Pompey, after all, 
already was widely considered their benefactor by restoring the institutional authority 
in 70. The next step was a practical one, but also took the same meaning to a new level. 
Caesar was granted tribunician sacrosanctitas for life in 45 or 44, Octavian seems to have 
enjoyed it together with his right to sit on the subsellia in 36.391 In 35, Livia and Octavia 
were also given sacrosancity.392 The sacrosanctitas meant that the person was inviolable 
from physical harm, but also from insults. But there was again another symbolic 
meaning attached to this. The sacrosanctitas was originally nothing more than an oath by 
the plebs to the gods, which held that they would protect the inviolable bodies of the 
tribunes with their own lives and avenge them if they were harmed, effectively making 
the perpetrators sacer. Again, this right gave Caesar and Octavian a very close symbolic 
connection with the plebs, who were expected to defend them as their representatives. 
Finally, Octavian, who had in the meanwhile received the title of Augustus, received the 
tribunicia potestas for life in 23.393 This meant that the Princeps completely appropriated 
all political powers and authority of the tribunes, without becoming a tribune himself. 
The enormous powers of the tribunes made this a very valuable appropriation: he could 
introduce new legislation in the comitia tributa, call the senate together for meetings and 
introduce matters before it, veto motions and laws, issue edicts, give contiones... 
Proconsular imperium which was maius was given to him at the very same time. In this 
way, the institutional powers of the tribunate lived on in the Principate, even if the 
institution itself had become quite irrelevant.  
 
                                                     
390 O’Neill, ‘A Culture of Sociability’, p. 165. 
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5.4 The tribunate in the end: conclusion 
This chapter has responded to some essentialising descriptions of the tribuni plebis. 
Authors have described them in ways ranging from destructive demagogues or safety 
valves to meek retainers of the ‘Great Individuals’. Different narratives have depicted 
the tribunate as a destabilising element the Republic or as an important institution 
which reaffirmed the societal consensus. Throughout this chapter, the model of 
analysing the tribunate as a complex agent institution, as has been established in the 
theoretic framework and the previous chapter, has been used to look at the 
involvement of the tribunes in the transformation of the Republic. Various principals 
(individuals, political groups, societal groups) were constantly engaged in contention 
with the tribunes as a result of its institutional architecture. 
The first section of this chapter investigated the various types of privilegia proposed 
by tribunes. By doing this, we have looked at whether the ‘Great Individuals’ became the 
most important or even the only principals for the tribunate in the late Republic. A 
negative answer was given to this question. As an institution, as was often the case, the 
tribunate was divided on proposals which granted privilegia to individuals, whether 
these privilegia were military or non-military commissions or personal prerogatives. 
Successful tribunician legislation on these topics was often the consequence of larger 
political or societal groups backing the law, rather than merely of the goodwill of a 
tribune towards a person. In all three categories of privilegia, the senate, often through 
senatus consulta which activated the consuls, were just as or even more active than the 
tribunes. This was especially the case for personal prerogatives, but also for important 
innovations such as the commands of Lucullus and Antonius in the 70s, Pompey’s 
procuratio annonae, and Pompey’s sole consulship. A change was effected from 52 
onwards, and especially in the different civil wars after this date, as soldiers and 
veterans became important principals which benefitted specifically from a personal 
bond with the their generals. This often left very little room for successful opposition by 
the tribunes. By 37 we have no more information of societal struggle in which the 
tribunate featured prominently. 
This chapter has also discussed the role of the tribunes in conflicts. It has been 
reaffirmed that this was the consequence of the position of the tribunate as an agent 
institution in Roman society. It was not an institution which primarily drew young 
demagogues, nor did it function as a safety-valve. Fierce socio-political conflicts did not 
disappear at all when the tribunes were less influential, such as in the 70s or during the 
triumvirate. However, when they were active, the tribunes did more than any other 
magistrate indicate discord when dominant groups were claiming a societal consensus. 
Tribunes indicated the many rifts which ran through Roman society: between the 
senatorial families, between old and new elites, between creditors and debtors, between 
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freedmen and freeborn, between citizens and Italian allies, the plebs urbana and 
veterans, or the landless and those owning large properties. As a consequence of 
tribunician actions, the fact that the interests and desires of several groups clashed 
could become more clear to societal and political groups, which could lead to more 
vehement conflict. However, the open nature of a conflict could also potentially lead to 
resolving the underlying issues. 
The Roman governmental institutions, including the tribunate, had always been 
subject to change, but in the latter half of the final century BCE the evolutions became 
more dramatic. The Republic transformed into the Principate, a new system of rule. The 
final section of this chapter has described the changes for the tribunate in the very last 
decades of the Republic, the founding of a new dominant coalition which would be the 
basis for the Principate, and how these evolutions were linked to broad societal changes. 
The tribunate moved to the background. When they did act, principals such as the army 
had become too powerful to resist. Especially this group had become very important 
through repression of mobilisation by other principals, and through ever more 
personalised relations with their general the army was the most important element in 
the new coalition. Other important societal groups, such as the plebs urbana, had been 
disciplined by the new order. While their influence in politics did not disappear, their 
possibilities of directly engaging in politics severely declined. Their personalised 
relation to a few individuals also became more important, as for instance the grain 
distributions became the responsibility of the Princeps. The Princeps and his familia 
became the focus of groups to promote their interests and desires, and one basic 
element for this was the appropriation of the tribunicia potestas. In a way, many of the 
institutional characteristics of the tribunate were transferred to the Princeps. 
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Conclusion 
The previous century has seen many interpretations about which part the tribuni plebis 
played in the late Republic. The tribunes have been safety-valves, servants of the 
senatorial consensus, ambitious young demagogues, social-democratic reformers, and, 
ever popular, the puppets of the Great Individuals. Scholars have even depicted the 
tribunate as making clear-cut switches between these ‘roles’, when a ‘new phase’ of the 
Republic started. As such, the tribunate has regularly been used as a crutch which can 
support any preconceived notion of how the Roman Republic functioned at any time, 
whether that be democratic, oligarchic, meritocratic... 
In this thesis, I have maintained a broad socio-economic perspective on the last 90 
years of the Republic, with the tribuni plebis firmly at the heart of the analysis. I have 
rejected a functionalist approach. This thesis has looked at the concrete behaviour of 
the tribunes, rather than preconceived interpretations of their ‘role’ in an a priori 
coherent system. Through the concept of contention and the metaphor of the principal-
agent relation, tribunician behaviour has been linked to a complex theoretical 
framework which has attempted to reconcile structure and agency, change and stasis, 
personal preference and societal pressure, purposeful action and uncertainty. The goal 
has been to offer a more coherent interpretation of the variety in behaviour we see 
from the different tribuni plebis. It has been argued that the tribunate was an agent 
institution, and that the tribunes were expected to behave in accordance with the 
expectations of various societal and political groups, the principals. 
The Roman Republic featured societal struggle between various groups, which does not 
preclude cooperation between some of these groups in collective projects. There never 
was a consensus, however, as has been claimed by especially German scholars such as 
Flaig and Hölkeskamp.1 The political system of the Republic was constantly negotiated, 
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and had a long history of evolution. Pointing to a breakdown of consensus in Roman 
society is therefore – in my opinion – an invalid explanation for the changes in the 
political system. Rejecting this hypothesis also makes it far less extraordinary how long 
the Republic ‘endured’, despite frequent moments of crisis. Elites always have to defend 
their dominance against other groups, which can lead to conflicts. Already before the 
Principate, the nobilitas was forced to allow many concessions, which temporarily 
defused problems. The developments towards the Principate were the eventual 
outcome of the historical developments in the final century BCE, but at no point the 
necessary outcome. The series of political crises never acquired a fixed logic. I believe 
that at least as late as the negotiations with Sextus Pompeius, a very different 
alternative could have been possible. In this sense, Meier’s ‘Krise ohne Alternative’ is 
not very helpful.2 Neither is it helpful – in my view – to look at the failure of the ruling 
elites to institute reforms, as Brunt did.3 It would be more accurate to state that 
throughout the late Republic, the dominant elites did not want certain changes which 
challenged their rule, and actively opposed these changes, rather than that no-one in 
the late Republic could think of any alternative or necessary reform. 
The last two centuries BCE, socio-economic evolutions did make the dominant elite 
coalition very fragile. In this, I have followed the general model of Brunt and the social 
historians of the 70s and 80s, who have focussed on rifts in politics caused by societal 
and economic developments. The concrete interpretation of these rifts greatly varies, 
however, as does the interpretation of the causes of the transformation to the 
Principate. Rather than a depopulation of especially rural Italy, recent scholars accept a 
population growth, and argue that the deracination and privation of its free inhabitants 
may have been slightly exaggerated. The property of the lower strata in the Italian 
heartland did significantly drop, and the high pressure demographic regime did in 
general cause much uncertainty in life. This did not imply, however, that slaveholders 
came to dominate agrarian production, or that the real incomes of peasants plummeted. 
Tenancy, for instance, counteracted these evolutions. The political unification and 
urbanisation of Italy presented opportunities to many peasants, while of course still 
being detrimental to others. Veterans as a group experienced a significant upward 
social mobility. Land grants and even lump sums became the norm over the course of 
the late Republic. In part, this was because soldiers and veterans came to expect and 
demand these rewards, and the start of the Principate they had become one of the 
strongest groups in the new dominant coalition. Redistribution to this group also often 
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implied geographic mobility, which relieved some pressure from the overpopulation in 
central Italy. Generally, the role of the army in the late Republic and the evolution 
towards the Principate can hardly be overstated. The fortunes of parts of the plebs 
urbana, specifically the plebs frumentaria, were also rising over the course of the 
timeframe. Real wages of skilled labourers were relatively high, the subsidies of a large 
part of an individual’s caloric needs may have raised living standards, and the 
organisation of these groups in vici and sometimes collegia gave them a solid base for 
making political demands. The city doubled in size over the course of the timeframe, 
however, which caused unprecedented overpopulation, the proletarianisation of large 
groups, and rampant disease and violence. Nevertheless, it was mainly due to political 
decisions that the plebs urbana had to give up much of its political power at the end of 
the final century BCE, such as the limiting of the lists of recipients for the grain doles, 
the disciplining of the vici and collegia, and the military occupation of the Urbs. The 
nobilitas did fracture on a socio-economic level, with conspicuous consumption ruining 
some, and provoking others to corruption. New elites such as the equites and the Italian 
elites became increasingly important. These new elites would again be integrated into 
the new dominant coalition under Augustus. Riches flowing to Italy from military 
conquests and the extortion of the provinces offered opportunities to some groups, 
while others could profit less. In general, it drastically raised the inequality between 
elites and non-elites, even if much of the wealth was redistributed through euergetism 
and elite spending. 
Important political rifts were in part a consequence of many of these socio-economic 
developments. Some conflicts, mainly the civil wars and the Social War, left gaping 
wounds across Republican society. Attempts to mend these wounds largely failed, 
because many did not want them to heal. The growth in power of so many groups, 
including non-elites, did make it increasingly difficult for the traditionally dominant 
senatorial elites to maintain control. Ultimately, one could argue that they did, at least 
for the part that survived the proscriptions. The senate as a governmental institution 
was legally better off during the Principate. The nobilitas did have to share much of its 
power, as the senatorial group now was much wider. Caesar and later the triumvirs had 
apparently made a point of boosting the careers of new elites from the provinces, but 
especially from across Italy. Furthermore, there were less opportunities for exceptional 
individual powers, as this had been largely privatised by the Princeps and his family. 
Only Augustus was relatively successful in constructing a narrative of consensus, or a 
‘new regime of truth’ as Moatti has called it.4 Augustus’s broadening of the dominant 
coalition has been presented in this thesis as a response to the growing power of non-
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elite and elite groups, rather than primarily as a response to splits within the nobilitas. 
The new dominant coalition succeeded to a large degree in disciplining those groups 
which were excluded, partly through new forms of violence, such as policing, and partly 
through the revaluation of parts of the public transcript, such as collective religious 
observances. 
Where were the tribunes in these broad evolutions? The variety of societal and political 
groups, which could act as principals for the tribunes, and their increased possibilities 
to exert power, were reflected in the frequent and fierce conflicts involving the 
tribunate in the late Republic. Principals engaged in contention with the tribunes over 
their behaviour, although each of these groups potentially had different expectations of 
this behaviour and competed with one another as rival principals. This is one of the 
reasons why the programmes of the tribunes could be so diverse. On top of this, the 
tribunate had institutional habits of its own, to which a tribune was socialised. Despite 
these limits, a tribune had some discretionary freedom in his behaviour. There were ten 
tribunes with different dispositions and preferences. While it mainly were the principals 
which decided the effective outcome of certain conflicts, a tribune could seek to align 
himself with any of them in a certain way. Tribunes were caught in a ‘complex web of 
strings’, and were constantly pulled in various directions. The ‘power costs’ paid by the 
principals and the concrete relation between their respective expectations were 
decisive elements. Theoretically the tribunate was an immensely powerful magistracy, 
but this constant contention over their behaviour was (generally) a very effective 
deterrent. In the late Republic, so many principals could exert so much power that the 
tribunes were either caught in nonaction or in violent struggles. 
As an institution, the tribunate did include a certain orientation in the political 
architecture. This is especially visible in their concrete appearance and expected habits, 
such as the subsellia and the requirement to leave their homes open. As has been 
mentioned, tribunes were expected to be especially open to face-to-face non-
hierarchical interactions with anyone, with specific attention to non-elites. As such, the 
tribunate was indeed a ‘beachhead of resistance’ for non-elite groups in the late 
Republic. However, in practice this was largely negated by the social background of the 
tribunes as members of the highest elites, and by the disproportionate possibilities of 
the elites to engage in contention and mobilise power. 
Because of the expectations of the tribunate, also in the public transcript, as an agent 
institution, it is very difficult to portray it as essentially contributing to the rise of the 
‘Great Individuals’ in the late Republic. Even when Sulla and Caesar were dictator, or 
when the triumvirate was in power, it was not mainly their personal identity which 
caused many tribunes to comply to their programmes. It was their alliance to groups of 
elites and especially soldiers. It was these groups together which could exert enough 
pressure to generally marginalise the expectations of other principals. Even then, the 
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tribunes were often less eager to grant privilegia than the senate, and the military 
commands granted in the 60s and 50s also largely followed examples set by the senate in 
the 70s. Quite often, as in other matters, different tribunes opposed one another on 
these issues. 
As has been established, the tribunes often pierced discourses of consensus in the late 
Republic. This was not their ‘role’, but a consequence of the institutional position of the 
tribunate, which made it open to the claims of very different societal and political 
groups. Because there were many powerful groups with different interests, behaviour of 
the tribunes was very likely to soon break claims to the contrary. One ‘role’ which the 
tribunes probably did play, was an increased consciousness of diverging interests. After 
all, when groups mobilised power to influence the tribunes to behave in a certain way, 
this could give some indication of their interests and desires. The open conflicts 
involving the tribunes in the late Republic then could have made clear how these could 
be different between different groups. 
Were the tribunes then – all things considered – a force for stability or for change, 
guardians of the Republic or heralds of the Principate? It should be clear by now that I 
find this question somewhat misleading. Throughout this thesis I have focussed on how 
the intricacies of political struggle are not a detail but an important part of societal 
change. The institutional characteristics did make the tribunate specifically susceptible 
to sensitivities of the non-elites, but by the late Republic these were scattered in many 
different but powerful societal and political groups. The decline of the power of the plebs 
urbana caused the tribunate to move to the background, at least in terms of political 
conflicts. Principals such as the army had become too powerful to resist, at least by 37, 
and the occupation of Rome stifled the possibilities of struggle between principals. The 
change, in the case of the tribunate at least, was quite abrupt. In 53 tribunes proposed to 
restore the consular tribunate and radically increase the power of the institution, 15 
years later they were hardly relevant in debates. Of course, in the appropriation of its 
potestas by Augustus, the tribunate certainly became a pillar of the Principate. 
One consequence of rejecting a functionalist approach to governmental institutions 
is that they do not have a fixed ‘role’ in the system, and that therefore the tribunes 
cannot be pointed at for having failed to fulfil such a role. Russell, for instance, has 
recently claimed that the tribunes did not go far enough in effecting change in favour of 
the people.5 For one, this is a value judgment, which also seems a bit harsh for a set of 
magistrates who relatively often lost their lives or social status because they adhered to 
the expectations of particular groups. But most importantly, it clearly shows where I 
disagree with this type of claim: the tribunes did not go ‘far enough’ in our eyes because 
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they already went too far in the eyes of certain principals. While they did have some 
limited agency, many tribunes who did try to alter a certain course were simply not in 
the position to individually effect this change. The tribunate was in fact involved in 
many of the profound problems of the late Republic, especially concerning the non-
elites. They proposed land laws, grain laws, laws equalising the voting power of 
marginalised groups, laws granting more possibilites for non-elite association, and laws 
for debt cancellation. But even here this was often the consequence of pressure by these 
groups. One claim of this thesis has been to reevaluate the political power of these non-
elite groups, but this does not imply that these groups were the only principals. The 
tribunate was perhaps more popular than any other magistracy in the late Republic, but 
it was not essentially popular. 
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